JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, CJ.—This petition is filed by the petitioner for an appropriate writ, direction or order quashing and setting aside election of Smt. Asha Chauhan, respondent No. 5. herein, as Pradhan of Gram Panchayat, Gaich (Kohbag), Tehsil and District Shimla, held on December, 13, 2000, being illegal and violative of Section 122 of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and by directing respondents No. 1 to 4 to immediately suspend her as a Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat, under Section 145 of the Act. Other prayers were also made. 2. The case of the petitioner in the petition is that he is resident of Gawahi Kalan-Kharaun in Tehsil and District Shimla, H.P within the jurisdiction of Gram Panchayat, Gaich (Kohbag). The petitioner has approached this court by filing this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is the case of the petitioner that on 3rd February, 1997, FIR 27 of 1997 was registered at Police Station, Boileauganj, under Section 302 read with Sections 147, 148, 149 and 342 I.P.C. in which the name of respondent No. 5 herein has also been shown as one of the accused. On 5th January, 1999, a charge was framed for those offences and respondent No. 5 is also one of the accused. On 13th December, 2000, respondent No. 5 was elected as Pradhan of Gram Panchayat, Gaich. On 26th December, 2000, the petitioner submitted an application to the Director of Rural Development and Panchayati Raj-respondent No. 2 and Deputy Commissioner, District Shimla, respondent No. 3 not to administer oath of Pradhan to respondent No. 5 and requested them to take appropriate action against her in accordance with the Act, since she was involved in offences punishable under Section 302 and other Sections of the I.P.C. Since no action was taken, the petitioner was constrained to approach this court by filing the present writ petition. 3. On 21st June, 2000, we had issued notice as to admission as well as final hearing, returnable after ten days since a question of suspension of respondent No. 5 in public interest was raised by the petitioner. In pursuance of the notice issued by this court, respondents appeared. Affidavit-in-reply is filed by the authorities as well as by the contesting respondent No. 5. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 5. Mr. In pursuance of the notice issued by this court, respondents appeared. Affidavit-in-reply is filed by the authorities as well as by the contesting respondent No. 5. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 5. Mr. Kanwar, learned Senior Advocate, submitted that action of the respondent-authorities in not placing the respondent No. 5 under suspension by invoking the provisions of Section 145 of the Act is clearly illegal and unlawful. He submitted that when serious allegations have been made against respondent No. 5 and were prima facie found to be well founded inasmuch as even a charge was framed against respondent No. 5 for commission of various offences, including an offence of murder punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, it was incumbent on the respondent authorities to exercise powers under Section 145 of the Act. Since no order whatsoever has been passed by the authorities, an appropriate direction is required to be issued to the authorities to take an appropriate decision in accordance with law. 6. The State Government has filed a reply, inter alia, contending that petition is ill-conceived and is liable to be dismissed. It is submitted that earlier respondent No. 5 was elected and was placed under suspension by the competent authority, but considering the fact that no offence was proved against respondent No. 5, the State Government in its wisdom did not confirm an order of suspension and in the light of the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 145 of the Act, as it stood then, the suspension came to an end. It is also stated that the Government thought it proper that when a criminal case is pending against the accused in a competent court, no departmental action should be initiated against her. It is then stated; "It is always safer and wise to let Rule of Law prevail which in this case by facing criminal-trial the accused, respondent No. 5, was already facing. Therefore, by holding a superfluous enquiry over and above the action so pending against her before criminal trial it amounted to nothing but only wastage of time with no result". It is further stated; "Moreover the decision of the said criminal trial was to take more time and Panchayat cannot be left unrepresented as in this case Pradhan, Up Pradhan and Panch, i.e. three office bearers of same Panchayat have same cause of action. It is further stated; "Moreover the decision of the said criminal trial was to take more time and Panchayat cannot be left unrepresented as in this case Pradhan, Up Pradhan and Panch, i.e. three office bearers of same Panchayat have same cause of action. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it was decided by the respondent State not to confirm the suspension order and as such it was revoked and it was settled principle of law that no person can be held guilty till he is convicted by the criminal court, as such, the respondent has rightly passed the suspension order at the relevant time." 7. Respondent No. 5, contesting respondent herein, has also filed affidavit, contending that the petitioner has no locus standi. If an action is taken under Section 145 of the Act, it would be a sort of punishment and penalty which cannot be imposed unless she has been convicted by a competent criminal court. It is stated that expression used in Section 145 by the Legislature is, "may" and not "shall" and it is for the authorities to consider the facts and circumstances of the case and to take appropriate action. It is, therefore, submitted that no action is called for. 8. Reliance was also placed at the time of hearing of the petition, on Article 20 of the Constitution of India which declares that there should not be double jeopardy and no person can be prosecuted and convicted twice for same offence. 9. It is urged that an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is available to the petitioner of filing an election petition and by invoking jurisdiction of the competent authority under Section 175 under Chapter XI, of the Act which provides for settlement of disputes relating to elections. On all these grounds, it is submitted that the petition deserves to be dismissed. 10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, in our opinion, the petition deserves to be partly allowed. 11. In our considered opinion, nature and scope of two provisions, namely 122 and 145 are totally different. They operate in different fields altogether. Section 122 provides disqualification. Section 145, on the other hand, states that a person may be suspended under certain circumstances specified in sub-section (1) of the said section. 11. In our considered opinion, nature and scope of two provisions, namely 122 and 145 are totally different. They operate in different fields altogether. Section 122 provides disqualification. Section 145, on the other hand, states that a person may be suspended under certain circumstances specified in sub-section (1) of the said section. Obviously, therefore, what Section 122 contains is disqualification by way of penalty or punitive action which can only be taken after providing an opportunity of hearing and observing the principles of natural justice, which has been recognised in sub-section (2) of Section 12 Section 145 states that prescribed authority may suspend from the office any office bearer against whom charges have been framed in criminal proceedings under Section 302 and other sections mentioned in clause (a). It is, no doubt, true that the Legislature has used the expression may. It is, therefore, vehemently contended by the learned counsel for respondent No. 5 that legislature in its wisdom by using the expression may has conferred discretion on the Prescribed Authority to place or not an office bearer, who has been duly elected to a particular office by people, under suspension. The said action cannot be termed as arbitrary or unlawful. 12. In our opinion, the contention has no force. Before more than 100 years, in the leading case of Federic Guilder Julius v. The Right Rev. The Lord Bishop of Oxford; The Rev. Thomas Thellusson Carter, (1880) AC 214, the House of Lords propounded; "when power is deposited with a public officer for the purpose of being used for the benefit of persons, who are specially appointed and with regard to whom definition is supplied by the Legislature on the condition upon and which they are entitled to call for its exercise of that power and to be exercised and the court will require to be exercised". 12 A. The ratio laid down in Bishop of Oxford has been followed and quoted with approval by the Honble Supreme Court in several cases. It has been held in a number of decisions that "may" can be read as shall or must where the power vested with the authority and the conditions for the exercise of such power are fulfilled. It has been held in a number of decisions that "may" can be read as shall or must where the power vested with the authority and the conditions for the exercise of such power are fulfilled. In State of U.P. v. Jogendra Singh, AIR 1963 SC 1618, interpreting the provision may in U.P. Disciplinary Proceeding (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947, the court stated; "Sometimes the Legislatures use the word may7 out of deference to the high status of the authority on whom the power and the obligation are intended to be conferred and imposed." 13. In our opinion, if may is to be read as may only, and the Prescribed Authority is left to exercise the power at his sweet will, such provision may be held to be arbitrary and unreasonable. A Court of law will not interprete the provision in the manner suggested by the learned counsel for respondent No. 5 unless there are compelling reasons to do so. 14. Since the object underlying two provisions (Sections 122 and 145) is different and as they do not operate in one and the same field, in our opinion, an appropriate decision has to be taken by the Prescribed Authority keeping in mind the object thereof. One provides penalty and is punitive in nature and the other is preventive. The purpose for Section 145 and placing a person elected to a public office under suspension is to prevent him/her in exercising powers and in discharging duties till the proceedings initiated against him/her are over and finalised. 15. In the instant case, serious allegations have been levelled against respondent No. 5 and charge is also framed for commission of various offences including offence punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. We are not impressed by the submission in the affidavit-in-reply by the State authorities that since a competent criminal court is seized of the matter, no action could be taken under Section 145 of the Act. The object of criminal trial is different than the object under Section 145 or for that purpose 122 of the Act. We are also unable to accept the argument by the learned counsel for respondent No. 5 that clause (2) of Article 20 of the Constitution would be attracted. The object of criminal trial is different than the object under Section 145 or for that purpose 122 of the Act. We are also unable to accept the argument by the learned counsel for respondent No. 5 that clause (2) of Article 20 of the Constitution would be attracted. In our view a person is not prosecuted and punished twice for the same offence if an action is taken either under Section 145 or under Section 122 of the Act. We also do not uphold the contention of Mr. Dhaulta that since earlier petition (CWP 587 of 1999) was disposed of by this court on November 17, 2000, the present petition is not maintainable. Looking to the facts of the case, it is quite clear that the said petition was disposed of in November, 2000 in view of subsequent development. The present respondent No. 5 was again elected as the Pradhan of Gram Panchayat on December, 13, 2000. We also see no substance in the contention of learned counsel for respondent No. 5 that an alternative and equally efficacious remedy under Section 175 of the Act is available. Such remedy, in our considered opinion, is altogether different and it has nothing to do with placing a person holding public office under suspension. 16. It was urged that no action can be taken in the instant case in view of the fact that the charge was framed on January 5, 1999 and the term for which respondent No. 5 was elected came to an end thereafter as it was not confirmed by the State Government. Thereafter new election took place and respondent No. 5 was again elected to the office of Pradhan of Gram Panchayat on 13th December, 2000. It was, therefore, submitted that now provisions of Section 145 cannot be attracted. We are afraid, the contention has no force. In our opinion, the language of Section 145 is amply clear. As we have already observed, if the conditions laid down in sub-section (1) of Section 145 are fulfilled and satisfied, it is obligatory and incumbent on the part of the Prescribed Authority to exercise power even if respondent No. 5 is re-elected in 2000, since the charge relates to one of the offences covered by clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 145 of the Act. Hence, an appropriate action has to be taken in accordance with law. 17. Hence, an appropriate action has to be taken in accordance with law. 17. It was also stated by respondent authorities that a reference was made to the office of Secretary (Law), Law Department to the Government of Himachal Pradesh on 31st January, 2001, whereupon Law Department has tendered its advice on 7th February, 2001, but it was tendered by Law Department on an unamended provision of Section 145 of the Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. Then it was stated as under: "As and when the said advice of Law Department is received back, the department intends to implement the same with respect to Respondent No. 5". 18. Mr. Dhaulta also referred to CWP No. 92 of 2001 decided by a Division Bench of this Court in March, 2001. According to him almost in similar circumstances a petition was not entertained by this court. Reading the order passed by the Division Bench, in our view, contention raised by the learned counsel, is not proper. In that case, election had already taken place and election petition was already filed and was pending with the authorities. For quashing and setting aside the election, the petitioner has approached this court observing that the election petition would be alternative and efficacious remedy which had already been availed of by the petitioner, this court did not think it proper to entertain the petition. In the instant case the prayer made by the petitioner relates to passing of order of suspension. In our opinion, therefore, it cannot be made subject matter of election petition under Section 175 of the Act. 19. For the above reasons, in our opinion, the petition deserves to be partly allowed and is accordingly allowed by issuing direction to the respondents to consider the matter as per Annexures PI and P2 and to take appropriate decision in accordance with law. Such decision will be taken within four weeks from today. No costs. Petition allowed. -