KUNDAN SINGH, J. ( 1 ) ). THIS is an application tiled under Art. 226 (3) of the Constitution of India, by the applicant-original respondent No. 1 for vacating the ex parte ad-interim order dated 16-12-1999 granted in the petition. ( 2 ) IT is stated that the above Special Civil Application was filed in this court and this Court passed the following order :"rule. Notice as to interim relief returnable on 18-1-2000. Ad-interim relief in terms of Para 8 (C) till then. Sd/- date : 16-12-1999 A. M. Kapadia, Judge. "this application has been moved on the following main amongst other grounds as mentioned in Para-2 of the application. (1) There is no pleading, documentary evidence and affidavit-in-support of an urgency at all for an ad-interim relief in the petition. (2) A claim to an ad-interim relief in Para 8 (C) of the petition is without a cause of action alleged, evidence and duly proved especially therefor on the face of the petition anywhere. (3) An otherwise please "as the matter is urgent one" alleged of and addressed to the learned Registrar of this Honble Court in the "urgent note" dated apparently nil by the learned two Advocates for the opponent Nos. 1 and 2 is opposed to, outside the legitimate scope of an falsified by the true material fact obtaining to the contrary that reckoned from the impugned orders dated 31-3-1999 to the petitions institution date 6-12-1999 or thereabout the alleged plea of urgent itself therein is late, belated and dislodged by the delay of or many as 249 days or thereabout. (4) The opponent Nos. 1 and 2 acting through their learned Advocates have falsely, incorrectly and improperly invoked application of Rule 77 of the g. H. C. Rules, 1993 (briefly, "the Rules"), the learned Registrar has mistakingly only allowed to be passed through him the said invocation and this Honble Court has apparently erroneously let to being applied and enforced the said invocation through nothing is as a matter -of hard fact embodied on the record of the petition to let one to be duly, lawfully and reasonably "satisfied about the urgency" thereunder in the case. (5) No conditions precedent to ever lawfully reach and invoke Rule 179 (1) of the Rules to the opponent 1 and 2s favour and against this applicants already executable decretal-rights are met and satisfied in the case and in terms of the said very rule this Honble Court has failed and erred to think "just" in its issuing the direction on 16-12-1999 in first instance. (6) The direction in the first instance and the subsequent orders continuing if are contrary to and inconsistent with the material facts of the case, violative of the law of ad-interim relief, illegal, invalid, improper, irregular, perverse not just and reasonable at all and deserve to be vacated forthright. (7) Not even prima facie, there exists any good case for the grant of and continuing, the rule in the petition much less for the urgency in the grant of ad-interim stay of "implementastion and operation" of the impugned orders in the petition and still much less for any continuity of and letting confirmed the ad-interim stay thereof. (8) No irreparable injury and substantial loss to the opponent Nos. 1 and 2 emerge to ensue in the case in the absence of the stay of the implementation and operation of the impugned orders being prayed for. (9) No balance of convenience weighs in the opponents 1 and 2s favour qualifying them to the stay prayed for. (10) There is never made the claim for the stay at once, forthwith and without the accompanying, long and unreasonable delay of the intervening about 249 days and this long drawn and prolonged delay itself disqualifies the grant thereof. (11) There is not even the security for the due payment of the decretal debt payable under the impugned orders offered or otherwise enjoined to be duly furnished though the impugned orders are for payment of money itself only. ( 3 ) IT is also stated that the applicant respondent has also moved an application being Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 965 of 2000 (review petition) under Art. 226 of the Constitution read with Rule 48 of Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993 for review of the order dated 16-12-1999. ( 4 ) AFFIDAVIT-IN-REPLY was filed in the petition on 12-6-2000. Later on, he also filed further affidavit under Art. 226 (3) of the Constitution. ( 5 ) THE respondent No. 1 appeared party-in-person as Counsel in robes wearing bend and gown. ( 4 ) AFFIDAVIT-IN-REPLY was filed in the petition on 12-6-2000. Later on, he also filed further affidavit under Art. 226 (3) of the Constitution. ( 5 ) THE respondent No. 1 appeared party-in-person as Counsel in robes wearing bend and gown. The learned Counsel for the original petitioner objected to that the respondent applicant cannot appear and argue the case as an Advocate as he is appearing as party in person. Mr. Shah also. relied on the decision of Mysore High Court in the case of T. Venkanna v. The Honble High Court of Mysore by its Registrar and Anr. , reported in AIR 1973 Mys 127 wherein it has been held that where an Advocate whose name is entered in the commonroll appears before the Court as a litigant in person, he is not exercising any right under Sec. 30 of the Act. In that case, no question of right of the petitioner under the Act arose. No right conferred under the Act has been denied to him. The word "practise" means the exercise of a profession. Where an Advocate is a litigant in person he does not practise his profession, and therefore, he cannot be permitted to argue with his robes on from the Advocates table. He can address the Court from the same place and in the same way as an ordinary member of the public. Shri Venkanna was not prepared to argue at the preliminary hearing without his robes on. Hence the petition was dismissed. He also relied on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Vidya Verma through next friend R. V. S. Mani v. Dr. Shiv Narain Verma, reported in AIR 1956 SC 108 in which the Supreme Court has observed as under :"mr. Mani appeared again on the appointed date and was robed as he had been on the previous occasion. He was asked to clarify his position and when he said he had no power of attorney and explained that he was appearing in a private capacity as next friend he was told that at the next hearing he must address the Court without his robes. He was also warned that if he lost he might have to bear the costs of the other side personally. "an Advocate is a legally authorised representative of a litigant. He was also warned that if he lost he might have to bear the costs of the other side personally. "an Advocate is a legally authorised representative of a litigant. Advocate is required to appear in Court, by Rule 5 under Chapter II of the Bar Council of India (Miscellaneous) Rules, all times in prescribed dress and his appearance should always be presentable. Under Rule 9, an Advocate should not act or plead in any manner in which he is himself pecuniarily interested, he is not required under Rule 18 to be party to to menting of litigation. In my view, a person cannot appear or plead before a Court of law in dual capacity, one as party and other as an advocate. If an Advocate is appearing as party-in-person, he should in order to maintain the norms and decorum of the legal profession, appear before the Court of law as party in person putting off the bend and robes prescribed for legal practitioner. He insisted and continued to argue the case in robes without going into the legality of his robes. He stated that he has adopted certain grounds of the review petition in the affidavit-in-reply. The grounds adopted are as under : (i) Rules 51 (ii) and 188 of the Rules are contravened in making the person of the opponent No. 3 who is neither a party nor a privy nor a person participating in the suit a party-respondent No. 2 in the petition without making therewith a regular stamped application therefore and the affidavit-in-support thereof. (ii) Rules 26, 176 and 188 of the Rules are contravened in relying on the opponents 1 and 2s purported first an abandonment of the suit on 2-1-1999, and secondly, a discharge of the applicant as their Advocate in the suit on 3-1-1999 by suppressing altogether and without producing at all the authenticated true copies of the documents-relied on therefore in and along with the petition itself. (iii) Rules 176 (i) and 188 of the Rules are furthermore contravened in not producing with the petition the Certified copies of the Orders impugned in the petition and so also in not annexing to the petition the authenticated true copies of the documents otherwise annexed thereto and marked annexures A, B, C, D and E as at its pages 13-27, 28-30, 31-32, 33-37 and 38-43 respectively. (iv) Rules 176 and 188 of the Rules are contravened by the act of annexing to the petition the unauthenticated, untrue and incomplete copies of the original documents of which they purport to be copies as at Annexures a to E thereto and are produced thereat all tainted, tampered with and vitiated by suppressio veri and suggestio faisi especially in the subject, context or matter of the contents of internal annexures to and internal-endorsements below the originals concerned thereof on the R and Ps of the suit. (v) Rules 77 and 78 (i) of the Rules too are contravened by the non-removal of all the office objections on the record of the petition within the time- limit therefore. The respective contraventions of the Rules aforementioned are not only the procedural illegalities but also are the substantive infirmities in the petition and vitiate the Order rendering it void ab initio. ( 6 ) WHEN the Court asked Mr. Desai as to whether he intends to argue this application confining himself within the ambit of constitutional provisions of Art. 226 (3) or a general application for vacating interim order on merits or both. He replied that he has been provided for constitutional right under art. 226 (3) to argue before this Court for automatic vacation of interim order passed when the interim order was passed behind him, without serving a copy of the petition on him and without giving an opportunity of hearing to him. He has moved this application under Art. 226 (3) of the Constitution in this court on 12-6-2000 and he has served the copy of this application on the learned counsel for the petitioner on the same day i. e. , 12-6-2000 and the application has not been disposed of finally within 14 days from the date of presentation in the Registry of this Court as required under the constitutional provisions of art. 226 (3), the interim order will stand vacated after 14 days from the presentation of the application. Thus, he confined himself within the provisions of Art. 226 (3) of the Constitution. ( 7 ) HE contended that this Court has jurisdiction conferred upon it by express provisions of Art. 226 (3) of the Constitution to receive, take cognizance and dispose of on merits, the present civil application is for vacating the interim order including the ad-interim order. Thus, he confined himself within the provisions of Art. 226 (3) of the Constitution. ( 7 ) HE contended that this Court has jurisdiction conferred upon it by express provisions of Art. 226 (3) of the Constitution to receive, take cognizance and dispose of on merits, the present civil application is for vacating the interim order including the ad-interim order. There is no express period of limitation or time bar or otherwise delay created by law to the lodging of the present civil application. There is no bar in the constitution or statute or otherwise created by law made by Parliament, Legislature or High Court on its legislative side to the reception, cognizance and disposal on merits of the present application. There is no legality, infirmity, illegality or otherwise irregularities raised by the office in the form of office objection to the act of presenting memo of this civil application. There is absence of pleadings in the reply on the record on the proceedings of the present application by any of the petitioners to the maintainibility on the point of pure law, pure fact or a matter of mixed question of facts and law. In absence of any bar at all whether in law or in facts to the maintainibility of the present application, this application is admitted without any arguable question arising out of facts of the case to the contrary. The present application is maintainable in law and in the facts of the case. As the application is entertainable and to be decided finally on merits, hence Rule should be issued. The applicant-original respondent was on leave of this Court. Hence, this Court committed an error in taking up the matter and passing the order on 18-1-2000, and thereafter, till 12-6-2000. ( 8 ) THOUGH the applicant raised several questions which are the subject -matter of the review petition, as the review petition for review of the order dated 16-12-1999 is pending and that is required to be decided by the same learned Judge who passed the impugned order, this Court cannot take cognizance of the grounds mentioned in the review petition or which are subject-matter of the review petition as the review petition is said to be still pending. ( 9 ) THE contention of the applicant respondent is that under the constitutional provisions, this application will be deemed to have been allowed after two weeks from the date on which the copy of the application for vacating the ex pane interim order was served i. e. , on 12-6-2000 and filed in the registry on 12-6-2000. As such after two weeks, the interim order passed by this Court on 16-12-1999 will stand vacated. He relied on the Full Bench decision of this court in the case of District Development Officer v. Maniben Virabhai, reported in 2000 (2) GLH 204 (FB) : 2000 (2) GLR 1436 (FB ). The relevant portion of the Full Bench decision is reproduced as under :"on the discussion aforesaid, we have answered all the questions posed by the learned Single Judge M. R. Calla, J formulated in his order. Our conclusion therefore is that on plain language of clause (3) in Art. 226, an ex pane order of injunction or stay shall stand vacated automatically after two weeks, if the aggrieved party completes all the formalities of making an application to the high Court and furnishing copy of such application to the party in whose favour the order is made. The period of limitation of two weeks specified under clause (3) shall commence on the plain language of that Art. from the date the application is received by the Registry of the Court or is furnished to the party for whose benefit it is passed whichever is later in accordance with the Rules and practice of the Court. In our opinion, action or inaction on the part of the parties or registry shall have no consequence of undoing what the Constitution law contemplates of automatic vacation of the order after expiry of two weeks on the completion of required formalities of procedure and occurrence of eventualities mentioned in clause (3) of Art. 226. " ( 10 ) ON the contrary, the learned Counsel for the original petitioners/opposite parties of this application submitted that the ex parte ad-interim order was passed initially to be operative till the returnable date of notice issued by this Court, as to why the interim relief should not be granted. " ( 10 ) ON the contrary, the learned Counsel for the original petitioners/opposite parties of this application submitted that the ex parte ad-interim order was passed initially to be operative till the returnable date of notice issued by this Court, as to why the interim relief should not be granted. When the applicant has not argued, that ex parte ad-interim order should be vacated either on his appearance on 27th December, 1999 or on the returnable date on 18-1-2000, this Court passed the order to continue the order of ad-interim relief already granted vide order dated 18-1-2000 till next date fixed i. e. 9-2-2000, and thereafter, the applicant-original respondent or on behalf of the respondent No. 2 did not appear or argued the matter on 9th February, 2000, the ad-interim relief in terms of para 8 (c) was directed to continue till further orders. On 24-4-2000, somebody appeared on behalf of the applicant-respondent and agreed for an adjournment of the matter to go beyond vacation. The main matter along with two Civil applications including the present application was listed on 23-1-2001 though the main matter could have been argued as Rule on the writ petition has already been issued, but the respondent-applicant is pressing this application for vacating the interim relief. The prayer of the applicant-respondent is not sustainable in the eye of law and it deserves to be refused. ( 11 ) I have carefully considered the arguments of the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the papers on record. The petitioner-opposite party filed the petition for quashing and setting aside the impugned order at Annexure "d" and the impugned final order at Annexure "e" and for rejection of the application exh. 42. This Court passed the order on 16-12-1999 as under :"rule. Notice as to interim relief returnable on 18-1-2000 and ad-interim relief in terms of Para 8 (C) till then. "on 18-1-2000, the matter was listed and was adjourned to 9-2-2000 and ad-interim in terms of Para 8 (c) was directed to continue till then as it appears that none appeared on behalf of the applicant-respondent and the matter was adjourned to 9-2-2000 and in absence of the applicant/ respondent, ad-interim relief in terms of Para 8 (c) was directed to continue till further orders vide order dated 9-2-2000. This application has been filed on 12-6-2000. This application has been filed on 12-6-2000. It appears that three files were tagged together i. e. Special Civil Application No. 9713 of 1999 and C. A. No. 4358 of 2000 and C. A. No. 5686 of 2000. The orders in respect of this application were transcribed wrongly on Civil Application No. 5686 and not on the present application being C. A. No. 4358 of 2000 as it appears from the order sheet of Civil Application No. 5686 of 2000. This application was listed and it was adjourned to 26th July, 2000. Then it was adourned to 27-7-2000, 20-7-2000, 27-7-2000, 8-8-2000, 16-8-2000, 28-9-2000, 18-10-2000, 1-1-2001, 13-12-2001 (sic.) and 10-1-2001. Thereafter, this application has been listed before this Court on 23-1-2001 and it does not appear from the order sheet that the applicant-respondent has ever pressed this application prior to 23-1-2001. On 23-1-2001, the matter was listed on adjourned date. Then the applicant pressed this application for the first time. ( 12 ) MR. Desai contended that the writ petition itself is not maintainable in the eye of law and interim order passed against the applicant is liable to be discharged for non-compliance of Rules of the Court within stipulated period and wrong presentation of the writ petition by the petitioner, but the scope of this application is very limited one. If the application is entertainable under the provisions of Art. 226 (3) of the Constitution, this application would stand allowed and the interim order passed by this Court will stand vacated in view of the ratio laid down by the Full Bench of this Court as stated above, as this application was filed in the registry, on 12-6-2000 and on the same day the copy of the application was served on the learned Counsel for the petitioner and it is not disputed that this application has not been decided or disposed of within 14 days as required under the provisions of Art. 226 (3) of the Constitution. In case this application does not come within the ambit of Art. 226 (3) and is not entertainable, then this application will stand dismissed. Now, we have to see as to whether this application is maintainable under Art. 226 (3) of the constitution. In case this application does not come within the ambit of Art. 226 (3) and is not entertainable, then this application will stand dismissed. Now, we have to see as to whether this application is maintainable under Art. 226 (3) of the constitution. In usual manner, the Courts used to pass four types of ex pane interim orders with or without conditions which are as follows : (1) Issue notice returnable within specific date or period. Ad-interim order in terms of para "xxx xxx" is granted till the returnable date or operation of the impugned order dated "xxx xxx" shall remain stayed/suspended till the returnable date. (2) Issue notice meanwhile, the interim relief in terms of para "xxx xxx" is granted or the operation of the impugned order shall remained stayed/ suspended. (3) Issue notice interim relief in terms of para "xxx xxx" is granted or operation of the impugned order shall remained stayed/suspended. (4) Issue notice returnable on specified date. Interim relief in terms of para " xxx xxx" till then. Even after affording an opportunity of being heard to the respondent, such interim or ad-interim order continues till the next date of listing and that continues for months together on subsequent dates and the order is not passed till further orders or till final disposal of the petition. In the first type of interim orders, the respondents are afforded an opportunity to represent their case and an opportunity of hearing is granted to argue the case with or without counter-affidavit on the returnable date to show that it is not a case in which interim order can be passed there is no prima facie case for interim order or petition is not maintainable in law. If the Court does not find prima facie case for interim order or not to extend the interim order after hearing the parties, the interim order is modified or varied or rejected/vacated or if the Court finds prima facie case, the Court passes the order to continue interim order already passed till further orders or final decision of the case. In such cases, there is no bar to move an application for vacating interim order on merits which has been directed to continue till further orders or till final decision of the matter or the petition. In such cases, there is no bar to move an application for vacating interim order on merits which has been directed to continue till further orders or till final decision of the matter or the petition. In such types of cases, the respondents are required to move an application for vacating the interim relief granted, on additional or changed facts and circusmtances of the case. In the second, third and fourth type of orders, after service of notice, the respondents can move an application under Art. 226 (3) at any time for vacating interim orders or argue his case or contest the interim order already granted in his absence with or without counter-affidavit. There is no bar or time-limit for moving such application. In the fourth type of orders, it will be presumed that the Court has not applied its mind to continue or discharge the interim or ad-interim order. Hence, Art. 226 (3) would be applicable. ( 13 ) LET us know what are the legal requirements for moving an application under Art. 226 (3) of the Constitution. (1) Where a writ petition has been filed against respondents party. (2) An interim order by way of injunction or stay has been passed against respondents party without (a) furnishing to such party, copies of the petition and all documents in support thereof (b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard. (3) If such respondent party moves an application for vacating the interim order and gives copy of such application to the opponent/petitioner, the court is required to decide such application within two weeks from the date on which such application is filed or on the date on which the copy of such application is furnished to other side whichever is later or where the High Court is closed on the last day then next date on which the Court opens. ( 14 ) FOR knowing the scope of the constitutional right of respondent party, what is the meaning of "without giving an opportunity of being heard?" Let us have an illustration: an interim order is passed on 16-12-1999. "issue notice as to interim relief returnable on 18-1-2000. Ad-interim order as per para "xxxxx" till then. " The notice is served on 24-12-1999 and files an appearance on 27-12-1999. "issue notice as to interim relief returnable on 18-1-2000. Ad-interim order as per para "xxxxx" till then. " The notice is served on 24-12-1999 and files an appearance on 27-12-1999. It will be deemed that the notice along with copies of petition and all documents in support there of are served upon the respondent as per Rules of the Court. If copies of documents were not supplied as per Rules of the court, the respondent could have made an oral or written complaint on or before 18-1-2000. On 18-1-2000, the case is called out and the respondent appears and contests and argues that there is no prima facie case for interim order. After bi-parte hearing, the Court passes an order in respect of interim order "ad interim order will continue till further order. " Can the respondent say that the interim order passed on 18-1-2000 is an order without affording an opportunity of being heard? The answer would be "no". The order dated 16-12-1999 will merge in the order dated 18-1-2000 and the order dated 18-1-2000 cannot be said to have been passed without affording an opportunity of hearing. In case, the respondent party does not appear on 18-1-2000, even after service of notice on 24-12-1999 and filing of appearance on 27-12-1999, such order even in the nature of ex parte will be deemed in law to have passed after bi-parte hearing. As an opportunity of hearing was given to the respondent party, it would be immaterial whether it is availed or not. Where an opportunity of hearing has been afforded to the respondent party as required under Art. 226 (3) whether he avails that opportunity of being heard or not, he cannot say that he was not afforded an opportunity of hearing on 18-1-2000 as the order dated 16-12-1999 will merge in the order passed on 18-1-2000. The arguments were available to the respondent party on 18-1-2000 for vacating the interim or ad-interim order that the petition itself was not maintainable in law, the relief sought in the petition cannot be allowed and the writ of certiorari cannot be issued, the petition was not presented and heard as per Rules of the Court due to non-compliance of certain Rules of the Court and no prima facie case is made out for grant of interim or ad-interim orders. As the respondent party has not availed the opportunity of hearing, it cannot be said that the interim order was passed without affording an opportunity of being heard. If none on behalf of the respondent party appears on 18-1-2000, the Court thinks it proper to stand over the case on the next date on 9-2-2000 giving another opportunity of hearing. On 9-2-2000, again none appears on behalf of the respondent party. The Court after considering the facts and circumstances of the case, passes a short order. " S. O. to xxx. " interim relief already granted will continue till further orders. " The same anology would be applicable and the order dated 9-2-2000 will be deemed to have been passed after bi-parte hearing only in respect of interim order. ( 15 ) NOW, we have to see the object of insertion of clause (3) of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. All applications including the applications for vacating the ex parte interim orders are required to be filed in the registry as per the Rules of the Court. Hence, the learned advocate for the respondents filed their applications in the registry of this Court. Most of the Advocates do not insist to get such applications listed in the Court for disposal. Some times they are listed but the Advocate of either side seeks an adjournment and some times Advocates for respondent agree and give consent for an adjournment and hence Court cannot be able to take cognizance of such applications for vacating ex parte interim orders either due to inaction of the Registry in not listing such matters before the Court or non insistence of the Advocate for the respondents or Advocate for petitioner or by taking adjournment or consenting for an adjournment. Hence, the learned single Judge, Honble Mr. Justice H. L. Gokhale (as he was then) took the decision in the case of Mrs. S. N. Pandor and Ors. v. District Judge, District Court, Sabarkantha, reported in 1995 (2) GLH 976 that mere filing or lodging of such an application in the registry cannot be construed as making an application to the High Court and the period of two weeks starts from the date on which the learned Judge takes cognizance of the application. S. N. Pandor and Ors. v. District Judge, District Court, Sabarkantha, reported in 1995 (2) GLH 976 that mere filing or lodging of such an application in the registry cannot be construed as making an application to the High Court and the period of two weeks starts from the date on which the learned Judge takes cognizance of the application. This is because it is the High Court which is supposed to dispose of such type of application within the period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of the application is so furnished to the other side, whichever is later. The disposal is also permitted to be done on the date next to the day on which the High Court is closed falling on the last day i. e. , 14th day. When the Art, speaks of the High Court disposing of the application on merits and hence, that is the responsibility of the learned Judge for taking up the assignment. Of course, the petitioner is expected to take active steps to have the application heard at the earliest, but that responsibility will start after the application is made to the learned Judge and not merely on lodging of the application in the office of the Court and serving the same on the Counsel of the original petitioner. ( 16 ) IN another case, the learned single Judge Honble M. R. Calla, J. was of the opinion that the decision of the learned single Judge Honble Mr. Justice gokhale was not correct one as the concept of automatic vacation of ex parte interim order was included by amending Art. 226 and introducing Art. 226 (3) by 44th Amendment of the Constitution and the matter was referred to the Larger bench and the Larger Bench has held as stated above and relied on by the applicant-respondent. ( 17 ) BY 42nd Amendment (42nd Amendment Act of 1976), the powers of the High Court were taken away for granting ex parte interim relief to the petitioner except in exceptional cases required under the circumstances and the reasons to be recorded therefor. ( 17 ) BY 42nd Amendment (42nd Amendment Act of 1976), the powers of the High Court were taken away for granting ex parte interim relief to the petitioner except in exceptional cases required under the circumstances and the reasons to be recorded therefor. By Constitution 44nd Amendment Act, 1978, it has been introduced whereby in case ex parte interim order by way of injunction or stay or in any manner has been granted, without furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for the interim orders and without giving such party an opportunity of being heard. If any application is made to the High Court for vacation of such interim orders and furnish a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or Counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which the application is received in the High Court or the copy of such application is so furnished to other side, whichever is later or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period on the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open and if such application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall on expiry of that period or as the case may be, on the expiry of the next day stand vacated. ( 18 ) IT appears that a large number of litigations on respondent sides were suffering irreparable loss due to inaction of the registry in listing such matters or due to adjournments sought and granted to the Advocates of the parties or due to non-insistence of the Advocates of the parties to get such matters listed in the Court, though in this High Court, no application with any stamp fee is required and only a note has to be given to the Registrar by the Advocate of the party concerned for such purpose. As such, the Parliament laid heavy burden on Judges of the High Court to decide such applications within two weeks from the date of filing of such applications. But no amendment has been made in the Rules of this Court to list these matters by the Registry for decisions immediately after filing of such applications. As such, the Parliament laid heavy burden on Judges of the High Court to decide such applications within two weeks from the date of filing of such applications. But no amendment has been made in the Rules of this Court to list these matters by the Registry for decisions immediately after filing of such applications. ( 19 ) I am in full agreement with the ratio laid down by the Full Bench of this Court and that ratio is applicable to cases where the ex parte interim order has been granted for unlimited or indefinite period without restricting it to a time-limit. Mr. Desai referred to actual orders passed in the following cases (1) C. A. No. 3052 of 1994 with C. A. No. 91 of 1995 in S. C. A. No. 7565 of 1994, S. N. Pandor and Ors. v. District Judge, reported in 1995 (2) GLH 976 , opinion of Honble Mr. Justice H. L. Gokhale; (2) C. A. No. 1724 of 1995 in S. C. A. No. 642 of 1994 Maniben Virabhai v. District Development officer, reported in 1996 (2) GCD 1 , opinion of Honble Mr. Justice M. R. Calla, J. ; (3) C. A. No. 4358 of 2000 in S. C. A. No. 9713 of 1999 Vinayak s. Desai v. Interlink Petroleum Ltd. and Ors. (present application ). (1) Date of order : 9-6-1994 "rule. Ad-interim relief in terms of para 7 (B ). " (2) Date of order : 19-1-1994 "rule. Ad-interim relief in terms of para 8 (C) to the extent of payment of back wages. " it is stated that returnable date is not mentioned in the order, but registry sent notice returnable on 4-4-1994. (3) Date of order : 16-12-1999 "rule. Notice as to interim relief returnable on 18-1-2000. Ad-interim relief in terms of para 8 (C) till then. " in the present case (1) Rule was issued (2) Notice was issued as to why the interim relief should not be granted and that notice was issued returnable on 18-1-2000, meaning thereby on hearing the parties, interim relief can be granted or refused. (3) Ad-interim relief was granted till 18-1-2000. In the first two cases referred to by Mr. " in the present case (1) Rule was issued (2) Notice was issued as to why the interim relief should not be granted and that notice was issued returnable on 18-1-2000, meaning thereby on hearing the parties, interim relief can be granted or refused. (3) Ad-interim relief was granted till 18-1-2000. In the first two cases referred to by Mr. Desai, the interim order was granted for unlimited or indefinite period, while in the present case, for hearing interim relief, notice was issued returnable on 18-1-2000 and ad-interim relief was granted till 18-1-2000. Mr. Desai received notice on 24-12-1999 and filed his appearance on 27-12-1999. In the present case, Mr. Desai could have filed an application for vacation of ad-interim order, under Art. 226 (3) of the Constitution on or after 27-12-2000 as the ad-interim order was passed against him without furnishing copy of the petition and all documents in support thereof and without giving an opportunity of being heard. As an opportunity of hearing was to be given to him on 18-1-2000, but on 18-1-2000, Mr. Desai remained absent. Hence, it appears that ad-interim relief was extended till 9-2-2000, next date fixed for giving another opportunity of hearing to him. On 9-2-2000, Mr. Desai again remained absent and he had not chosen to avail the opportunity of hearing or contest the interim relief granted on 16-12-1999. He could have argued on 9-2-2000 that it is not a case in which interim order can be passed or ad interim relief can be extended. The Court heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner on interim relief for which the notice was issued to Mr. Desai and the Court passed an order in short as per practice prevalent in this Court. "s. O. to 23-2-2000. Ad-interim relief as per Para 8 (c) to continue till further orders. " the contention of Mr. The Court heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner on interim relief for which the notice was issued to Mr. Desai and the Court passed an order in short as per practice prevalent in this Court. "s. O. to 23-2-2000. Ad-interim relief as per Para 8 (c) to continue till further orders. " the contention of Mr. Desai that ad-interim relief has been directed to continue till further orders and the interim relief has not been heard and hearing on interim relief was to take place on 23-2-2000 or on subsequent date as no orders regarding interim relief has been passed by the Court on 9-2-2000, nor it is mentioned in the order dated 9-2-2000 that the learned Counsel for the petitioner was heard, has no substance inasmuch as, as per practice prevalent in this Court, no learned judge of this Court makes mention in any short order that the learned Counsel for the petitioner was heard. Even if it is assumed that the learned Counsel for the petitioner was not heard, the contestant does not avail the opportunity of being heard and remains absent, the learned Judge after perusing the relevant papers may pass appropriate orders, that order will be deemed to have been passed on interim relief or interim order on bi-parte hearing for which notice was issued, shape of the order may be different. Sometimes interim order or relief as claimed under relevant para of the petition is granted or ad-interim relief granted is directed to continue till further orders or till the disposal of the petition. After an opportunity of being heard afforded is not availed, an application under Art. 226 (3) of the Constitution of India would not be entertainable. It appears that somebody appeared on behalf of Mr. Desai or on behalf of the respondent No. 2 and consented to list the matter after vacation. Once the respondent had an opportunity to represent his case on the above-mentioned dates and he had chosen not to contest or agitate the continuance of the ex parte interim order, the application for vacating the ex pane interim order under Art. 226 (3) would be misconceived and not sustainable. Once the respondent had an opportunity to represent his case on the above-mentioned dates and he had chosen not to contest or agitate the continuance of the ex parte interim order, the application for vacating the ex pane interim order under Art. 226 (3) would be misconceived and not sustainable. Where ad interim relief has been granted for, a certain period till the returnable date of the notice, if the notice issued by the Court has been served on the respondent before the returnable date or the respondent comes to know that some interim relief or ad-interim order has already been passed against him, he has been given the right to move an application under Art. 226 (3) of the Constitution to vacate the interim order granted against him where the interim order has been passed for unlimited or indefinite time or without any time-limit, the respondent would be at liberty to move an application for vacation of that interim order under art. 226 (3) of the Constitution and then the application is required to be decided within two weeks as enshrined under Art. 226 (3) of the Constitution. Where the notice as to interim relief has been served, ad interim relief has been granted till the returnable date, he appears before the Court and he does not choose to contest the interim relief already granted for a limited period and the order is passed for continuance of the interim order till further orders. That order will be deemed to have been passed on interim relief after affording an opportunity of being heard. It cannot be said that the interim order dated 9-2-2000 was passed without affording an opportunity of being heard as the order dated 16-12-1999 would merge in the subsequent order dated 18-1-2000 and the order dated 18-1-2000 would merge in the subsequent order dated 9-2-2000, then the application moved after 9-2-2000 by the respondent in such circumstances, having an opportunity to contest would not come within the purview of the ratio laid down by the Full Bench of this Court. Mr. Desai will not be permitted to say that the order dated 18-1-2000 and 9-2-2000 are illegal as they were passed behind him and the learned Counsel for the petitioners were knowing that he had gone to attend pre-scheduled spiritual course at Coimbatore. Mr. Desai will not be permitted to say that the order dated 18-1-2000 and 9-2-2000 are illegal as they were passed behind him and the learned Counsel for the petitioners were knowing that he had gone to attend pre-scheduled spiritual course at Coimbatore. ( 20 ) IN the present case, the notice has already been issued by an order dated 16-12-1999 returnable on 18-1-2000, admittedly the applicant received notice on 24-12-1999 and had filed the appearance on 27th December, 1999. He did not choose to contest the ad-interim ready granted against him. He had an opportunity to contest grant of interim relief to the petitioner on 18-1-2000 and 9-2-2000 or even before 18th January, 2000 by moving an application under Art. 226 (3) for vacating the interim relief granted against him. When the respondent applicant did not appear, this Court passed the order on 9-2-2000 for continuance of the interim relief already granted till further orders, it will be presumed under the Rules that the applicant-respondent had been served with the notice along with the copy of the petition and Annexures in compliance with the order dated 16-12-1999. As such, it cannot be said that the order dated 9-2-2000 directing to continue interim relief already granted till further orders was against him in his absence without giving an opportunity of hearing. The main object of the insertion of clause (3) to Art. 226 of the Constitution is to provide an opportunity to the respondents on the question of interim relief before passing such interim order or to move an application for that purpose for getting that interim relief vacated by moving such an application under Art. 226 (3) of the Constitution where interim relief has been granted for indefinite or unlimited period. In the present case, the applicant has failed to show that the leave was granted to the applicant respondent to go to Coimabtore, but the Rule is that leave of a weeks time can be granted at one time unless other application is moved and properly considered by the Honble Chief Justice of the High Court that it is just and proper to grant then further leave can be granted. After a week if the leave has not been granted, it is the duty of the applicant-respondent to get his case represented in his absence when it is listed before any Court. After a week if the leave has not been granted, it is the duty of the applicant-respondent to get his case represented in his absence when it is listed before any Court. He has not chosen to do so. Voluntary absence cannot vitiate the order passed on 9th February, 2000 and the ratio of the Full Bench case is not attracted in the present case. . . ( 21 ) AS such, in the facts and circumstances of the case, this application is misconceived and deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, it is dismissed. .