JUDGMENT : - G.P. Mathur, J. This special appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 14-10-1999 of a learned single Judge by which the C. M, Writ Petition No. 109 of 1999 filed by the appellants was dismissed. 2. AN office memorandum was issued by the Allahabad High Court on 24-11- 1998 inviting applications for making recruitment to the post of Bench Secretary Grade II from such assistants of the Court who had put in not less than 10 years continuous service on 1-12-1998 in Class III cadre. The selection was to be made on the basis of a competitive examination and interview. The appellants, Shatrughan Tripathi and Kamlakar Dwivedi, who were working as Lower Division Assistants, made applications for the post but their candidature was rejected on the ground that they had not put in 10 years' continuous service in Class III cadre. The appellants then filed the writ petition giving rise to the present appeal in which an interim order was passed on 8-1-1999 that they should be allowed to appear in the examinations but their result shall not be declared. The petitioners appeared in the examination and, thereafter, moved an application praying that their results be declared. The writ petition was thereafter heard and, on the finding that their experience in Class III cadre fell short of the essential requirement of 10 years, and that they were not eligible for appearing in the examination held for promotion to the post of Bench Secretary Grade II, it was dismissed. The selection and appointment on the post of Bench Secretary Grade II is governed by the Allahabad High Court Officers and Staff (Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 1976, (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). Rule 8 of the Rules lays down the source of recruitment to various Class III posts in the establishment, and sub-rule (e), which relates to the post in question, reads as follows: (e) Bench Secretaries Grade II- By selection through competitive examination con ducted by the appointing authority open to the assistants having not less than 10 years continuous service in class III posts. Preference shall be given to candidates possessing a Law Degree". 3. THE office memorandum laid down the same conditions viz. that the candidates should have put in not less than 10 years' continuous service in Class III post on 1-12-1998. Preference shall be given to candidates possessing a Law Degree". 3. THE office memorandum laid down the same conditions viz. that the candidates should have put in not less than 10 years' continuous service in Class III post on 1-12-1998. THE petitioners were admittedly appointed in 1989, and had put in less than 10 years' continuous service in Class III post by the date fixed. Consequently, they did not meet the essential qualification for being considered for appointment on the post of Bench Secretary Grade II. 4. THE appellant No. 2 who argued in person for both the appellants, has submitted that the appellants appeared in the examination for making recruitment to the post of Routine Grade Assistants in the year 1988 and in the merit list names figured at SI. Nos. 71 and 75, respectively and though 100 selected candidates came to be appointed as Routine Grade Assistants in the year 1988 itself, but the appellants were given appointment in 1989 on the basis of the some merit list. It has been contended that if the appellants had been given appointments in 1988 along with other successful candidates who were much lower in the merit list, they would have completed 10 years' continuous ser vice in Class III post as on 1-12-1998. It has been further urged that the reservations rules were not properly followed and the roistering was wrongly done and as a consequence thereof the persons who had secured lower rank in merit, like SI. Nos. 239, 258 and 270 in the merit list prepared in the year 1988 were given appointment prior to the appellants. THE contention is that the appellants ought to have been appointed in 1988 and therefore they should be treated to be eligible for the post in question. In the counter affidavit, filed on behalf of respondent No. 2 in the writ petition it is averred that the candidates who had secured rank at SI. Nos. 239, 258 and 270 in the merit list were Scheduled Caste and on account of roistering they came to be appointed in the year 1988 itself. It is further pleaded that sub- rule (5) of Rule 10 of the Rules as it existed in 1988 provided that in case of typists a separate merit list shall be prepared on the basis of marks obtained by them in the written examination, interview and type test. It is further pleaded that sub- rule (5) of Rule 10 of the Rules as it existed in 1988 provided that in case of typists a separate merit list shall be prepared on the basis of marks obtained by them in the written examination, interview and type test. The proviso to Rule 13 (I) as it existed at the relevant time laid down that in case of Routine Grade Assistants and typists a combined list shall be prepared by taking candidates alternatively, the first name being from the list of Routine Grade Assistant, and in accordance with the aforesaid rules, two separate lists were prepared in respect of recruitment held in the year 1988 and, thereafter, a combined list based on roistering of the selected candidates was prepared, giving adequate representation to general categories and reserved categories. By an amendment dated 27-10-1989, sub-rule (5) of Rule 10 and proviso to Rule 13 (1) have been deleted. However, the appointment of the appellants had been made prior to 27-10- 1989 in accordance with the proviso to Rule 13 (1) and as a result of roistering the names of the appellants did not find place in the first list of 100 candidates. 5. THE question which requires consideration is whether the appellants can be treated to be eligible for the post in question. THE dictionary meaning of the word 'continuous' is without break or interruption. However, in the service jurisprudence the expression 'continuous service' has acquired a slightly different connotation. In M/s Jeewan Lal Ltd Calcutta v. Its Workmen, AIR 1961 SC 1567 , a scheme of gratuity which provided for payment of gratuity on a certain rate on voluntary retirement or resignation of an employee after 15 years' continuous service came up for consideration. In paragraph 6 of the Reports, meaning of the expression 'continuous service' was explained as under: "continuous service" in the context of the scheme of gratuity framed by the tribunal in the earlier reference postulates the continuance of the relationship of master and servant between the employer and his employees. If the servant resigns his employment service automatically comes to an end. If the employer terminates the service of his employee that again brings the continuity of service to an end. If the servant resigns his employment service automatically comes to an end. If the employer terminates the service of his employee that again brings the continuity of service to an end. If the service of an employee is brought to an end by the operation of any law that again is another instance where the continuance is disrupted; but it is difficult to hold that merely because an employee is absent without obtaining leave that itself would bring to an end the continuity of his service. " 6. THE same expression came up for consideration in Banaras Hindu University v. Dhirendra Pratap Singh, AIR 1992 SC 780 , with reference to paragraph 2 (a) of Merit Promotion Scheme of University Grants Commission, which provided that a teacher in the university department engaged in advance teaching and research and whose contribution and achievements are such as to merit recommendation must be considered for merit promotion in the first instance after completing 8 years' continuous service in the respective cadre, of which at least 4 years should be in the institution where he is being considered for such assessment of merit promotion. THE meaning of the expression of "eight years of continuous service" was explained in paragraph (sic) of the Reports as under: "we agree with the learned Counsel for the respondent that the expression "eight years of continuous service" in para 2 (a) of the scheme should be understood in a reasonable manner having regard to the underlying aim and object. Para 2 (a) itself expressly recognises that the eight years' service may be in more than one institution, the only requirement being a mini mum of four years' service in the institution where he is being considered for promotion under the scheme. In case of shift from one University to other-or from one institution to the other-it can reasonably be presumed that there is bound to be some interval. THE interval may be of a day, a week or a month. What is relevant is not the length of the interval or break, as it may be called, but its nature. We do not mean to say that length of such interval is totally irrelevant; what we mean, however, is that one must take into consideration the reason for such break- or the circumstances in which such break-has occurred. What is relevant is not the length of the interval or break, as it may be called, but its nature. We do not mean to say that length of such interval is totally irrelevant; what we mean, however, is that one must take into consideration the reason for such break- or the circumstances in which such break-has occurred. Another factor to be taken into consideration in understanding and construing the said expression is the object underlying the said requirement. According to us, the object is to ensure eight years' teaching experience. . . . . " These authorities show that in ser vice jurisprudence 'continuous service' would not mean a wholly uninterrupted service, in which there is no break at all. What it means is continuance of the relationship of master and servant between the employer and employees, and a short break would not end the continuity of his service. The object of such a requirement is to ensure actual working experience for the period specified. How ever, no notional or deemed appointment or promotion can be taken into consideration for counting the period of continuous service and the date from which an employee started actually working cannot be pushed back to some notional date in order to determine the length of continuous service. 7. THE appellants have next urged that the procedure adopted for making appointment in the year 1988 by bifurcating the list and making appointment in batches without regard to the number of posts of Routine Grade Assistants and typists was not warranted under the rules. They have also submitted that the roistering of the candidates for making appointment in 1988 was not correctly done. Sri Sunil Ambwani, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 2, has submitted that the appointments made in 1988 and 1989 cannot be challenged in the writ petition filed in the year 1999, wherein the appellants have assailed the rejection of their candidature on the ground that they had not put in loyears' continuous service on the relevant date. Learned Counsel has submitted that the claim of the appellants is highly belated and they are guilty of laches as they should have raised such a grievance in the year 1988 itself when they were not given appointments. Learned Counsel has submitted that the claim of the appellants is highly belated and they are guilty of laches as they should have raised such a grievance in the year 1988 itself when they were not given appointments. He has further submitted that such a plea can not be raised and entertained by the Court in the present writ petition where the controversy is entirely different. THE only explanation given by the appellants for the delay is that some other candidates, namely, Sharad Upadhyay, Sunil Kumar and J. K. Jaiswal had made a representation to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice on 15-9-1989 and that Sharad Upadhyay and others had also filed Writ Petition No. 21928 of 1989, which is still pending. It is noteworthy that the appellants themselves neither filed any representation nor any writ petition challenging the action of the respondents in not giving appointment to them in 1988. THE appellants willingly accepted the appointment given to them in 1989 and never raised any grievance regarding alleged delay in appointments given to them is wholly untenable and cannot be accepted. 8. IT is well-settled that this Court would not examine stale claims under Article 226 of the Constitution, especially where there is no allegation of violation of fundamental rights. In Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar and others v. The State of Maharasthra and others, AIR 1974 SC 259 , it was held as under: "the rule which says that a Court may not inquire into belated or state claims is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. The question is one of direction to be followed on the facts of each case. " In Mis Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Limited v. District Board, Bhoj-pur and others, AIR 1992 (2) SCC 598 , it was held as under: "the rule which says that the Court may not enquire into belated and stale claim is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion. Each case must depend upon its own facts. It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how delay arose. Each case must depend upon its own facts. It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how delay arose. The principle on which the relief to the party on the grounds of laches or delay is denied is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay. The real test to determine delay in such cases is that the petitioner should come to the writ Court before a parallel right is created and that the lapse of time is not attributable to any laches or negligence. The test is not to physical running of time. Where the circumstances justifying the conduct exists, the illegality which is manifest cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. " 9. IN Makashi v. Menon, AIR 1982 SC 101 , a writ petition filed after a delay of 8 years was allowed by the High Court. The Apex Court reversed the judgment and dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches with the observation that it seeks to disrupt the vested rights regarding seniority, rank and promotions which had accrued to a large number of respondents during the period of 8 years which had intervened. IN Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC1414, a stale claim of similarly placed constable who had been dismissed from service was rejected though the claim of another con stable similarly dismissed had been al lowed earlier. These authorities show that there is no absolute bar in entertaining a claim after a long gap, but there should be a reasonable explanation for the delay. If some rights have been created in favour of others during the period which has intervened, then such rights of others cannot be disturbed by entertaining a writ petition after a long delay. 10. IN the present case the appellants have not impleaded those persons as party to the writ petition or in the present special appeal who according to them had been illegally given preference over them and had been appointed prior to them in 1988. If the contention of the appellants is entertained it would result in disturbing the seniority-list prepared in 1988-89. If the contention of the appellants is entertained it would result in disturbing the seniority-list prepared in 1988-89. Valuable rights have accrued in favour of such persons who were given appointment prior to the appellants in 1988. It is also pertinent to mention that the appellants are not illiterate rustic villagers living in some remote area who may not be having any idea of Court proceedings. The appellants were working as Routine Grade Assistant and, thereafter, as Lower Division Assistant in the High Court, and it can be safely presumed that they have some knowledge of Court proceedings. As against a common man, it was very easy and convenient for them to take appropriate legal proceedings for redress of their alleged grievance that they should have been appointed in 1988. But they chose to remain silent and contended. IN these circumstances, there is absolutely no ground to entertain any challenge regarding their initial appointment in the present writ petition which has been filed after more than 10 years in the year 1999. For the reasons mentioned above, we find no merit in the present special appeal, which is hereby dismissed. Special appeal dismissed.