Jaganmohan Reddy, C.J.:- The question before us is whether, under section 220 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’), the holding of an annual general meeting of a company and laying before it the balance sheet and the profit and loss account are pre-requisites for a prosecution under section 220 (3). The High Court of Bombay in Emperor v. Pioneer Clay and Industrial Works2, and earlier, the Madras High Court in Lakshmana v. Emperor4, and In re Narasimharao5 had held under section 134 and the analogous provisions, of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 (hereinafter called the ‘Old Companies Act) corresponding to section 220 of the Act that the omission to file with the Registrar the balance sheet and the profit and loss account of a company is not a contravention of those provisions in as much as either no general meeting was held at which the balance sheet was laid, or no general meeting was due to be held. After the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Bhandhan Ram3, some of the High Courts have taken the view that the decision of the Bombay High Court in Emperor v. Pioneer Clay and Industrial Works2, has been overruled and that therefore the Directors cannot take shelter in the defence that no general meeting was held when the non-holding of the general meeting was due to their own default. It may be stated that even after the Supreme Court’s decision, this Court in Public Prosecutor v. H.R. Basavaraj1, took a similar view to that taken by the Bombay High Court.1 But having regard to the decisions of several High Courts, which have taken a contrary view, Sharfuddin Ahmed and A.D V. Reddy, JJ., have referred this matter to a Full Bench. The petitioners who are the Directors of the Andhra Provincial Potteries Ltd., have been prosecuted for contravention of the provisions of section 220 (1) of the Act viz., for not filing the balance sheet and the profit and loss account with the Registrar of Companies, as contemplated in that section within the prescribed time On 14th December, 1967, a notice was issued by the Registrar of Companies informing the petitioners that the annual general meeting of the company ought to have been held at the latest on 30th September, 1967, that the balance sheet and the profit and loss account ought to have been laid before the said annual general meeting, and that they should have been filed before the Registrar on or before 30th October, 1967, in accordance with the provisions of section 220 (1) of the Act. In as much as the said balance sheet and profit and loss account were not filed, they being the directors of the company, it would be presumed that they are the officers of the company in default with in the meaning of section 5, and as such, are liable to be prosecuted. The Registrar therefore asked them to make good the default mentioned above within one month from the date of issue of the notice. To this, a reply was sent on 17th February, 1968, by one of the petitioners, stating that they were arranging to send the concerned document immediately and requesting for condonation of delay. As no balance sheet and profits and loss account were filed, a complaint was lodged. A preliminary objection was raised before the VIth City Magistrate that prosecution will not lie under section 220 (3) of the Act, inasmuch as no annual general meeting as required under section 166 of the Act was held, without which the question of filing copies of the balance sheet and the profit and loss account would not arise. In a considered order, the Magistrate applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Bhandan Ram1, and taking the view that the decision had overruled the Bombay High Court’s decision in Emperor v. Pioneer Clay and Industrial Works2, dismissed the objection. It was throughout admitted both by the prosecution and the accused that no general meeting was held on the date when the complaint was filed, namely the 4th March, 1968. It was throughout admitted both by the prosecution and the accused that no general meeting was held on the date when the complaint was filed, namely the 4th March, 1968. The learned Advocate for the petitioners however states that the meeting was held on the 9th March, 1968, and the documents lodged on 19th March, 1968. Inasmuch as several decisions dealing with the provisions of the Old Companies Act, 1913 and the Act have been cited before us, we give below the relevant provisions of the Old Companies Act and the Act as they would assist in the understanding of the question before us. Indian Companies Act (VII of 1913) Companies Act 1956 (I of 1956) 32 (1) "Every company having a share capital shall within eighteen months from its incorporation and thereafter once at least in every year make a list of all persons who, on the date of the first or only ordinary general meeting in the year, are members of the company and of all persons who have ceased to be members since the date of the last return or (in the case of the first return) of the incorporation of the company). 159 (1) "Every company having a share capital shall, within sixty days from the day on which each of the annual general meetting referred to in section 166 is held, prepare and file with the registrar, a return containing the particulars specified in Part I of Sch. V as they stood on the day, regarding- 2....................... (a) to g............................ 3....................... Proviso............................ 4....................... (5) If a company makes default in complying with the requirements of this section, it shall be liable to a fine not exceeding fifty rupees for every day during which the default continues, and every officer of the company who knowingly and wilfully authorises or permits the default shall be liable to the like penalty." Explanation.-Any reference to this section or in section 160 or 161 or in any other section or in Schedule V to the day on which the annual general meeting shall, where the annual general meeting for any year has not been held, be construed as a reference to the latest day on or before which that meeting should have been held in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (2)................................." 160 (1) "Every company not having a share capital shall within sixty days (3) If default is made in complying with the requirements of sub-sections 1 and (2), the company, and every officer of the company who is in default, shall be liable to the like punishment as is provided by section 162 for default in complying with the provisions of sections 159, 160 or 161.” A comparison of the conspectus of the sections under the old Companies Act and the Act would show that section 32 of the old Companies Act has been replaced by sections 159,160, 161 and 162 of the Act with this difference that under the old Companies Act, there was nothing to indicate as to what was meant by the day of the first or only ordinary general meeting in the year,” while under the Act, the Explanation to section 159 clearly indicates that a reference to “the day on which an annual general meeting” in that section or sections 160 and 161 or in any other section or schedule shall be construed as a reference to “the latest day on or before (which) that meeting should have been held in accordance with the provisions of the Act.” It is apparent under section 166 (1) of the Act that the company has to hold in each year, a general meeting as its annual general meeting not more than fifteen months, from the date of the previous general meeting, unless of course the Registrar, for any special reasons, extends the time within which any annual general meeting, not being the first annual general meeting shall be held by a period not exceeding three months. It is clear from that provisions that an annual general meeting, not being the first annual general meeting has to be held within fifteen months or eighteen months, where it is extended, from the date of the last general meeting. At such an annual general meeting, both under the old Companies Act and the Act, the balance-sheet and the Profit and loss account etc. have to be laid, in default of which punishment has been provided therefor. At such an annual general meeting, both under the old Companies Act and the Act, the balance-sheet and the Profit and loss account etc. have to be laid, in default of which punishment has been provided therefor. It is also apparent, at any rate from the specific provision of the Act, that this punishment is attracted even in cases where no meeting has been held due to wilful default of those on whom the duty was cast to call the meeting and lay the specified documents before it. That this was also the position under the old Companies Act, has been the view taken by the highest Court. Now the question is whether the company or its Directors agents and servants can be held liable on the analogy of the same principle as applicable in the case of non-holding of the annual general meeting or the omission to lay before that general meeting the documents specified in the earlier provisions for not fulfilling the requirements of section 220 of the Act, notwithstanding the fact that no annual general meeting was held and no balance-sheet or profit and loss account laid before that annual general meeting. Both section 134 of the old companies Act and section 220 of the Act provide that, after these documents viz. the balance-sheet and profit and loss account have been laid before a general meeting, three copies of the balance-sheet and profit and loss account should be filed before the Registrar of Companies. It is also necessary where the balance sheet is not adopted by the general body, a statement to that effect and all the reasons therefor shall be annexed to the balance-sheet and to the copies thereof required to be filed before the Registrar. In default of these two requirements, viz., of filing the balance-sheet and the statement of the balance sheet not being adopted, where it is not so adopted, the company and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to like punishment as provided in section 32 of the old Companies Act or section 162 of the Act for not complying with the provisions of sections 159, 160 or 161. Before the explanation to section 159 01 the Act was added defining the day on which the annual general meeting is to be held as the latest day on or before which that meeting should have been held under the provisions 01 section 166 of the Act, Courts had been called upon to interpret that expression under sections 32, 76 and 77 of the old Companies Act. It would appear that in some cases no difference was noticed between these sections and section 134. It may be stated that both section 134 of the old Companies Act and section 220 of the Act do not use the words “on the day” or “from the day on which,” which are used, in section 32 of the old Companies Act and in sections 159 and 160 of the Act. An examination of the language of these sections significantly demonstrate the conclusion when it is stated that after the balance-sheet and the profit and loss account have been so laid before the company at the general meeting, three copies of the same should be filed with the Registrar, that they should be the copies of the very same balance-sheet and profit and loss account which are in fact laid before the annual general meeting and not those which would have been laid before an annual general meeting had such a meeting been called. Under section 134 (1) of the old Companies Act, the time within which these documents should be filed is the same as for filing copies of the annual list of members and summary prepared in accordance with section 32. Section 220 (1) of the Act varies the language by specilying the time viz., that after the balance sheet and the profit and .loss account had been laid before a company at an annual general meeting as aforesaid, that is to say, as required under section 210, they shall be filed with the Registrar within thirty days on which the balance-sheet and the profit and loss account were so laid. The reference to section 201 by the use of the word " aforesaid " and the emphasis indicated by the words " were so laid’ make the filing or copies of those balance sheets and the profits and loss accounts which are laid before the general body meeting an essential prerequisite. The reference to section 201 by the use of the word " aforesaid " and the emphasis indicated by the words " were so laid’ make the filing or copies of those balance sheets and the profits and loss accounts which are laid before the general body meeting an essential prerequisite. If no general body meeting is held, it is obvious that no copies of the balance sheet and profit and loss accounts can be filed even though the default may be wilful. Both under section 134 of the old Companies Act and section 220 of the Act, the laying of the balance-sheet and the profit and loss account before an annual general meeting is a condition precedent to the requirement that copies of such documents so laid should be filed before the Registrar. This intention is made further clear by the provision under sub-section (2) of the respective sections of both the Acts that if the balance-sheet is not adopted at the general meeting, before which it is laid a statement to that fact and of the reasons therefore have to be annexed to the balance-sheet and to the copies thereof required to be filed with the Registrar. If no balance sheet is laid before a general body, there can be no question of that balance-sheet not being adopted nor of complying with the requirements of sub-section (2) of section 134 of the old Companies Act or section 220 of the Act as the case may be, while wilful omission to call a general meeting or omit to lay the balance-sheet and profit and loss account before it may expose the person responsible to punishment under other provisions of the Act, it certainly does not make him liable under the aforesaid provisions. The punishment under these sections is for default in filing copies of the balance-sheet or the profit and loss account which are laid before a general body and for not sending a statement of the fact that the balance-sheet was not adopted. The punishment under these sections is for default in filing copies of the balance-sheet or the profit and loss account which are laid before a general body and for not sending a statement of the fact that the balance-sheet was not adopted. It may be that copies of the balance-sheet so laid before the general body may have been forwarded under sub-section 1 of section 134 of the old Companies Act or sub-section 1 of section 220 of the Act, but nonetheless, if the requirements of subsection (2) of the respective sections have not been complied with, even then, the persons concerned would be liable for punishment for that default. In our view those provisions unmistakably indicate as we said earlier, that the holding of the annual general meeting and the laying before it of the balance-sheet and the profit and loss account is a sine qua non for filing of the copies thereof before the Registrar. If no general body meeting is held, the persons concerned cannot be said to have committed a default in complying with these provisions. An examination of the case-law would, in our view, show that the difference in the language on the one hand of section 134 of the old Companies Act and section 220 of the Act and on the other of the provisions of sections 32, 7b and 77 of the old Companies Act and analogous provisions of the Act has not been taken note of in most of the cases. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Bhandhan Ram1, pointed out this difference. Notwithstanding this, cases decided subsequently in the several High Courts in our view, with great respect, failed to appreciate the significant difference. In Park v. Lawton1, a similar question arose for consideration under section 26 of the English Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, which is analogous to section 32 of the old Companies Act. In that case, information was laid against the respondents by the appellant who was a staff officer of the Companies Regrstration Department of Somerset House, alleging that the respondents knowingly and willingly permitted default to be made by the English Traders Ltd., in forwarding to the Registrar of Companies at Somerset House a copy of the list of members, with summary as to capital and shares etc. for the year 1909 as required under section 26 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908 and that the said default had since continued for the space of sixty seven days thereafter and still continued — Though the General Meetings of the company were duly held, on 15th November, 1007, and on 7th December, 1908, and the annual list of members and summary for those years were duly forwarded to and filed by the Registrar of Somerset House, the Justices convicted the respondents of the offence charged in the first information. It was contended that the words “on the fourteenth day and after the first or only ordinary general meeting in the year” were words directory as to time only; and that the company was in default in not forwarding the annual list of members and summary. The respondents however contended that no general meeting having been held in 1909, it was impossible to make up the list required by section 26, and that the respondents could not, therefore, be convicted of a default for omitting to do that, which, in fact was impossible for them to do and further that the time did not begin to run until after the date of the meeting mentioned in section 26 This contention was negatived by Lord Alverstone, C.J., (with whom Hamilton and Avory, JJ. concurred said at page 592 “the cases of Gibson v. Batton2 and Edmonas v. Hoster3, are clear authorities “that a person” charged with an offence under section 26 is not entitled by way of defence to “plead the impossibility of complying with section 26 by reason of no general meeting, in other words, a person charged with an offence cannot rely on ‘his own default as answer to the charge. Nearer Home, Mitter J., in BallavDass v. Mohan Lal Sadhu4 was considering the case of the petitioner director of the Cash Insurance Bank Ltd., who had been convicted under clause 4 of section 32 clause 6 of section 77, clause 4 of section 134 of the old Companies Act and sentenced to pay a fine. The statutory meeting of the company had not been held within the time mentioned in section 77. The statutory report required to be forwarded under clause 2 of section 77 was not forwarded to any member of the petitioner-company and there could be no doubt that the petitioner knew of the said fact. The statutory meeting of the company had not been held within the time mentioned in section 77. The statutory report required to be forwarded under clause 2 of section 77 was not forwarded to any member of the petitioner-company and there could be no doubt that the petitioner knew of the said fact. Even after the prosecution was started on the 14th April, 1935, the register of share-holders was not prepared in accordance with the provisions of section 32 and there was no doubt that the petitioner also knew of the fact. The balance-sheet of the company was not prepared and placed at a general meeting nor filed with the Registrar of the Joint Stock Companies In fact the General meeting was never held and the petitioner also knew of the fact According to the learned Judge, the provisions of section 134 were therefore not complied with and in his view, in order to sustain a conviction under those sections, the only thing the prosecution had to prove was that a particular officer knowingly and wilfully authorised or permitted these defaults. It was further held that the offenee was also complete if the officer of the company knew of the defaults and permitted the defaults. In Bhagirath v. Emperor5, Lodge, J., was also dealing with sections 32 and 134 of the old Companies Act and while observing that he was supported by the decision Ballav Dass’s case4 said at page 45 ”In England it has been consistently held that a director who is prosecuted, for knowingly and wilfully permitting a company to default in respect of filing the balance sheet and Profit and loss account with the Registrar, cannot plead the impossibility of doing so when that impossibility is due to his own previous default. The same view has been taken in India........ Both these decisions, in our view did not consider the difference in the language of the several sections under which the petitioners were convicted particularly the difference between the requirements of section 134 and other sections of the old Companies Act. In Lakshmana v. Emperor1, Walsh, J., took a different view, though in fact the time for holding the general meeting had not yet come, and therefore, it may possibly be contended that what he said was obiter. In Lakshmana v. Emperor1, Walsh, J., took a different view, though in fact the time for holding the general meeting had not yet come, and therefore, it may possibly be contended that what he said was obiter. In Re Narasitnha Rao2 Pandrang Rao, J., considered the applicability of section 131 and 134 and held that “the same persons cannot be charged in respect of the same years with offences punishable both under sections 131 and 134 Companies Act, because section 134 clearly contemplates the sending of a copy of the balance-sheet only after it has been placed before the company at a general meeting under section 131. Where in a case there is no such placing of the balance-sheet before the company at a general meeting the offences under section 134, cannot be committed.” Some of the cases cited before him dealt with the non-sending of a copy of the balance sheet after it had been laid before a general meeting of the company. The prosecution against the persons was for default made in preparing a balance-sheet or placing before a general meeting ofthe company, which took place long before they ever became directors or officers of the company, and indeed even before they were share holders. As against this Ramaswami, J., In Re Gangipati Appayya3 and Viswanathan v. Asst. Registrar4, dealing in the former case with section 133 (3) and in the latter with sections 76 and 131 did not refer to the previous decisions of the Madras High Court. However reliance, was placed on Park v. Lawton5, and Bhagirath v. Emperor6, While these cases may be an authority for the proposition that under the provisions of sections 76 and 131, the wilful non-holding of an annual general meeting or the non laying before such a meeting of the balance-sheet and the profit and loss account amounts to a default of the provisions, there is nothing in those decisions which throws any light on the interpretation of section 134. A Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Chagla, Ag. C.J., and Gajendragadkar J., (as he then was) in Emperor v. Pioneer Clay and Industrial Works7, did consider the question which is now before us viz., wherether default was committed under section 134 (4). A Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Chagla, Ag. C.J., and Gajendragadkar J., (as he then was) in Emperor v. Pioneer Clay and Industrial Works7, did consider the question which is now before us viz., wherether default was committed under section 134 (4). The facts on which the prosecution was founded alleged that the accused had failed, as required by section 134 (4) of the old Companies Act to file with the Registrar of companies three copies of the balance-sheet and accounts of the company for the year 1944. It was common ground that no general meeting of the company had been called, at which the balance-sheet and the profit and loss account for the year 1944 had been laid. After referring to Sub-sections (1) and (4) of section 134, the learned Acting Chief Justice observed at page 357: “It is to be noted that what is made penal is default in complying with the requirements of the section and the requirements of section 134 (1) are that there is an obligation cast upon the company to file three copies of the balance-sheet and the profit and loss account after they have been laid before the company at the general meeting. There is no obligation cast upon the company to file any such copies if no general meeting has been called.” It was contended by the Government Pleader in that case that the directors are themselves in default in not calling a general meeting and it is not open to them to plead in their own defence their own default. Dealing with this contention, the Bench pointed out that under section76 (1), there is an obligation to hold a general meeting within eighteen months from the date of the Company’s incorporation in default of which a penalty was prescribed under sub- ection (2) of section 76. Again section 131 provides that the director of every company must lay before the company in general meeting a balance-sheet and profit and loss account at the time stated in that section, and the failure to does is made penal by section 133 (3). Therefore, it was observed at page 358, on the facts which are not disputed it is clear that the directors have failed to comply with the requirements both of section 76 (1) and also of section 131 (1). Therefore, it was observed at page 358, on the facts which are not disputed it is clear that the directors have failed to comply with the requirements both of section 76 (1) and also of section 131 (1). The Government instead of prosecuting them for what they have failed to do as required by the law and in respect of which they seem to have no defence whatever, have thought fit to launch a prosecution under section 134 (4) when the obvious defence which is put forward by the accused is that the stage has not arrived when they can be called upon to send copies of the balance-sheet and the profit and loss account, because that stage can only be reached after a general meeting has been called and balance-sheet and profit and loss account have been placed before that meeting. This decision is on all fours with the one we are considering. But as we noted earlier, an impression has gained ground that their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Bhandhan Ram1, have overruled the decision of the Bombay High Court in. Emperor v. Pioneer Clay and Industrial Works2, We do not think this is a valid assumption. Their Lordships, after referring to the Bombay decision, pointed out at page 189: “The language of that section is to a certain extent different, from the language used in sections 32 and 131.” After examining the language of section 134 (1) Sarkar J., (as he then was) speaking for the Court observed: If the language of section 134 (1) makes any difference as to the principle to be applied in ascertaining whether a breach of it has occured or not as to which we say nothing in this case then that case can be of no assistance to the respondents. However, if no such difference can be made, then we think that it was not correctly decided.“ Perhaps, that last sentence has given rise to the impression that their Lordships have overruled the decision in Emperor v. Pioneer Clay and Industrial Works2, But that is not so, because the subsequent observations clearly indicate that while Chagla, C.J. did not question the correctness of the decision in Park v. Lawton3 which he was asked to follow, all that he said with regard to that case was that the scheme and the terms of the section on which it turned were different from section 134 of the Companies Act, 1913. While saying” that may or may not be so,“Sarkar J., observed at page 189” “There is however no difference between section 26 of the English Companies Act, 1908, on which Park’s case3 turned, and which apparently through some mistake Chagla, C.J., cited section 36 and section 32 of the Indian Companies Act of 1913 except that the English section required the summary to include a statements the form of a balance-sheet containing certain particulars mentioned, whereas our section does not required that. Section 131 of our Act. contains some provision about the laying of the balance-sheet before the general meeting. This provision was inserted in the Act by the Amending Act of 1956. The fact, that one of the requirements of the English section 26 is not present in section 32 of our Act cannot create any material difference between section 32 of our Act and section 26 of the English Act. If the principle that a person charged with an offence cannot rely on his default as an answer to the charge is correct, as we think it is and which we do not find Chagla, C.J., saying it is not, then that principle would clearly apply when a person is charged with a breach of section 32 of our Act.” The decision of the Supreme Court is only an authority in respect of sections 131 and 132 of the old Companies Act and not for section 134 In so far as section 32 is concerned, the Supreme Court decided (1) that the fact that no general meeting of the company was held was, in the circumstances, no defence to the charge of not complying with the requirements of section 32. A person charged with an offence could not rely on his own default, as an answer to the charge and as in the case of section 32 and for the same reasons, it was no defence to the charge under section 131 to say that a general meeting was not called. Subsequent to Supreme Court’s decision Kailasam, J., in Neptune Studios Ltd. v. State1, Anantanarayanan, J. (as he then was) in P.S.N.S.A. Chettiar v. Registrar of Companies2, and a Bench of the Rajastan High Court consisting of J. S. Ranawat C.J., and P.N. Shingal, J., in State v. T.C. Printers3, and Amaresh Roy, J. in Dulal Chandra Bhar v. State of West Bengal4, apart from other sections, have dealt with prosecutions under section 220 of the Act. In all these cases, it was assumed that the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Bhandhan Ram5, applied the principle in Park v. Lawton6, to cases under section 134 of the Act which as we have pointed out with great respect is not the case. Kailasam, J., in Neptune Studio Ltd. v. State1 however did not say that the Supreme Court has in terms over ruled the decision in Emperor v. Pioneer Clay and Industrial Works7, but nontheless thought that the Bombay decision cannot be of much guidance. According to him, the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision is that a person charged with failure to carry out the requirements of the section cannot take advantage of his own default. Applying the principles laid down therein it was held that the appellants cannot be heard to plead their own default in not convening the general meeting for the submission that they are not guilty of the offence under section 220 (3) of the Act. Anantanarayana, J., (as he then was) in P.S.N.S.A. Chettiar v. Registrar of Companies2 and Ranawat, C.J., and Shinghal, J., in State v. T. C. Printers3, held that the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Bhandan Ram5, apply to cases under section 220 D. P. Uniyal, J., in Ramachandra & Sons. (P.) Ltd. v. State6 did not consider the contention that section 220 was differently worded. (P.) Ltd. v. State6 did not consider the contention that section 220 was differently worded. In this view that section was not Very happily worded, in that, the opening words of the section indicate that the balance sheet and the profit and loss account required to be filed with the Registrar must be such as have been laid before the annual general meeting. But in his view that does not and cannot absolve the company or the directors from performing their statutory duty in filing the balance-sheet and the profit and loss account before the Registrar within the stated time. With great respect we are unable to agree with his conclusion particularly when the learned Judge had held that the effect of the opening words would indicate that the balance sheet and the profit and loss account required to be filed before the Registrar, must be such as have been laid before the annual general meeting. Where there are clear words which justify a certain conclusion, in our view, that conclusion must be reached. Amaresh Roy, J., in Dulal Chandra Bhar v. State of West Bengal4, expressed the view at page 1149 that in State of Bombay v. Bhandhan Ram5, their Lordships of the Supreme Court stated that the principle enunciated in Park v. Lawton,6 would apply, when a person is charged with breach of the Indian Companies Act. While applying the principle to the case before him which was under section 220 the learned Judge, however, did not refer to the passage of Sankar, J., in the Supreme Court decision in which the learned Judge distinguished the Bombay Case. These decisions in terms do not notice the difference in the language and the requirements of section 220 on the one hand and sections 159 to 162, 166 and 210 of the Act on the other. It appeals to us on a consideration of the releavant provisions of the Act that the wilful failure to hold a general meeting cannot be pleaded as a defence for default committed in preparing the statements of members of the company as required under section 32 or for failure to lay before the general meeting, the balance sheet nd the profit and loss account, or in the case of a company not trading for profit an income and expenditure account. One cannot plead one’s own default in defence. One cannot plead one’s own default in defence. The principle in Park v. Lawton1, however cannot be held to be applicable to the requirements of section 134, because the actual holding of an annual general meeting is a condition precedent or a sine qua non for the filing of the copies of the balance-sheet and profit and loss account which are so laid, before an annual general meeting with the Registrar within thirty days from the day when they are so laid We have already noticed that the language of section 134 (1) and (2) requires only copies of that balance-sheet and profit and loss account or a statement that the balance sheet has not been adopted with full reasons therefor should be filed before the Registrar, which have been laid at an annual general meeting, which in fact in reality have been held and not copies of those documents which would have been filed had such a meeting been held, if the persons concerned had not wilfully defaulted in calling the meeting. As already pointed out, the language of the relevant provisions of the present Companies Act(the Act) is somewhat different, and if anything, lends further weight to this conclusion. It is clear that the default in not holding an annual general meeting and preparing statements or returns and filing them before the Registrar or in not laying of the balance sheet and the profit and loss account before the meeting as required under sections 166, 159 to 161 and 210 cannot be pleaded in defence of a prosecution. The contrary view taken in Public Prosecutor v. H.B. Basava Raj2, that the holding of an annual general meeting would be necessary for the prosecution under section 166 and 210 of the Act is in our view with respect no longer good law, having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court on the analogous provisions of the old Companies Act. While this is so, the defence that no general meeting was in fact held for the non-filing of the copies of the balance sheet or profit and loss account or the non-attachment of the statement that the balance-sheet has not been adopted with the explanation therefor before the Registrar within the time specified, will however be open to the person prosecuted under section 220 (3). While it is open to the Registrar to prosecute the persons who have committed default under section 166, 159 to 162 and 210 by wilfully not holding a meeting and not fulfilling the requirements of these provisions for which no period of limitation is prescribed under the Act, any prosecution under section 220 would be premature without such a meeting being in fact held. In the view have taken, the Criminal Revision Case is allowed and the prosecution is quashed. A.B.K. ----- Revision allowed; prosecution quashed.