JUDGMENT Kuldip Chand Sood, J.—This second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, arises out of the judgment and decree of learned District Judge (Forests), Shimla dated September 2, 1993. The facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal may be noticed: Shop No. 3/1 comprised in Khasra Number 20 at Lakkar Bazar, Shimla, is the bone of contention between the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs-respondents, sons and daughters of one Ganga Dass, are owners of this shop. This shop was purchased by Ganga Dass on May 16, 1974 by a registered sale deed. One Jagat Singh was the tenant in this shop at annual rental of rupees of 450 plus municipal taxes when the shop was purchased by Ganga Dass. Ganga, Dass, father of plaintiffs— Owners, filed an eviction petition under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act (Act for short) against Jagat Singh on the ground of non-payment of rent. During the pendency of this petition before the Rent Controller, Shimla, Jagat Singh died. The rent petition was withdrawn. Subsequently, the suit out of which the present appeal arises, was filed by the plaintiffs on April 28, 1983. 2. The case of the plaintiffs, as set out in the plaint, is: Jagat Singh who was the sole tenant of the premises in dispute, died issueless on August 17, 1979. After the death of Jagat Singh, defendant-appellant Daljit Singh occupied the premises unlawfully and illegally without any right, title or interest. Jagat Singh was bachelor and no body inherited the tenancy rights as contemplated under Section 4 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act. It is the further case of the plaintiffs that defendant Daljit Singh being tresspasser, has no right to remain in possession or occupation of the disputed premises. The possession of defendant Daljit Singh, according to the plaintiffs, is illegal, unlawful and therefore, he is liable to be evicted from the shop in dispute. Plaintiffs claim Rupees 2,700 as mesne profits for the period of three years before the filing of the suit. Plaintiffs also claimed future mesne profits from the date of the suit till the date of payment or delivery of actual physical possession to the plaintiffs. 3. Defendant Daljit Singh resisted the suit. Allegations are controverted. Defendant did not dispute the ownership of the plaintiffs in respect of the disputed premises. Plaintiffs also claimed future mesne profits from the date of the suit till the date of payment or delivery of actual physical possession to the plaintiffs. 3. Defendant Daljit Singh resisted the suit. Allegations are controverted. Defendant did not dispute the ownership of the plaintiffs in respect of the disputed premises. It was admitted by the defendant that plaintiffs filed an eviction petition against Jagat Singh and Jagat Singh died during the pendency of the petition. However, it is pleaded that provisions of Section 4 of the Act are not attracted. It is the case of the defendant-appellant that Jagat Singh alone was not the tenant of the disputed premises. Rather, M/s. Jagat Singh Daljit Singh were the tenants and, therefore, tenancy continued to be held by Daljit Singh after the death of Jagat Singh. In the alternative, it is pleaded that Daljit Singh being brothers son of Jagat Singh and in occupation of the property in dispute is entitled to inherit the tenancy rights of Jagat Singh and, therefore, is not liable to be evicted. Learned trial Court settled the following issues: 1. Whether the defendant is a tenant of the shop in question as alleged? OPD. 1-A. Whether Jagat Singh was the contractual tenant and the tenancy devolved upon Daljit Singh who is brothers son of Jagat Singh? OPD. 2. If issue No. 1 is not proved, whether plaintiffs are entitled for possession of the shop in question as alleged? OPD. 3. Whether M/s. Jagat Singh Daljit Singh is necessary party to the suit if so its effect? OPD. 4. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from filing the present suit as alleged? OPD. 5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to mesne profits as claimed? OPD. 6. Relief. 4. Learned trial Court found that Jagat Singh alone was the tenant. The plea of the defendant that M/s. Jagat Singh Daljit Singh were the tenants were negatived. The defendant, it was held, was not the tenant of the premises. The plea of the defendant that he inherited the tenancy rights of Jagat Singh was also rejected. The suit was decreed for possession of the disputed premises and mesne profits. 5. Dis-satisfied, the defendant carried an appeal before the learned District Judge, Shimla. This appeal was dismissed by the learned District Judge (Forests) Shimla vide impugned judgment and decree. 6. Still aggrieved, the defendant is in second appeal. The suit was decreed for possession of the disputed premises and mesne profits. 5. Dis-satisfied, the defendant carried an appeal before the learned District Judge, Shimla. This appeal was dismissed by the learned District Judge (Forests) Shimla vide impugned judgment and decree. 6. Still aggrieved, the defendant is in second appeal. This appeal was admitted on March 15, 1994 on the following substantial questions of law : 1. Whether the findings of the Court below that Jagat Singh Daljit Singh were not joint tenants of the premises are vitiated for misreading and misconstruing the provisions of the Act and the oral and documentary evidence, particularly, Dl, DW1/A, DW1/ B, DW1/BK and DW7/A? 2. Whether on a proper construction of the provisions of H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, it had to be decided that in respect of non-residential premises, the appellant independently inherited the tenancy rights on the death of Jagat Singh. 3. Whether on the. basis of will of Jagat Singh, the appellant was entitled to inherit the tenancy rights? 7. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record with their assistance. Question No. 1. 8. Mr. Kapil Dev Sood, learned Counsel for the appellant made a vain attempt to impress that findings of both the trial Court and the appellate Court to the effect that Jagat Singh and Daljit Singh were not joint tenants of the premises, are vitiated on account of misreading and misconstruing the documents, viz., Exts. Dl, DW1/A, DW1/B, DW1/BK and DW7/A. There is preponderance of evidence on record, as noticed both by the learned trial Court and the Appellate Court, apart from these documents, which proves that Jagat Singh alone was the tenant of the disputed premises, I have perused these documents with the help of learned Counsel. By no stretch, it can be said, that documents have been misread or misconstrued by the Courts below. Document Ext. Dl is the copy of the statement made by Ganga Dass, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs before the Rent Controller in Eviction petition filed by him in September 1979 against Jagat Singh on the ground of non-payment of rent. In this statement, Ganga Dass categorically stated that M/s. Jagat Singh Daljit Singh were not his tenants. He no where admitted in his statement that Jagat Singh Daljit Singh or M/s. Jagat Singh Daljit Singh were the tenants. In this statement, Ganga Dass categorically stated that M/s. Jagat Singh Daljit Singh were not his tenants. He no where admitted in his statement that Jagat Singh Daljit Singh or M/s. Jagat Singh Daljit Singh were the tenants. The fact is that he categorically denied the suggestion in his cross-examination to the effect," it is incorrect that Jagat Singh and Daljit Singh used to work in the shop". Learned District Judge, referring to this statement (Ext. Dl) had stated that from this document, it is not shown that Jagat Singh and Daljit Singh were ever inducted as tenants. This document, according to the learned District Judge, "instead of helping the defendant goes against him. In view of the recitals in the sale deed Ext. P2 and the Reply Post Card Ext. P13". Similarly, learned trial Court referring to this document noticed, "a bare perusal of this document nowhere shows as to whether he at any stage of the statement admitted the defendant as tenant much less co tenant with Jagat Singh on the basis of partnership. There is not even a whisper. Rather, in his cross-examination, he denies,,emphatically the suggestion as to whether Daljit Singh and Jagat Singh were working in the shop on the partnership basis". Document Ext. DW1/ A and DW1/B are the rent receipts given by Mool Raj to Jagat Singh Daljit Singh for the year 1957-58. Mool Raj is said to be the agent of previous owner Renuka Devi. Rent receipt Ext. D7 is issued by one Mehar Chand who is also said to be another agent of the previous owner. Both the Courts below, after appreciating these documents, concluded that these documents were got prepared from Mool Raj and Mehar Chand after the institution of the eviction petition by Jagat Singh to avoid eviction from the tenanted premises. These documents were viewed in the context of other evidence oh record such as electricity meter installed since 1938 in the name of Jagat Singh without any change. Learned district Judge observed that production of documents, viz., Ext. DW1/A, DW1/B and DW7/A are irrelevant and meaningless. I do not find any infirmity in the appreciation of these documents by the learned trial Court and the first appellate Court. It was for the defendant to prove by acceptable evidence that he was joint tenant with Jagat Singh in respect of the disputed premises. No such evidence was produced. DW1/A, DW1/B and DW7/A are irrelevant and meaningless. I do not find any infirmity in the appreciation of these documents by the learned trial Court and the first appellate Court. It was for the defendant to prove by acceptable evidence that he was joint tenant with Jagat Singh in respect of the disputed premises. No such evidence was produced. Learned District Judge appreciating the evidence on record observed that if defendant Daljit Singh really was tenant of the shop in question with Jagat Singh, as he would have the Court believe, and paid the rent till 1974 against proper receipts, then it was not difficult for him to produce such receipts, particularly when he could produce manufactured receipts Ext. DW1/A and DW1/ B pertaining to the years 1957 and 1958. Learned District Judge proceeded to observe that adverse inference has to be drawn from with holding production of remaining rent receipts which were in possession of the defendant. Learned District Judge also referred to the sale deed by which Ganga Dass, father of the plaintiffs, purchased the shop in dispute from Renuka Devi. The recital in the sale deed specifically mentions that Jagat Singh alone was the tenant in the shop. This sale deed is witnessed by defendant Daljit Singh. The municipal record also show that Jagat Singh alone was the tenant. Learned trial Court noticed that so far documents receipts Ext. DW1/A and DW1/B as also document Ext. D7 are concerned, there is no mention in any of these documents that defendant was joint or co-tenant along with Jagat Singh on account of joint partnership business. Mool Raj, author of receipt Ext. DW1/A and DW1/B, noticed learned trial Court, has admitted in his cross-examination that he was not aware if rent note was in the name of Jagat Singh Daljit Singh. According to him, he received the rent on the instructions of Krishan Dass. He expressed his ignorance if Renuka Devi was the owner. So far receipt Ext. DW1/ A is concerned, this receipt could not be proved as the author of the receipt was no more in the land of living. His son was examined to prove this receipt who merely identifies the signatures of his father. It was only after appreciation of the evidence in totality that all the three receipts were rejected by the learned trial Court and the first Appellate Court. 9. His son was examined to prove this receipt who merely identifies the signatures of his father. It was only after appreciation of the evidence in totality that all the three receipts were rejected by the learned trial Court and the first Appellate Court. 9. It may be noticed that there is no document exhibited as Ext. DW1/BK on record. The concurrent findings of the trial Court and the first Appellate Court to the effect that Jagat Singh alone was the tenant of the shop in question cannot be said to be perverse or vitiated by misappreciation or misreading of evidence on record. The question is accordingly answered. Question No. 3. 10. This question has not been pressed. It is not disputed that tenancy rights are not heritable by will. Question No. 2. 11. Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Counsel for appellant contends that at the worst, Jagat Singh was statutory tenant and, therefore, defendant Daljit Singh being his nephew (brothers son), inherited the tenancy rights of Jagat Singh. On the other hand, Mr. D.D. Sood, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents submitted that tenancy rights are not heritable so far non-residential/commercial premises are concerned and in any event, there is nothing on record to show that present appellant Daljit Singh inherited the statutory tenancy rights. 12. So far question of heritability of statutory tenancy rights is concerned, it is no longer res Integra, The matter stands concluded in Stnt. Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar and others, AIR 1985 SC 796, which was followed by our own High Court in Smt. Satya Devi and another v. Ravinder Kumar and others, AIR 1990, H.R 43; Vinod Kumar v. Rajesh Kumar and others, 1995 (1) Sim. L.C. 452 and Balwant Rai v. Surjit Singh and others, 1996 (2) Sim. L.C. 275. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Gian Devi, after considering various judgments including Demadi Lai v. Parashram, AIR 1976 SC 2229; Ganpat Lai v. Shashi, AIR 1978 SC 955, construing the provisions of definition of tenancy in Delhi Rent Control Act, which are similar to the provisions of H.R Urban Rent Control Act, observed in paras 24 and 25 of the judgment: "24. Though provisions of all the Rent Control Acts are not uniform, the common feature of all the Rent Control Legislation is that a contractual tenant on the termination of the contractual tenancy is by virtue of the provisions of the Rent Acts not liable to be evicted as a matter of course under the ordinary law of the land and he is entitled to remain in possession even after determination of the contractual tenancy and no order or decree for eviction will be passed against a tenant unless any ground which entitles the landlord to get an order or decree for possession specified in the Act is established. In other words, the common feature of every Rent Control Act is that it affords protection to every tenant against eviction despite termination of tenancy except on grounds recognised by the Act and no order or decree for eviction shall be passed against the tenant unless any such ground is established to the satisfaction of the Court. 25. This Court has very aptly observed in Demadi Lals case (AIR 1976 SC 229) (supra) that it cannot be assumed that with the determination of the tenancy, the estate must necessarily disappear and the statute can only preserve the status of irremovability and not the estate he has in the premises in his occupation; and it is not possible to claim that the sanctity of contract cannot be touched by legislation. As already noticed, this Court in Damadilal’s case (supra) after referring mainly to the definition of tenant in Section 2 (i) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 came to the conclusion that the so-called statutory tenant had an interest in the premises-occupied by him and the heirs of the statutory tenant "had a heritable interest in the premises". As already noticed, this Court in Damadilal’s case (supra) after referring mainly to the definition of tenant in Section 2 (i) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 came to the conclusion that the so-called statutory tenant had an interest in the premises-occupied by him and the heirs of the statutory tenant "had a heritable interest in the premises". A tenant has been defined in Section 2(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, which reads as follows : "tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises is, or, but for a special contract would be, payable, and includes— (i) a sub-tenant; (ii) any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy; and (iii) in the event of the death of the person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy, subject to the order of succession and conditions specified respectively, in Explanation I and Explanation II to this clause, such of the aforesaid persons: (a) spouse, (b) son or daughter, or, where there are both son and daughter, both of them, (c) parents, (d) daughter-in-law, being the widow of his predeceased son, as had been ordinarily living in the premises with such person as a member or members of his family upto the date of his death, but does not include,— (A) any person against whom an order or decree for eviction has been made, except where such decree or order for eviction is liable to be re-opened under the proviso to Section 3 of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1976. (B) any person to whom a licence, as defined by Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 has been granted. (B) any person to whom a licence, as defined by Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 has been granted. Explanation I.—The order of succession in the event of the death of the person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy shall be as follows:— (a) firstly, his surviving spouse; (b) secondly, his son or daughter, or both, if there is no surviving spouse, or if the surviving spouse did not ordinarily live with the deceased person as a member of his family up to the date of his death; (c) thirdly, his parents, if there is no surviving spouse, son or daughter of the deceased person, or if such surviving spouse, son or daughter or any of them, did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person up to the date of his death; and (d) fourthly, his daughter-in-law, being the widow of his pre-de-ceased son, if there is no surviving spouse, son, daughter or parents of the deceased person, or if such surviving spouse son, daughter or parents or any of them did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person up to the date of his death. Explanation II.—If the person, who acquires, by succession, the right to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy was not financially dependent on the deceased person on the date of his death, such successor shall acquire such right for a limited period of one year; and, on the expiry of that period, or on his death, whichever is earlier, the right of such successor to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy shall become extinguished. Explanation III.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that,— (a) where, by reason of Explanation II, the right of any successor to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy becomes extinguished, such extinguishments shall not affect the right of any other successor of the same category to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy; but if there is no other successor of the same category, the right to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy, shall not on such extinguishments, pass on to any other successor, specified in any lower category or categories as the case may be; (b) the right of every successor, referred to in Explanation I, to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy, shall be personal to him and shall not, on the death of such successor, devolve on any of his heirs;" The definition of tenant as it stands at present in the Act is after the amendment of the definition in Section 2(1) of the earlier Act, by the Amendment Act (Act 18 of 1976) which was introduced with retrospective effect. Prior to the amendment, the definition of tenant as it stood in the Original Act, 1958 was in the following terms:— "tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises is, or, but for a special contract would be payable and includes a sub-tenant and also any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy but shall not include any person against whom any order or decree for eviction have been made." It is, therefore, clear from the definition of tenant, whether in the Original Act or in the amended Act, that the tenant within the meaning of the definition of term in the Act includes any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy. It will be seen that the definition of tenant in Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 on which the decision in Damadilals case (supra) mainly turns, is similar to the definition of tenant as given in the Delhi Act in the sense that the tenant under both the Acts includes for the purpose of the Rent Act any person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy." 13. Their Lordships held that there is no distinction between so called "statutory tenant" and "contractual tenant". Their Lordships held that there is no distinction between so called "statutory tenant" and "contractual tenant". The Act proceeds to treat both alike and preserve and protect the status and rights of a tenant after determination of the contractual tenancy in the same way as the status and rights of a contractual tenant are protected and preserved. Dealing with the tenancy in commercial premises, Their Lordships held that the legislature could not possibly have intended that with the death of tenant of commercial premises/the business carried by a tenant must necessarily come to an end simply because the tenant died after contractual tenancy had been determined. In para 36 of the judgment, Their Lordships held that if the concerned Rent Act defines a tenant to mean a tenant who continues to remain in possession even after the termination of the contractual tenancy till the order of eviction against him is passed, then the tenant, even after the determination of the tenancy continues to have an estate or interest in the tenanted premises and the tenancy rights both in respect of residential premises and commercial premises are heritable, devolves on the heirs under the ordinary law of succession. There is no scope of dispute that there is no provision in the Act which regulate the rights of heirs to inherit the tenancy rights in respect of commercial or non-residential premises. Therefore the tenancy rights under the Act are heritable under the ordinary law of succession. (Emphasis supplied) 14. A Full Bench of this Court in Smt. Satya Devi and another v. Ravinder Kumar and others, AIR 1990 Himachal Pradesh 43, held that definition of a tenant which was considered in "Gian Devi" was almost the same as the one contained in Himachal Act. A single Judge of this Court in 1995(1) Sim. L.C. 452, Vinod Kumar v. Rajesh Kumar and others, held that inheritance of the tenancy rights in commercial premises is governed by general law of succession in view of the law. laid down in "Gian Devi". Inypara 12 of the judgment, it was observed : "12. The law laid down in Smt. Gian Devi Anands case (supra) applies in the present case on all fours. laid down in "Gian Devi". Inypara 12 of the judgment, it was observed : "12. The law laid down in Smt. Gian Devi Anands case (supra) applies in the present case on all fours. Not only the definition of tenant as given in Section 2(j) of the 1987 Act is similar to that found in the Delhi Rent Control Act but admittedly there is no separate provision dealing with the inheritance of tenancy of commercial premises as in the Delhi Rent Control Act. There is also similarity in both the Acts so far different treatment in respect of grounds of eviction from residential and commercial premises is concerned. Therefore, following the ratio in Smt. Gian Devi Anands case (supra), it is safe to hold that so far commercial premises governed by the 1987 Act are concerned, the inheritance of their tenancy is governed by general law of succession and not by the 1987 Act and all the legal heirs of a deceased tenant of a commercial premises governed by the 1987 Act and all the legal heirs of a deceased tenant of a commercial premises have a right to inherit his estate in respect of tenancy rights and after they step into the shoes of the deceased tenant, their eviction can be sought only in accordance with the provisions of the 1987 Act." 15. Again in Balwant Rai v. Surjit Singh and others, 1996 (2) Sim. L.C. 275, relying upon Vinod Kumar, it was held that inheritance of tenancy rights in respect of non-residential /commercial premises under the Act is governed by general law of succession and not by the provisions as contained in Section 2(j) of the Act and, therefore, all the legal heirs of the deceased-tenant in accordance with general law of succession have a right to inherit the tenancy rights in commercial premises and they can only be evicted in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Rent Control Act. 16. The law thus is settled that tenancy rights in respect of non-residential/commercial premises under the Act are heritable under the general law of succession. 17. The next question arises is whether the defendant-appellant Daljit Singh inherited the tenancy rights of Jagat Singh in respect of the premises in dispute. Mr. 16. The law thus is settled that tenancy rights in respect of non-residential/commercial premises under the Act are heritable under the general law of succession. 17. The next question arises is whether the defendant-appellant Daljit Singh inherited the tenancy rights of Jagat Singh in respect of the premises in dispute. Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Counsel for the appellant contended that appellant being nephew of deceased Jagat Singh, inherited the tenancy rights and he cannot be evicted from the premises save and except in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It may be noticed that it was for the defendant Daljit Singh to prove, by leading appropriate evidence that he inherited the tenancy rights of Jagat Singh. Issue No. 1-A was specifically framed, on the application made by appellant Jagat Singh under Order 14 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on a plea of defendant-appellant that after the death of Jagat Singh, defendant inherited the tenancy rights. Issue No. 1-A reads : 1-A. Whether Jagat Singh was the contractual tenant and the tenancy devolved upon Daljit Singh who is the brothers son of Jagat Singh? OPD. 18. Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act by which the parties admittedly are governed, provides that if a male Hindu dies intestate, his property shall devolve firstly upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in Class I of the Schedule; secondly, if there is no heir of Class I, then upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in Class II of the Schedule; thirdly, if there is no heir of any of the two classes, then upon the agnates of the deceased and lastly, if there is no agnate, then upon the cognates of the deceased. Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act may be reproduced for convenience : "8. General rules of succession in the case of males.—The property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the provisions of this Chapter— (a) firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in Class I of the Schedule; (b) secondly, if there is no heir of Class I, then upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in Class II of the Schedule; (c) thirdly, if there is no heir of any of the two classes, then upon the agnates of the deceased; and (d) lastly, if there is no agnate, then upon the cognates of the deceased". Section 9 of the Hindu Succession Act provides for the order of succession among the heirs in the Schedule. It is stipulated that amongst the heirs specified in the Schedule, those in Class I shall take simultaneously and to the exclusion of all other heirs; those in the first entry in Class II are to be preferred to those in the second entry; those in the second entry shall be preferred to those in the third entry; and so on in succession. 19. Admittedly, there is no Class-I heir as Jagat Singh died as bachelor. So far heirs in Class II are concerned, there is no heir in first entry of Class II. It is the evidence of defendant-appellant Daljit Singh (DW 4) that his father were five brothers, the eldest was Hazara Singh, second was Bishan Singh, third was Harcharan Singh, fourth was Jagat Singh and fifth was Arjun Singh. There is nothing on the record to show that none of the brothers of deceased Jagat Singh is alive. In view of the order of succession, defendant Daljit Singh cannot succeed to the statutory tenancy rights of Jagat Singh in the presence of brothers of Jagat Singh as he falls under entry IV (I) of Class II heirs in the Schedule, whereas, the brothers fall under entry II of Class II heirs in the schedule. In the absence of any evidence on record, it cannot be held that the defendant inherited the tenancy rights of Jagat Singh. 20. Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Counsel for the appellant lastly submitted that there is a specific averment in para 2 of the written statement that tenancy devolved upon Daljit Singh who is brothers son of Jagat Singh and" this averment has not been controverted. The argument is misplaced. The relevant portion of tHe written statement reads : "In the alternative, even it may be held that Shri Jagat Singh was alone the tenant, in that case, Shri Jagat Singh being contractual tenant, the tenancy has come to an end and it has devolved upon Shri Daljit Singh....." 21. This allegation has specifically been controverted and denied in the replication in the following terms : "It is false and incorrect to the knowledge of the defendant that he is entitled to inherit the tenancy as alleged." 22. This allegation has specifically been controverted and denied in the replication in the following terms : "It is false and incorrect to the knowledge of the defendant that he is entitled to inherit the tenancy as alleged." 22. I have already referred to the evidence of the defendant where he states in the opening lines of his statement, "my father were five brothers, the eldest was Hazara Singh, second was Bishan Singh, third was Harcharan Singh, fourth was Jagat Singh and fifth was Arjun Singh". In the absence of evidence that the defendant inherited the statutory tenancy rights of Jagat Singh under the general law of succession, particularly, when there were other brothers of deceased Jagat Singh, it cannot be said that the defendant inherited the tenancy rights of Jagat Singh. The question is accordingly decided. 23. No other point is urged before me. 24. In result, appeal fails and is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. -