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2001 DIGILAW 1545 (AP)

Syed Mumtaz Hyder Abedin v. Dilshad Siraj Virji

2001-11-27

P.S.NARAYANA

body2001
P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) THE civil revision petition is filed by the unsuccessful defendant in OS No. 1566/99 on the file of IX Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. ( 2 ) THE respondent is the plaintiff. The respondent/plaintiff filed the suit for recovery of possession as against the revision petitioner-defendant and the legal representatives, family members, G. P. As. etc. , by redelivering the property i. e. , the entire ground floor portion of the premises bearing M. No. 22-3-861 to 866 at Darulshifa and also restraining the revision petitioner-defendant from changing the nature or dealing with or letting out the plaint schedule property, and the Court below after recording the evidence of PW1 to PW7 and DW1 and also marking Exs. A1 to A23, on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence had decreed the suit on 23-7-2001 and the reision petitioner-defendant aggrieved by the said judgment and decree had filed the present civil revision petition. ( 3 ) FOR the purpose of convenience, the parties will be referred to as arrayed in the original suit as "plaintiff and "defendant". ( 4 ) THE facts in nutshell are that the plaintiff filed a suit OS No. 1566/99 on the file of IX Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad on 1-4-1999 under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, hereinafter referred to as "act" in short, for recovery of a portion of the house bearing No. 22-3-861 to 866, situate at Darul Shifa, Hyderabad measuring 18. 5 ft. x 31 ft. and a room admeasuring 18. 5 ft x 9. 8 ft. on the ground that the plaintiff has been a tenant since 1991 in the premises stated supra on a monthly rent of Rs. 1500/- and had been running a cafe in the name and style of "new Hussaini Cafe". For the purpose of road widening, an extent of 5 ft. had been taken by the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad which had given a notification in this regard and had demolished the portion on 9-2-1999 and consequent thereupon the entire building had been demolished in view of the fact that it was on walls of jack arch roof. For the purpose of road widening, an extent of 5 ft. had been taken by the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad which had given a notification in this regard and had demolished the portion on 9-2-1999 and consequent thereupon the entire building had been demolished in view of the fact that it was on walls of jack arch roof. The stand taken by the defendant is that there is no forcible dispossession and inasmuch as the building was demolished by an act of the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, the plaintiff had voluntarily vacated the premises and hence Section 6 of the Act cannot be invoked at all. On the contrary, the stand of the plaintiff is that there was forcible dispossession so as to attract Section 6 of the Act. The respective pleadings of the parties are as follows: it was pleaded in the plaint that the plaintiff is in possession of the entire ground floor portion of the premises bearing No. 22-3-861 to 866 admeasuring 18 1/2 ft x31 ft and a room admeasuring 18 1/2 ft x9. 8 ft situated at Darulshifa, Hyderabad; and that she is carrying on the business under the name and style of New Hussaini Cafe, as a tenant since 1991 and that the defendant is the owner of the said property on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,500/- and that she is very regular in payment of monthly rent and there is no any single incident of default. The plaintiff obtained all the required licences to carry on the business of hotel and also paying the electricity and water charges as levied by the concerned authorities. It is the further case of the plaintiff in pursuance of the notification the MCH required 5 ft. of the existing structure to be demolished for the purpose of road widening; and in the said road widening process the premises in occupation of the plaintiff was reduced to 13 1/2 ft. x 31 ft from 18 1/2 ft. x 31 ft; and that the M. C. H. acquired the portion affected in the road widening on 9-2-1999 when in fact the area acquired by the MCH was only approximately 204 sq. ft. The defendant had no manner of right, title or interest to dispossess the plaintiff from the suit schedule property. x 31 ft from 18 1/2 ft. x 31 ft; and that the M. C. H. acquired the portion affected in the road widening on 9-2-1999 when in fact the area acquired by the MCH was only approximately 204 sq. ft. The defendant had no manner of right, title or interest to dispossess the plaintiff from the suit schedule property. Thus the plaintiff was wrongfully dispossessed from the schedule property without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff, and that on the intervention of the elders, the defendant and his agents agreed to deliver the portion in occupation of the plaintiff after reconstructing the same; and inspite of agreeing to respondents-deliver the portion after reconstruction the defendant is negotiating with third parties to let out and is demanding huge amount towards deposit to gain illegally and cause wrongful loss to the plaintiff; and that the defendant is bound under law to redeliver the entire ground floor portion and the plaintiff is entitled to the same. ( 5 ) THE defendant had filed a written statement through the GPA holder and the pleading of the defendant is to the following effect: - the plaintiff was in possession of the entire ground floor as a tenant and the defendant is the absolute owner of the suit schedule property. The plaintiff is not a tenant of the defendant as she has already vacated the portion under her occupation when she learnt that major portion of the property under her occupation is being affected in road widening and she had voluntarily vacated the premises and surrendered vacant possession of the same and thereafter the MCH had demolished the portion for the purpose of effecting the road widening and the remaining portion was got demolished by the authorities and after surrendering the land required for road widening, the defendant was permitted to reconstruct a new building in the remaining area. The defendant is a Scientist and staying in London, as such his Attorney who is no other than his own brother is looking after his interest at Hyderabad; and the defendant last visited Hyderabad in the month of October 1998 and left on 17-10-1998 and thereafter the defendant has not visited Hyderabad and suppressing the said fact the plaintiff filed the suit showing the defendant s address as D. No. 22-3-861 to 866 darul Shifa, Hyderabad with ulterior motive. The defendant being the owner of the property has got every right to make use of the property by developing the same; and that the plaintiff was not at all dispossessed from the property; and on the other hand, she herself voluntarily vacated and handed over possession of the property, as such the allegation of the dispossession is absolutely false and incorrect and same is invented for the purpose of the suit. There was neither the intervention of the elders nor the defendant and his agents agreed to deliver the portion in occupation of the plaintiff after reconstruction; and that there is no agreement from the defendant and his agents to deliver the portion after respondents-construction as such the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any right in respect of the property; and that the defendant is under no legal obligation to redeliver back the entire ground floor portion as claimed by the plaintiff. After getting permission from the MCH for reconstruction, new building in the remaining area was constructed by spending huge amount consisting of four mulgies in the ground floor out of which one mulgi bearing No. 22-3-861 was let out to a tenant who started and running a business known as sajjad Sweets and three other mulgies bearing Nos. 22-3-862 to 866 were let out to the tenant who is running a hotel business known as Sameera Hotel and Pan Shop space was also let out to a tenant; therefore the relief of injunction as sought by the plaintiff has become infructuous. There is no any landlord and tenants relationship in between the parties as the plaintiff voluntarily vacated the premises and filed a false case to harass the defendant. ( 6 ) ON the strength of the respective pleadings of the parties, the following issues had been settled:- 1. Whether the plaintiff was dispossessed from the premises on 9-2-1999 by the defendant? 2. Whether there was an agreement in between the parties to redeliver the portion after reconstruction? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for recovery of possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act? 4. To what relief? as stated supra, on appreciation of evidence of PW1 to PW7 and also the evidence of DW1 and Exs. 2. Whether there was an agreement in between the parties to redeliver the portion after reconstruction? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for recovery of possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act? 4. To what relief? as stated supra, on appreciation of evidence of PW1 to PW7 and also the evidence of DW1 and Exs. A21 to A23, the Court below had arrived at a conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree as prayed for and aggrieved by the same, the present civil revision petition was filed. ( 7 ) SRI N. Rama Rao, the learned Counsel representing the revision petitioner-defendant had vehemently contended that the remedy itself is misconceived remedy and if the facts and circumstances of the case are taken into consideration, Section 6 of the Act is not attracted at all and that for the purpose of enforcing any agreement or understanding, as the case may be, at the best the remedy can be by way of a regular suit and it is not a case falling under Section 6 of the Act. The learned Counsel also had contended that it is not in dispute that the plaintiff was the tenant, but the facts and circumstances definitely disclose that voluntarily the plaintiff had walked out of the premises and hence there is no forcible dispossession so as to attract Section 6 of the Act. The learned Counsel also had pointed out that the owner of the property is not concerned with this dispossession at all and it is the act of demolition by MCH which made the plaintiff-tenant to vacate the premises voluntarily. The learned Counsel had drawn my attention to several details in the evidence of PW1 and PW2 and also PW3 to PW6, especially the evidence of PW7. The learned Counsel also had contended that the very fact that there was no resistance or any objection on the date of demolition clearly goes to show that the vacation of the premises is nothing but voluntary. The learned Counsel also had pointed out that the inaction on the part of the plaintiff in taking serious steps like pursuing the remedies before the Police, also goes to show that the premises was vacated by the plaintiff-tenant voluntarily and after keeping quiet for certain months only with a view to have some gain again, the plaintiff had thought of this speculative litigation. The remedy itself is totally misconceived one. The learned Counsel placed strong reliance on Sukhjeet Singh v. Sirajunnisa, AIR 2001 MP 59 , Shree Onama Glass Works Ltd. , Gondia v. Shri Ram Harak Panday and others, AIR 1966 MP 282 , Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd and others v, K. S, Narayana Iyer, AIR 1965 Mad. 122 , Ramamanemma v. Basavayya, AIR 1934 Mad. 558 , Smt. Sobhabati v. Lakshmi Chand and others, AIR 1984 Ori. 171 , Mahabir Prasad Jain v. Ganga Singh, (1999) 8 SCC 274 . ( 8 ) SRI Kishore Rai, the learned Counsel representing the respondent in this civil revision petition-plaintiff in the suit, had contended that the Court below while answering issues had given a categorical finding on appreciation of evidence that the dispossession was without consent of the plaintiff/defendant and this is nothing but forcible dispossession attracting Section 6 of the Act. The learned Counsel also had pointed out that the evidence of PW7 is clear that the plaintiff was carrying on business even as on the fateful day and the plaintiff was thrown out of the property only by the acts of the agents of the defendants which is binding on the defendant as such and the demolition activity of the MCH was taken as an advantage to thrown the plaintiff out, but the forcible acts had been perpetrated by the agents of the defendant only. The learned Counsel also had pointed out that the evidence available on record, the evidence of PW7 and also the evidence of DW1 and Ex. A15, clearly point out the forcible dispossession only and not voluntary vacating of the premises. The learned Counsel submitted that there is no consent given by the plaintiff at any point of time and on the fateful day the contention that the public had removed the furniture is only an invented plea so as to escape the legal consequences. The learned Counsel also had stressed about the mediation which had taken place subsequent to the incident and the learned Counsel also had submitted that the findings relating to this aspect of the matter in the present suit may not be of much relevance since the suit is for recovery of possession on the ground of forcible dispossession under Section 6 of the Act. The learned Counsel had taken me through the pleadings, the evidence let in by the parties and also the documents marked in the suit. The learned Counsel also had placed reliance on East India Hotels Ltd. v. Syndicate Bank, (1992) 2 SCC (Suppl) 29, ACME Tiles and Building Products v. B. Sudarshan, 1993 (3) ALT 359 , Ajmer Singh v. Improvement Trust Khanna and another, 1996 AIHC 1620, Hari Shanker v. Chandra Prakash, 1996 AIHC 4952, Chinna Pillai v. N. Govindaswami Naidu and another, AIR 1969 Mad. 191 , Krishnaji Madhavarao Khannukar v. Mahed-Husen Budansahab and others, AIR 1959 Mys. 127, Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by his LRs. v. Mrs. Shoba Venkat Rao, AIR 1989 SC 2097 , M/s. Ushodaya Publications v. The Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, 2001 (3) ALD 173 = ILR (2001) AP 19 (FB), and also the decisions referred (supra ). ( 9 ) HEARD both the Counsel and perused both oral and documentary evidence available on record and also the impugned judgment and decree made in OS No. 1566 of 1999. ( 10 ) AT the outset it may be stated that the question whether there was an agreement in between the parties to redeliver the possession after reconstruction may not be very relevant for the purpose of deciding the present dispute since the settlement appears to be after the demolition. Hence, the questions which arise for consideration while deciding the present revision are: 1. Whether the plaintiff was forcibly dispossesed without consent and otherwise than in due course of law from the plaint schedule property ? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of the plaint schedule property under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 ? 3. To what relief ? ( 11 ) FOR the purpose of convenience, Points 1 and 2 can be answered together. Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 which deals with suit by person dispossessed of immovable property, reads as follows:- (1) If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit. (2) No suit under this section shall be brought (a) after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession; or (b) against the Government. (2) No suit under this section shall be brought (a) after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession; or (b) against the Government. (3) No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor shall any review of any such order or decree shall be allowed. (4) Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof. For maintaining a suit under Section 6 of the Act, a person should have been dispossessed from immovable property without consent and it must be otherwise than in due course of law. In such a case, the plaintiff or any person claiming through him, may be a suit recover possession thereof notwithstanding any other title which may be set up in such a suit. Hence, it is essential to note that the mere dispossession is not sufficient, but such dispossession should be without consent and further it must be otherwise than in due course of law. In the Law of Specific Relief, 1990 Edition, by me, at page 31, on this aspect, on the strength of the decided cases, I observed :- "a person can be said to be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law when he is dispossessed by one who acted of his own authority without taking any legal step through a Court of law. The words "otherwise than in due course of law" are not synonymous with the word "illegality" (AIR 1935 Cal. 454 ). If a person is dispossessed from the land under colour of law, without observing either the relevant rules or the principles of natural justice it cannot be said that such dispossession is in due course of law ( AIR 1971 Raj. 84 ). Dispossession cannot be contemplated by law and by a legal process which ought to have been applied, cannot amount to dispossession in due course of law (1915) 18 1c 727 ). The general purpose of the law is that regardless of the actual condition of the title to or the right of possession of the property, the party actually in peaceable and in quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror (AIR 1958 Punj. 325 ). The general purpose of the law is that regardless of the actual condition of the title to or the right of possession of the property, the party actually in peaceable and in quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror (AIR 1958 Punj. 325 ). The word "law" has to be given a wide meaning so as to include rules ( AIR 1952 SC 16 )". ( 12 ) NOW, on the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is to be seen whether the judgment and decree made by the Court below are sustainable in law though several facts are not in dispute at all. The main controversy between the parties is that the plaintiff had voluntarily vacated the premises as per the defendant and the plaintiff in turn contending that the dispossession was forcible and without consent. No doubt, it is also brought to my notice that a third party had been inducted into possession of the plaint schedule property during the pendency of the litigation and it is needless to mention that such a party is bound by the result of this dispute. The plaintiff who was examined as PW1 had specifically stated that the dispossession on 9-2-1999 was without her consent and illegal dispossession. In fact, PW1 narrated all the facts and events in detail. It is relevant to note that PW1 had deposed as follows: "as on 9-2-1999 I was not in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. The family members of the defendant without any right and authority had illegally demolished the remaining ground floor portion which was in my occupation i. e. , the plaintiff and I was forcibly dispossessed from the suit schedule premises. The landlord has no manner of right to dispossess me. Thus, I was wrongly dispossessed from the suit schedule property without my knowledge and consent". No doubt, PW1 also had stated that on intervention of third parties, the defendant agreed to deliver the property i. e. , the ground floor after reconstruction. It is also pertinent to note that this witness PW1 had stated that her husband will be looking after the business, which is but natural. PW2 is the husband of PW1. No doubt, PW1 also had stated that on intervention of third parties, the defendant agreed to deliver the property i. e. , the ground floor after reconstruction. It is also pertinent to note that this witness PW1 had stated that her husband will be looking after the business, which is but natural. PW2 is the husband of PW1. He had narrated the fateful incident and also the series of events and both of them i. e. , PW1 and PW2, had specifically denied several suggestions put by the Counsel for the defendant to the effect that there was no illegal dispossession and they had voluntarily vacated the premises. It is also pertinent to note that PW2 had spoken to his verbally informing the police about the illegal demolition and dispossession, it was specifically stated by PW2 that: "it is not true to suggest that on account of demolition commenced by M. C. H. 1 thought that the premises would be unfit for business. Therefore I voluntarily vacated the premises". PW3, PW4, PW5 and PW6 also support the case of plaintiff. PW7 was working as Additional Commissioner of M. C. H. and PW7 had deposed in Chief-Examination as follows:- "1 was incharge of road "widening scheme. It is true that a hotel by name New Hussaini Cafe, witness aguin says that he was not sure of nature of the hotel but there was a hotel. I can identity PW2 who was in occupation of the hotel at the time of demolition. It is true that 5 feet was affected in the road widening. Witness says that since there was a junction, demolition was to be done in a crucial manner so at the junction the. . . . was more. After demolition the balance area left was in occupation of plaintiff. Even at the time of demolition also, the plaintiff was carrying on his business. The M. C. H. never asked the plaintiff to vacate the hotel premises. Witness says that M. C. H. issues to all the owners. . . to hand over affected portions only for road widening. After demolition 1 was not available at the demolition spot. " in cross-examination, PW7 had deposed as follows:- "for the first time I saw PW2 on the date of demolition and later on after 7 days thereafter nearby the premises. . . to hand over affected portions only for road widening. After demolition 1 was not available at the demolition spot. " in cross-examination, PW7 had deposed as follows:- "for the first time I saw PW2 on the date of demolition and later on after 7 days thereafter nearby the premises. We have requested the plaintiff of remove the furniture to enable us to carry out the demolition and after discussion with owner PW2 accepted and shifted the furniture for the portion affected in the road widening. The said. . . . was very old and I do not think it was an R. C. C. construction. I do not remember the type of construction but it looks like lime mortar construction. I do not remember the name of the person who had a talk with pw2 and his name may be Karar AH. Along with the said Karat- Ali, there were three other persons. . . PW2 to shift the furniture. I do not know what transpired in between PW2 and those persons, but PW2 co-operated so far as demolition of affected portion. PW2 never complained about any force for shifting of his articles. I am not aware whether any letter was submitted about the demolition of the remaining portion. . . . There was no any written consent from PW2 for putting up any grill or wall, but he expressed that premises will become open and without security. Soon after the demolition myself and my staff left the place. As such T do not what happened thereafter. " thus, the evidence of PW7 also negatives the pica of the defendant that voluntarily the plaintiff had vacated the premises on her own accord. Even DW1 had deposed as follows:- ". . . . In my absence, said Rail used to attend the case on my specific instructions, as 1 underwent by-pass surgery. Said Razi Hyder is working in the Office of Police Commissioner, Hyderabad. 1 have been to aboard i. e. , U. A. E. About 20 years I was at aboard i. e. , till 1992. Personally I have not collected the rent from plaintiff in respect of suit premises after becoming G. P. A. I did not inform the plaintiff that I became the g. P. A. of defendant, as I. . . . . find any to do so. Personally I have not collected the rent from plaintiff in respect of suit premises after becoming G. P. A. I did not inform the plaintiff that I became the g. P. A. of defendant, as I. . . . . find any to do so. I saw the suit property only from outside, because I was not having any reason to visit inside. PW2 used to sit in the hotel. I have not met PW2 at any point of time. It is not true to suggest that I am not at all acquainted with the facts relating to the suit schedule property. M. C. H. has not served any notice of demolition to me. Witness adds that M. C. H. served notice to the tenant. I cannot identify PW2 since I have not met him. I gave consent to M. C. H. for demolition of portion affected in the road widening. On 9-2-1999 I gave my consent. As there was no body and the premises was vacant I did not pass the message to PW1 or PW2 about giving of my consent to MCH. I do not know the MCH served notice of demolition to the tenant. The major portion of building was affected in road widening. It is not true to suggest that PWl and PW2 were not having the knowledge of demolition. I was under the impression that PW1 and PW2 were aware of my giving consent to M. C. H. for demolition on 9-2-1999. Thus, the evidence of PWI and PW2 and also the evidence of PW7 and the evidence of DW! will clearly point out that in facts and circumstances of the case, the stand taken by the defendant that there was no forcible dispossession and the dispossession was only in due course of law, cannot be believed at all. In the decision referred (supra), it was held that the consent by the lessor is not binding on the lessee in the cases of possession of land in occupation of lessee and recourse to Land Acquisition Act has to be taken. In the decision referred (supra), it was held that where the tenant handed over premises to landlord for the marriage of the former s son and the landlord failed to hand over the same after marriage, Section 6 of the Act is not attracted. In the decision referred (supra), it was held that where the tenant handed over premises to landlord for the marriage of the former s son and the landlord failed to hand over the same after marriage, Section 6 of the Act is not attracted. In the decision referred (supra), the demolition of premises in occupation of the tenant-plaintiff by defendants by obtaining orders illegally from the Court of first instance contrary to the order of injunction made by the appellate Court, was held to be illegal and the plaintiff is entitled to the restitution of premises to the same position as prevailing prior to the passing of the impugned order. In the decision referred (supra), it was held that where the remedy under the provision is clear, the parties will not necessarily be driven to another suit. In the decision referred (supra), where the lessee has no jurisdical possession, it was held that he cannot claim the relief under Section 9 of Specific Relief Act. In the decision referred (supra), the aspect of settled possession after expiry of the licence or its termination and dispossession of the plaintiff by any process other than in due course of law had been dealt with. In the decision referred (supra), it was held that where the trial Court had directed the appellant-defendant to remove construction put up by him in the plaint schedule property including dismantling of glass, it was held that such relief cannot be granted under Section 6 of the Act. In the decision referred (supra), it was held that ordinarily no Revision lies in cases under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. In the decision referred (supra), where the plaintiff alleged forcible dispossession during the pendency of the suit, it was held that non-lodging of a report with police may not be material. In the decision referred (supra), it was held that in case of forcible eviction in a suit filed by the plaintiff for recovering possession only, defendant-owner of the premises is necessary party and the mother of the defendant who was alleged to have been present at the time of eviction may not be necessary. In the decision referred (supra), it was held that a tenant holding over after expiry of the lease will have a possessory title and the expression due process of law cannot be equated with the word legally. In the decision referred (supra), it was held that a tenant holding over after expiry of the lease will have a possessory title and the expression due process of law cannot be equated with the word legally. In the decision referred (supra), where there was a collusion between the agent of tenant and the landlord and the landlord got possession from the agent, it was held that it will amount to dispossession and a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act can be maintained. In the decision referred (supra), it was held that it is well settled law in this country that where a person is in settled possession of the property even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by due course of law. ( 13 ) THE present civil revision petition is filed, as already discussed above, as against the judgment and decree decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiff under Section 6 of the Act. The very scope of the revisional jurisdiction is limited. The appreciation of evidence and the findings recorded by the Court of first instance normally cannot be disturbed unless those findings are perverse or such findings are not based on any evidence at all or there is no evidence at all to come to a particular conclusion. As already discussed above, there is ample evidence to show that on the fateful day, taking advantage of the fact that a limited portion was going to be removed by the M. C. H. for the purpose of road widening, the other acts had been perpetrated by the agents of the defendant only and the evidence available on record coupled with the conduct of the parties and the circumstances clearly go to show that there was no voluntary handing over of possession of the plaint schedule property by the plaintiff as contended by the defendant and the only inference that can be drawn in such circumstances is that the dispossession was not with consent and not by following the procedure and hence it falls within the meaning of forcible dispossession under Section 6 of the Act. It is no doubt true that the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner-defendant had made a serious attempt to show that it is a peculiar case where there was total nonintervention of the owner of the property or the agents of the owner, whether G. P. A. or otherwise, in the acts of demolition and it is only by virtue of the demolition acts perpetrated by the M. C. H. under peculiar circumstances there was voluntary eviction of the premises by the plaintiff and hence the provisions of Section 6 of the Act cannot be invoked. As already observed by me, on the fateful day, the demolition activity of just a part or portion by the M. C. H. for the purpose of road widening, had been taken as an advantage by the defendant who had continued the rest of the activity and I am satisfied on the material available on record that the rest of the acts done by the G. P. A. or agents of the defendant as such in carrying on the rest of the demolition activity, will definitely amount to forcible dispossession of the plaintiff, otherwise than in due course of law, within the meaning of Section 6 of the Act. Apart from all this, in the light of the clear and detailed findings recorded while answering the issues by the Court below and also in the light of the limitations placed in re-appreciation of evidence while exercising revisional jurisdiction, I am not inclined to interfere with the well-considered judgment of the Court below. ( 14 ) HENCE, for the reasons recorded above, the civil revision petition fails and accordingly the same is dismissed, with costs.