S. B. SINHA, C. J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition is directed against a judgment and order dated 15. 10. 2001 passed by the A. P. Administrative Tribunal in O. A. No. 6945 of 2001. PACTS: ( 2 ) THE fact of the matter shorn of unnecessary details is as follows: The petitioner herein was empanelled in the year 1989 in the selection list to the posts of Secondary Grade Basic Teacher. He and other similarly situate persons filed the aforementioned original applications when they were not appointed but a fresh recruitment was taken up. Before the learned Tribunal the prayer of the writ petitioner was : to declare that the applicant is entitled for the benefits conferred in Memo No,18788/ Ser. VI/99, Education (Ser. VI) Department, dated 23. 5. 2001 for appointment as Teacher in Krishna District as per merit list dated 20. 8. 2001 prepared by the fourth respondent herein by holding the action of the respondents herein insisting the applicant to get the order from the Court of Law is illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory, capricious and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. ( 3 ) IT was dismissed on the ground that the same was barred by limitation. ( 4 ) SRI P. V. Subrahmanya Sarma, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that the learned Tribunal ought to have considered that matter in the light of the Division Bench decision of this Court in Kinnera Asirwadam v. Government of A. P. , 2000 (5) ALD 354 = 2000 (5) ALT 108 (DB), which has been followed by this Bench in Writ Petition No. 21937 of 1999 and batch, dated 17. 1. 2001. The learned Government Pleader on the other hand has drawn our attention to an unreported decision of this Court in Paul John v. State of A. P. and others (Writ Petition No. 15080 of 2001, dated 18. 8. 2001 ). Question_: ( 5 ) THE only question, which arises for consideration is as to whether the petitioner in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case is entitled to any relief. Finding: ( 6 ) THE fact that the petitioner has approached the Tribunal after expiry of the period of limitation is not in dispute. The Division Bench decision of this Court in Kinnera Asirwadam (supra) was rendered on 28. 8. 2000. Finding: ( 6 ) THE fact that the petitioner has approached the Tribunal after expiry of the period of limitation is not in dispute. The Division Bench decision of this Court in Kinnera Asirwadam (supra) was rendered on 28. 8. 2000. The petitioner approached the Tribunal on 15. 11. 2001. No reason, far less any sufficient reason, has been assigned tor approaching the Tribunal after such an inordinate delay. ( 7 ) BEFORE this Court in Writ Petition No. 21937 of 1999 and Batch the parties conceded that the matter is covered by the decision of the Division Bench in kinnera Asirwadam (supra ). On that representation the writ petition was disposed of directing that the said judgment shall govern those cases also. But the matter had been considered in some detail by this Bench in Writ Petition No. 15080 of 2001 on contest. The petitioner like the petitioners in the other cases had also been waiting on the fence. Despite a Government order in G. O. Rt. No. 310, dated 22. 11. 1990 having been issued and despite the order of this Court in Writ Petition No. 17104 of 1993 disposed of on 3. 4. 1996, the petitioner did not file any application. Even 912 posts were created by the State in terms of G. O. Ms. No. 156, dated 8. 7. 1996. The Petitioner admittedly was not appointed pursuant to or in furtherance thereof. The petitioners before this Court in Kinnera Asirwadam (supra) filed the original applications before the Tribunal in the year 1998. The said applications were disposed of by the Tribunal on 7. 5. 1999 whereagainst the petitioners approached this Court. The Division Bench directed: however, having regard to the fact that there are only 912 vacancies, which left unfilled because of the erroneous interpretation and importing the panel theory and as there are more number of qualified candidates among the petitioners, the petitioners have to be arranged in terms of their merit among them and in order of that merit, the appointments are to be made. We make it clear that such of 911 petitioners, who stand qualified to be appointed in order of the above merit, shall continue and others have to pave the pay for more meritorious candidates basing upon the merit list. We make it clear that such of 911 petitioners, who stand qualified to be appointed in order of the above merit, shall continue and others have to pave the pay for more meritorious candidates basing upon the merit list. We reiterate that merit list shall be drawn for 912 posts only among the writ petitioners herein and shall not percolate beyond them for the reason for their initiation of legal proceedings right on time and pursuing the same before several forums right from A. P. Administrative Tribunal to that of Supreme Court and others even if they were qualified, had not initiated any legal proceedings and remained contented. ( 8 ) THIS Court in Paul John (supra) noticed that if any other direction were to be issued, the same would run contrary to the doctrine of amity and comity. It was held: it is no doubt true that ordinarily, the benefit of judgment should be extended to the other persons who are similarly situated. But gross delay and laches on the part of the petitioners is one of the exceptions to the aforementioned rule. It is now a well settled principle of law that those who sleep over their rights for a long time cannot be granted any relief. In this connection we may refer to the decisions of the Apex Court in A. Hamsaveni v. State of T. N. , (1994) 6 SCC 51 , State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, AIR 1995 SC 1991 , State of Maharashtra v. Additional Commissioner, 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 568, Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, AIR 2000 SC 671 . In Principal, Engineering College v, S. Mukherjee, 1998 (1) CHN 471, a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court to which one of us was a party observed: the petitioner furthermore, filed the writ application after a long time although the impugned order as contained in Annexure-D to the writ application passed as aforesaid on 19. 12. 1988. It is now well known that those who sleep over their right could not be granted any equitable relief. Reference in this connection may be made to AIR 1997 SC 2249. in the instant case, the petitioner in unequivocal terms stated that they had been waiting on the fence. As noticed hereinbefore despite the fact that the judgment of this Court was delivered as far back on 28. 8. Reference in this connection may be made to AIR 1997 SC 2249. in the instant case, the petitioner in unequivocal terms stated that they had been waiting on the fence. As noticed hereinbefore despite the fact that the judgment of this Court was delivered as far back on 28. 8. 2000, he filed this writ application on 23. 7. 2001, about one year after passing of the judgment. In a situation of this nature, we are of the opinion that no suitable relief could be granted in favour of the petitioner. Furthermore, this Court had directed drawing up of merit list for 912 posts only amongst the writ petitioners in the said batch of cases and further directed that the same shall not percolate them beyond them for the reason of their initiation of legal proceedings right on time and pursuing the same before several forums right from A. P. Administrative Tribunal to that of Supreme Court. ( 9 ) WE are, however, not oblivious of the decision of the Apex Court in K. L Shephard and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 1988 SC 686 . In that case the Apex Court was concerned with giving effect to a scheme prepared in terms of the Banking Regulation Act and held that all concerned are entitled to an opportunity of. being heard. It is true that therein an observation had been made that when some of the excluded employees had come to Court there cannot be any justification to penalise others for not litigating. But, in the instant case, having regard to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court, the said principle cannot be made applicable. The order of this Court in Writ Petition No. 21937 of 1999 and Batch dated 17. 1. 2001 having been passed on consent, the same cannot be treated to be a binding precedent. ( 10 ) FOR the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in this writ petition, which is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.