P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) THE civil revision petition is filed as against an order made in LA. No. 84/ 96 in I. A. No. 1477/92 in C. M. A. S. R. No. 6804/92 dated 13-2-1997 by the learned district Judge, Medak at Sangareddy, dismissing the said I. A. filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The revision petitioner is the General Manager (Engg.), hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and severage Board, Operation and Maintenance, patancheru, Medak District. ( 2 ) THE revision petitioner filed an appeal C. M. A. S. R. No. 6804/92 on the file of District Judge, Medak at Sangareddy, aggrieved by an order made under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 passed by the Additional Commissioner of Labour- authority under Payment of Wages Act, patancheru, Medak in PW5/92 along with ia. No. 1477/92 to condone the delay of 126 days in preferring the said appeal. The application LA. No. 1477/92 was dismissed as there was no representation on 31-8-1995 and the revision petitioner- appellant filed an application to restore i. A. No. 1477/92 along with an application i. A. No. 84/96 to condone delay of 123 days in filing the application for restoration of i. A. No. 1477/92. It was averred in the affidavit that their advocate had not rspresented the matter on 31-8-1995 before the Court when the matter was called and all along they were under the impression that the advocate on record had been defending the interest of the revision petitioner-appellant effectively and when the revision petitioner-appellant had deputed another advocate to ascertain the progress of the matter, it was reported that the petition was dismissed for default on 31-8-1995 and in the said process there was delay of 123 days in filing the application for restoration and hence a request was made to allow the said application and to give an opportunity to the revision petitioner-appellant. The 1st respondent herein had filed a counter denying the submissions made in the affidavit in support of the application and had taken a stand that for the proceedings under the payment of Wages Act, Section 5 of the limitation Act, 1963 itself is not applicable and apart from it, the revision petitioner- appellant and their Counsel had been regularly absent for more than one year and ultimately it was dismissed for default and there are no valid grounds to restore the same. The Court below after recording certain reasons in paragraph 4 of the impugned order had arrived at the conclusion that no useful purpose will be served to restore the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 since the same is not applicable and further observed that there is no bonafide ground to condone delay of 123 days in the facts and circumstances of the case. Aggrieved by the said order, the present revision is filed by the revision petitioner under Section 115 of the Code of civil Procedure, hereinafter referred to as "code" in short for the purpose of convenience. ( 3 ) THE facts in nutshell are that the 1st respondent had filed PW 5/92 on the file of Assistant Commissioner of labour-Authority under Payment of Wages act, 1936, Patancheru, Medak District, shown as 2nd respondent in the present civil revision petition, claiming difference of wages. It is no doubt true that certain contentions had been advanced whether the difference of wages and the deduction of wages under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, hereinafter in short called as "act" for the purpose of convenience, will be one and the same or they are different. This is a matter touching the merits of the matter. Inasmuch as the said PW 5/92 was allowed by the 2nd respondent and aggrieved by the same c. M. A. S. R. No. 6804/92 was filed along with an application to condone delay (LA. No. 1477/92) and as already stated supra the same was dismissed for default and to restore the said application an application to condone delay of 123 days (I. A. No. 84/96) was filed, which was also dismissed by the impugned order dated 13-2-1997, and aggrieved by the said order the present civil revision petition had been preferred. No. 1477/92) and as already stated supra the same was dismissed for default and to restore the said application an application to condone delay of 123 days (I. A. No. 84/96) was filed, which was also dismissed by the impugned order dated 13-2-1997, and aggrieved by the said order the present civil revision petition had been preferred. ( 4 ) SRI K. Janardhan Rao, the learned counsel representing the revision petitioner had raised several contentions virtually drawing my attention to all the factual details of the matter and also the conduct of the 1st respondent. All these aspects are matters touching the very merits of the case, which may have to be ultimately decided at the time of considering the main civil miscellaneous appeal, which had been preferred by the revision petitioner-appellant on the file of the District Judge, Medak at sangareddy. Coming to the present civil revision petition filed under Section 115 of the Code, now the first question that has to be considered is whether the civil revision petition under Section 115 of the Code is maintainable ? Janardhan Rao, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, on the question of maintainability of the civil revision petition had drawn my attention to sections 15, 17 and also 18 of the Act and had contended that inasmuch as a civil miscellaneous appeal is preferred to district Court, definitely Section 5 of the limitation Act, 1963 is applicable and when an order is made by the District Court dismissing such an application, the remedy available to the aggrieved party is only by invoking Section 115 of the Code. The learned Counsel had placed strong reliance on Nirmal Industries v. Naseemuddin, air 1967 AP 370 and also Raj Kumar mills v. Inspector, P. W. M. B. , AIR 1955 M. B. 60. Sri Janardhan Rao, also had contended that even otherwise it is not a final order under Section 17 of the Act, but it is as against an order Dismissing an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 only. The learned Counsel had also contended that the Court below had totally erred in not deciding the question of sufficiency of cause and dismissing the application mainly on the ground that no useful purpose will be served since Section 5 of the" Limitation Act, 1963 itself is not applicable, is totally erroneous approach adopted by the Court below. The learned Counsel had also contended that the Court below had totally erred in not deciding the question of sufficiency of cause and dismissing the application mainly on the ground that no useful purpose will be served since Section 5 of the" Limitation Act, 1963 itself is not applicable, is totally erroneous approach adopted by the Court below. The learned counsel also had drawn my attention that there is no specific exclusion of the applicability of the provisions of the limitation Act, 1963 in Section 17 of the act and hence in view of Section 3 read with Section 29 (2) of the Limitation act, 1963, definitely the provisions of sections of the Limitation Act, 1963, are applicable to the case on hand. The learned j counsel had placed strong reliance on gram Panchayat Committee v. G. Lingaiah, 1997 (6) ALT 112, Mahendra Kumar Goyal v. Addl. Commissioner of Civil Supplies, 1997 (1) ALD (Crl.) 317 (DB) (AP) = 1997 (1) ALD 623 (DB) = 1997 (2) ALT 722 (DB) and also Mukri Gopalan v, C. P. Aboobacker, AIR 1995 SC 2272 . The learned Counsel had gone a step further and had contended that if the stand of the other side has to be accepted then, the very power to dismiss for default is not available and had placed reliance on Jai Prakash v. Seventh addl. District Judge, 1985 (2) LLN 93. ( 5 ) SRI Rajamalla Reddy, the learned counsel representing the 1st respondent had strenuously contended that as far as the merits and demerits of the matter are concerned, this is not the stage to be gone into since the main appeal itself is an unnumbered appeal. The learned Counsel also had pointed out that several grounds which are being raised had not been raise in the grounds of appeal in the civil miscellaneous appeal. As already observed by me, these are all matters touching the merits of the case, which need not be necessarily gone into at this stage. The learned Counsel also had placed strong reliance on Parimi Venkanna v. Modern spun Pipe Co. , 1974 (1) An. W. R. 435 and also Shaik Maqbool Bash v. B. Lakshmi kanthamma, 2001 (1) ALD 97 = 2000 (6) alt 735 and had contended that inasmuch as the Code itself is not applicable, the revision under Section 115 of the Code is no maintainable. , 1974 (1) An. W. R. 435 and also Shaik Maqbool Bash v. B. Lakshmi kanthamma, 2001 (1) ALD 97 = 2000 (6) alt 735 and had contended that inasmuch as the Code itself is not applicable, the revision under Section 115 of the Code is no maintainable. The learned Counsel also in the alternative had submitted that in view of the specific bar imposed relating to the conversion of the proceedings into one under article 227 of the Constitution of India, by virtue of decisions Vishwsh Kumar v. Shanti prasad, AIR 1980 SC 892 and N. S. Reddy v. T. V. Reddy, 1997 (2) ALT 534 , such conversion also is not permissible. The learned Counsel also had placed reliance on hyderabad Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd v. M. H. Khan, 1970 Labour and Ind. Cases 1082 and Hind Mazdoor Sabha v. State of U. P. , 1999 (1) LLN 840 and also the decision rendered in Ramesh Raju, M. D. , M/s. Sanicons Engineers and Contractors v. Abdul samad and others, C. R. P. No. 2297/98, dated 4-9-1998. The learned Counsel also had strenuously contended that the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are not at all applicable and when the main application I. A. No. 1477/92 itself is not maintainable, the application to condone delay along with an application to restore such an application, will be a futile exercise and hence the revision is liable to be dismissed. ( 6 ) HEARD both the Counsel and perused the material available on record. The appeal was preferred under Section 17 of the Act and the words used in sub-section (1) of section 17 of the Act are " before the Court of Small Causes and elsewhere before the district Court". In the decision referred in nirmal Industries case (supra), it was held that though a revision under Section 115 of the Code as against an order in appeal under Section 17 of the Act lies, it is not as a matter of right, but however the order can be challenged by way of a writ petition. In the decision referred in nirmal Industries case (supra), it was held that though a revision under Section 115 of the Code as against an order in appeal under Section 17 of the Act lies, it is not as a matter of right, but however the order can be challenged by way of a writ petition. In the decision referred in Raj kumar Mills case (supra), it was held that when an appeal is provided under Section 17 to the District Court, that Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the country, consequently its orders and decrees will be governed by the Rules of Civil procedure Code and therefore a revision is competent against the decision of District court under Section 115 of the Code. In the decision referred in Parimi Venkanna case (supra), it was held that under the act there is no provision attracting to its proceedings all the provisions of the Code, including the right to file Cross-Objections. Reliance also was placed on the decision referred (supra), wherein at paragraph - 8 it was observed that for every person who is adversely affected by an order passed in an interlocutory application finally disposing of the proceedings, the remedy of revision under Section 115 of the Code does not lie and this is especially so when the proceedings are disposed of in an interlocutory application, but not in a suit. Since the appeal under Section 17 of the act is filed before a District Court, the district Court being a civil Court exercising the appellate powers under Section 17 of the act, as against the orders of this nature, I am of the considered opinion that the revisions under Section 115 of the Code are maintainable. ( 7 ) COMING to the next question relating to the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, it is pertinent to note there is no specific exclusion of the applicability of the provisions of Section 17 of the Act. In fact, in the decision referred in Gram Panchayat Committee s case (supra), it was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to appeals under the Payment of Wages Act. In fact, in the decision referred in Gram Panchayat Committee s case (supra), it was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to appeals under the Payment of Wages Act. It is no doubt true that a Division Bench in the decision referred in Hyderabad Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd. s case (supra) had arrived at a conclusion that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be said to be applicable in case of an appeal under the act by virtue of Section 29 (2) of the said act. Following the said decision, in the revision referred in Ramesh Raju, M. D. , m/s. Sanicons Engineers and Contractors case (supra) also, a similar view was expressed. In the decision referred in Hind mazdoor Sabha s case (supra), it was held that the Tribunal being not a Court under section 4 and 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the power of condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is not available. But however, as already stated (supra), in the decision referred in Gram panchayat Committee s case (supra), this court had expressed an opinion that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation act, 1963 are applicable in a proceeding of this nature. The question whether there is power to dismiss for default or not, which was considered in the decision referred in Jai Prakash s case (supra), need not be considered in the present matter. Be that as it may, in the light of the decision of the Apex Court referred in murki Gopalan s case (supra), it can be no longer said that the view expressed in the prior decisions holds good, even as on today. In the light of the ratio laid down in the decision of the Apex Court referred in murki Gopalan s case (supra) and also in the light of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation act, 1963, I am of the considered opinion that inasmuch as there is no specific exclusion of the applicability of the powers of condonation of delay, it must be taken that such powers can be exercised by the district Court. ( 8 ) NOW the other question, which survives for consideration is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned order of the Court below can be sustained or it is liable to be set aside. ( 8 ) NOW the other question, which survives for consideration is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned order of the Court below can be sustained or it is liable to be set aside. No doubt, as already stated supra, both the counsel had made an attempt to address certain arguments relating to the merits and demerits of the main case, which I am inclined to go into at this stage, suffice for me to say that as far as the aspect of condonation of delay is concerned, it is pertinent to note that the revision petitioner is the General Manager (Engg), Hyderabad metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage board, Operation and Maintenance, patancheru, Medak District, and it is also not in dispute that on the date of presentation of the appeal itself, the amount had been depositd as contemplated by Section 17 of the Act. In fact, cogent reasons had been given under what circumstances the delay had occurred and a responsible officer had sworn to the affidavit explaining the circumstances since the Board and the officials were under the impression that the advocate on record was looking after the litigation and when they had ascertained the same through another advocate they came to know about the proceedings and in course of this process there was delay in filing the application to restore the application filed for condonation of delay along with the civil miscellaneous appeal. Taking into consideration the overall facts and circumstances and after perusing the complete material available on record, I am of the considered opinion that both in the interest of justice and also in view of the cogent and convincing explanation given in the affidavit in support of the application, the delay has to be condoned and accordingly the delay of 123 days in filing the application is hereby condoned. ( 9 ) FOR the reasons recorded above, the civil revision petition is allowed. But however, in the facts and circumstances of the case, no order as to costs.