JUDGMENT 1. - The instant writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 6.3.1991 (Annex.13), by which the respondent No. 2 has accepted the review application filed by the respondent No. 2 (sic 3) against the order passed on 3.6.1986. 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the respondent no. 3, while working as Assistant Secretary with the present petitioner-society, tendered his resignation on 11.4.1985 (Annx.1), which was accepted by the petitioner vide its resolution dated 16.4.1985. The order of acceptance was communicated to the respondent No. 3. However, he made an application on 18.4.1985 to reconsider his resignation, which was rejected. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied, the respondent No. 3 filed a revision petition under Section 128 of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 (for short, "the Act") and the same stood dismissed vide order dated 3.6.1986 (Annx.7). After expiry of more than four and half years, the respondent No. 3 filed a review petition on 21.1.1991 for reviewing the order dated 3.6.1986, which has been reviewed vide impugned order dated 13.2.1991. Hence this petition. 3. The petition raises pure question of law. Firstly, whether an employee submits a resignation and it is accepted in accordance with law, has any remedy to get the acceptance of the resignation nullified; and secondly, whether in absence of any provision for review, the review could be entertained and even if it is entertained, whether it can be entertained after expiry of unreasonable period of more than four and half years? 4. The law on the issue of withdrawal of resignation is crystal clear and the legal position, which emerges out from the catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, is that an employee has a right to withdraw his resignation letter before its acceptance and in case the resignation is tendered with a stipulation to be effective from a future date, he can withdraw it even after its acceptance but prior to the date on which the resignation was to be made effective. (Vide (1) Raj Kumar Vs. Union of India & ors., AIR 1969 SC 180 ; (2) P. Kasilingam Vs. P.S.G. College of Technology, AIR 1981 SC 789 ; (3) Balram Gupta Vs. Union of India & ors., AIR 1987 SC 2354 ; (4) Punjab National Bank Vs. P.K. Mittal, 1989 (Supp.) 2 SCC 175 ; (5) Moti Ram Vs. (Vide (1) Raj Kumar Vs. Union of India & ors., AIR 1969 SC 180 ; (2) P. Kasilingam Vs. P.S.G. College of Technology, AIR 1981 SC 789 ; (3) Balram Gupta Vs. Union of India & ors., AIR 1987 SC 2354 ; (4) Punjab National Bank Vs. P.K. Mittal, 1989 (Supp.) 2 SCC 175 ; (5) Moti Ram Vs. Paramdeo & Anr., AIR 1963 SC 1662 ; (6) The Power Financial Corporation Ltd. Vs. Pramod Kumar Bhatia, (1997) 4 SCC 280 ; (7) Nand Keshav Irasand Vs. Indian Farmers Fertilizers Co-operative Societies Ltd. & Anr. (1998) 5 SCC 461 ; (8) J.N. Srivastava Vs. Union of India & Anr., AIR 1999 SC 1571 ; and (9) Dr. Dinesh Purohit Vs. State of Rajasthan, 2001 WLC 628 ) . 5. A similar view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in (10) Shambu Murari Sinha Vs. Project & Development India & Anr., (2000) 5 SCC 721 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the resignation, inspite of its acceptance, can be withdrawn before the effective date. 6. In (11) Union of India & Anr. Vs. Wg. Comm. T. Parthasarthy, JT 2000 (Supp) 2 SC 490 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that even if the policy of the Government provides that once the resignation is submitted by the employee and he was fully aware of the fact that he cannot seek for cancellation of the application, such policy will be destructive of the right of the employee in law to withdraw his request for premature retirement before it ever becomes operative and effective and effected termination of his status and relation with department. The Court observed as under:- "The reliance placed upon the so-called policy decision which obligated the respondent to furnish a certificate to the extent that he was fully aware of the fact that he cannot later seek for cancellation of the application once made for premature retirement cannot, in our view, be destructive of the right of the respondent, in law, to withdraw his request for premature retirement before it even becomes operative and effective and effected termination of his status and relation with the department. When the legal position is that much clear, it would be futile for the appellants to base their rights on some policy decision of the department or a mere certificate of the respondent being aware of a particular position which has no sanctity or basis in law to destroy such rights which otherwise inhered in him and available in law. No such deprivation of a substantive right of a person can be denied except on the basis of any statutory provision or rule or regulation. There being none brought to our notice in this case, the claim of the appellants cannot be countenanced in our hands. Even that apart, the reasoning of the High Court that the case of the respondent will not be covered by the type or nature of the mischief sought to be curbed by the so-called policy decision also cannot be said to suffer any conformity in law, to warrant our interference." 7. Thus, it is evident that an employee has a right to withdraw the resignation prior to its acceptance or prior to its becoming effective. In the instant case, respondent-employee submitted his resignation on 11.4.1985 (Annx.1) and the same was accepted on 16.4.1985 with immediate effect. It is not his case that he had ever filed an application to withdraw the application for resignation prior to its acceptance. The respondent-employee submitted an application to reconsider the case later on and when nothing was done, he submitted a revision under Section 128 of the Act against that order before the Hon'ble Minister. The said revision was also dismissed. Thus, it is not a case where it can be held, that the respondent-employee had a right to withdraw the resignation or had exercised the power of withdrawal of application for resignation prior to the date of its acceptance and the aforesaid law has no application in the matter. 8. Mr. B.L. Sharma, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent-employee, has submitted that the employee had never tendered any resignation; in fact, he had raised the grievances and instead of considering the said grievances and redressing the same, it was treated as a resignation and accepted by the Authority. 8. Mr. B.L. Sharma, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent-employee, has submitted that the employee had never tendered any resignation; in fact, he had raised the grievances and instead of considering the said grievances and redressing the same, it was treated as a resignation and accepted by the Authority. However, there is enough material on record to show that the employee had recovered only 10% of the total dues he was supposed to recover and he was not only given an opportunity to withdraw the resignation but was also advised by the Secretary of the society and other officers to withdraw the same. The order dated 21.6.86 (Annx.6), by which the revision filed by the employee was rejected, makes it crystal clear that the present petitioner-employer had filed reply before the Authority and adduced documentary evidence to satisfy the Authority that before accepting the resignation submitted by the employee, the Authority had asked the Department to submit its comments wherein the Department had denied the allegations made by the employee. He was only informed that he could recover 10% of the total dues he was supposed to recover. When he was called by the Officer of the department on 15.4.1986, he had told him that he had submitted the resignation to look-after his family work and when he was advised by the Secretary of the society not to submit the resignation or to file an application to withdraw the same, the employee did not respond. The Revisional Authority considered this aspect that the employee had been given sufficient opportunity to withdraw the resignation and was advised to withdraw the same but the employee did not acceed to the said suggestion. The Authority further came to the conclusion that asking the employee to work efficiently did not fall within the ambit of "harassment." Thus, in view of the above; I reach the conclusion that it was a case of voluntary resignation without any condition and once it has been accepted, the question of reconsideration of the same did not arise. 9. Mr. Sharma has submitted that the resignation has been accepted by the Administrator of the society, who was not competent to do so. 9. Mr. Sharma has submitted that the resignation has been accepted by the Administrator of the society, who was not competent to do so. The submission is preposterous and not worth consideration for the simple reason that if the Administrator had replaced the Board of Directors of the society/Management, it cannot be held that he had only a limited power and had no competence to accept the resignation. Moreso, in absence of any allegation of mala fide against the Administrator, the issue raised by Mr. Sharma does not require any further probe. Competence of the Administrator to accept the resignation has been confirmed by the Assistant Registrar of the Societies vide letter dated 28.5.1985 (Annx.4) 10. The employee had submitted the revision before the Hon'ble Minister under Section 128 of the Act against the order of acceptance of his resignation, which was dismissed vide order dated 21.6.86 (Annx.7) by a speaking and reasoned order and recording the finding of fact that it was a voluntary resignation. The employee was given an opportunity to withdraw the same and advised for withdrawal of resignation but he did not pay any heed and there was no irregularity or illegality in the order accepting the resignation. The present petitioner has submitted that the revision filed by the employee was not maintainable because the order of acceptance of the resignation was passed on the application filed by the employee voluntarily. Thus, the employee could not be aggrieved by the order on his own application. 11. Mr. Sharma has submitted that it was not a revision and merely mentioning that it was a revision, is misnomer. Section 128 of the Act does not provide for revisional power. There are various provisions in the Act, particularly Section 123 provides for appeal to the Tribunal; Section 124 provides for appeal to the other Authorities within the stipulated period; Section 125 deals with the power of revision by the Tribunal and Section 126 deals with the review of the order by the Tribunal. The power exerciseable under Section 128 are sui generis in nature as if the same did not fall within the ambit of appeal, revision or review. Moreso, the Legislature did not mention the word "revision" anywhere in the said provision though the language used therein suggests that it is the revisional power. The power exerciseable under Section 128 are sui generis in nature as if the same did not fall within the ambit of appeal, revision or review. Moreso, the Legislature did not mention the word "revision" anywhere in the said provision though the language used therein suggests that it is the revisional power. The analogous provision contained in the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (12) Everest Apartments Co-operative Society Ltd., Bombay Vs. State of Maharashtra & ors., AIR 1966 SC 1449 and the Court held that such an application is maintainable even if the order is not subject to an ordinary appeal or revision, for the reason that the Legislature, in its wisdom, has conferred special 'power upon the Government to exercise its power wherever it thinks fit to interfere and filing such an application would amount to merely drawing attention of the Government to the cases, in some of which Government may be interested to intervene. 12. If it is assumed that the application of the employee under Section 128 of the Act was maintainable and it had been entertained and dealt with by the Authority on merit and stood dismissed vide order dated 21.6.85, the question does arise : whether the Authority was competent to review the said order? The review petition was filed after expiry of four and half years. In (13) M. Satyanarayana Murthy & ors. Vs. Mandal Revenue Officer cum Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1999 SC 40 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that unexplained inordinate delay of two years in filing the review petition was fatal and petition in such a case cannot be entertained. In the instant case, as the review petition was filed after four and half years, it ought to have been rejected only on the ground of delay and laches. 13. The Authority, while deciding the review petition, vide order dated 6.3.91, has not made any reference to the delay though the employer had raised the issue that the petition was not maintainable after four and half years. The only explanation given by the Authority in accepting the review had been that the resignation had been tendered being harrased by the circumstances and the employee was willing to join the service, thus, the review petition was being accepted only on humane considerations. The only explanation given by the Authority in accepting the review had been that the resignation had been tendered being harrased by the circumstances and the employee was willing to join the service, thus, the review petition was being accepted only on humane considerations. It is settled legal proposition that while dealing the matter, judicially or quasi-judicially, the Authority should be guided by the statutory provisions and law and not by humane consideration alone. In (14) Madamanchi Ramappa & Anr. Vs. Muthaluru Bojjappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:- "What is administered in courts is justice according to law and considerations of fair play and equity, however important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of law." 14. The order impugned is liable to be set-aside on this count alone. Whatever may be the nature of the powers conferred upon the Government to be exercised under Section 128 of the Act, whether appellate or revisional or of any other nature, exercise of the power is to be held definitely as quasi- judicial, if not judicial. The quasi-judicial order must contain the following conditions: (a) the body of persons must have legal authority; (b) the authority should be given to determine question affecting the rights of subjects; and (c) they should have duty to act judicially. (Vide (15) Rex Vs. Electricity Commissioner, ex-parte, London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1924) 1 KB 171 ; (16) Rex Vs. London Countsy Council, Ex-parte Entertainments Production Association Ltd., (1931) 2 KB 215 ; (17) Province of Bombay Vs. Khushaldas S. Advani, AIR 1950 SC 222 ; (18) Gullapalli Nageswara Rao Vs. A.P. State Road Transport Corporation, AIR 1959 SC 308 ; and (19) State of Orissa Vs. M/s. Chakobhai Ghelabhai and Co. AIR 1961 SC 284 . 15. In (20) State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Raja Mahendrapal Singh, AIR 1999 SC 1786 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the test to determine whether the proceedings are quasi-judicial or not, is as under:- "Quasi-judicial acts are such acts which mandate an officer the duty of looking into certain facts not in a way which it specially directs but after a discretion, in its nature, judicial. Raja Mahendrapal Singh, AIR 1999 SC 1786 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the test to determine whether the proceedings are quasi-judicial or not, is as under:- "Quasi-judicial acts are such acts which mandate an officer the duty of looking into certain facts not in a way which it specially directs but after a discretion, in its nature, judicial. The exercise of power by such Tribunal or Authority contemplates the adjudication of rival claim of persons by an act of mind or judgment upon the proposed course of official action as to an object of the corporate power, for the consequence of which the official will not be liable, although his act was not well judged. A quasi judicial function has been termed to be one which stands midway on judicial and administrative functions. The primary test is as: whether the authority alleged to be a quasi-judicial, has any special judicial duty to act judicially in arriving at the decision in question. If the reply is an affirmative, the Authority would be deemed to be quasi-judicial and if the reply is in negative, it would not be. The dictionary meaning of the word quasi-judicial is 'not exactly'." 16. In (21) Lt. Col. P.R. Chaudhary Vs. Municipal Corporation, Delhi, (2000) 4 SCC 577 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that when an authority acts in quasi-judicial capacity, it cannot arbitrarily ignore principles of law or the principles of natural justice. Similar view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in (22) Rakesh Kumar Jain Vs. State, AIR 2000 SC 2754 ; and (23) Union of India Vs. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364 . 17. Therefore, in view of the above, it is clear that the order dated 21.6.1986 has been passed in exercise of quasi-judicial power. 18. The further question does arise; whether the Authority, in absence of any statutory provision providing for the same, can exercise the power of review against an order passed in exercise of its quasi-judicial authority? 19. In (24) Patel Chunibhai Dajibha Vs. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar, AIR 1965 SC 1457 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that in absence of any power of review, the Tribunal could not have subsequently reconsidered its previous decision and the subsequent order re-opening the matter was illegal, ultra-vires and without jurisdiction. 20. In (25) Harbhajan Singh Vs. 19. In (24) Patel Chunibhai Dajibha Vs. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar, AIR 1965 SC 1457 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that in absence of any power of review, the Tribunal could not have subsequently reconsidered its previous decision and the subsequent order re-opening the matter was illegal, ultra-vires and without jurisdiction. 20. In (25) Harbhajan Singh Vs. Karam Singh, AIR 1966 SC 641 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that in absence of any provision in the Act granting express power of review, it is manifest that review could not be made and the order in review was ultra-vires, illegal and without jurisdiction and the High Court has rightly quashed it by the grant of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. 21. While deciding the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court placed reliance on a large number of judgments, particularly in (26) Drew Vs. Mills, 1891 (1) QB 450; (22) , Hession Vs. Johns, 1914 (2) KB 421 ; in (28) Re: St. Nazaire Company, (1879) 12 Ch.D. 88 ; and (29) Baijnath Ram Goyanka Vs. Nand Kumar Singh, 14 Indian Appeal 54 (PC) , wherein it had categorically been held that the power of setting-aside an order, which has been made after hearing the arguments, does not lie unless it is given by the Statute. The Court, under the Statute, cannot review an order deliberately made after argument and entertain a fresh argument upon it with a view to ultimately confirming or reversing it. The Courts may have limited power only to make a necessary correction if the order, as drawn up, did not express the intention of the Court. A party is entitled to assail the judgment only by the mode as indicated in the Statute and in absence of express provision of review, it cannot be entertained for the reason that review is practically the hearing of an appeal by the same Officer who decided the case. 22. In (30) Patel Narshi Thakershi & ors. Vs. Pradyumansinghji Argunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication and in absence of any provision in the Act, review of an earlier order is impermissible. 23. In (31) Maj. Chandra Bhan Singh Vs. Vs. Pradyumansinghji Argunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication and in absence of any provision in the Act, review of an earlier order is impermissible. 23. In (31) Maj. Chandra Bhan Singh Vs. Latafat Ullah Khan & ors., AIR 1978 SC 1814 , the Apex Court followed the earlier referred two judgments in Chunnibhai and Harbhan Singh (supra) and observed that it is well settled that review is a creature of Statute and cannot be entertained in absence of a provision therefor. 24. In (32) Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta Vs. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidhyalaya, Sitapur, AIR 1987 SC 2186 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- "It is now established that a quasi-judicial authority cannot review its own order, unless the power of review is expressly conferred on it by the statute under which it derives its jurisdiction......... In the circumstances, it must be held that Vice Chancellor acted wholly without jurisdiction.........The said order of the Vice Chancellor dated March 7, 1987 was a nullity. (Emphasis added) 25. Similar View has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (33) State of Orissa & ors. Vs. Commissioner of Land Records and Settlement, (1998) 7 SCC 162 . 26. In (34) Krishna Ashram Educational Trust Vs. District Judge, AIR 1995 Allahabad 415 , after placing reliance upon a large number of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Allahabad High Court held that in absence of a provision for review, the Authority becomes functus officio after deciding the case and it has no competence to entertain review application and change the order passed by it earlier. 27. In view of the above, the review petition was not maintainable as there is no provision in the Act conferring the power of review of the order passed under Section 128 of the Act.Thus, in view of the above, in absence of any statutory provision providing for review, the order impugned dated 6.3.91 (Annx. 3) is held to be without jurisdiction. Petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 6.3.91 (Annx. 13) is hereby quashed. There shall be no order as to costs.Petition allowed. *******