JUDGMENT Pattanaik, J.-Union of India is the appellant in all these appeals and these appeals are directed against the orders of different Central Administrative Tribunals. The respondents are the employees of the Unit-Run-Canteens which provide canteen facilities to the troops at the unit level. Applications before the Central Administrative Tribunals were filed by these employees claiming benefits as regular defence personnel employees or at least as civilian employees serving under the Ministry of Defence on the allegation that the Unit-Run-Canteens are part of the Canteen Stores Department and since the Canteen Stores Department forms a part of the Government in the Ministry of Defence there is no reason as to why the Unit-Run-Canteens should not be held to be a part of Ministry of Defence. On behalf of Union of India the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was assailed on the ground that these employees cannot be held to be the Government employees and consequently the Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the applications and decide the grievances of the employees. According to the Union of India the Unit-Run-Canteens are operated by the non-public funds and the expenditure required to run the Unit Canteens is made out of the profits earned by the canteens itself and, therefore, so far as the personnel serving in such canteens, there is no relationship of master and servant between the Government of India and the employees, and consequently the applications before the Tribunal should be rejected. The Central Administrative Tribunals, however, at Jodhpur and Bombay took the view that the Unit-Run-Canteens are the part of Defence establishment and consequently the holder of a post in the management of such canteen must be held to be connected with the Defence Services. The Tribunals examined the relevant provisions made by different personnel providing all pervasive control with the Ministry of Defence and thus held that there subsist master and servant relationship between the employees serving in Unit-Run-Canteens and the Ministry of Defence and, therefore, the Tribunal retains the jurisdiction to entertain applications and decide those applications in accordance with law. Mr. The Tribunals examined the relevant provisions made by different personnel providing all pervasive control with the Ministry of Defence and thus held that there subsist master and servant relationship between the employees serving in Unit-Run-Canteens and the Ministry of Defence and, therefore, the Tribunal retains the jurisdiction to entertain applications and decide those applications in accordance with law. Mr. Goswami, learned senior counsel appearing for the Union of India vehemently contended before us, that these Unit-Run-Canteens are different from the Canteen Stores Department and the salary of the employees serving in the Unit-Run-Canteens are not paid out of the Consolidated Fund of India but a fund created at the unit level and profit out of sales in Unit and Canteens are utilised for the payment of salary as well as for creating assets of the canteens, and consequently it is not possible to hold that there exist relationship of master and servant between the employees serving in these canteens and the Union of India in the Ministry of Defence. According to Mr. Goswami, no doubt, some amount of control is vested with the local defence personnel, be it Army, Air Force or Navy, over the employees serving in Unit-Run-Canteens, but conferment of such disciplinary control alone will not clothe the employees with the status of Government servant or servants under the Ministry of Defence and the Tribunal, therefore, committed serious error in declaring the status of these employees as Government servants. Mr. Goswami also strongly relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Union of India and Another v. Chotelal and others1 in which case this Court has held that the Dhobis in the National Defence Academy, Khadakwasla are not Government servants, particularly because their salary is not paid out of the Consolidated Fund of India. According to Mr. Goswami, the Administrative Tribunals at Allahabad and Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh have taken contrary view so far as the status of these Unit-Run-Canteens employees are concerned, and according to the learned counsel that constitutes a correct view. 2. Mr. Mohta, Mr. P.N. Mishra, senior advocates and several other learned counsel appearing for the respondents, on the other hand contended, that the Central Administrative Tribunals at Jodhpur and Bombay have taken the correct view with regard to the status of such employees. 2. Mr. Mohta, Mr. P.N. Mishra, senior advocates and several other learned counsel appearing for the respondents, on the other hand contended, that the Central Administrative Tribunals at Jodhpur and Bombay have taken the correct view with regard to the status of such employees. According to them the decision of this Court and the test indicated in the Life Insurance Corporation case would fully apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case and, as such, there will be no reason to hold that the employees in the Unit-Run-Canteens are not the Government servants. 3. In order to decide whether the employees serving in the Unit-Run-Canteens can be held to be Government servants, it is necessary to find out the mode of appointment of such employees, Rules and Regulations governing the conditions of service of such employees, fund from which such salary is paid, and other factors which really determine the existence of relationship of master and servant between the Government and the employees. In the Defence Services there are two types of canteens; (1) Canteen Stores Department, and (2) Unit-Run-Canteens. The Canteen Stores Department was in existence in this country even during pre-independence days and it has its Head Office and Base Depot in Bombay with 33 Area Depots all over the country. These Area Depots are the wholesale outlets, which serve Unit-Run Canteens in their respective zones. The Canteen Stores Department after the independence from 1948 onwards function as a Department under the Ministry of Defence initially for 3 years on an experimental basis and later from 1950 has been working on permanent basis. We are concerned in the present case with the Unit-Run Canteens and the status of the employees serving therein. As has been stated earlier, these Unit-Run Canteens under their respective Commanding Officers in the three services - Army, Navy and Air Force get their articles from the wholesale outlets in Area Depot of the Canteen Stores Department and at present there exist 3400 Unit-Run Canteens. Prior to the World War II the retail trade in the Defence Services was in the hands of the contractors. During World War II a regular cadre called Indian Canteen Code came to be formed under the Canteen Services (India) to handle retail trade in operational areas where contractors were not expected to go. Prior to the World War II the retail trade in the Defence Services was in the hands of the contractors. During World War II a regular cadre called Indian Canteen Code came to be formed under the Canteen Services (India) to handle retail trade in operational areas where contractors were not expected to go. After 1947, the organisation split into two : Canteen Stores Department (India) and Canteen Stores Department (Pakistan). The retail trade, however, was reverted to the contractors. But by the early fifties it was realised that the margin of profit between the wholesale price and the retail rate could be a welcome source of funds available to commanding officers for welfare purposes. Thus, the concept of unit-run canteens was born, and contractors were driven out. When Major Gen. K.S. Thimaya took over as Quarter Master General, he gave detailed thought to providing canteen facilities to the troops at the unit level. He found that retail outlets being in the hands of the unit canteen contractors, the margin between the wholesale price and retail price of goods went to the contractors whereas the amount in the hands of individual commanding officers of units in the Army, Navy and Air Force could be utilised for the welfare of the troops. The case was therefore, made out jointly for taking over of contractor-run canteens by units or formations, as the case may be, so that the profits from the sale of canteen stores could be retained within the unit. Contractors, no doubt, put up considerable objection to the aforesaid proposal but the Government agreed to the proposal of General Thimaya and orders were issued. The concept of Unit-Run Canteens, therefore, became an accepted doctrine though it took considerable period for implementing change over. It goes without saying that from 1948 onwards the Canteen (for short CSD ) functioned as a department under the Ministry of Defence, initially for three years on an experimental basis, and later from 1950 on a permanent basis and yet right upto 1977 the legal status of the same remained nebulous. For functional purposes, it was a commercial undertaking, but for actual practice it was treated as a Department of the Ministry of Defence. The result was that the terms and conditions of employees presented various problems which quite often became a source of discontent and unpleasant employer-employee relations. For functional purposes, it was a commercial undertaking, but for actual practice it was treated as a Department of the Ministry of Defence. The result was that the terms and conditions of employees presented various problems which quite often became a source of discontent and unpleasant employer-employee relations. As has been stated earlier, for effective functioning of the defence services it is absolutely necessary to provide canteen facilities through out the country and while the Canteen Stores Department serve as whole sale outlet it is the Unit-Run Canteens which serve as retail outlet. A set of Rules regulating the terms and conditions of service of the employees of Unit-Run canteens have been framed which confers all pervasive control over the employees with the authorities of Defence services. Though the funding of the Unit-Run Canteens is not made out of the Consolidated Fund of India but it is made by the Canteen Stores Department and this Department it its turn has formed a part of the Ministry of Defence, admittedly. In Parimal Chandra Raha and others v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and others2, the employees of different canteens in different offices of the Life Insurance Corporation whether were employees of the Corporation itself was under consideration by this Court. This Court evolved four principles which are quoted hereunder : "(i) Canteens maintained under obligatory provisions of the Factories Act for the use of the employees became a part of the establishment and the workers employed in such canteens are employees of the management. (ii) Even if there is a non-statutory obligation to provide a canteen, the position is the same as in the case of statutory canteens. However, if there is a mere obligation to provide facilities to run a canteen, the canteen does not become part of the establishment. (iii) The obligation to provide canteen may be explicit or implicit. Whether the provision for canteen services has become a part of the service conditions or not, is a question of fact to be determined on the facts and circumstances in each case. (iii) The obligation to provide canteen may be explicit or implicit. Whether the provision for canteen services has become a part of the service conditions or not, is a question of fact to be determined on the facts and circumstances in each case. (iv) Whether a particular facility or service has become implicitly a part of the service conditions of the employees or not, will depend, among others, on the nature of the service/facility, the contribution the service in question makes to the efficiency of the employees and the establishment, whether the service is available as a matter of right to all the employees in their capacity as employees and nothing more, the employees who avail of the service, the length of time for which the service has been continuously available, the hours during which it is available, the nature and character of management, the interest taken by the employer in providing, maintaining, supervising and controlling the service, the contribution made by the management in the form of infrastructure and funds for making the service available etc." Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts in the present case, it is difficult to conceive as to how the employees working in the Unit-Run Canteens can be held to be not Government servants, when it has emerged that providing canteen facilities to the Defence service personnel is obligatory on the part of the Government and in fact these Unit-Run Canteens discharge the duty of retail outlets after getting their provision from the wholesale outlet or depot of the Canteen Stores Department. Mr. Goswami, the learned senior counsel appearing for the Union of India strongly relied upon the judgment of this Court in Union of India and another v. Chotelal & Others (supra), wherein the question for consideration was whether Dhobis appointed to wash the clothes of cadets at NDA at Khadakwasla who are being paid from the regimental fund could be treated as holders of civil post within the Ministry of Defence. This Court answered in the negative because the regimental fund was held not to be a public fund as defined in paragraph 802 of Defence Services Regulation. Payment to such dhobis out of the regimental fund and the character of that regimental fund was the determinative factor. This Court answered in the negative because the regimental fund was held not to be a public fund as defined in paragraph 802 of Defence Services Regulation. Payment to such dhobis out of the regimental fund and the character of that regimental fund was the determinative factor. But in the case in hand if the Canteen Stores Department forms a part of the Ministry of Defence and if their funds form a part of the Consolidated Fund of India and it is the said Canteen Stores Department which provides fund as well as different article through the retail outlets of Unit-Run Canteens then the employees who discharge the duties of salesmen in such retail outlets must be held to be employees under the Government. The officers of the Defence Services have all pervasive control over the Unit-Run Canteens as well as the employees serving therein. Regular set of Rules have been framed determining the service conditions of the employees in Unit-Run Canteens. The funding of articles are provided by Canteen Stores Department which itself is a part of the Ministry of Defence. The report of a Committee of Subordinate Legislation went into detail the working conditions of the employees engaged in the Unit-Run Canteens and categorically came to the conclusion that these employees are recruited, controlled and supervised by the Rules and Regulations made by the Defence Services although these have been given the name of Executive Instructions. The said Committee came to the conclusion that for all intent and purposes the employees in the Unit-Run Canteens are Government employees and should be treated as such. In the aforesaid premises, we are of the considered opinion that the status of the employees in the Unit-Run Canteens must be held to be that of a government employee and consequently the Central Administrative Tribunal would have the jurisdiction to entertain applications by such employees under the provisions of Administrative Tribunal Act. Civil Appeal Nos. 1039-1040 of 1999 by the Union of India against the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jodhpur Branch in O.A. No. 86 of 1995 accordingly stand dismissed. 4. Civil Appeal No. 1041 of 1999 is Union s appeal against the decision of Central Administrative Tribunal, Jodhpur Branch in O.A. No.157 of 1993 and OA No. 333 of 1994. 1039-1040 of 1999 by the Union of India against the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jodhpur Branch in O.A. No. 86 of 1995 accordingly stand dismissed. 4. Civil Appeal No. 1041 of 1999 is Union s appeal against the decision of Central Administrative Tribunal, Jodhpur Branch in O.A. No.157 of 1993 and OA No. 333 of 1994. By the impugned orders the Tribunal came to hold that it had the jurisdiction to entertain the applications filed by the employees of the Unit-Run Canteens and further directed that those employees are entitled to pay and other benefits similar to the pay and other benefits available to the canteen employees in the CSDI. The Tribunal also further directed that the applicants should get the minimum of the salary presently being paid to their counter-parts in the CSDI and all the benefits of the other service conditions available to the regular Government employees in the CSDI. It also further directed that they should be treated as Government employees from the date of the filing of the applications before the Tribunal. It also directed that they would be entitled to retiral benefits. As already stated, we have come to the conclusion about the status of the employees serving in Unit-Run Canteens to be that of Government servants, but that by itself ipso facto would not entitle them to get all the service benefits as is available to the regular government servant or even their counter parts serving in the CSD Canteens. It would necessarily depend upon the nature of duty discharged by them as well as on the Rules and Regulations and Administrative Instructions issued by the employer. We have come across a set of Administrative Instructions issued by the Competent Authority governing the service conditions of the employees of such Unit-Run Canteens. In this view of the matter, the direction of the Tribunal that the employees of the Unit-Run Canteens should be given all the benefits including the retiral benefits of regular government servants cannot be sustained and we accordingly, set aside that part of the direction. In this view of the matter, the direction of the Tribunal that the employees of the Unit-Run Canteens should be given all the benefits including the retiral benefits of regular government servants cannot be sustained and we accordingly, set aside that part of the direction. We, however, hold that these employees of the Unit-Run Canteens will draw at the minimum of the regular scale of pay available to their counter parts in the CSDI and, we further direct the Ministry of Defence, Union of India to determine the service conditions of the employees in the Unit-Run Canteens at an early date, preferably within six months from the date of this judgment. This appeal is accordingly disposed of with the aforesaid direction and observation. 5. Civil Appeal Nos. 1042-43 of 1999. These appeals by the Union of India are directed against the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jodhpur Bench in OA No. 231 of 1994, whereunder the Tribunal has directed the Union Government to review the payment of subsistance allowance payable to the employees in the light of the E.F.R. 53 of the Fundamental Rules. Notwithstanding the fact that we have recorded the conclusion that the employees serving under Unit-Run Canteens could be treated as Government servants, but that does not necessarily mean that the service conditions of such employees are governed by the Fundamental Rules. It would be open for the employer to frame separate conditions of service of the employees or to adopt the Fundamental Rules. There is no decision of the employer that Fundamental Rules would be applicable to such employees and in the absence of such decision the Tribunal was not justified to direct that the question of payment of subsistance allowance should be reviewed in accordance with the provisions contained in the Fundamental Rules. In this view of the matter, though we uphold the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain applications filed by employees serving in Unit-Run Canteens but the impugned direction for reviewing the payment of subsistance allowance in terms of Fundamental Rules cannot be sustained and that part of the direction accordingly stands set aside and Union s appeal to that extent stands allowed. These appeals are disposed of with aforesaid directions and observations. (C.R.) Order accordingly. **************** JUDGMENT Thomas, J.-Leave granted. 2. These appeals are disposed of with aforesaid directions and observations. (C.R.) Order accordingly. **************** JUDGMENT Thomas, J.-Leave granted. 2. Can a claim be maintained before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal ( Tribunal for short ) on the basis of strict liability propounded in Rylands v. Fletcher1. The Tribunal dismissed a claim made before it solely on the ground that there was neither rashness nor negligence in driving the vehicle and hence the driver has no liability, and the corollary of which is that the owner has no vicarious liability to pay compensation to the dependants of the victim of a motor accident. A Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad dismissed the appeal filed by the claimants by a cryptic order stating that there is no error in the Tribunal s order. Hence this appeal by special leave. 3. The accident which gave rise to the claim occurred at about 7.00 P.M. on 20.3.1986. The vehicle involved in the accident was a jeep. It capsized while it was in motion. The cause of the capsized was attributed to bursting of the front tyre of the jeep. In the process of capsizing the vehicle hit against one Haji Mohammad Hanif who was walking on the road at that ill-fated moment and consequently that pedestrian was crushed and subsequently succumbed to the injuries sustained in that accident. 4. Appellants are the widow and children of Haji Mohammad Hanif, the victim of the accident. They filed a claim petition before the Tribunal in 1986 itself claiming a sum of Rs. 2,36,000/- as total compensation. They said that deceased Haji Mohammad Hanif was aged 35 when he died and that he was earning a monthly income of Rs.1500/- during those days by doing some business in manufacturing steel trunks. 5. The owner of the jeep disclaimed the liability by denying even the fact of the accident in which his jeep was involved. Alternatively, he contended that any liability found against him in respect of the said jeep the same should be realised from the insurance company as the vehicle was covered by valid insurance policy. The Tribunal repelled the above contentions of the jeep owner. Alternatively, he contended that any liability found against him in respect of the said jeep the same should be realised from the insurance company as the vehicle was covered by valid insurance policy. The Tribunal repelled the above contentions of the jeep owner. However, the Tribunal found as follows : "It appears that the front wheel of the jeep suddenly got burst resulting in the disbalance and occurrence of this accident as it is mentioned in Ex-2 the report of the Police Station. Whatever is the circumstance, the rash and negligence of the alleged jeep is not established." 6. Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the claim for compensation. However, the Tribunal directed the insurance company to pay Rs. 50,000/- to the claimants by way of no fault liability envisaged in Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short the MV Act ) (corresponding to Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 - the old MV Act). 7. Aggrieved by the said rejection of the claim the appellants moved the High Court of Allahabad in appeal, as per the provisions of the MV Act on 28.4.1999, a Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal for which a very short order has been passed. It reads thus: "Heard learned counsel for the appellant. Finding has been recorded that the tempo overturned and there were no negligence or rashness of the driver. Hence Rs.50,000/- has been awarded as compensation which is the minimum amount. There is no error in the order. Dismissed." 8. We have to proceed on two premises based on the finding of the Tribunal. The first is that there was no negligence or rashness on the part of the driver of the jeep. Second is that the deceased was knocked down by the jeep when its front tyre burst and consequently the vehicle became disbalanced and turned turtle. Should there necessarily be negligence of the person who drove the vehicle if a claim for compensation (due to the accident involving that vehicle) is to be sustained? 9. For considering the above question we may refer to the relevant provisions of the MV Act. Chapter XII of the MV Act subsumed the provisions relating to "Claims Tribunal". Should there necessarily be negligence of the person who drove the vehicle if a claim for compensation (due to the accident involving that vehicle) is to be sustained? 9. For considering the above question we may refer to the relevant provisions of the MV Act. Chapter XII of the MV Act subsumed the provisions relating to "Claims Tribunal". Whatever could be considered and determined by the civil courts in suits claiming compensation in respect of accidents, arising out of the use of motor vehicles, have been now directed to be determined by Claims Tribunals established by the State under the provisions of the MV Act. Of course, when accident in this case happened it was the old MV Act which was in force. But the old Act contained identical provisions in respect of a lot of matters connected with Claims Tribunal. For the purpose of the appeal only those provisions which are identically worded need be considered. So it would be convenient to refer to the provisions of the new Act. 10. Section 165(1) of the MV Act confers power on the State Government to constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals by notification in the Official Gazette for such area as may be specified in the notification. Such Tribunals are constituted for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both. Section 175 of the MV Act contains a prohibition that "no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal." 11. It must be noted that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is not restricted to decide claims arising out of negligence in the use of motor vehicles. Negligence is only one of the species of the causes of action for making a claim for compensation in respect of accidents arising out of the use of motor vehicles. There are other premises for such cause of action. 12. Negligence is only one of the species of the causes of action for making a claim for compensation in respect of accidents arising out of the use of motor vehicles. There are other premises for such cause of action. 12. Even if there is no negligence on the part of the driver or owner of the motor vehicle, but accident happens while the vehicle was in use, should not the owner be made liable for damages to the person who suffered on account of such accident? This question depends upon how far the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (supra) can apply in motor accident cases. The said Rule is summarized by Blackburn, J, thus: "The true rule of law is that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land, and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff s default, or, perhaps, that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God; but, as nothing of this sort exists here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient." 13. The House of Lords considered it and upheld the ratio with the following dictum : "We think that the true rule of law is that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff s default, or, perhaps, that the escape was the consequence of vis major or the act of God; but, as nothing of this sort exists, here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient." 14. The above Rule eventually gained approval in a large number of decisions rendered by courts in England and abroad. Winfield on Tort has brought out even a chapter on the "Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher". At page 543 of the 15th Edn. The above Rule eventually gained approval in a large number of decisions rendered by courts in England and abroad. Winfield on Tort has brought out even a chapter on the "Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher". At page 543 of the 15th Edn. of the celebrated work the learned author has pointed out that over the years Rylands v. Fletcher has been applied to a remarkable variety of things: fire, gas, explosions, electricity, oil, noxious fumes, colliery spoil, rusty wire from a decayed fence, vibrations, poisonous vegetation........". He has elaborated seven defences recognised in common law against action brought on the strength of the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. They are: (1) Consent of the plaintiff i.e. volenti non fit injuria. (2) Common benefit i.e. where the source of the danger is maintained for the common benefit of the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant is not liable for its escape. (3) Act of stranger i.e. if the escape was caused by the unforeseeable act of a stranger, the rule does not apply. (4) Exercise of statutory authority i.e. the rule will stand excluded either when the act was done under a statutory duty or when a statute provides otherwise. (5) Act of God or vis major i.e. circumstances which no human foresight can provide against and of which human prudence is not bound to recognise the possibility. (6) Default of the plaintiff i.e. if the damage is caused solely by the act or default of the plaintiff himself, the rule will not apply. (7) Remoteness of consequences i.e. the rule cannot be applied ad infinitum, because even according to the formulation of the rule made by Blackburn, J., the defendant is answerable only for all the damage "which is the natural consequence of its escape". 15. The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher has been referred to by this Court in a number of decisions. While dealing with the liability of industries engaged in hazardous or dangerous activities P.N. Bhagwati, CJ, speaking for the Constitution Bench in M.C. Mehta & Anr. v. Union of India and Ors.2, expressed the view that there is no necessity to bank on the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. What the learned Judge observed is this : "We have to evolve new principles and lay down new norms which would adequately deal with the new problems which arise in a highly industrialised economy. v. Union of India and Ors.2, expressed the view that there is no necessity to bank on the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. What the learned Judge observed is this : "We have to evolve new principles and lay down new norms which would adequately deal with the new problems which arise in a highly industrialised economy. We cannot allow our judicial thinking to be constricted by reference to the law as it prevails in England or for the matter of that in any other foreign country. We no longer need the crutches of a foreign legal order." 16. It is pertinent to point out that the Constitution Bench did not disapprove the Rule. On the contrary, learned Judges further said that "we are certainly prepared to receive light from whatever source it comes." It means that the Constitution Bench did not foreclose the application of the Rule as a legal proposition. 17. In Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India3 another Constitution Bench of this Court while dealing with Bhopal gas leak disaster cases, made a reference to the earlier decisions in M.C. Mehta (supra) but did not take the same view. The rule of strict liability was found favour with. Yet another Constitution Bench in Union Carbide Corporation and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.4 referred to M.C. Mehta s decision but did not detract from the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. 18. In Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and Anr.5 the question considered was regarding the application of the Rule in cases arising out of motor accidents. The observation made by E.S. Venkataramiah, J. (as he then was) can profitably be extracted here: "Today, thanks to the modern civilization, thousands of motor vehicles are put on the road and the largest number of injuries and deaths are taking place on the roads on account of the motor vehicles accidents. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, the motor vehicles upon the roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands v. Fletcher. From the point of view of the pedestrian the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of the motor vehicles highly dangerous. Hit and run cases where the drivers of the motor vehicles who have caused the accidents are not known are increasing in number. From the point of view of the pedestrian the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of the motor vehicles highly dangerous. Hit and run cases where the drivers of the motor vehicles who have caused the accidents are not known are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives as the case may be should be entitled to recover damages if the principle of social justice should have any meaning at all. In order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents there has been a continuous agitation throughout the world to make the liability for damages arising out of motor vehicles accidents as a liability without fault." 19. Like any other common law principle, which is acceptable to our jurisprudence, the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher can be followed (at least until any other new principle which excels the former can be evolved, or until legislation provides differently.) Hence, we are disposed to adopt the Rule in claims for compensation made in respect of motor accidents. 20. "No Fault Liability" envisaged in section 140 of the MV Act is distinguishable from the rule of strict liability. In the former the compensation amount is fixed and is payable even if any one of the exceptions to the Rule can be applied. It is a statutory liability created without which the claimant should not get any amount under that count. Compensation on account of accident arising from the use of motor vehicles can be claimed under the common law even without the aid of a statute. The provisions of the MV Act permits that compensation paid under no fault liability can be deducted from the final amount awarded by the Tribunal. Therefore, these two are resting on two different premises. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even apart from Section 140 of the MV Act, a victim in an accident which occurred while using a motor vehicle, is entitled to get compensation from a Tribunal unless any one of the exceptions would apply. The Tribunal and the High Court have, therefore, gone into error in divesting the claimants of the compensation payable to them. 21. The Tribunal and the High Court have, therefore, gone into error in divesting the claimants of the compensation payable to them. 21. Now, we have to decide as to the quantum of compensation payable to the appellants. We first thought that the matter can be remitted to the Tribunal for fixation of the quantum of compensation but we are mindful of the fact that this is a case in which the accident happened more than 13 years ago. Hence we are inclined to fix the quantum of compensation here itself. 22. Appellants claimed a sum of Rs. 2,36,000/-. But PW-1 widow of the deceased said that her husband s income was Rs. 1,500 per month. PW-4 brother of the deceased also supported the same version. No contra evidence has been adduced in regard to that aspect. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe that the monthly income of the deceased was Rs. 1,500/-. In calculating the amount of compensation in this case we lean ourselves to adopt the structured formula provided in the Second Schedule to the MV Act. Though it was formulated for the purpose of Section 163A of the MV Act, we find it a safer guidance for arriving at the amount of compensation than any other method so far as the present case is concerned. 23. The age of the deceased at the time of accident was said to be 35 years plus. But when that is taken along with the annual income of Rs. 18,000/- figure indicated in the structured formula is Rs. 2,70,000/-. When 1/3 therefore is deducted the balance would be Rs. 1,80,000/-. We, therefore, deem it just and proper to fix the said amount as total compensation payable to the appellants as on the date of their claim. 24. Now, we have to fix up the rate of interest. Section 171 of the M.V. Act empowers the Tribunal to direct that "in addition to the amount of compensation simple interest shall also be paid at such rate and from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim as may be specified in this behalf." Earlier, 12 was found to be the reasonable rate of simple interest. With a change in economy and the policy of the Reserve Bank of India the interest rate has been lowered. With a change in economy and the policy of the Reserve Bank of India the interest rate has been lowered. The nationalised banks are now granting interest at the rate of 9 on fixed deposits for one year. We, therefore, direct that the compensation amount fixed hereinbefore shall bear interest at the rate of 9 per annum from the date of the claim made by the appellants. The amount of Rs.50,000/- paid by the Insurance Company under Section 140 shall be deducted from the principal amount as on the date of its payment, and interest would be recalculated on the balance amount of the principal sum from such date. We direct the first respondent Insurance Company to pay the above amount to the claimants by depositing it in the Tribunal. Once such deposit is made the same shall be disbursed to the claimants in accordance with the principles laid down by this Court in General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma Thomas & Ors.6. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. (C.R.) Order accordingly. *************** Parallel Citations of other Journals : Union of India & Ors. v. M. Aslam & Anr., 2001(1) Supreme 11 : 2001(1) JT 278 : (2001) 1 SCC 720 : 2001 LIC 488 : 2001 (88) FLR 759 : 2001 (1) SCSLJ 167 : AIR 2001 SC 526 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 302 : 2001 (1) ATJ 667 : 2001 (2) LLN 95 : 2001 (2) SLJ 287 : 2001(3) SLR 414 00074