JUDGMENT Joytosh Banerjee, J. This is tenant/defendants appeal against order No.44 dated 19.9.85 by which the learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court dismissed a proceeding under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code, which was started by the defendant/tenant for setting aside the ex parte decree passed in ejectment suit No. 574/81 by the said City Civil Court on 19.11.81 and the ground taken by the tenant/defendant for the said prayer was non-service of summons. 2. Briefly stated the facts leading to the filing of the instant Misc. Appeal are that plaintiff/respondent filed a suit for eviction (ejectment Suit No.5741/81) against the defendant/tenant before the City Civil Court, Calcutta on 4-7-81. The summons were issued both by ordinary manner and also by registered post with A.D. After the service of summons by registered post, the date was fixed for ex parte hearing when the defendant/tenant failed to turn up inspite of the service of summons. On 19.11.81, the suit was heard and decreed ex parte. On 22.3.82, the defendant/tenant filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code praying for restoration of the suit after setting aside the ex parte decree dated 19.11.81. That proceeding too was dismissed for default when decree-holder/opposite party was ready but the petitioner/tenant did not take any step. Thereafter on 22.12.84, the defendant/ tenant filed another application under section 151 Civil Procedure Code for setting aside the order of dismissal dated 24.11.84. That application was finally allowed on payment of cost on 23.3.85 and the order of dismissal dated 24.11.84 was set aside and the proceeding under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code which was registered as a Misc. Case was restored to its original file and number. Subsequently, on 27.7.85, 17.8.85 and 24.8.85 the Misc. Case was heard and by an order dated 19.9.85, the learned Chief Judge dismissed the proceeding under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code. Hence this appeal. 3. Through the memo of appeal, the appellant/tenant has urged that there was no service of summons in connection with the aforesaid ejectment suit and therefore the ultimate order passed by the learned Chief Judge dismissing the proceeding is tainted with illegality. 4. Hence this appeal. 3. Through the memo of appeal, the appellant/tenant has urged that there was no service of summons in connection with the aforesaid ejectment suit and therefore the ultimate order passed by the learned Chief Judge dismissing the proceeding is tainted with illegality. 4. In this background, the only point for our consideration in this appeal is whether the learned Chief Judge came to an erroneous finding while deciding that summons sent under registered post was duly received by the tenant/ defendant? 5. From the grounds of challenging the impugned order passed by the learned trial court we find that the specific plea taken by the appellant was that the learned trial Judge ought to have held on the evidence before him that there was no service or valid service of summons of the suit on the appellant and the evidence on record did not warrant the ex parte decree passed in the suit. It was further alleged that the learned Judge failed to appreciate that the alleged postal acknowledgement in respect of the writ of service purporting to be signed by the appellant, was not his signature and the purported initial on the acknowledgement card was not his initial. At the time of making his submission, the learned Counsel for the appellant made two fold submissions for the purpose of challenging the order impugned. Firstly, it is submitted that the learned trial Judge arrived at an erroneous conclusion regarding service of summons on the basis of the evidence on record. Secondly, it is submitted that even assuming for the sake of argument that the service was effected then also it can be said that the same was not served as per provisions contained under Order 30 Rule 10 Civil Procedure Code. 6. The learned Counsel for the respondent on the other hand has submitted that the learned trial Judge considered the matter correctly and after assigning sufficient reasons came to a final conclusion that there was service of summons upon the appellant and inspite of the same when such appellant failed to turn up, the suit was decreed ex parte and hence there was no sufficient reasons for setting aside such ex parte decree. Regarding the submission made on behalf of the appellant relating to the service under Order 30, it is contended that no such ground has been taken by the appellant in the appeal and therefore in an appeal under Order 43 Civil Procedure Code, the learned Counsel for the appellant is not entitled to raise that question. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondent that the jurisdiction of the appellant court here is limited only to consider the propriety or correctness of the order appealed against and it has no power or jurisdiction to go beyond the order appealed against. 7. Taking the first thing first, we find from the order impugned that the learned Judge when considering the question whether summons in connection with the suit was served upon the appellant or not found on the basis of the delivery sheet and acknowledgement receipt that summons which were sent through registered post was received by the defendant/appellant on 22.7.81. In this respect he also placed his reliance on the evidence of postal peon O.P.W.-l Santi Ranjan Kar who at the relevant point of time was attached to G.P.O's Registration Section. The learned Judge noted that in the evidence, the postal peon stated clearly that he had been in the area where the defendants shop was situated, namely, Radha Bazar Street for a pretty long time and he tendered many registered letters to the petitioner (appellant). The said postal peon also identified the petitioner (in the proceeding and the appellant here) as the person whom he served the said registered letter containing the summons of the suit. In this background, the learned Judge could not place any reliance on the denial made by the defendant as to the service of notice by registered post specially pointing out that the defendant/appellant admitted that he received the ejectment notice issued to him by the landlord but when the acknowledgement receipt (in connection with the ejectment notice) was shown to the witness/ appellant he also denied the signature on the acknowledgment receipt of the said ejectment notice. In that background, the learned Judge came to a clear conclusion that the petitioner/appellant had no regard for the truth. We are unable to discover any error in the approach of the learned Judge in coming to such a conclusion. In that background, the learned Judge came to a clear conclusion that the petitioner/appellant had no regard for the truth. We are unable to discover any error in the approach of the learned Judge in coming to such a conclusion. It transpires that the appellant has criticised the way, the appellant was allowed to be further cross-examined by the respondent/O.P. But on going through the record we find that initially the acknowledgement card was not available and after such acknowledgement was available, further cross-examination of the appellant/petitioner was thought necessary by the respondent in view of the denial on the part of the appellant regarding service of summons through registered post. So on the very next day that prayer was made and it was allowed. The order in question in this respect goes to show that learned court below also heard the learned Advocate for both sides, therefore, in our considered opinion, the order allowing the further cross-examination of the petitioner/appellant was not at all unjustified, in the facts and circumstances of the case. In this respect it should be added that in the instant case the summons which had been sent through registered post, were served and the acknowledgement card containing the signature of the defendant/ appellant was returned after such service. No doubt, it was open to the defendant/tenant to allege, in spite of such service, that actually summons in connection with the suit were not served upon him. In the instant case for the aforesaid purpose, the defendant/tenant only by examining himself simply alleged that he did not receive the summons. In our considered opinion, this was not sufficient to come to a conclusion disregarding the evidence adduced from the side of the landlord/respondent that summons was in fact served; specially when the landlord/respondent examined the postal peon who on oath stated before the court that he himself served the summons, further stating that he was attached to that zone for a considerable period of time and he had the occasion to serve letters in the address of the tenant/appellant. Besides a bland denial the appellant/tenant did not try to give any reason why the summons which was sent through registered post, would not reach him. There was no allegation that the address given was wrong or there was any other suitable reason for such allegation. Besides a bland denial the appellant/tenant did not try to give any reason why the summons which was sent through registered post, would not reach him. There was no allegation that the address given was wrong or there was any other suitable reason for such allegation. That being the position we do not find any reason to disturb the finding of the learned Chief Judge of the City Civil Court and to take a different view from that of the court below. 8. Next comes the question regarding the service of notice/summons under Order 30 of the Civil Procedure Code. The main contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant in this respect is that summons were not served as per the provisions under Order 30 Rule 10 of Civil Procedure Code. In order to advance his argument in this respect our attention was drawn to the provisions of Rules 3,5 and 10 of Order 30 and it was submitted that the alleged service on the tenant/appellant was not valid/sufficient as the said service had been effected on M/s. Canton Electricals though the same was a proprietary concern of Sri Vedpraksh Chabra. Before we proceed further we should point out that Order 30 deals with mode of suing the firms or persons carrying on business in the names other than their own. Rule 3 of the said order provides that where persons are sued as partners in the name of their firm, the summons shall be served upon anyone or more of the partners or at the principal place at which the partnership business is carried on within India. Rule 5 further provides that where a summons is served on the person as provided by Rule 3, the persons served should be informed by notice in writing given at the time of service whether he is served a partner or as a person in the management of the business or in both characters. Rule 10 of the said order further provides that any person carrying on business in a name or style other than his own name may be sued in such name or style as if it were a firm name. In the instant case admittedly Sri Vedprakash Chabra was at the relevant point of time, the sole proprietor of the tenant/appellant firm namely, M/s. Canton Electricals. In the instant case admittedly Sri Vedprakash Chabra was at the relevant point of time, the sole proprietor of the tenant/appellant firm namely, M/s. Canton Electricals. Now, before the trial court, the said admitted proprietor of the firm tried to deny his signature on the acknowledgement card showing the service of summons upon him and such assertion was not accepted by the learned trial court and we have already seen that there is no cogent reason of differ with the ultimate finding of the court below in this respect. The question, therefore, boils down to whether it would be sufficient if the summons were served upon the sole proprietor of the firm? We have already seen from Rule 3 of Order 30 that when persons are sued as partners in the name of their firm the summons should be served either upon anyone or more of the partners or at the principal place at which the partnership business is carried on within India. Rule 10 of the same order further lays down that a person carrying on business in a name or style other than his own name may be sued in such name or style as if it were a firm. In this way on going through the provisions of Rules 1, 3 and 10 of Order 30, we find that these rules make it very clear that when a suit is filed in the name of the firm as defendant, the name of the firm is merely an assumed collective name representing all partners in case where there is a partnership or as provided in Rule 10 it is the name and style under which a person is carrying on a business. In both cases, the defendants or the defendant, as the case may be, sued in the name of the firm' and when so sued the firm includes and represents defendants/defendant in their respective personal names. In that view of the matter, the aforesaid objection raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant seems to us without any force in view of the admitted position that it has been established in the proceeding under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code that the summons in connection with the suit was received by the sole proprietor of the firm, the tenant/defendant of the case. 9. 9. In support of his contention regarding defect in service, the learned Counsel for the appellant has referred us decisions given in Harjiban Das Gordhan Das vs. Bhagwan Das Pursran, Chowranghee Properties Ltd. vs. Bright & MC Ivor, Tripura Modern Bank vs. Bansen & Co., reported in AIR 1922 Calcutta 390, AIR 1960 Calcutta 294, AIR 1952 Calcutta 781 respectively. In the first case, it was decided that if the firm stood dissolved at the relevant point of time then the only way in which writ could be served was by serving it upon a partner. In the second case, it was decided that the words "Person having at the time of service, the control or management of the partnership business" were not synonymous with the word "manager". In other words, a person might be a manager yet he might not have control or management of the partnership business within the meaning of Order 30 Rule 3 (b) of the Civil Procedure Code. So far as the third case mentioned above is concerned, the same did not deal with the question of service under Order 30 of the Civil Procedure Code. It mainly dealt with the question when and under what circumstances service by affixation could be made, so the case on the face of the record is not relevant. So far the other two aforesaid cases are concerned, it should be noted that in the instant case since the service was made on the sole proprietor as required under Order 30 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code, the appellant cannot get any benefit from those decisions. But before we leave the matter, we must consider the argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the respondent/landlord, raising the question that the tenant/appellant cannot challenge the service of summons under the provisions of Order 30 Civil Procedure Code due to simple fact that the appellant did not challenge the service of summons in that way either before the court below in the proceeding under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code or even before this court through the memo of appeal. 10. 10. In this respect, the learned counsel for the landlord/respondent has submitted that unlike an appeal under Order 41 Civil Procedure Code, an appeal under Order 43, as in this case, the scope of consideration before the appellate court is limited and therefore if the same question was never raised before the trial court, it would not be possible to raise such question in the appeal under Order 43. In this respect, the learned Counsel has placed his reliance on a decision of this court in Wellman Incandescent India Limited vs. M/s. A.K. Agnihotry, reported in 1983 (1) CHN 349 . On the other hand, the learned counsel for the tenant/appellant has submitted that the plea that the notice was not properly served was taken in ground Nos. 1 and 19 of grounds of appeal and paragraphs 4,6 and 11 of the application under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code, therefore, the preliminary objection on this point raised on behalf of the landlord/respondent cannot be sustained. 11. It transpires from the record that both in the application under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code and in the grounds of appeal taken by the tenant/ appellant before this court plea which was taken by the tenant/appellant was that no summons in connection with the suit were ever served upon the defendant, though the tenant/appellant did not allege any where either in the application under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code or in the memo of appeal that summons were served upon the defendant in his personal capacity and not as the proprietor of the defendant/tenant firm. From the reported judgment (supra) we find that the learned Judge after considering the various provisions of the Civil Procedure Code came to the following conclusion" the conclusion, is therefore, inescapable that power of the appellate court under Order 43 is not as wide as it is under Order 41. So I reach the conclusion that while entertaining an appeal under Order 43, the appellate Court has very limited power, it will only consider the property or correctness of the order appealed against for which appeal has been expressly provided under the order. So I reach the conclusion that while entertaining an appeal under Order 43, the appellate Court has very limited power, it will only consider the property or correctness of the order appealed against for which appeal has been expressly provided under the order. It has no power or jurisdiction beyond the order appealed against, though in the case of an appeal from a decree, the appellate court has power in respect of order not directly coming within an ambit of a decree." The atoresaid observation at once will go to show that the objection taken by the learned Counsel for the appellant is within the ambit of the appeal since' through the argument advanced 'before this court, the learned Counsel for the appellant only wanted to satisfy the court that in view of the different provisions of Order 30, there was no service of summons in connection with the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent here. In order to consider the propriety or correctness of the order impugned, this court is required to consider whether there was any force behind the argument canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant regarding the service of summons under Order 30. It is already evident that we have considered the argument and we have rejected the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant but we cannot say that such argument should not be considered by this court in view of limited power under Order 43. 12. In the result, we hold that the present case must fail. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. Having regard to the circumstances we make no order as to costs. Y.R. Meena, J.: I agree. Appeal dismissed.