P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) JUDGMENT the civil revision petition is filed by the unsuccessful tenants in both the Courts below under Section 22 of the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, in short referred to as "act" hereinafter. ( 2 ) THE respondent in the civil revision petition is the landlord and the petitioner in RCC. It is pertinent to note that a common judgment was delivered in RCC No. 76, 84, 77/84 and 90/84 by the learned Rent Controller, Rajahmundry by "order dated 16-7-1996 and as against the said orders of the eviction RCAs. 32, 33 and 34 of 1996 were filed on the file of appellate authority-Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry which were also dismissed by a common order dated 4-7-2000 and the tenants in RCC No. 90/84 as appellants in RCA No. 33/96 had preferred the present civil revision petition. It is represented that as far as the other matters are concerned, the orders of eviction made by the appellate authority became final. ( 3 ) FOR the purpose of convenience, the Revision Petitioners will be referred to as "tenants" and the respondent will be referred to as "landlord". ( 4 ) THE landlord filed RCC No. 90/84 under Section 10 (2) (i), 10 (2) (ii) (a) and 10 (3) (iii) (b) of the Act, i. e. , on the grounds of wilful default in payment of rent, bonafide personal requirement and subletting of the premises to the 2nd revision petitioner i. e. , Sri Rajeswari Cloth Stores, represented by the Proprietrix Smt. Rajeswari. ( 5 ) THE respective pleadings of the parties are as follows:- the petition schedule premises and the other shops in the same building originally was the joint family property of the landlord and his brothers and there was partition on 28-8-1983 in which the schedule premises fell to the share of the landlord. The 1st petitioner in the CRP i. e. , 1st respondent in the RCC took the petition schedule premises on 8-4-1972 to run cloth business in the name of Sri Rajeswari Cloth Stores and the rent payable by him is Rs. 375/- per month by first of every month. The 1st petitioner in the CRP i. e. , 1st respondent in the RCC took the petition schedule premises on 8-4-1972 to run cloth business in the name of Sri Rajeswari Cloth Stores and the rent payable by him is Rs. 375/- per month by first of every month. But however, he had transferred his leasehold rights and had sub-let the premises in favour of the 2nd respondent i. e. , 2nd respondent in the RCC and thus the sub-lessee is in actual possession and enjoyment of the property and hence the sub-lessee also was impleaded as a necessary party. It was further averred that the tenants had committed wilful default in payment of rents from 1-11-1983 to 30-6-1984 amounting to Rs. 3,000/- and the landlords family is carrying on business in cloth and since this premises had fallen to his share he had proposed to start his own business in his own shop in cloth and there is no other non-residential building of his own or taken on rent in which he is carrying on his business and the landlord got issued a notice on 12-10-1983 stating all the particulars and demanding vacant possession and the tenant-1st respondent in the RCC got issued a reply dated 19-10-1983 and on that the landlord and his brothers jointly issued a rejoinder dated 12-11-1983 specifically stating regarding the partition and requesting payment of rents individually to them and again the tenant had issued a reply dated 24-1-1983 raising untenable contentions and the landlord had issued a detailed reply on 6-12-1983 stating that nonpayment of rents will amount to wilful default and inspite of warning the wilful default was committed. Thus on the grounds of wilful default, bona fide requirement and sub-letting the revision petitioners-respondents in the RCC are liable to be evicted. The 1st revision petitioner as 1st respondent in the RCC filed a counter to the effect that he is only a Manager of the 2nd revision petitioner-2nd respondent firm in the RCC and that the 2nd respondent in the said RCC is the actual tenant. The pleading of the 2nd respondent is that the 1st respondent in the RCC is the tenant. But the 2nd respondent alone is the tenant in occupation of the petition schedule premises for the last 20 years and the 1st respondent is the Manager of the 2nd respondent firm. The rent was enhanced from Rs. The pleading of the 2nd respondent is that the 1st respondent in the RCC is the tenant. But the 2nd respondent alone is the tenant in occupation of the petition schedule premises for the last 20 years and the 1st respondent is the Manager of the 2nd respondent firm. The rent was enhanced from Rs. 375/- with effect from 1-11-1982 and it was also agreed that the rent should be prevailed upto five years. Prior to reconstruction, the respondent put a girder valued at Rs. 2,300/- to amalgamate two shop rooms without the consent of the owners to make it as one big shop room and the same was also used in the reconstruction and this respondent has to be reimbursed its value when she vacates the premises. This respondent spent Rs. 7,100/- in the construction works and also putting the girder and as such this the respondent is entitled for the said amount and as and when she vacates the premises without apportioning the respective liability for refunding the amount of contribution paid by the tenants individually, it is un-understable how the landlords could divide the property without providing for its discharge to them individually when they vacate. Then this respondent got issued a further reply notice stating that they have no objection individually to attorn to such of the landlords to whose share the leasehold in their occupation fell on the alleged partition provided he accepts to repay their individual contribution of such tenant for reconstruction of the building when he or she vacates as per the original mutual agreement between landlords and tenants. The petitioners gave an evasive reply on 6-12-1983. Then the respondent sent the rents regularly by money orders to the joint landlord Maddula Narayana Rao and brothers, but only one M. O. was received, after alleged incident of the partition and after the notice, but the other money orders stood illegally refused. After filing of the petition, the respondent deposited into Court a sum of Rs. 3,760/-under Challan No. 588, dated 31-8-1984. As such, there are neither arrears of rent nor wilful default in payment of rents. The landlords to whom the rents were tendered by M. Os. cannot take advantage of their laches and the defaults. The petition is a mala fide one and is intended to pin down the respondents unconscionable terms and hence the petition is liable to be dismissed. The landlords to whom the rents were tendered by M. Os. cannot take advantage of their laches and the defaults. The petition is a mala fide one and is intended to pin down the respondents unconscionable terms and hence the petition is liable to be dismissed. ( 6 ) ON the respective pleadings of the parties, the learned Rent Controller after appreciating the evidence of PW1 to PW3 and RW1 to RW5 and Exs. A1 to A28 and Exs. B1 to B14 and after detailed discussion in paragraphs 14 to 18 came to the conclusion that the landlords in all the RCCs. had established all the grounds and had ordered eviction and as already stated supra as against the said orders, the appeals were preferred by the tenants and as against the order in RCC No. 90/84 RCA No. 33/96 was filed which was also dismissed by the appellate authority after detailed discussion and aggrieved by the same, the present civil revision petition was preferred. ( 7 ) SRI T. Veerabhadrayya, the learned Counsel for the revision petitioners had taken me through the pleadings and also the evidence and the findings recorded by the Court of first instance and also the appellate authority. The learned Counsel had contended that as far as this matter is concerned, the landlord was examined as PW3 and the tenant was examined as RW3 and the period of default alleged is from 1-11-1983 to 30-6-1984. The learned Counsel had contended that in fact always attempt had been made to tender the rents and there was no conscious and deliberate default committed at any point of time by the tenants and it is pertinent to note that the notice is dated 12-10-1983 and the reply is dated 19-10-1983 and subsequent notice by all the brothers was on 12-11-1983 and reply on 24-11-1983 and again the notice on 6-12-1983 and even subsequent thereto M. Os. were sent and in fact the amount had been deposited and the same was received even by the landlord. were sent and in fact the amount had been deposited and the same was received even by the landlord. Hence, in the light of the view expressed by this Court in CRP No. 1618/2000 and Batch, decided on 30-10-2001 and also the ratio of the Apex Court in Kameshwar Singh Srivastava v. IV Addl District Judge, Lucknow and others, 1986 (4) SCC 661 , at the best this default can be said to be a technical default and cannot fall under the ground of wilful default. The learned Counsel also had brought to my notice the proviso to Section 10 (2) of the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 which reads as follows : "provided that in any case falling under clause (i), if, the Controller is satisfied that the tenant s default to pay or tender rent was not wilful, he may, notwithstanding anything in Section 11, give the tenant a reasonable time, not exceeding fifteen days, to pay or tender the rent due by him exceeding fifteen days, to pay or tender the rent due by him to the landlord upto the date of such payment or tender and on such payment or tender, the application shall be rejected. " and contended that the said proviso to Section 10 (2) of the Act, and the effect of the proviso had not been taken into the proviso had not been taken into consideration while deciding the aspect of wilful default. The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to a decision of this Court in Vinukonda Venkata Ramana and others v. Mootha Venkateswara Rao and others, 2001 (6) ALD 27 = 2001 (5) ALT 479 , and contended that in the light of the same, the default in the present case cannot be said to be wilful default. The learned Counsel further contended that Ex. A1 itself cannot be believed and hence the bona fide requirement also has to be negatived. As far as sub-letting is concerned, it was contended that the Court-below had totally erred in arriving at a conclusion that there is sub-letting in view of Ex. A28. The learned Counsel also had submitted that the ingredients essential for establishing the subletting had not been proved at all and hence both the Courts below had committed a grave error in arriving at the conclusion that sub-letting is established. A28. The learned Counsel also had submitted that the ingredients essential for establishing the subletting had not been proved at all and hence both the Courts below had committed a grave error in arriving at the conclusion that sub-letting is established. The learned Counsel also had submitted that the Proprietrix of the 2nd revision petitioner is none other than the wife of the 1st revision petitioner. The learned Counsel had placed reliance on P. Raj anna v, Smt. K. Lalitha Reddy, 1995 (3) ALD 922 = 1995 (3) ALT 789 . ( 8 ) SRI Ramchander Rao, the learned Counsel representing the respondent-landlord had contended that the concurrent findings had been recorded by both the Courts below relating to all the grounds and hence the impugned order does not suffer from any legal infirmity. The learned Counsel also had contended that in the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no question of invoking the proviso to Section 10 (2) of the Act. The conduct of the tenant clearly goes to show that the default committed by him is nothing but wilful default. The learned Counsel had pointed out the detailed discussion relating to the grounds on which eviction was ordered. The learned Counsel had stressed on Ex. A28. The learned Counsel also had contended that RW3, the husband alone was examined and the wife was not examined. The learned Counsel also had submitted that in Ex. A28 there is a clear undertaking that the business will be run by the husband only and hence in the absence of the consent of the landlord automatically the act of the husband in permitting the wife to run business will definitely amounts to sub-letting. The learned Counsel also had taken me through the relevant portions of the pleadings and also the evidence which had been let in by the respective parties and the learned Counsel also had contended that the findings are very clear and categorical as far as bona fide requirement is concerned and hence the civil revision petition is liable to be dismissed. ( 9 ) AS far as the ground of wilful default is concerned, the main contention of the revision petitioners is that in view of the decision of the Apex Court cited (supra) and also the decision of this Court in CRP No. 1618/2000 and Batch, dated 30-10-2001, the default if any, should be taken as only technical default and not real default and hence it will not amount to wilful default. The disputed period is from 1-11-1983 to 30-6-1984. The tenant has been paying Rs. 325/- per month from 1982 onwards. It is the case of the landlord that in the year 1983 there was partition and the respective portions fell to the shares of the respective brothers and the same is evidenced by a partition list Ex. A1. No doubt, the stand of the revision petitioner is Ex. A1 was brought into existence only with a view to evict them. But however, this aspect did not find favour in both the Courts below. Exs. A2 to A4, A13, A14, A16 to A20 and A21, clearly go to show that Ex. Al was acted upon. Ex. A7 is the notice to the respective tenants informing the said partition and arrangement under Ex. A1. It is pertinent to note that after the partition Madula Narayana Rao and his brothers failed to receive rents sent to them by M. Os. except on the first occasion and hence the rents were being deposited into Bank and the Bank passbook maintained by the 2nd petitioner had been filed. But however inspite of specific direction by the landlord to pay rents to the respective sharers under Ex. A7, a notice issued jointly, the tenant had failed to pay rents to the landlord and no doubt an attempt was made by Sri Veerabhadrayya to show that because of these events only there was some default, which is only technical default and not wilful default. It is pertinent to note that despite the notices, the conduct of the tenant in sending the amount in the name of Maddula Narayana Rao and even after Ex. A7 the non-payment of rent to the respective parties clearly go to show that for reasons best known the tenant was not inclined to pay the rents to the right person. It is pertinent to note that despite the notices, the conduct of the tenant in sending the amount in the name of Maddula Narayana Rao and even after Ex. A7 the non-payment of rent to the respective parties clearly go to show that for reasons best known the tenant was not inclined to pay the rents to the right person. Here is a case where the conduct of the parties clearly reveal that the non-payment of rents during the relevant period is deliberate, intentional and wilful as held by both the Courts below. This conduct of the party was well appreciated by both the Courts below and it is also not in dispute that subsequent to the filing of the petition only the deposit of rents had been made into Court for a period of 10 months and hence in the light of the concurrent findings relating to the ground of wilful default, I am not inclined to disturb this finding of the Court below to the effect that the tenant had committed wilful default in payment of rents. ( 10 ) AS far as bona fide requirement is concerned, there is detailed discussion about the bona fide requirement by both the Court of first instance and also the appellate authority. A clear finding had been recorded that PW3 had got experience in doing cloth business and he wants to put up cloth business in the petition schedule premises which fell to his share and this fact recorded on appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence being a concurrent finding of fact, I am not inclined to disturb the said finding. ( 11 ) COMING to the aspect of sub-lease, it is the contention of the landlord that originally the 1st revision petitioner had taken the petition schedule premises on lease and subsequently it was let out to the 2nd revision petitioner which was made without the consent of the landlord and thus the 1st revision petitioner had violated the terms and conditions. However, it is the stand of the 1 st revision petitioner that from the inception, the 2nd revision petitioner alone has been doing business in the petition schedule premises and the 1st revision petitioner has been acting only as a Manager in the said shop and there is no sub-lease at all. Strong reliance is placed on Ex. However, it is the stand of the 1 st revision petitioner that from the inception, the 2nd revision petitioner alone has been doing business in the petition schedule premises and the 1st revision petitioner has been acting only as a Manager in the said shop and there is no sub-lease at all. Strong reliance is placed on Ex. A28, a letter executed by the 1st revision petitioner on 6-4-1972. The 1st revision petitioner was examined as RW3 and he was confronted with Ex. A28 who had admitted as follows: "ex. A28 is the undertaking letter which is in my handwriting and it bears my signature. I addressed Ex. A28 to the petitioner in RCCNo. 90/84. In Ex. A28 it is mentioned that I have undertaken and agreed to run the business in the shop in RCC No. 90/84 and in the shop of my brother-in-law in the name and style of Kakamparthi Krishna Murthy". The contention of the revision petitioners is that since 1964 the business was being run in the name of the 2nd revision petitioner, but however this contention no doubt was negatived for want of proof. It is pertinent to note that RW3 is none other than the husband of Rajeswari. Now the question that has to be considered is in view of Ex. A28 and also the evidence of RW3, whether the ground of sub-letting had been established. The findings of the Courts below on the aspect of sub-letting appear to be that in view of the violation of the conditions of Ex. A28, it can be taken that the sub-letting had been established. Subletting or sub-lease is, no doubt, made a ground of eviction and in fact it is a transfer of right under lease by the tenant to a sub-tenant. Sub-tenancy is an assignment of right of tenancy by a tenant in favour of a person a person other than a tenant. It is no doubt true that even the wife can be a person other than the tenant. Under Ex. A28 no doubt certain condition had been stipulated. Even a sub-lease or a transfer of lease for the purpose of Section 10 (2) (ii) (a) of the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, must satisfy the ingredients of Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. Under Ex. A28 no doubt certain condition had been stipulated. Even a sub-lease or a transfer of lease for the purpose of Section 10 (2) (ii) (a) of the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, must satisfy the ingredients of Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 reads as follows: "a lease of immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, on consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms. The transferor is called the lessor, the transferee is called the lessee, the price is called the premium, and the money, share, service or other thing to be so rendered is called the rent. " the only evidence available on record is Ex. A28 and certain admissions of RW3. The other ingredients essential to establish the aspect of sub-lease had not been proved in the present case. The rate of rent or the premium between the parties and other terms and conditions in between the lessee and the sub-lessee are all certain of the essential aspects to be proved and established in the case of sub-letting and in the absence of satisfactory evidence it cannot be said that merely because a condition had been stipulated under Ex. A28, automatically it can be taken that the ground of sub-letting is established, unless by letting in proper evidence the ingredients of Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act are established. It is one thing to say that the conditions stipulated in Ex. A28 had been violated and it is another thing to say that there is subletting of the premises. In my considered opinion, to establish sub-letting of the premises, the material available on record is not sufficient, more so especially in the light of the relationship of the alleged lessee and sub-lessee in the present case. Hence, as far as the ground of sub-letting is concerned, in my considered opinion, both the Courts below had erred in ordering eviction on this ground. Hence, as far as the ground of sub-letting is concerned, in my considered opinion, both the Courts below had erred in ordering eviction on this ground. ( 12 ) BUT however since both the Courts below concurrently held that the revision petitioners are liable to be evicted on the ground of wilful default and also bona fide requirement and inasmuch as this Court also is affirming those concurrent findings relating to the two grounds, the civil revision petition is devoid of merits and accordingly the same is dismissed. No order as to costs. But however, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the revision petitioners are granted four months time to vacate the premises.