Honble LAKSHMANAN, CJ.–The above-mentioned six special appeals arise out of the order, dated 24.5.96, passed by Honble Arun Madan, J., in S.B. writ petitions Nos. 6826/94, 6855/94 and 1162/95. Writ Petition No. 6826/94 was filed by an Advocate, Shri Kamlakar Sharma; Writ Petition No. 6855/94 was filed by Rambagh Golf Club; and Writ Petition No. 1162/95 (by post), was sent by Dr. S.C. Kabra and another. Writ Petition No. 6826/94 was filed by Advocate Shri Kamlakar Sharma, for a writ of prohibition, restraining the State of Rajasthan and the Jaipur Development Authority (in short, ``JDA), from altering the status of any open space, park, play-ground and green areas etc., in the City of Jaipur and from carrying out any construction activity, including construction of buildings or roads in any of the said areas of the City of Jaipur, including Ram Bagh Complex, Golf Club, Polo Ground etc. A further prayer for prohibition, restraining from altering the land-use of any open space, play- ground, park, green areas etc. in any of the future master plans for the City of Jaipur, was also made. The petitioner, Shri K.K. Sharma, who is an Advocate by profession, is also an environmentalist, states that he is deeply interested in the preservation of environment and ecology of the State of Rajasthan in particular, and the country in general. He is also an active sports loving person and believes in physical and mental well- being of human life. According to him, every citizen has a right to fresh air and to live in a pollution free environment; that it is essential that mankind has to live in tune with the nature; and that keeping the environment clean is a fundamental duty not only of the State, but also of every citizen. He was constrained to file the writ petition, on account of the high-handed, arbitrary and unreasonable attitude of the State Government as well as the JDA, by which they, instead of protecting the environment and ecology of the city, were acting detrimental to it. (2). Writ Petition No. 6855/94 was filed by M/s. Rambagh Golf Club, through its Joint Secretary, with the prayer that by a suitable order or direction, the action of the non-petitioner, in removing the barbed fencing around the petitioner-club, may be quashed and for further restraining from causing any damage to the green area, maintained by the petitioner. (2). Writ Petition No. 6855/94 was filed by M/s. Rambagh Golf Club, through its Joint Secretary, with the prayer that by a suitable order or direction, the action of the non-petitioner, in removing the barbed fencing around the petitioner-club, may be quashed and for further restraining from causing any damage to the green area, maintained by the petitioner. A further prayer was made to restrain the non-petitioners, from construction any road within the petitioner-club area; from cutting or uprooting the own trees within the petitioner-club area; and also from raising any construction or allotting any land within the area, possessed by the petitioner-club and Polo Ground. (3). Writ Petition No. 1162/95 (by post), a public interest litigation, was made by one Dr. S.C. Kabra and another, requesting the Rajasthan High Court, to intervene and direct the State Government and the JDA, to maintain the entire area of the Rambagh Complex, as open green area and to declare this area as ``no-construction zone. They also requested to direct the State Government, not to approve any scheme/colony in the City of Jaipur, without adequate green areas to be located therein and further not to alter or reduce the existing developed green areas. They said in the petition that the people of the City shall ever remain grateful to this Court, for this act of kindness. (4). All the three writ petitions were contested by the State of Rajasthan and the JDA. The learned Single Judge, while allowing the writ petitions, imparted the following directions:- ``108. During the course of hearing it was brought to the notice of this Court that the green area over the land in question in use and occupation of the petitioner-club is being spoiled due to its misuse on account of concentration of large number of horses brought by polo players and, if not checked in time, this would result in damaging the green area of the Rambagh Complex besides causing irreparable damage to its grassy lawns. In view of this fact the stabling and schooling of horses shall not be permitted by the polo players in any manner whatsoever. If any obstruction has been caused by the polo players, as a result of pitching of tents for the abode of horse caretakers, stabling of horses including wooden-planks, the same should be removed immediately. In view of this fact the stabling and schooling of horses shall not be permitted by the polo players in any manner whatsoever. If any obstruction has been caused by the polo players, as a result of pitching of tents for the abode of horse caretakers, stabling of horses including wooden-planks, the same should be removed immediately. However, the polo players shall be at liberty to bring the horses only when the matches are played and they would remove the same as soon as the matches are over. This would serve as safeguard for protection of the environment and the green area from the likely damage. 109. As a result of the above discussion, I am of the considered opinion that the petitioner in all the aforesaid writ petitions deserve to succeed. The writ petitions are consequently allowed, and a mandamus is issued prohibiting the respondents from altering the status of the land in question comprising Rambagh Golf Course and Polo Ground and other green areas, parks and play-grounds of Jaipur City. The respondents are further prohibited from converting or changing the user of the land in question in any manner as indicated in the Master Plan of the year 1976 which is still operative and binding on the respondents. The respondents are further restrained from carrying out any construction activity including roads and buildings i.e. residential, commercial, administrative and cultural complexes etc., over the land in question. A mandamus is issued to the respondents to give effect to the directions of this Court, as referred to above, by constituting the High Level Committee comprising the Secretary, Tourism Department, Government of Rajasthan, Commissioner, J.D.A., Secretary, State Pollution Control Board, and the Captain/Secretary of the Rambagh Golf Club within a period of 3 months from the date of this order with a view to have overall supervisory control of the Rambagh Complex comprising the land in question and to take effective steps for maintenance and further development of recreation facilities provided by the petitioner-club and for protection and maintenance of the green areas over the land in question for public utility and in the interest of general public. The said committee shall maintain overall control, supervision and monitoring over the land in question with a view to give effect to the aforesaid directions and shall arrange appropriate allocation and utilization of the funds apart from the funds already allocated by the Central Government of Rajasthan, for the maintenance, development and protection of green areas over the land in question and for further development of the Rambagh Complex. The respondents are further directed not to permit any sort of encroachment to be done over the land which is in use and occupation of the Rambagh Golf Club and the said club would be fully within its rights to protect the land under its occupation. There will be no order as to costs. (5). Aggrieved by this judgment, the Rajasthan Polo Club preferred three special appeals, namely, D.B. Civil Special Appeals Nos. 847/96, 848/96 and 849/96, challenging a part of the aforesaid order, passed by the learned Single Judge. The appellant, Rajasthan Polo Club felt aggrieved only to the extent of certain directions and observations that are rendered by the learned Single Judge in paras 108 and 109 of the judgment, as on account of the aforesaid, the status and position of the Rajasthan Polo Club stood seriously compromised. The State of Rajasthan and the JDA also filed three special appeals, namely, DB Civil Special Appeal (W) Nos. 1051/96, 1089/96 and 1116/96, against the judgment dated 24.5.1996. (6). Two fresh writ petitions : one, Writ Petition No. 4692/2000, by Ved Prakash Bishnoi; and the other, Writ Petition No. 4114/2000, by one Jeetendra Shrimali and another, were also filed. (7). Briefly stated, the facts, which gave rise to the filing of the original writ petition by petitioner K.K. Sharma, are mentioned hereunder:- (8). The entire land of Rambagh Complex originally belonged to Royal Family of Jaipur. In 1944, the then Maharani Gayatri Devi of Jaipur, developed a golf-course by the name of Rambagh Golf Club. In 1960, the Polo Club was shifted from Ganapati Nagar, to this area. Since then, both the Rambagh Golf Club and the Rajasthan Polo Club were jointly using this areas as a gold- course as well as the polo-ground. The area in question, at the time of filing of the writ petition in 1994, had over 40,000 trees and acres of lawns in the form of fairways of the golf- course and the polo-ground. The area in question, at the time of filing of the writ petition in 1994, had over 40,000 trees and acres of lawns in the form of fairways of the golf- course and the polo-ground. The area acts as the lungs of the City of Jaipur. On 18.12.72, the draft Master Plan for the City of Jaipur was published, wherein it was mentioned as under:- ``There are two existing stadiums in Jaipur, namely, Chougan Stadium in the walled city and Sawai Mansingh Stadium near Rambagh Palace. Both the stadiums are grossly undeveloped. It is proposed to provide all necessary facilities in these two stadiums. The existing Polo Ground in the Rambagh Palace complex has been retained. To meet the requirements of the expanding City, a golf course has been proposed as part of the Jhalana Park Development Scheme. (9). As there are a number of earlier writ petitions, appeals and fresh writ petitions, for convenience, we are giving reference of documents, annexed in Writ Petition No. 4114/2000, although, copies of the said documents have been filed in the original writ petitions, filed by K.K. Sharma and the Rambagh Golf Club. On 24.3.73, the State Government issued a notice under Sec. 52(2) of the Urban Improvement Trust Act, 1959, (hereinafter referred as the ``UIT Act), proposing to acquire 322 bighas and 8 biswas of this land, which included the golf-course and the polo ground. The purpose of acquisition, was as under:- ``For the purposes of the trust and constructing administrative, commercial and residential buildings. The purposes have also been extracted in the judgment of Honble the Supreme Court, in case, Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan and others (1), wherein, Honble the Supreme Court has referred to the ``public purpose in its judgment, as Development plan and construction of residential, commercial and administrative buildings, as stated in the notification, issued under Sec. 52(1) of the UIT Act. For the above acquisition, nine parties, including Rambagh Golf Club and Rajasthan Polo Club submitted objections under Section 52(3) of the UIT Act. The objections were made in the year 1973. On 18.6.74, the State Government, through its Revenue Secretary, rejected the objections of six parties. For the above acquisition, nine parties, including Rambagh Golf Club and Rajasthan Polo Club submitted objections under Section 52(3) of the UIT Act. The objections were made in the year 1973. On 18.6.74, the State Government, through its Revenue Secretary, rejected the objections of six parties. It was decided that though the land may be acquired, but may be allotted to the Rambagh Golf Club and the Rajasthan Polo Club, according to their needs, on lease and that the lease-money is to be decided after the acquisition is complete. This decision was approved by the Revenue Minister, on 21.6.74; and by the Chief Minister, on 27.6.74. This document has been filed by the petitioner, in Writ Petition No. 4114/2000, as Annexure-R.4/2. It is useful to extract certain portions of the order, passed by the State Government: ``......They have also submitted that these lands should not be acquired because if they are acquired then Jaipur would be bereft of the facilities of Polo and Golf. They have also submitted that Jaipur is famous all over the world for Polo and in case the polo ground is acquired then the prominence of Jaipur would be lessened to a great extent. I have carefully gone through all the arguments, put forward by the concerned parties and I feel that there is some jurisdiction in retaining the lands meant for Polo and Golf. This is more so because land of Ashoka Club was not put under acquisition. I have discussed the matter in detail with Chairman U.I.T. and C.T.P. It is proposed that though the land should be acquired but they may be leased out to Polo Club and Golf Club according to their needs in case the authorities of these clubs are willing to pay the lease money as decided by the Government. As to how much lease money would be required from the clubs will be decided after the land has been acquired. As regards objections by other 6 parties they have got no force and land should be acquired. This decision was taken under Section 52(3) of the UIT Act, which is statutory in nature. (10). On 11.7.74, the final notification for the acquisition under Section 52 (1) of the UIT Act, was issued. The purpose mentioned was the same as in the preliminary notification. It appears that two writ petitions were filed against the acquisition, one by Lt. Col. (10). On 11.7.74, the final notification for the acquisition under Section 52 (1) of the UIT Act, was issued. The purpose mentioned was the same as in the preliminary notification. It appears that two writ petitions were filed against the acquisition, one by Lt. Col. Bhawani Singh; and the other, by the Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti, which were ultimately decided by Honble the Supreme Court, on 30.3.93. (11). On 4.6.76 the final Master Plan of Jaipur, was published. This Master Plan remained in force uptil 31.8.98. Thereafter, a new Master Plan had been published with effect from 1.9.98. While the draft Master Plan, issued on 18.1.72 had proposed to shift the Golf-Course to Jhalana Park Development Scheme, the final Master Plan indicated a different intention of the State Government. It is relevant to refer to final Master Plan, under heading, ``Stadium and Playground, which reads thus:- ``There are two stadiums in Jaipur, namely, Chougan Stadium in the walled city and Sawai Mansingh Stadium near Rambagh. Both the stadiums are grossly undeveloped. It is intended to provide all active recreational facilities in these two stadiums. The existing Polo Ground and Golf Club in Rambagh complex shall also be retained. (12). It is also relevant to refer to page 63 of the Master Plan, wherein it is further mentioned as under:- ``The existing two Stadiums (SMS Stadium and Chougan Stadium) have adequate lands to provide games and sports facilities. The Polo Club and Golf Club near SMS Stadium shall be developed further in their present locations. (13). The change in the final Master Plan, as contra- distinguished from the draft Master Plan, was obviously made in view of the fact that the State Government, while deciding the objections against the acquisition by its decision dated 18.6.74, referred to above, accepted the objections of the Polo Club and the Golf Club and had held that even though the acquisition be made, but the land may thereafter be allotted to the Golf Club and the Polo Club, according to their needs, on lease and that the lease-money is to be decided after the acquisition is completed. The extracts from the draft Master Plan and the final Master Plan have also been produced as Annexures R/4 and R/5 in the Writ Petition No. 4114/2000, by the respondent, Rambagh Golf Club. (14). The extracts from the draft Master Plan and the final Master Plan have also been produced as Annexures R/4 and R/5 in the Writ Petition No. 4114/2000, by the respondent, Rambagh Golf Club. (14). On 13.3.92, the Commissioner and Secretary, Department of Tourism, Government of Rajasthan, on inquiry from the Central Government, wrote to them that the State Governments intention was to develop the site for sports, i.e. golf and requested the Central Government, to sanction financial aid to the Rambagh Golf Club, for its upgradation (Annexure-R4/6, dated 13.3.92). (15). On 12.11.93, the Government of India, Department of Tourism, vide Annexure-R/4/7, sanctioned a grant of 38.22 lacs, for the upgradation of the Rambagh Golf Club and Rs. 10 lacs was disbursed as the first advance, to the Government of Rajasthan, for the items of work, mentioned in para 2 of the said letter. The sanction was issued by the Central Government, subject to certain conditions and terms, mentioned in para 5 of the said letter. One of the conditions, is that Rambagh Golf Club would accept two nominees of the Golf Promotion Committee, namely, the Financial Controller, Department of Tourism; and Mr. Manjeet Singh, Member ICU, to be on their management, to ensure proper utilisation of the grant. There are other conditions, with which, we are not concerned. (16). In April/May, 1994, there was a proposal that the State Government intended to remove the Golf-Course and to construct commercial complexes in this area. A signature campaign was started, wherein, thousands of persons put their signatures as a token of objections to the State Governments proposal. (17). In December 1994, the Government declared its intention, to construct commercial complexes in this area, at the instance of Non-Resident Indian Jewellers. (18). The petitioner, K.K. Sharma, in his original petition, placed before the Court, the extensive data, to prove that the City of Jaipur was facing a severe pollution-hazard. He also filed satellite pictures, taken by the Department of Space, Government of India, along with the report of that Department, as Annexure-7, in his Writ Petition No. 6826/94. It was also proved from the report that the only area having good and healthy vegetation was depicted near Rambagh Palace. It had also shown that as compared to 1990, in 1995, there was a huge increase in settlement, and a decrease in vegetation. It was also proved from the report that the only area having good and healthy vegetation was depicted near Rambagh Palace. It had also shown that as compared to 1990, in 1995, there was a huge increase in settlement, and a decrease in vegetation. Annexure-8, a report of the Society of Public Awareness and Conservation of Environment, was submitted. It is mentioned in that report that the temperature of the City of Jaipur, was recorded at four different places, on the same date and at the same time. While the temperature at Jhalana quarrying area was observed as 44 degrees centigrade, the minimum was recorded at the Rambagh green area, as 34 degrees centigrade. A decrease of 10 degrees centigrade from densely populated concrete area to non populated green area. It was also shown that the decreased of temperature was not confined to the Rambagh area, but the effect of the extensive greens had the effect of lowering down the temperature of the adjoining areas as well. The temperature of the adjoining Statute Circle, was recorded as 39 degrees centigrade. Several other reports were also filed. At para 3.1 of the report, at page 172, it was mentioned that there must be an area of 0.8 hectares per 1000 population, under parks and playgrounds. At para 4.4, the necessity of playgrounds and open spaces, was mentioned; and in para 5.1, it was mentioned that area required under parts and playgrounds should be 1500 hectares, whereas, presently, in Jaipur, only 420 hectares is under parks and playgrounds. Thus, making a gap of around 1100 hectares. In view of the far-reaching consequences, which would have ensued, if the proposal of the State Government, to remove the Golf-Course and build commercial complexes would have been carried out, the petitioner, Shri K.K. Sharma decided to seek the protection of this Court. His anxiety could be measured from the averments made in his writ petition. His anxiety was to ensure that while the facilities pertaining to sports are not destroyed by the arbitrary and unreasonable proposal of the State Government to build commercial complexes in this area, the greenery, which so vital for the entire population of Jaipur, must be maintained at any cost. Thus, according to Shri K.K. Sharma, not only it is necessary for the present generation, but it is all the more necessary for the future generation to come. Thus, according to Shri K.K. Sharma, not only it is necessary for the present generation, but it is all the more necessary for the future generation to come. He filed the writ petition, on 19.12.1994. As already noticed, another writ petition, Writ Petition No. 6855/94 was filed by the Rambagh Golf Club. The learned Single Judge ordered maintenance of status quo on 22.12.94. In 1995, a letter, sent by Dr. S.C. Kabra and another, was also treated as a public interest writ petition, which is numbered 1162/95. Honble Arun Madan, J., by his order dated 22.4.96, allowed all the three writ petitions, after a prolonged hearing. The gist of the order, passed by the learned Single Judge, can be summarised as under:- ``(i) Even though, the acquisition had been upheld, it was not open to the authority to change or convert the user of the land in question contrary to what has been indicated in the Master Plan. (ii) The petition has been filed by Kamlakar Sharma for espousing public cause and for substantial public purpose for the conservation and protection of the green areas located in the Rambagh Complex which are earmarked in the Master Plan for recreational activities. (iii) In view of the importance of the game of golf considering the aspect of recreation and tourism and in view of the unequivocal assurance conveyed by the State Government, to the Central Government by its letter dated 13.3.1992 and the sanction of the grant by the Central Government on that basis, it is not open to the authority to change or convert the user of the land in question. (iv) Jaipur is grossly lacking in the provision for stadiums, recreational facilities and sports grounds and more so, lacking in open green areas, hence the conservation and protection of green areas of the Rambagh Golf Club and Polo Ground is of paramount importance. (v) A High Level Committee comprised of the Secretary, Tourism Department, Government of Rajasthan; Commissioner, Jaipur Development Authority; Secretary, State Pollution Control Board and the Captain/Secretary of the Rambagh Golf Club should be constituted with a view of have an overall control and supervision of the Rambagh Complex and for maintenance and further development of the green area and recreational facilities in the interest of general public. In view of the directions, the learned Single Judge accordingly restrained the respondents from altering the status of the land in question comprising of the Rambagh Golf Course and Polo Ground and further prohibited them from converting or changing the user of the land in question in any manner contrary to as indicated in the Master Plan of the year 1976. They were further restrained from carrying out any construction activity over the land in question. (19). As already noticed, three special appeals were preferred by the State of Rajasthan and the JDA, and three appeals by the Rajasthan Polo Club, which was not a party to the writ petition. On 29.8.96, the then Honble Acting Chief Justice and Honble D.C. Dalela, J. passed a detailed order, admitting all the special appeals and giving certain directions in regard to the Polo-Meet, which was to take place. The stay petition was disposed of with certain observations, with liberty given to the parties, to obtain such interim orders as may be necessitated from circumstances, by moving the Court in this particular regard, with due notice to all the appropriate parties. It was also made clear that the user of the land by the Rajasthan Polo Club will not create any equities in its favour so far as the merits of the case are concerned and the said order was passed, without prejudice to the rights and contentions of all the parties. The stay order was granted in the following terms:- ``As regards application for stay filed by the respective parties, we are of the considered view that even though the judgment under appeal would remain stayed, it would not empower either the State of Rajasthan or the Jaipur Development Authority to make any construction in the Rambagh Complex or cause any material alteration or addition to the existing site. (20). While the special appeals were pending in this Court, the matter was taken up by the State Government, for proposing a settlement, out of court. In this connection, a meeting was convened by the Minister for Urban Development and Housing. A minute was drawn up by the Deputy Secretary to the Government and a copy of the same was sent to the Commissioner, JDA. The english-translation has been filed as Annexure-R.4/10, at page 106, in Writ Petition No. 4114/2000. In this connection, a meeting was convened by the Minister for Urban Development and Housing. A minute was drawn up by the Deputy Secretary to the Government and a copy of the same was sent to the Commissioner, JDA. The english-translation has been filed as Annexure-R.4/10, at page 106, in Writ Petition No. 4114/2000. It was decided to retain the area as a 18 hole golf-course, built to international standards. It was decided that the JDA would appoint a consultant, for preparation of layout plan for the golf-course, polo-club and a city level park. A high level committee was constituted to do the work of framing policy, for determining the broader issues, relating to the use of the area. Day-to-day management of the clubs would be carried out by executive committee of both the clubs. Instead of taking steps to implement the same, the JDA filed an application before the Court, seeking permission to construct a city level park in 86.9 acres of the area, which included a sizable area, presently in use as the golf-course. On 22.3.2000, the Division Bench rejected the application, filed by the JDA. The JDA has filed a special leave petition before Honble The Supreme Court, and we are told that the said matter is pending there. In the meanwhile, on 18.4.2000, the Government constituted a high powered committee, under the chairmanship of the Urban Development and Housing Minister, so as to resolve the dispute relating to the use of the Rambagh Complex, including Rambagh Golf Club as also City Level Park. The Government in engaging in this exercise, constituted a committee, consisting of the following members:- (i) State Minister for Tourism, Art & Culture. (ii) State Minister for Sports and Youth Affairs. (iii) Chairman, Rajasthan Sports Council. (iv) Secretary, Urban Development and Housing. (v) Secretary, Tourism, Art & Culture. (vi) Jaipur Development Commissioner. (vii) President, Rambagh Golf Club. (viii) President, Rajasthan Polo Club. The Committee has a composite representation inasmuch as various departments and bodies as also associations that had concern with the utilization of the Rambagh Complex, were duly represented. On 11.8.2000, after a prolonged discussion, a settlement was arrived at in the meeting, by which, it was unanimously accepted that the JDA was the owner of the entire land. The area in question would be used as city level park, an 18-hole golf-course, including a club-house and a polo-ground. On 11.8.2000, after a prolonged discussion, a settlement was arrived at in the meeting, by which, it was unanimously accepted that the JDA was the owner of the entire land. The area in question would be used as city level park, an 18-hole golf-course, including a club-house and a polo-ground. The JDA would engage a golf-expert to design, including re-design, re-laying, if required, the 18-hole golf-course. It was further agreed as follows:- ``1. As a part of its proposed scheme of city level park on the acquired land or Rambagh campus, JDA will have an 18-hole golf course including a Club House. For this purpose, JDA will engage a Golf expert to design (including redesigning/relaying, if required) a 18 hole-golf course so that it is accommodated in minimum possible area and integrates and complements the polo and the public park uses of the land. A suitable site will be identified for the stables of Polo Ground and exercise of horses. 2. This 18-hold golf course will be owned by Jaipur Development Authority and shall be known as `JDA Golf course and will be managed and controlled by the Golf Club (in accordance with its Constitution and Articles of Association) whose President would be the Secretary, Urban Development, Govt. of Rajasthan and Jaipur Development Commissioner would be its Vice President. Other modalities and lease rent to be paid by the Club to JDA will be decided in due course. 3. The land used by Rajasthan Polo Club would be owned by Jaipur Development Authority and Secretary, Urban Development, would be the President of the Club and JDC would be the Vice President. 4. Rambagh Golf Club will arrange before 22.8.2000 the withdrawal of all the three writ petitions which led to the passing of the judgment by the Honble Single Bench on 24.5.96. Whereupon JDA and Polo Club will also withdraw their D.B. appeals (3 each). Honble Division Bench will be requested to allow all these withdrawals and set aside the judgment passed by Honble Single Bench in view of the settlement reached between the parties. Consequently, the JDA will also withdraw the SLPs pending before the Honble Supreme Court. 5. Whereupon JDA and Polo Club will also withdraw their D.B. appeals (3 each). Honble Division Bench will be requested to allow all these withdrawals and set aside the judgment passed by Honble Single Bench in view of the settlement reached between the parties. Consequently, the JDA will also withdraw the SLPs pending before the Honble Supreme Court. 5. Pending designing of the golf course, and in anticipation of the withdrawal of the litigation as above, JDA will immediately start the development of the two parking lots (proposed along P.R. Road & B.D. Road) and development of the part from the PR Road/BD Road end in view of the forthcoming international Rajasthan/Conclave 2000 starting from 23.9.2000 in Jaipur. It was also decided that the Honble Division Bench would be requested to allow withdrawals of the original Writ Petitions Nos. 6826/94, 6855/94 and 1162/95 and set aside the judgment passed by the Honble Single Bench in view of the settlement, arrived at between the parties. (21). Vide another order dated 4.9.2000, the former Maharaja of Jaipur, Shri Bhawani Singh was conferred the honour of being the life time President of the Polo Club, looking to the contributions made to the game of polo by him and by the Royal Family. (22). In pursuance to the said decision, the original writ petitioners submitted applications to the effect that since the matter had been settled between the State Government and all other contesting parties and the State Government had agreed to retain this area as a golf-course and a polo-ground, and the remainder of the area to be used as a city level park, hence, the prayer made in the original writ petition having been accepted, the petitioner, K.K. Sharma, wanted to withdraw the writ petition. According to him, since the State Government had agreed to the proposal, there is no point in keeping the writ petitions pending and, therefore, he requested this Court, to put its seal on the settlement, so that, the entire area may be used in public interest, partly as city level parks, partly as golf-course and partly as a polo-ground. When the applications were taken up by this Court, Jitendra Shrimali and another filed Writ Petition No. 4114/2000, challenging the authority of the State Government, to enter into such a settlement. Another Writ Petition No., 4692/2000 was filed by Ved Prakash Bishnoi. When the applications were taken up by this Court, Jitendra Shrimali and another filed Writ Petition No. 4114/2000, challenging the authority of the State Government, to enter into such a settlement. Another Writ Petition No., 4692/2000 was filed by Ved Prakash Bishnoi. Apart from these two writ petitions, an application for intervention was also filed on behalf of the Public Action Group, to resist the withdrawal of the original public interest petition, while questioning the legality of the decisions, taken by the High Powered Committee, constituted by the State Government. Both the Writ Petitions Nos. 4692/2000 and 4114/2000 as well as the intervention application were taken up for hearing. The matter was heard at length, on various dates. These writ petitions and the intervention application were opposed by the respondents therein, as not being maintainable and not being in public interest and on the ground that they are absolutely frivolous and have been filed by mere busy bodies, meddlesome interlopers having no public interest whatsoever. It was also submitted that the original writ petition was filed by the petitioner, K.K. Sharma, in the year 1994 and the matter has been subject-matter of dispute since then and that neither Jitendra Shrimali, nor Ved Prakash Bishnoi, nor any other intervener showed any interest whatsoever in the dispute, nor showed their concern with regard use of this area. (23). Mr. Kamlakar Sharma, the writ petitioner in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6826/1994 submitted that the writ petition No. 4114/2000 filed by Shri Jitendra Shrimali and writ petition No. 4692/2000 filed by Ved Prakash Bishnoi are not in public interest and cannot be entertained and that the original public interest litigation can be withdrawn and decided in terms of the settlement arrived at on 11.8.2000 with the leave of this Court. While deciding this issue, this Court has to consider as to whether the acquired land can be utilised for the purpose of Golf Course, Polo Ground or City Level Park and whether the utilisation of the acquired land in the aforesaid manner can be reckoned to be in public interest. According to Mr. Sharma, three other questions would also emerge for consideration namely; (a) whether the Government could constitute a committee to deal with the issue of utilisation of the land of Rambagh Complex by way of order dated 18.4.2000? According to Mr. Sharma, three other questions would also emerge for consideration namely; (a) whether the Government could constitute a committee to deal with the issue of utilisation of the land of Rambagh Complex by way of order dated 18.4.2000? (b) whether arrangement can be with the Polo Club and Golf Club without taking recourse to tender procedure of auction machanism? and (c) whether the impugned action is justiciable and if so, to what extent? Elaborating his arguments on the question of maintainability, Mr. Sharma submitted that neither in the writ petition nor in the intervention applications any allegation of malafides and bias whatsoever has been levelled by the petitioners against any of the respondents or the members of the Committee, who took the impugned decision. None of the writ petitioners or the interveners show any semblance of infringement of any legal right of the writ petitioners or any injury to public interest and no factual foundation has been led as regards the legality or validity or justification of the decisions taken by the High Powered Committee. At best, the writ petitioners as well as intervener were seeking directions from this Court to the effect that instead of use of the land of Rambagh Complex as agreed to in the settlement, the State should be directed to use the land either for the commercial complex as envisaged earlier or if not then the entire area should be used as a City Level Park. He would also submit that none of these persons ever showed their anxiety in regard to the area when the original petitions were filed by Kamlakar Sharma and the Rambagh Golf Club in 1994. Mr. Sharma placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Sampat Singh vs. State of Haryana (2), wherein it has been held that ``Persons not party to a writ petition cannot join the public interest cause at the appeal stage. The Supreme Court has further held as under:- ``Matters of public interest are not a free for all which can be joined in at leisure. (24). In support of the same contention, Mr. Sharma cited Janta Dal vs. H.S. Chaudhary (3), to the effect that the Court will not allow a mere busy body or a meddlesome interloper or wayfarer or officious intervener having altogether no public interest to enter a litigation at an advance stage. In view of this, Mr. (24). In support of the same contention, Mr. Sharma cited Janta Dal vs. H.S. Chaudhary (3), to the effect that the Court will not allow a mere busy body or a meddlesome interloper or wayfarer or officious intervener having altogether no public interest to enter a litigation at an advance stage. In view of this, Mr. Sharma submitted that the petitions filed by Shri Jitendra Shrimali and Shri Ved Bishnoi and intervene applications deserve to be rejected. (25). Arguing further he submitted that it is an undisputed fact that a public interest litigation can be filed and can be withdrawn only in public interest and a public interested petitioner does not have an absolute right to withdraw such a petition arbitrarily without leave of the Court. The Court may permit such petition to be withdrawn. Objections raised by the counsel for Jitendra Shrimali and Ved Bishnoi based on the case Sheela Barse vs. Union of India (4), is far too general a proposition to be accepted. In that case, the public interest petitioner being frustrated with the delay in disposal of the case sought to withdraw the writ petition. It was in these circumstances that the Honble Supreme Court did not permit the writ petitioners to withdraw the writ petition and directed that the petitioner should be allowed to be substituted by vesting the carriage of the petition on some other petitioner or an amicus curie. The Court also held that a public interest writ petition cannot be allowed to be withdrawn as a matter of right. Mr. Sharma placed reliance on the principles laid down in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Anand vs. H.D. Devegoda (5). It is submitted that the petitioner Mr. K.K. Sharma does not claim any right to withdraw the writ petition as a matter of right nor can it be said that withdrawal of the writ petition is to achieve some ulterior objective. He would next submit that the acquired land can also be used for the purpose of Golf Course and Polo Ground and City Level Park. Mr. Sharma submitted that the `public purpose has been defined under Sec. 2(17) of the Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982, which includes any purpose which is useful to the public or any class or section of the public. Mr. Sharma submitted that the `public purpose has been defined under Sec. 2(17) of the Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982, which includes any purpose which is useful to the public or any class or section of the public. One of the purposes of the authority under Sec. 16(h) of the Act is preparing schemes and advising the concerned authorities in relation to sports, tourism, entertainment and similar other activities. In regard to the objections taken by the learned counsel for Shri Jitendra Shrimali and Shri Ved Bishnoi to the effect that in the judgment of Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti vs. State (supra), the arguments with regard to polo ground was rejected by the Honble Supreme Court. Mr. Sharma submitted that the aforesaid objection is not based on a correct reading of the judgment. The said SLP had been filed by the Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti. The acquisition in that case was by the State Government. It was contended that since the land was being used for a polo ground which was serving a public purpose, hence the acquisition must be set aside. The Honble Supreme Court did not say that use of the land as a polo ground was not serving a public purpose but it was said that the court cannot go into the comparative utility of the public purpose and once the court is satisfied that the acquisition is for public purpose no fault can be found with the proceedings on the ground that the land already is being used for some beneficial purpose. Hence, it cannot be said that in view of the aforesaid judgment it cannot be said that the government cannot now permit the land to be used as a polo ground or a golf course. Mr. Sharma also submitted that if the State Government now frames a scheme for use of this area as a polo ground and golf course and a city level part, it cannot be said that it is being used for a purpose different than the purpose for which it was acquired. Mr. Sharma has cited the following decisions: Gulam Mustapha vs. State of Maharasthra (6), Mangal Oram vs. State of Orrisa (7), Forward Construction Co. vs. Prabhat Mandal (8), Collector of 24 Pargnas vs. Lalit Mohan (9), Sachhidanand Pande vs. State of West Bengal (10) and Ram Lal Sethi vs. State of Haryana (11). (26). Mr. Sharma has cited the following decisions: Gulam Mustapha vs. State of Maharasthra (6), Mangal Oram vs. State of Orrisa (7), Forward Construction Co. vs. Prabhat Mandal (8), Collector of 24 Pargnas vs. Lalit Mohan (9), Sachhidanand Pande vs. State of West Bengal (10) and Ram Lal Sethi vs. State of Haryana (11). (26). Referring to the decision taken by the High Powered Committee on 11.8.2000 that the land of Rambagh Complex is sought to be utilised for the purpose of Polo Ground, Golf Course and a City Level Park Mr. Sharma relied upon the provisions of Section 2(17), Section 16(h) and Section 21(2)(ix) of the Act. According to Mr. Sharma, the utilisation scheme for the Rambagh Complex envisaging therein a Polo Ground, Golf Course and a City Level Park is very conceivable consideration in public interest and it is in conformity with the Master Development Plan. The aforesaid utilisation scheme also secured integrated development of the Jaipur region, which is also one of the fundamental objects of the Jaipur Development Authority. The utilisation scheme fully in conformity with the functions of the Jaipur Development Authority as enunciated in Section 16 of the Act. Mr. Sharma then submitted that no objection can be taken to the decision of the Government to use the area as a Golf course, Polo ground and City Level Park. It is then submitted that development of sports facilities is in public interest. Maintenance of green areas is also in public interest considering the fact that settlements have increased at a very high pace thus, reducing open areas it is highly necessary for any city to maintain open green areas such as the Rambagh Complex in order to protect the citizen from the drastic effects of pollution and degradation of environment. According to Mr. Sharma Golf and Polo attract tourists in great measure, and therefore, are a great boost for the tourism industry. In view of this, it cannot be said that the utilisation of the acquired land as proposed in the settlement is not in public interest. According to Mr. Sharma Golf and Polo attract tourists in great measure, and therefore, are a great boost for the tourism industry. In view of this, it cannot be said that the utilisation of the acquired land as proposed in the settlement is not in public interest. He also advanced arguments on the three questions referred to supra as to whether the Government could constitute a committee to deal with the issue of utilisation of the land of Rambagh Complex by way of order dated 18.4.2000; whether arrangement can be with the polo club and golf club without taking recourse to tender procedure of auction machanism and whether the impugned action is justiciable. He invited our attention to the following provisions of the Act of 1982 namely; Section 2(2) `amenities, Section 2(17) `public purpose and Section 31(2)(ix), which includes within the conspectus of a master plan ``Games and sports complexes worthy of holding international events. Section 16, `Functions of the Authority, Section 54 `Land to vest in the Authority and its disposal and Section 90 `Control by the State Government and Article 166(1) of the Constitution of India. Mr. Sharma then submitted that constitution of the High Powered Committee by the State Government under order dated 18.4.2000 comprising of Ministers and senior functionaries of the Government cannot be held to be lacking in legal sanction. The same is in exercise of the executive power vesting in the Government under Article 162 of the Constitution. Referring to Section 166(1) of the Constitution and its requirement of `executive action being taken in the name of the Governor it is stated that it does not relate to the myriad of decisions taken every day but it relates only where a formal order or notification is required. This submission was made in regard to the objection of the Counsel Mr. SR. Bajwa, Sr. Counsel for petitioner Ved Bishnoi and Mr. Rajendra Prasad, Counsel for petitioner Jitendra Shrimali that since the decision has not been taken in the name of the Governor, the said settlement is illegal and cannot be enforced. He has also cited some decisions on this question. Mr. SR. Bajwa, Sr. Counsel for petitioner Ved Bishnoi and Mr. Rajendra Prasad, Counsel for petitioner Jitendra Shrimali that since the decision has not been taken in the name of the Governor, the said settlement is illegal and cannot be enforced. He has also cited some decisions on this question. Mr. Sharma also drawn our attention to Sections 16(i), 16(s), Section 46 and Section 90 of the Act of 1982 and submitted that the State Government is generally empowered and under a statutory empowerment and duty to explore the best possible use of the land, the impugned decision has been taken. It is then submitted that the settlement having been arrived at in public interest and the State Government having realised that the decision to construct commercial complexes in the area was detrimental to public interest, and, therefore, it would be better to use the land as set out in the settlement, which is also a public purpose, it is submitted by Mr. Sharma that it would not be proper for this Court to sit over the decision as a Court of appeal and the State Government should be left free to decide and execute its plan as envisaged by the settlement. He also submitted that the matter is not open for judicial review at the instance of people who have no interest in the matter. It is therefore, submitted by the original writ petitioner that D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4114/2000 filed by Shri Jitendra Shrimali and D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4692/2000 filed by Shri Ved Bishnoi deserve to be dismissed with costs and the State Government may be directed implement and execute the settlement and the writ petitions filed by Shri Kamlakar Sharma and Rambagh Golf Club be decided in terms of the settlement and the settlement be made part of the order of this Court. (27). Mr. Jagdeep Dhankad, Sr. Counsel appearing for the Rajasthan Polo Club invited our attention to Sections 16, 43 and 90 of the Act and stated that the decision was taken by the State Government after consultation with the members of the two clubs and that it is fundamental principle of democratic governance that the decisions be arrived at after consultations and deliberations with those likely to be affected. Even otherwise by virtue of Article 162 of the Constitution of India, executive power of the State is co-terminus with the legislative power of the State and if it is reckoned that the legal competence as regards orders dated 11.8.2000 and 4.9.2000 cannot be drawn from the provisions of the Act of 1982 and the same can be drawn from the power vesting in the government by virtue of Article 162 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, he would submit that no legal exception can be taken to the passing of the orders dated 11.8.2000 and 4.9.2000 by the Government by invoking its executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Dhankar also submitted that the petitioners in D.B. Civil Writ Petitions No. 4114/2000 and 4692/2000 have laid no factual foundation that can persuade this Court to engage in a judicial review of the aforesaid orders. He submitted that it is trite law that judicial review is not an appeal from a decision. While in appeal, the power of the Court/authority is co-extensive power to appreciate evidence, in judicial review the Court examines an administrative action by focusing on three aspects of irrationality; illegality; and procedural impropriety. Mr. Jagdeep Dhankad relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of A.K. Kaul vs. Union of India (12). He also invited our attention to the reflections of the Supreme Court in the case of Tata Cellular vs. Union of India (13). In this case, their Lordships in para 109 of the judgment have observed as follows:- ``109. Referring to the doctrine of unreasonableness, Prof. Wade says in Administrative Law (supra): ``The point to note is that a thing is not unreasonable in the legal sense merely because the court thinks it is unwise. ``113. The principles deducible from the above are: (1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) ................ (3) ................ (4)................ (5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by malafide. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by malafide. (6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure. (28). He also cited the judgment in the case of S.P. Anand vs. H.D. Deve Gowda, (supra) which according to him bear relevance to the present controversy. Thus, according to Mr. Jagdeep Dhankad from the aforesaid judgment, the following situation emerge:- i) The orders dated 11.8.2000 and 4.9.2000 have been legally passed in consequence of the authority available to the Government and the Jaipur Development Authority under the Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982; ii) The orders dated 11.8.2000 and 4.9.2000 can be passed by the Government in exercise of its Executive Power vesting in it by virtue of Article 162 of the Constitution of India; iii) The aforesaid orders are in public interest as it apparent from the stand of the respondents and as nothing is substantiated by way of facts to the contrary; iv) The petitions are blissfully bereft of facts. Further the petition does not make reference to violation of any provisions of the Constitution, Act or Rules made thereunder in relation to the passing of the impugned orders. The action of the Government and the JDA is bonafide as no allegations of malafide or bias have been imparted in the petitions, nor the Government functionary has been impleaded by name; and v) In view of the contents of the petitions as also the judgment of the Honble Apex Court in the case of S.P. Anand (supra), the petitions cannot be reckoned as PIL. (29). As already noticed, D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4114/2000 was filed by Jitendra Shrimali and another. He is represented by Shri Vimal Chaudhary and Shri Rajendra Prasad Advocates. (29). As already noticed, D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4114/2000 was filed by Jitendra Shrimali and another. He is represented by Shri Vimal Chaudhary and Shri Rajendra Prasad Advocates. After narration of events in the concluding part of the writ petition, in ground A at page No. 15 of the writ petition, it has been observed as follows: ``A. Because the JDA and the State Government have acted totally against the public interest of common residents of Jaipur City and once a decision was taken to develop a city level part over the land in question, no compromise can be made with the Rambagh Golf Club or Rajasthan Polo Club who have no right, title or interest over the land in question and the land has already vested in the State Government and the JDA free from all encumbrances after valid acquisition and the possession of the land has already been taken and huge compensation has already been paid to the khatedars and reference petitions are pending, filed by the khatedars for enhancement of compensation. Therefore, the JDA and the State Government are duty bound to utilise the land for the purpose for which the land was acquired and for common good of general public of Jaipur City and not for the benefit of few persons of elite class or a particular society of Golfers of Golf Club. B. Because the land after vesting in the State Govt. and the JDA beco- mes a public land and can be disposed of only as per the provisions of the rules meant for disposal of the land and not in any other man- ner but compromise which has been entered into between the JDA and the State Government on one side and the Rambagh Golf Club and Polo Club on the other side is detrimental to the public interest and the State Govt. and the JDA have utterly failed to take care of the interests of the Commoner of the Jaipur City and they have failed to discharge their functions as per the provisions of the JDA Act. C. Because the land in quexstion being a most prestigious and precious one the State Government and the JDA and which involve public money, cannot be fittered away in this manner in which the State Government and the JDA may deem fit. C. Because the land in quexstion being a most prestigious and precious one the State Government and the JDA and which involve public money, cannot be fittered away in this manner in which the State Government and the JDA may deem fit. It is a settled proposition of law that every action of the State Government and other statutory bodies like JDA should be in public interest and should be strictly in accordance with the provisions of laws and should not be arbitrary in any manner and every such action of the State Government and other statutory body like JDA are open for judicial review. D. Because in the garb of this agreement the JDA and the State Government have ignored the real public interest which would have been served by utilizing the land for the purposes for which it was acquired or for leaving it completely green and open to be utilised by the general public of the Jaipur City and no right is vested with the Golf Club or Polo Club to claim that they will play their games on this land alone and the general public is not going to be benefited by it. (30). The petitioner filed the writ petition with the following prayers:- ``It is, therefore, humbly prayed that: (a) the writ petition filed by the petitioners may kindly be allowed and the relevant complete record in this regard may kindly be called for and it may be seen that how the State Government and the JDA have acted contrary to the public interest; (b) by an appropriate writ, order or direction, the agreement dated 11.8.2000 may kindly be quashed and set aside and it may be declared that the land in question may be utilised by JDA only for the public purpose for which it was declared and if it is decided to leave the complete area as open and green then it can be utilised as a public park for the ordinary residents of Jaipur City. Reply affidavit was filed by the State of Rajasthan, Jaipur Development Authority, Rajasthan Polo Club and Rambagh Golf Club. Paras 6 and 7 of the reply filed by respondent No. 1, State of Rajasthan are relevant, which run as under:- ``6. Reply affidavit was filed by the State of Rajasthan, Jaipur Development Authority, Rajasthan Polo Club and Rambagh Golf Club. Paras 6 and 7 of the reply filed by respondent No. 1, State of Rajasthan are relevant, which run as under:- ``6. The arrangement made by the State Government while taking the decision on 11.8.2000, has been arrived at looking to the practical aspect and the management of the Golf Club and the Polo Club has been left to the members of the club in the interest of the games as the JDA may not have personal who may be equipped with the requisite experience in the games. The Club would be required to pay lease rent as they would be using the land which has been vested in JDA. This fact has been agreed by the representatives of the Golf Club and Polo Club that the JDA is the absolute owner of the land. The Commissioner, JDA presented the case of the JDA before the State Government and stressed the need to develop it into a city Level Public Park in the larger public interest and after detailed discussions decisions was taken as a part of the proposed scheme of City Level Park on the acquired land of Rambagh campus and it was decided that JDA will have 18 hole Golf Course including house also. The other details are given in the decision which is already on record of the court and has been filed by the petitioners as Annexure-4. This decision has been signed in token of its acceptance by the Commissioner, JDA for and on behalf of the JDA. It is wrong to suggest that the general public has been kept in dark or has been befooled. It is also wrong that the JDA has yield to the pressure of the Golf Club or the Polo Club who are branded by the petitioner as trespassers. It is wrong to suggest that the general public has been kept in dark or has been befooled. It is also wrong that the JDA has yield to the pressure of the Golf Club or the Polo Club who are branded by the petitioner as trespassers. The decision which has been taken by the State Government on 11.8.2000 has been reviewed by the order dated 4.9.2000 looking to the contribution made by the former ruling family of Jaipur State to the popularisation of Polo game in Jaipur and outside and, H.H. Sawai Bhawani Singh, President, Rajasthan Polo Club would be continued as Life Time President of the Club and it has been further decided that the Secretary to the Government, Urban Development Department would be inducted as working President and the Jaipur Development Commissioner as Secretary, Polo Ground. 7. That the submissions made in para 7 of the writ petition are replied in the terms that the petitioners have submitted this writ petition at a very late stage when the entire controversy has been resolved. The petitioners have kept silence since 1993 when the land stood finally acquired. The petitioners were neither parties before the learned Single Judge nor had filed any appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The petitioners have overlooked the fact that the Scheme of City Level Park has not been given up by the JDA, but the City Level Park is going to be developed at 86 acres of land, though the prescribed area of the City Level Park has not been given in Annexure-4. The entire writ petition does not disclose how the writ petition seeks to advance public interest. (31). Respondent No.2, JDA in reply to grounds of the writ petition has come up with the following averments:- (a) The scheme of City Level Park over the land is going to be implemented. The City Level Park would be immense utility to the public of Jaipur City. As a part of the scheme and 18 hole Golf Course would be so designed as to be accommodated in minimum possible area and integrates and compliments the Polo ground and public park use of the land. The allegations of the petitioner are therefore, without any substance. As a part of the scheme and 18 hole Golf Course would be so designed as to be accommodated in minimum possible area and integrates and compliments the Polo ground and public park use of the land. The allegations of the petitioner are therefore, without any substance. (b) That the contents of ground (B) are replied in terms that the acquired land is not being parted with but would continue as JDA land and would be put to use as contemplated in the decision Annexure-4 dated 11.8.2000. It is incorrect to suggest that the JDA has failed to take care of interest of the commoner of the Jaipur City or that they are failed to discharge the functions as per the provisions of JDA Act. D. The portion of the land which would be used by the Golf Club and Polo Club subject to the payment of the lease money would continue to the open land with greenery intact. (32). Respondent No.3, Rajasthan Polo Club in paras 21, 24 and 25 has come with the following case:- 21. That raising contention in ground (A) the petitioners have not laid any legal or factual foundation in support thereof. The petitioners have not properly appreciated the settlement which is in large public interest. The land in question continuous to be that of the Jaipur Development Authority and the JDA is under statutory obligation to bring about an integrated development of Jaipur region which includes development of sport infrastructure. Precisely this has been done by the government and the Jaipur Development Authority. 24. That the petition deserves to be dismissed as it does not disclose any violation of a vested right of the petitioners or any infringement of any provision of law by the government and the Jaipur Development Authority while taking the impugned action. 25. That the petition deserves to be dismissed also for the reason that the government and the Jaipur Development Authority were fully competent in law to pass the impugned orders. No malafides that a factual foundation have been levelled by the petitioners. (33). Respondent No.4, Rajasthan Golf Club in its reply to grounds A to C has come with the following case:- ``A. That the contents of ground (A) are denied. It is denied that the Jaipur Development Authority and the State have acted contrary to public interest. No malafides that a factual foundation have been levelled by the petitioners. (33). Respondent No.4, Rajasthan Golf Club in its reply to grounds A to C has come with the following case:- ``A. That the contents of ground (A) are denied. It is denied that the Jaipur Development Authority and the State have acted contrary to public interest. The decision to develop city level park was only on part of the area and the State Government had decided that the city level park would co exist with the polo ground and the golf course. The decision of the State Government is, therefore, in consonance with the decision which was taken in the year 1974 and also in accordance with the master plan for the city of Jaipur. It may here be mentioned that the answering respondent never claimed title to the land in question. It was only claiming the limited right of the user of the land. Merely because the land had been acquired does not estop the government from reserving if for use as a golf course, polo ground or park. It is denied that Jaipur Development Authority and the State Government are duty bound to utilise the land for the purposes for which it was acquired. As a matter of fact, decision taken on the objections filed by the answering respondent and the polo club itself reveal that the acquisition was for the purpose of allotting the land to the Golf Club and Polo Club. C. The need of day is a proper development of the City. For development of any city it is highly necessary to cater to all needs of the society. Sports and recreation is one of the basic necessities of the common public which also needs to be caterred to. Apart from that, the State is also required to see that the green area is not dipleted or reduced. On the contrary it has to be increased. The reports submitted by the answering respondent in the writ petition No. 0855/94 would reveal that Jaipur is grossly deficient in open green areas. In one of the reports it has been mentioned that Jaipur needs over 1500 hectares of green areas where there exists only 420 hectares of green area, thus leaving it approximately 1100 hectares short. The reports submitted by the answering respondent in the writ petition No. 0855/94 would reveal that Jaipur is grossly deficient in open green areas. In one of the reports it has been mentioned that Jaipur needs over 1500 hectares of green areas where there exists only 420 hectares of green area, thus leaving it approximately 1100 hectares short. The answering respondent has also submitted satellite pictures taken by the Department of Space, Government of India which reveal that the only green area in the city of Jaipur is either Ram Bagh Complex or the Ram Niwas Gardan. Jaipur is being developed as a heritage city wherein lacs of tourists visit every year. It is shortly being developed as an International Airport. It is, therefore, necessary that to cater to the needs of these tourist, a proper golf course must be maintained. The Ram Bagh Golf Club is the only golf course which is open to the public. There is no other golf playing area in Jaipur. (34). A rejoinder was filed by the writ petitioner to the reply filed by the respondents. (35). One Shri Meetha Lal Mehta, filed an application for intervention on the final day of hearing of the writ petitions and the appeals. He states that he had been associated with the Government of Rajasthan for a number of years having worked in various senior positions in the Government and finally as Chief Secretary and is now an active social worker and resident of the State of Rajasthan and now is actively involved with the work of voluntary organisations. According to the intervener, Jaipur is badly in need of open spaces for use by the general public and if JDA wishes to develop a Golf Course of international standard, it could do so on other lands 10-15 Kilometers away from the city. The golfers can easily commute to that distance to enjoy their game of golf. The general public needs public park badly. The golfers can easily commute to that distance to enjoy their game of golf. The general public needs public park badly. Rambagh land is central and is inter alia more suitable for institutional buildings and open spaces for public use and for the Golf Course, a land near Sanganer Airport has been reserved in the Master Development Plan 2011 for Jaipur City and as the land acquisition has been upheld by the Honble Supreme Court notwithstanding the arguments raised for playing Golf and Polo on this land, the pleas raised about other use of the impugned land in this Honble Court have no force and relevance. (36). The respondent No.1, in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1089/1996, Ram Bagh Golf Club has filed an application that the special appeal as well as the writ petition filed by the applicant should be permitted to be withdrawn in view of the settlement arrived at between the parties. Along with the application, copy of the order of the Government dated 9.7.1999 and minutes of the meeting of the Committee have been filed marking as Annexures A/1 and A/2. An applications on behalf of Shri Jitendra Shrimali and R.S. Singh Advocate were filed for imploding them as appellants in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1089/1996. It is stated in the said application that as per news after compromise the JDA and the State Government have agreed to withdraw their appeals but they cannot be permitted to do so since it is a question which is involved with every residents of Jaipur City including the applicants. (37). A reply to the above said application was filed by the JDA. It is stated in the reply that the applicants who were neither parties before the learned Single Judge nor filed appeals have no right of being impleaded as appellants. (38). One another application seeking permission to intervene in the appeal was also filed by the Public Action Group through its members Mr. Hemant Nahta and Mr. Pratap Bhanu Singh Shekhawat. In the said application, it is stated that the settlement which is motivating force of withdrawal of application is itself against the public interest and as such the applicants deserve to be permitted intervention. It is further submitted that under the settlement, handful of persons associated with Rambagh Golf Club and Polo Club will have pre-eminent control over the Golf Course and the Polo Ground. It is further submitted that under the settlement, handful of persons associated with Rambagh Golf Club and Polo Club will have pre-eminent control over the Golf Course and the Polo Ground. There is no rationale basis for having such a settlement that sub serves the vested interest of only handful of people who would enjoy States property worth tens of Crores. Even otherwise, the settlement may not have any backing or legal sanction as regards utilisation of such precious land worth crores which has been confined only to two such clubs whose status in law is that of encroachers. The land in question already stands vested in the government and the two clubs were in occupation of the land not as a result of any legal right in their favour. Therefore, it is submitted that they may be permitted to intervene in the proceedings. (39). In D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1116/1996 filed by the State and JDA impleading K.K. Sharma as respondent, similar applications were filed and the settlement arrived at on 18.4.2000 has also been filed and marked as Annexure-1. (40). In D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1059/1996 filed by the State of Rajasthan and JDA against Dr. A.C. Kabra, an application for withdrawal of the appeal has been filed by the State of Rajasthan and intervention application has been filed as in the other two cases. (41). D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4692/2000 was filed by Shri V.P. Bishnoi. He is represented by Sr. Counsel Shri S.R. Bajwa. In the said writ petition, the impugned action of the State of Rajasthan was questioned. All interested parties in the settlement were impleaded as parties. It is submitted by Shri Bajwa that the respondents have no authority to put the land in dispute to any use other than that specified in the Master Development Plan 2011 and that the land use proposed under the decision dated 11.8.2000 is wholly contrary to that shown in the said plan and, therefore, is ex facie without jurisdiction. Shri Bajwa invited our attention to various Sections of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. Shri Bajwa invited our attention to various Sections of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. He would submit that the decision dated 11.8.2000 which seeks to dispose of the land in favour of the Rambagh Golf Club for unknown modalities and lease rent and in favour of the Rajasthan Polo Club has been allowed to enjoy the land even without any provision for the lease rent. He therefore, submitted that the disposal of the land is totally without jurisdiction and contrary to the provisions of the Disposal Rules of 1974. It is further submitted that constitution of the Committee for the purpose of specifying land use and its disposal in favour of the parties who formed the Committee itself is without jurisdiction and contrary to provisions of the Act of 1982 and the Rules of 1974. Further action of the Committee suffers from the principles of bias and natural justice and that the action of the Committee can by no stretch of imagination be deemed to be actions of respondents No.1 and 2, namely the State of Rajasthan and JDA and therefore, the same have no legal sanctity. The very decision of the Committee amounts to continuance and perpetuation of offences as provided under the provisions of the Act and therefore, they are void ab initio. Mr. Bajwa invited our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1993(2) SCC 662 (supra) and provisions of Sections 25(2) and (3) and Section 54 of the JDA Act and also the decision reported in 1999 (6) SCC 464 (14). (42). A detailed reply was filed by second respondent Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur. (43). Mr. Rajendra Prasad, learned counsel for petitioner Jitendra Shrimali in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4114/2000 made elaborate submissions with reference to the provisions of the law and also of the annexures and documents filed in the writ petition. According to him, the impugned decision dated 11.8.2000 and the application for withdrawal of the writ petition with prayer for issuance of directions in terms of the said decision by the State of Rajasthan gave cause of action to file the present writ petition by the petitioner. He took us through the impugned decision dated 11.8.2000 and the nature of the decision arrived at between the parties. In this regard, Mr. He took us through the impugned decision dated 11.8.2000 and the nature of the decision arrived at between the parties. In this regard, Mr. Rajendra Prasad drew our attention to the JDAs point of view as to the decision, States point of view, Golf Clubs point of view and Polo Clubs point of view. After inviting the view point by different parties, Mr. In this regard, Mr. Rajendra Prasad drew our attention to the JDAs point of view as to the decision, States point of view, Golf Clubs point of view and Polo Clubs point of view. After inviting the view point by different parties, Mr. Rajendra Prasad submitted that the settlement or compromise between the parties to the litigation:- (a) has frustrated in want of consensus ad idem; (b) a public interest litigation cannot be decided in terms of outside settlement between the parties unless it is in larger public interest apart from being valid in accordance with law; (c) the compromise dated 11.8.2000 is neither an order passed by the Government nor a decision taken by the JDA as defined under the Act of 1982; (d) the document is merely recommendations of a Ministerial Committee which may or may not be accepted by the Government i.e. the authorities competent under conduct of business rules or JDA i.e. the body constituted under the provisions of the Act of 1982 and hence, not final; (e) the members of the committee did not precede with authorisation or delegation of power to take decision of the nature stated in the recommendations and therefore, recommendations of persons not competent to take final decision in this regard are not final and cannot result in a complete settlement or compromise which become part of decree of a court; (f) the powers under Sections 54 and 90 of the Act of 1982 cannot even to be exercised pendentelite and directions of this Court cannot precede the exercise of such power by competent authorities; (g) the respondents themselves have conceded in their submissions to the effect that the minutes dated 11.8.2000 are mere preliminaries to the appropriate decisions to be taken by the competent authorities and are not final orders, the very request for passing order by this Court in terms of minutes amounts to gross abuse of the process of this Court; (h) the power of judicial review does not contemplate in India pre-review of a probable executive/statutory action; (i) the motive of the parties to the settlement is clearly to get a judicial seal over a pre-matured action to avoid questionability and review of its invalidity when it forms final decision of the competent authorities; and that (j) the decision leave questions of substantial importance undecided, is vague and uncertain. (44). Mr. (44). Mr. Rajendra Prasad states that the impugned minutes results in a decision to have own Golf Course and Club House by JDA; the decision to lease-out (dispose of) land for Golf Course and Polo to respective private clubs; a decision to induct officers of Government and JDA as office bearers of Private Clubs; change of land use from that provided under the Master Development Plan-2011 and withdraw of legal proceedings. In view of the above, he submitted that the decision is ultra vires of the objections and functions of the JDA. Relying upon Section 16(h) of the Act, 1982 Mr. Rajendra Prasad submitted that it does not permit undertaking and running of sports activities and tourism industry by itself and the action is thus not only a clear diversion from the object of integrated development of city but patently beyond the jurisdiction and functions of the JDA. He would further submit that making provision for land in Development Plans or Schemes for sports activities or disposal of land for such activities is not the same thing as undertaking such activities. Our attention was also drawn to Sections 4, 7, 8 and 10 of the JDA Act. It is submitted that the impugned decision of the Committee as accepted by the JDA has neither been approved nor ratified in any subsequent meeting of the authority or any other competent body as yet. Hence, the settlement is wholly without jurisdiction. It is then submitted that the Minister concerned or the Government is not authorised under the Act to constitute any Committee for taking final decision on the matters under consideration. The total absence of administrative or financial sanction by competent authorities for establishment or running of the JDA Golf Course, Club Houses or Polo Club and therefore, this action cannot attach any legal force to the recommendations by making it an order of the Court. It is next submitted that the Commissioner of the JDA has no power of disposal of land even as per the proviso to Section 54 of the JDA Act as contended by respondent No.4. It is next submitted that the Commissioner of the JDA has no power of disposal of land even as per the proviso to Section 54 of the JDA Act as contended by respondent No.4. As per clauses 16, 18 and 20 of Schedule-II read with Rule 8 of the Conduct of Business Rules, the decision taken only by Council of Ministers or defined under the Rules could have become the order of the State Government and since no order was passed by the State Government, the recommendations impugned have become unforceable and that exercise of power by the State Government under Section 90 of the Act holds no ground. It is further stated that the minutes placed before this Court cannot otherwise be treated to be a direction under Section 90 of the Act. Since the said Section contemplates issuance of directions in the nature of policy decisions of common application for efficient administration of the Act i.e. to say for giving effect to the provisions of the Act and not for settlement of a lis between the JDA and private parties or for specification of land use of a particular piece of land or for its disposal. The said directions shall have to be for efficient administration of the Act i.e. for giving effect to the provisions of the Act. Further the directions shall have to be for doing the acts which are otherwise permissible by the Authority to be done under the Act. Learned Counsel placed reliance in this context on AIR 1991 SC 1902 (15). (45). Mr. Rajendra Prasad submitted that the settlement clearly amounts to disposal of property in favour of two private Clubs in violation of Sec. 54 read with Disposal Rules of 1974. (46). Learned counsel submitted that some arguments raised in M.I. Builders case reported in 1999 SC 2468 (16), have not only been turned down by the Supreme Court but it has been held that such dubious methods to subvert the provisions of law cannot be upheld and the provisions of Sec. 128 etc. in that case were held to be clearly applicable and that the instant case is squarely covered by the said judgment. He invited our attention to paras 38 and 77 of the said judgment. in that case were held to be clearly applicable and that the instant case is squarely covered by the said judgment. He invited our attention to paras 38 and 77 of the said judgment. While retaining formal ownership of the land in question, the respondent authorities have divested the use and enjoyment of the land by the JDA and public at large for indefinite period and vested the right of use and enjoyment in private respondents and by seeking a direction from this Court for enforcement of such arrangement, the respondents seek to create right of such user by the two clubs in perpetuity. He invited our attention to Salmond on Jurisprudence Chapter-8, wherein the author recognises few incidents of ownership. The dual form of ownership i.e. Trust and beneficial ownership existing simultaneously, has also been discussed vested and contingent ownership has been distinguished. Looking from this angle, there will be no manner of doubt that there is clear transfer and disposal of all incidents of ownership particularly beneficial and vested ownership in favour of the respondents No.3 and 4. He further invited our attention again to Sec. 54, Sec. 2(16) and Rule 2(10), Rule 3, Rule 5 and Rule 19 of the Rules of 1974 and submitted that from the aforesaid provisions it is evident that none of the conditions of Sec. 54 and Rules of 1974 have been fulfilled by the settlement/decision in question and therefore, cannot be given effect to. (47). In so far as the land use is concerned, he submitted that the user of the land for sports activities of nature specified in the settlement is contrary to the land use specified in the plan of 2011. He said 2/3rd of the land in question i.e. 200 acres of it is shown for institutional user i.e. for Education, Medical etc. which by no stretch of imagination includes the sports of golf and polo. The remaining shown for open spaces, parks etc. have already been divided in the settlement to be used for city level park. Even this user does not cover regular sports activity. Thus, the user is contrary to master plan and results in change of land use. which by no stretch of imagination includes the sports of golf and polo. The remaining shown for open spaces, parks etc. have already been divided in the settlement to be used for city level park. Even this user does not cover regular sports activity. Thus, the user is contrary to master plan and results in change of land use. According to the learned counsel, any change in land use shall have to be in accordance with provisions of Sec. 25 of the Act of 1982 and in the instant case, the procedure provided having not been followed, the settlement offends the plan and is void. (48). Learned counsel also submitted that resort to Sec. 43 of the Act also does not save the act from being void, because, the decision does not fall in the category of a project or scheme and even if it is such a scheme or project it has not been prepared and as per the provisions of Sec. 38 and 39 and above all, the subject matter is already covered by the plan as it makes sufficient provisions for it and Sec. 43 is therefore, not attracted. Learned counsel has also advanced arguments on the point of bias, malice, corrupt abuse of public power and breach of public trust. It was argued that any administrative or statutory action for its being valid shall have to be free from bias or else it shall be void ab initio. It is submitted that the body taking decision shall have to be constituted of persons and authorities having no direct or indirect interest in the subject matter, pecuniary or otherwise. In the instant case, both the Clubs which are directly interested in the subject matter of the dispute and deriving benefits under the decisions and public servants who have been offered offices in the committees of clubs, who are to enjoy the benefits of the decision and the Chairman of the Committee being the authority constitute; therefore, the constitution of the Committee suffers from the vide of bias. It is a body coarum non judice and its decision is void ab initio. It is a body coarum non judice and its decision is void ab initio. Learned counsel submitted that where the lis before the Court is not adversarial, but a Public Interest Litigation where this Court as sentinel in qui vivo of public interest and parties to the litigation also have to ascertain as to whether the impugned action subserves the public interest or subjvest it for personal gains of parties to the decision and where the action is so patently outrageous defiance of logic and so patently full of dishonest intention that no microscopic investigation is called for to ascertain its being opposed to in the public interest. This Court is duty bound to outrightly reject all such pleas and to overstep the shackles of adversarial litigation for preserving and protecting the interest of public at large. (49). Mr. Vimal Choudahry, Advocate, has also submitted a synopsis and citations. According to him, Ram Bagh Golf Club which is a trespasser, has no locus standi to file the writ petition which has been allowed against which these Special Appeals were filed by the State of Rajasthan. He submitted that in the new petitions, Jitendra Shrimali and R.S. Singh have locus standi to file the writ petition and transposing them as appellants in place of State of Rajasthan and JDA, because a duty has been assigned only to a citizen under Article 51-A of the Constitution of India to safeguard public properties. Citing a decision in J. Jayalalita vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and others (17), the learned counsel submitted that any tax paper in the State has a right to challenge misuse or improper use of any public property by anyone, including the political party in power, where large sums of taxpayers money has been spent to build such public property. He also cited the case of Chairman, Railway Board and others vs. Chandrima Das (Mrs.) and others (18), and Anand vs. S.D. Devgowda and others (supra), to the effect that public interest litigation cannot be withdrawn by the petitioner at his own sweet will unless the Court sees reason to permit withdrawal. Sheela vs. Union of India and others (supra), was also relied on to show that there are certain limitations on the petitioners right to withdraw the public interest petition. Sampat Singh and others vs. State of Haryana and others (supra) was also relied on. Sheela vs. Union of India and others (supra), was also relied on to show that there are certain limitations on the petitioners right to withdraw the public interest petition. Sampat Singh and others vs. State of Haryana and others (supra) was also relied on. He also cited Tulsi Housing Co-operative Society Hyderabad vs. State of A.P. and others (19), for the proposition that the land must be utilised for the purpose for which it was required. He also cited the decisions of R. Rathinavel Chettiar and another vs. Shivaraman and others (20) and K.S. Bhoopathi and others vs. Kokila (21), for the proposition that the writ petition cannot be permitted to be withdrawn at the appellate stage. According to Mr. Vimal Choudhary, in the instant case, the writ petition has been filed in public interest which has been decided in their favour in public interest and when the appeal is pending, by an agreement, the State J.D.A. and the other respondents cannot be permitted to withdraw the public interest litigation on the ground of compromise. According to Mr. Choudhary, the JDA is an independent authority which has been created by an Act which has received assent of the President and, therefore, all decisions have to be taken only by the Statutory body and in the instant case, no decision has been taken by the JDA itself and the State Government has no jurisdiction to interfere in the working of the JDA which is an autonomous body. The State Government is not competent to interfere in the working of the JDA. However, the JDA has now taken a new stand and argued that the Government is competent to interfere in the working of the JDA and take decision, which stand nullifies the earlier stand which cannot be permitted. Thus he would submit that the decision of the Committee is not in the shape of the order and not sought approval of the Governor and therefore, this agreement is void ab initio and illegal. He further submitted that all orders of the Government of the State shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor under Article 166 (1) of the Constitution. In the instant case, no order has been passed by the Government in the name of the Governor, therefore, this does not take place of an order. Concluding his arguments Mr. In the instant case, no order has been passed by the Government in the name of the Governor, therefore, this does not take place of an order. Concluding his arguments Mr. Choudhary submitted that the JDA has already ear-marked the area for the Golf Club in the Master Plan near airport at Sanganer and there are two other polo grounds existing in Jaipur City. There is no need to ear-mark area for sports and games as the J.D.A. has earmarked an area for sports and games for international level in Sewrage Farm area. Thus, he submitted that the writ petition filed by Jitendra Shrimali is liable to be allowed and the agreement/compromise entered into by the Government with the JDA, Gold Club and Polo Club is liable to be quashed and set aside. (50). We heard Shri R.K. Dhawan, learned senior counsel for the Rajasthan Golf Club in extenso. Mr. Dhawan, after inviting our attention to the list of the dates, facts and averments as contained in Jitendra Shrimalis petition, submitted that on 18.12.72 when the Draft Master Plan was published, it was decided to retain the Polo ground and to shift the Golf course to Jhalana park. He then drew our attention to the acquisition process which was initiated on 24.3.73 and the order passed by the Revenue Secretary on 18.6.74 rejecting objections of six persons and accepting those of the Golf Club and Polo Club. This decision was approved by the Revenue Minister on 21.6.74 and the Chief Minister on 27.6.74. The final notification under Sec. 51 of the U.I.T. Act was issued. There was no change in the public purpose mentioned in the preliminary notice. He submitted that in the light of the order of the State Government on 18.6.74, which meant that the land could be acquired but leased out or develop for Golf and Polo purposes. He then drew our attention to the final Master Plan of Polo ground and Golf Club. He invited our attention to pages 43 and 63 of the Final Master Plan of Jaipur dated, 4.6.76, wherein it is stated as follows: ``There are two stadiums in Jaipur, namely, Chaugan stadium in the walled city and Sawai Mansingh stadium near Rambagh. Both the stadiums are grossly undeveloped. It is intended to provide all active recreational facilities in these two stadiums. Both the stadiums are grossly undeveloped. It is intended to provide all active recreational facilities in these two stadiums. The existing polo ground and golf club in Rambagh complex shall also be retained. The existing two Stadiums (SMS Stadium and Chougan Stadium) have adequate lands to provide games and sports facilities. The Polo Club and Golf Club near SMS Stadium shall be developed further in their present locations. (51). We have already noticed the Governments intention to construct commercial complex in the area in question in December, 1994 and the writ petitions were filed by Shri K.K. Sharma and status-quo order passed by the learned single Judge on 22.12.94 and the letter writ petition filed by Dr. Kabra in 1995 and the order passed by the learned Single Judge on 24.5.96 allowing all the three writ petitions and the D.B. Special Appeals filed by the State, JDA and the Rajasthan Polo Club and in the appeal the judgment of the learned Single Judge was stayed and ordered that it would not empower the J.D.A. or State Govt. to make any construction or alter the existing site. (52). We have already noticed and considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing on both the sides in regard to the meeting convened by the UDH Minister on 7.5.99, constitution of a committee to settle the entire dispute consisting of UDH Minister as Chairman, Tourism Minister, Sports Minister and Chairman Sports Council by the State Government on 18.4.2001 and the settlement arrived at in the meeting finally on 11.8.2000 and the application filed for withdrawal of the case on 20.08.2000 in pursuance to the settlement. According to Shri Dhawan, a Public Interest Litigation can be filed and can be withdrawn only in public interest and that a public interest petitioner can not suo motu and does not have the dominus litus to withdraw such a petition arbitrarily without the level of the Court. The Court may permit such petition to be withdrawn or further to be continued by vesting the carriage of proceedings in some other petitioner or an amicus curiea. Learned counsel has also submitted that the person not a party to the writ petition cannot join public interest cause at appeal stage. Elaborating this submission, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the matters of public interest are not free for all which can be joined in at leisure. Learned counsel has also submitted that the person not a party to the writ petition cannot join public interest cause at appeal stage. Elaborating this submission, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the matters of public interest are not free for all which can be joined in at leisure. The Supreme Court unreservedly held that where the petitioners were not parties to earlier proceedings at any stage, such petitioners have no locus standi to approach the Court in appeal. For this purpose Sampat and others vs. State of Haryana (supra) has also been relied. Shri Dhawan submitted that this Court will not allow a mere busy body having altogether no public interest to enter in litigation at an advance stage: Janata Dal vs. H.S. Chowdhary and others (supra). It is useful to refer to Sheela Barse case (supra) at paras 26, 27 and 31 and S.P. Anands case (supra) at para-8 and Sampat Singhs case at para-6. It is clearly seen that the present petitioners who were silent spectators for all these years who have not intervened in any of these proceedings earlier, cannot now be permitted to maintain the writ petition at this advance stage. It is not the case of the petitioners that the respondent State/JDA wants to proceed with the settlement without intervention of the Court. On the other hand, they filed application in pursuance to the settlement and for the approval of this Court. In our opinion, the application filed for withdrawal of the case on 20.08.2000 in pursuance to the settlement is a bonafide attempt on the part of the State to place the entire matter before the Court and invite objections of the other parties and ultimately to take a decision therefor. Therefore, this contention raised by the petitioners is liable to be rejected. (53). Learned counsel invited our attention to the pleadings in the writ petition. Learned counsel submitted that the allegations of malafide must be supported by specific pleadings and that the burden to prove malafides is (a) heavy burden (b) cannot be proved by vague assertions and the Court would be show to draw dubious inference from incomplete facts and refuse to investigate assertions of malafides where they are vague and the persons against whom allegations of malafides are made must be impleaded as party. In this regard learned senior counsel invited our attention to the last few lines in Paras, 1, 4, 5 and para-6 and the grounds (a), (c) and prayer (b) of the writ petition and submitted that the allegations of malafides are conspicuously absent and persons against whom the allegations of malafides are made, must be impleaded as party. For the above proposition, learned senior counsel cited, State of M.P. vs. Nand Lal Jayasawal (22), K. Nagraj vs. State of A.P. (23), C.S. Cowjee vs. State of A.P. (24), State of Bihar vs. P.P. Sharma (25), Express News Paper Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India (26), E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu (27), Sukhvinder vs. State of Punjab (28) and Ashok Kumar Yadav vs. State of Haryana (29). According to Shri Dhawan where the land is acquired for a public purpose by the State government, it is not necessary for the State Government to frame a detailed scheme or development plan before exercising powers under the said provision. It is sufficient if a decision in this respect is taken and the detailed scheme is worked out at the stage of the execution of the plan under section 52(1) of the U.I.T. Act, 1959 and Sec. 46 and 54 of the JDA Act. Shri Dhawan has also advanced arguments on the public purpose and conformity with the Master Plan on the legality of the settlement and on the formalities of decision making on the agreement to enter into a lease. The learned senior counsel made elaborate submissions and answered each and everyone of the contentions put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioners with reference to sections and provisions of the Act, documents and the case laws. We shall refer to the detailed arguments and our conclusions in the paragraphs infra. (54). Learned Addl. Advocate General, Mr. R.N. Mathur, appearing for the State, submitted that the land in question has finally and validly acquired and its acquisition has been upheld by the Supreme Court of India in its judgment dated, 30.03.1993 and in this judgment, the Supreme Court has held that the Court is satisfied that the land has been acquired for the public purpose and since it is so satisfied, it cannot go to the comparative utility of different public purpose and existing beneficial use of the land. Thus, the JDA was left free to develop the land as per its scheme/plan. As per the Master Development Plan of Jaipur, 1991, the land used by the Rambagh Hotel is as under: (i) Residential (ii) Government and semi Government (later changed to institutional for the area known as Birla Auditorium u/S. 25 of the JDA Act. (iii) Parks, open space and play grounds. As per the Master Development Plan of Jaipur 2011, the land use of the Rambagh area is as under; ``(I) Institutional, (ii) Park, open space and play grounds/recreational. (55). Mr. Joshi, learned counsel for the JDA submitted that the petitioners have filed the writ petition at a very belated stage and that they were silent till the writ petition was filed in September 2000. They were also not parties to the writ petitions which were decided by the learned Single Judge by his judgment dated, 24.5.96 and did not also file the appeals against the aforesaid judgment of the learned Single Judge. The application for intervention was filed by the petitioners with some oblique motive and in the back drop of the facts of the case it can be said that the petitioners have no genuine public interest to advance. The J.D.A. has also filed the detailed reply to the writ petition No. 4114/2000 and filed certain annexures. It is further submitted that the petitioners have over-looked the fact that the scheme of city level park has not been given up by the JDA, but the city level park is going to be developed, though the precise area of the city level park has not been given in Annexure-4. In regard to the decision taken on 11.8.2000 Mr. Joshi submitted that the said decision has been arrived at looking to the practical aspect and the management of the Golf Club and Polo Club has been left to the members of the Club in the interest of the game as the JDA may not have personnel who may be equipped with requisite experience in games. The Club also would be required to pay lease rent as they would be using the land which has been vested in the JDA, which fact has been agreed by the representatives of the Golf Club and Polo Club that the JDA is the absolute owner of the land. The Club also would be required to pay lease rent as they would be using the land which has been vested in the JDA, which fact has been agreed by the representatives of the Golf Club and Polo Club that the JDA is the absolute owner of the land. He denied that the JDA has yielded to the pressure of the Clubs and that the decision which has been taken by the Government on 11.8.2000 has been reviewed by the order dated, 4.9.2000 looking to the contribution made by the former ruling family of Jaipur State to the popularisation of Polo game in Jaipur. (56). S/Shri Rajendra Prasad, Jagdeep Dhankhar and K.K. Sharma have also reiterated their contentions by way of reply and concluded their arguments. (57). We have given our thoughtful consideration on the entire aspect of the matter with reference to the provisions of the UIT Act, JDA Act and the rules made thereunder and the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing on either side with reference to the rulings cited and relied on by them. (58). In the back-ground of the submissions made the following issues arise for determination of this Court: (a) Whether the writ petitions filed by Jitendra Shrimali and Ved Prakash Bishnoi are in public interest and can be entertained? (b) Whether the original P.I.Ls. are liable to be withdrawn or can be withdrawn in view of the settlement dated, 11.8.2000 with the leave of the Court? (c) Whether the acquired land can be utilised for the purpose of Golf Course, Polo Ground and city level park? (d) Whether the utilisation of the acquired land in the aforesaid manner can be regarded in public interest? (e) Whether the Government can constitute a Committee to deal with the utilisation of the land of Rambagh complex by way of order dated 18.4.2000? (f) Whether the arrangements can be with the Polo Club and Golf Club without taking recourse to tender procedure of auction mechanism? (g) Whether the impugned action of the Government is justifiable? Issue (a) - Whether the writ petitions filed by Jitendra Shrimali and Ved Prakash Bishnoi are in public interest and can be entertained? (59). We have already referred to the respective averments made by the petitioners and the respondents in paragraphs (supra). (60). (g) Whether the impugned action of the Government is justifiable? Issue (a) - Whether the writ petitions filed by Jitendra Shrimali and Ved Prakash Bishnoi are in public interest and can be entertained? (59). We have already referred to the respective averments made by the petitioners and the respondents in paragraphs (supra). (60). In Sampat Singh and others vs. State of Haryana (supra), the writ petitions were jointly filed by the MLAs and MPs. in the High Court seeking directions for conducting a CBI investigation on the basis of F.I.R. registered on a complaint making serious allegations of corruption, misuse of authority etc. against a person holding a Cabinet rank in the Central Government and for setting aside order of Magistrate discharging that person. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were not parties to earlier proceedings at any stage and also held that they have no locus standi to approach the Supreme Court. In the said case, the Supreme Court held that the matters of public interest are not a free for all which can be joined in at leisure. The Supreme Court has unreservedly held that where petitioners were not at all parties to the earlier proceedings at any stage, such petitioners have no locus standi to approach the Court in appeal. (61). The Supreme Court in the case of Janata Dal vs. H.S. Chowdhary and others (supra), has held that the Court will not allow mere busy body having altogether no public interest to enter a litigation at an advance stage. (62). We have already noticed that neither in the writ petitions nor in the intervention application any allegation of malafides and bias have been levelled by the petitioners against any of the respondents or the members of the committee who took the impugned decision. There is no impleadment by any name of any authority that had taken decision and that are sought to be impeached. No factual foundation has been laid as regards the legality or validity of the decision taken by the Committee. There is no impleadment by any name of any authority that had taken decision and that are sought to be impeached. No factual foundation has been laid as regards the legality or validity of the decision taken by the Committee. All the interveners and the petitioners are seeking direction from this Court to the effect that in respect of the use of the land of Rambagh complex, as agreed in the settlement, the State should be directed to use the land either for commercial complex as envisaged earlier or if not, then the entire are should be used as a city level park. They have also not come to the Court or showed their anxiety in regard to the area at any earlier point of time. As noticed earlier, in the case of Janata Dal vs. H.S. Choudhary (supra), the Court will not allow a mere busy body to intervene and enter into a litigation at an advance stage. In view of this, we are of the opinion that both the writ petitions and intervention application deserve to be rejected on this ground alone. Issue No. (b) - Whether the original P.I.Ls. are liable to be withdrawn or can be withdrawn in view of the settlement dated, 11.8.2000 with the leave of the Court? (63). Shri Dhawan on this issue submitted that a public interest litigation can be filed and can be withdrawn only in public interest and that a public interest petitioner cannot sue motu and does not have the dominus litus to withdraw such a petition arbitrarily without leave of the Court and that the Court may permit such a petition to be withdrawn or further be continued by vesting the carriage of proceedings in some other petitioner or an amicus curiae. In support of the above submission Mr. Dhankhar relied on the following rulings: (i) Sheela Barse vs. Union of India (supra) and (ii) Sampat Singh vs. State of Haryana (supra) (64). In Sheela Barses case, the Supreme Court held in Paras 26, 27 and 36 as under: ``26. The first ground, therefore, does not justify the withdrawal of this public interest litigation. Dhankhar relied on the following rulings: (i) Sheela Barse vs. Union of India (supra) and (ii) Sampat Singh vs. State of Haryana (supra) (64). In Sheela Barses case, the Supreme Court held in Paras 26, 27 and 36 as under: ``26. The first ground, therefore, does not justify the withdrawal of this public interest litigation. If we acknowledge any such status of a dominus litis to a person who brings a public interest litigation, we will render the proceedings in public interest litigation vulnerable to and susceptible of a new dimension which might, in conceivable cases, be used by persons for personal ends resulting in prejudice to be public weal. 27. The second ground for withdrawal is no better. The ground is that the applicant, in view of what transpired in the two immediately preceding dates of hearing of the case, is unable to prosecute the proceedings with ``dignity and that, therefore, the applicant is entitled to withdraw the proceedings. There is, and can be, no disagreement with the principle that even the humblest citizen of the land, irrespective of his station in life, is entitled to present his case with dignity and is entitled to be heard with courtesy and sympathy. Courts are meant for, and are sustained by, the people and no litigant can be allowed to be looked upon as a supplicant or an importuner. It is unfortunate that the applicant claims that there was any shortcoming in this behalf in her case. We regret that there should at all have been any occasion for this. Let us see whether there is any real justification for this. 36. The third ground is that the proceedings are brought as a ``voluntary action and that applicant is entitled to sustain her right to be the ``petitioner-in-person in a public interest litigation and that the proceedings cannot be proceeded with after delinking her from the proceedings. This again proceeds on certain fallacies as the rights of a person who brings a public interest litigation. Any recognition of any such vested right in the persons who initiate such proceedings is to introduce a new and potentially harmful element in the judicial administration of this form of public law remedy. This again proceeds on certain fallacies as the rights of a person who brings a public interest litigation. Any recognition of any such vested right in the persons who initiate such proceedings is to introduce a new and potentially harmful element in the judicial administration of this form of public law remedy. That apart, what is implicit in the assertion of the applicant is the appropriation to herself of the right and wisdom to determine the course the proceedings are to or should take and its pattern. This cannot be recognised. In the present proceedings the court has already gone through and has initiated an elaborate exercise as indicated in the orders excerpted earlier. The petition can not be permitted to be abandoned at this stage. Only a private litigant can abandon his claims. (65). In the case reported in S.P. Anand vs. H.D. Deve Gowda and others (supra), it has been held at para-18 as under: ``The petitioner had contended before this Court when his petition was called on for hearing on 30.7.1996 that he filed a similar petition bearing No. 774 of 1996 in the Madhya Pradesh High Court and that the High Court had ordered notice to issue exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. He sought permission to withdraw his petition. Here we must mention that in PIL cases, the petitioner is not entitled to withdraw his petition at his sweet will unless the Court sees reason to permit withdrawal. In granting the permission the Court would be guided by considerations of public interest and would also ensure that it does not result in abuse of the process of law. Courts must guard against possibilities of such litigants settling the matters out of the court to their advantage and then seeking withdrawal of the case. There are umpteen ways in which the process can be abused and the courts must be aware of the same before permitting withdrawal of the petition. This is not to say that this was one such case. Here we did not allow withdrawal as we noticed that the very same question was being raised from court to court. It was raised in the High Courts of Delhi and Calcutta. This is not to say that this was one such case. Here we did not allow withdrawal as we noticed that the very same question was being raised from court to court. It was raised in the High Courts of Delhi and Calcutta. Notwithstanding the decisions rendered in the said two cases, to which we have already referred, we were informed by the petitioner himself that he had raised the issue in the Madhya Pradesh High Court and another such petition was filed in the Allahabad High Court. To avoid such snowballing leading to multiplicity of cases we thought it in public interest to examine the issue with a view of avoiding conflict of opinions. That is the reason why we refused to permit withdrawal of the petition and decided to settle the issue of law one way or the other, which we do by this decision. (66). It is an established principle that a public interest litigation can be filed and can be withdrawn only in public interest. A public interest petitioner does not have an absolute right to withdraw such a petition arbitrarily without leave of the Court. The Court may permit such a petition to be withdrawn. Learned counsel for the petitioners Mr. Rajendra Prasad and Mr. Vimal Choudhary based their arguments and raised an objection based on the case of Sheela Barse vs. Union of India (supra). We have gone through the relevant portion in the said judgment. In Sheela Barses case, the public interest petitioner being frustrated with the delay in disposal of the case sought to withdraw the writ petition. It was in these circumstances that the Honble Supreme Court did not permit the writ petitioner to withdraw and directed that the petitioner should be allowed to be substituted by vesting the carriage of the petition on some other petitioner or an amicus curiae. The Supreme Court held that a public interest writ petition cannot be allowed to be withdrawn as a matter of right. In this context, we have already referred to para 18 of S.P. Anands case (supra). In the present case, the original writ petitioner does not claim any right to withdraw the writ petition as a matter of right nor can it be said that the withdrawal of the writ petition is to achieve some ulterior motive or objective. (67). In this context, we have already referred to para 18 of S.P. Anands case (supra). In the present case, the original writ petitioner does not claim any right to withdraw the writ petition as a matter of right nor can it be said that the withdrawal of the writ petition is to achieve some ulterior motive or objective. (67). We have already dealt with the factual aspect of the writ petition and that is why the writ petition was filed in this Court. The prayer in that writ petition was broadly that the State Government may be restrained from altering the status of the area and may be restrained from constructing commercial complex therein. That having been accepted by the State Government as per their decision dated, 11.8.2000, it would be futile to continue the proceedings any further and application to seek leave of the Court and to pass orders in terms of the settlement has been filed and this Court has been requested to pass an order in terms of the settlement. It is not a case where absolute right to withdraw writ petition has been claimed or the withdrawal has been done for extraneous consideration with ulterior objective. In such circumstances, we are of the opinion that the objection taken by the counsel for the writ petitioners is baseless and therefore, is liable to be rejected. Issue No. (c) and (d): ``Whether the acquired land can be utilised for the purpose of Golf Course, Polo Ground and City level park? And- (d) Whether the utilisation of the acquired land in the aforesaid manner can be regarded in public interest? (68). These two issues can be considered together for the convenience. The provisions of the Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982 bear relevance and the relevant sections read as under: ``2(17) ``public purpose includes any purpose which is useful to the public or any class or section of the public and the requirement of land reserved or designated in a plan, project or scheme or for any other purpose under this Act. ``4(3) The Chairman of the Authority shall supervise and control all the activities on behalf of the Authority and shall exercise such powers and perform such other duties as the Authority may, by regulations, from time to time determine. 16. ``4(3) The Chairman of the Authority shall supervise and control all the activities on behalf of the Authority and shall exercise such powers and perform such other duties as the Authority may, by regulations, from time to time determine. 16. Functions of the Authority- The main object of the Authority shall be to secure the integrated development of the Jaipur Region and for that purpose the functions of the authority shall be: (a) to (g).............. (h) preparing schemes and adivising the concerned authorities, dep-artments, and agencies in formulating the undertaking schemes for development of agriculture, horticulture, floriculture, forestry, dairy development, transport, communication, schooling, cultural activities, sports, medicare, tourism entertainment and similar other activies; (i) execution of projects and schemes on the directions of the State Government; (j) & (k) ............... (i) to enter into contracts, agreements or arrangements with any person or organisation as the Authority may deem necessary for performing its function; (m) to (s) ............... ``43. Saving to any Project or Scheme - Notwithstanding anything contained in any provisions of this Act or in any plan sanctioned under it, the Authority shall be at liberty to make and carry out any project or scheme not covered by the said plan if in the opinion of the authority, it is necessary to do so or expedient in public interest, and the said plan shall be deemed to be modified to that extent. ``54. ``54. Land vest in the Authority and its disposal - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (Rajasthan Act No. 15 of 1956) the land as defined in section 103 of that Act, excluding land referred to in sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of the said section and Nazul Land placed at the disposal of a local authority under section 102-A of that Act in Jaipur Region shall, immediately after establishment of the Authority u/Sec. 3 of this Act, be deemed to have been placed at the disposal of and vested in the Authority which shall take over such land for and on behalf of the State Government and may use the same for the purposes of this Act and may dispose of the same subject to such conditions and restrictions as the State Government may, from time to time, prescribe: Provided that the Authority may dispose of any such land- (a) without undertaking or carrying out any development thereon;or (b) after undertaking or carrying out such development as it thinks fit, to such person, in such manner and subject to such covenants and conditions, as it may consider expedient to impose for securing development according to plan. ``90. Control by State Government : (1) The Authority shall exercise its powers and perform its duties under this Act in accordance with the policy framed and the guidelines laid down, from time to time by the State Govt. for development of the areas in the Jaipur region. (2) The authority shall be bound to comply with such directions which may be issued, from time to time, by the State Government for efficient administration of this Act. (3) If, in connection with the exercise of the powers and the performance of the duties of the Authority under this Act, any dispute arises between the Authority and the State Government, the matter shall be decided by the State Government and its decision shall be final. (69). The ``public purpose mentioned in the Notification to acquire this land was ``for the purpose of the Trust and for construction of administrative,commercial and residential buildings. It cannot, therefore, be said that the purpose of the acquisition was only for construction of administrative, residential or commercial buildings. It was also for the purpose of Trust, namely, that such development works as the Trust may deem proper. It cannot, therefore, be said that the purpose of the acquisition was only for construction of administrative, residential or commercial buildings. It was also for the purpose of Trust, namely, that such development works as the Trust may deem proper. The Trust here means the Urban Improvement Trust, which has subsequently been substituted by the JDA. The acquisition was started in 1972. If the State Government feels after a period of 30 years that it would be in public interest to permit the area to be used as green area for a city level park, Golf Course and Polo Ground, then the same cannot be said not to subserve the public purpose. We have already extracted the relevant sections above. Sec. 2(17) includes any purpose, which is useful to the public or any class or section of the public. One of the purposes of the authority u/S. 16 (h) is preparing schemes and advising the concerned authorities, departments and agencies in formulating and undertaking schemes for development of agriculture, horticulture, floriculture, forestry, dairy development, transport, communication, schooling, cultural activities, sports, medicare, tourism, entertainment and similar other activities. During the course or arguments, objections were taken by Shri Rajendra Prasad, Shri S.R. Bajwa, Senior counsel and Shri Vimal Choudhary that in the judgment of the Supreme Court in land acquisition case reported in Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti vs. State of Rajasthan (supra) the argument with regard to Polo Ground was rejected by the Honble Apex Court. We have carefully read that portion of the judgment. The aforesaid contention, in our opinion, is not based on a correct reading of the judgment. In the land acquisition case, a S.L.P. was filed by the Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti. The acquisition in this case was made by the State Government. It was contended that since the land was being used for Polo Ground, which was serving a public purpose, hence, the acquisition must be set aside. The Honble Supreme Court did not say that the use of the land as a Polo Ground was not serving a public purpose. All is said was that the court cannot go into the comparative utility of the public purpose and once the Court is satisfied that the acquisition is for a public purpose, no fault can be found with the proceedings on the ground that the land is already being used for some beneficial purpose. All is said was that the court cannot go into the comparative utility of the public purpose and once the Court is satisfied that the acquisition is for a public purpose, no fault can be found with the proceedings on the ground that the land is already being used for some beneficial purpose. (70). Hence, in our opinion, it cannot be said that the State Government cannot now permit the land to be used as Polo Ground or Golf Course. Secondly, neither the Polo Club nor the Golf Club had filed any writ petition challenging the acquisition in view of the fact that their objections had been accepted and the State Government had declared that after the acquisition is over, the land would be allotted to the Golf Club and Polo Club according to their needs. Their objections having been accepted, it can be said that the object of acquisition itself contained an intention to permit the land to be used for Polo and Golf. In this context, we may usefully refer to the decision taken by the Government u/Sec. 52(3) of the UIT Act, which is statutory in nature and the relevant portion has already been extracted at page 8 of this judgment (Annex.R-4/2). The objections of the Polo Club and the Golf Club having been accepted, it can be said that the object of acquisition itself contained an intention to permit the land to be used for Polo and Golf. Further an objection was also raised before the Honble Supreme Court. In that case, since no scheme had been framed for the use of this area, hence, the acquisition was bad. The Honble Supreme Court drew a distinction between the acquisition by the State and the acquisition by the Trust/Authority. The Apex Court held that where the land is acquired by the State, framing of the scheme is not a pre- condition for initiating acquisition proceedings, whereas, if the land is acquired by the Trust/Authority, the framing of a scheme is essential before acquisition proceeding can taken place. In the first case, where the State Government acquires the land, it is sufficient if a decision to acquire the land is taken and the detailed scheme is left to be worked out at the stage of execution of the plan. In the first case, where the State Government acquires the land, it is sufficient if a decision to acquire the land is taken and the detailed scheme is left to be worked out at the stage of execution of the plan. It can, therefore, be said that no scheme had been framed when the land was acquired by the State Government in 1973. If the State Government now frames a scheme for use of this area as a polo ground and golf course and the city level park, it cannot be said that it is being used for a purpose different that the purpose for which it was acquired. Apart from that, the State Government, if it so feels justified and in public interest, may use the land for a purpose different than for which it was acquired. (71). The following decisions can be usefully referred in the above context: Gulam Mustafa and Others vs. The State of Maharashtra and Others (supra) - It was held in that case, as under:- ``Once the original acquisition is valid and little had vested in the municipality, how it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long later the requiring authority divers it to a public purpose other than the one stated in the Sec. 6 (3) declaration. (72). In Mangal Oram and Others vs. State of Orissa and Another ect. (supra) - It was a case of acquisition of 78 square miles of land, for industrial use. In this case, another notification was issued subsequently for acquisition of further four square miles of land for the above purpose. Honble the Supreme Court, in para 6 of the above judgment, held that the use of land after a valid acquisition for a different public purpose will not invalidate the acquisition. (73). In Forward Construction Co. and Others vs. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.) Andheri and Others etc. (supra), the acquisition of a plot by the Municipal Corporation, was for a bus depot, but it was used for bus depot, combined with commercial purposes. The Supreme Court held that such user does not constitute ``change and ``meaning of, in para 33 of its judgment. (74). and Others vs. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.) Andheri and Others etc. (supra), the acquisition of a plot by the Municipal Corporation, was for a bus depot, but it was used for bus depot, combined with commercial purposes. The Supreme Court held that such user does not constitute ``change and ``meaning of, in para 33 of its judgment. (74). In Collectors of 24 Parganas and Others vs. Lalit Mohan Mullic and Others (supra), the acquisition was for a public purpose, namely, for re-settlement of immigrants, who had migrated into the State of West Bengal, on account of circumstances beyond their control. The owner of the land discovered, after receipt of a notice for acquisition of the land that the land was required not for the purpose, mentioned in the notification, but for the Society of Experimental Medical Science (India), for construction of a hospital for crippled children at the expenses of the said Society. The Supreme Court held that putting up of a hospital for crippled children is a public purpose, connected with the rehabilitation of displaced persons and the original object of acquisition proceedings, is generally termed as ``re-settlement of refugees, which would mean their rehabilitation and that the real purpose of rehabilitation can be achieved only if those, who are sought to be rehabilitated, are provided with shelter, food and other necessary amenities of life. It would be for the authorities concerned to think of providing various amenities for the displaced persons in the process of rehabilitation. In this case, after the declaration notification, the authorities concerned thought of a hospital. The Supreme Court held that to provide a hospital for the disabled and for the crippled children of such displaced persons, squarely comes within the concept of the idea of ``rehabilitation and consequently of settlement of the refugees. (75). The Sachidanand Pandey and another vs. State of West Bengal and Others (supra) was a case of acquisition of land for zoological garden, but leased out for hotel. In this case, the Supreme Court was considering a public interest litigation, questioning the cabinet decision of the State Government, to lease out a part of the zoo land, so far used for fodder cultivation, burial ground, hospital etc. for animals to a leading hotel company. In this case, the Supreme Court was considering a public interest litigation, questioning the cabinet decision of the State Government, to lease out a part of the zoo land, so far used for fodder cultivation, burial ground, hospital etc. for animals to a leading hotel company. The Supreme Court held that the decision taken openly after due application of mind to relevant considerations, including ecology and providing alternative facilities to the zoo, is not liable to be interfered with. The Supreme Court held that where a decision of commercial nature, taken by the State Government, after a process of protracted discussions, consultations, negotiations and consideration of various aspects, covering about two years, objections cannot be sustained. (76). Ram Lal Sethi and another vs. State of Haryana and others (supra) - This was a case of a land, acquired for public purpose of construction of road, but exigencies of development necessitated allotment of a portion of it, to a private company. The Supreme Court held that the allotment was not shown to be an act of favouritism and the person whose land was acquired, was also awarded compensation. In the circumstances, the Supreme Court held that it would not be equitable to direct restoration of the land to the owners. (77). Nasik Municipal Corporation vs. Harbanslal Laikwant Rajpal and others (30) - In this case, the land, included in a scheme under the Town Planning Act, was being reserved for public purpose. Subsequently, the land was needed for a different public purpose. The State Government, acquiring the same, issued a corrigendum. The Supreme Court held, public purpose becomes conclusive on publication of declaration under Section 6 of Land Acquisition Act and the scheme shall be deemed to be suitably varied by reason of acquisition of the said land. (78). It would be seen from the decision of the High Powered Committee that in the instant case, the land is sought to be utilised for the purposes of a polo ground, a golf-course and a city level park. Under Section 2(17) of the Act, ``public purpose includes any purpose, which is useful to the public, or any class, or section of the public. Under Section 16(h), one of the functions of the JDA, is to secure integrated development of the Jaipur Region, including promotion of schemes, relating to sports, tourism and similar other activities. Under Section 2(17) of the Act, ``public purpose includes any purpose, which is useful to the public, or any class, or section of the public. Under Section 16(h), one of the functions of the JDA, is to secure integrated development of the Jaipur Region, including promotion of schemes, relating to sports, tourism and similar other activities. Under Section 21(2)(ix), a master development plan is required to provide for matters, e.g. games and sports complexes, worthy of holding international events. The utilisation scheme for the Rambagh Complex, envisaging therein a polo-ground, a golf-course and a city level park, is from every conceivable consideration, in public interest. It is in conformity with the Master Development Plan, as mentioned in Sec. 16 of the Act. In case, Baljit Singh Mallik vs. Delhi Golf Club and others, (31), Honble The Supreme Court, in para 8 of the judgment, held as under:- ``Considering the fact that it is one of the avowed purpose of the Government to encourage sports and if Government so desires, may grant leases of land not necessarily at market rate and at appropriate concessional rates and the same cannot be stated not to subserve the public purpose. (79). It may pertinently be given out herein, that in the case of Netai Bag and others vs. State of W.B. and Others (32), it was prayed by way of a public interest litigation that a writ in the nature of mandamus, commanding the respondents, to forebear from using or utilising the acquired lands for the purposes other than the one, for which the acquisition was made, be issued. It came to be dismissed right upto the Apex Court. It would thus be seen that utilisation of the land of the Rambagh Complex, under the impugned decisions, is fully in conformity with the Master Development Plan, and it is bound to be in public interest, as it would contribute generation of eco-friendly atmosphere in the city, apart from promoting tourism. (80). Shri Rajeev Dhawan invited our attention to Sections 72, read with Sections 38 and 73 and also the provisions of the UIT Act and submitted that land use must broadly conform to the Master Plan, under the UIT Act and that though broad conformity is needed, small & minimal deviations are permitted. (80). Shri Rajeev Dhawan invited our attention to Sections 72, read with Sections 38 and 73 and also the provisions of the UIT Act and submitted that land use must broadly conform to the Master Plan, under the UIT Act and that though broad conformity is needed, small & minimal deviations are permitted. He has further submitted that land may be acquired by the State Government and placed at the disposal of the Urban Development Authority, to give effect to the Master Plan. He invited our attention to Section 52(1) of the UIT Act and Sections 46 and 54 of the JDA Act. There is also a continuity between the UIT Act and the JDA Act. The JDA Act retains the requirement of broad conformity, unless the Master Plan is modified, reviewed or changed. Thus, Shri Dhawan said that the term ``public purpose is to be broadly construed and varied in its application, in conformity with the local conditions, in the light of statutory and other requirements. In this context, he placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court, in the case of Smt. Somawanti and others vs. State of Punjab (33). In case, Gandhi Grah Nirman Samiti vs. State of Rajasthan, (supra), in para 15, Honble The Supreme Court has held that it is for the State Government and authorities, to determine the public purpose and land use planning. Although, normally, acquisitions of land should be used for the purposes for which they are acquired, but the State Government and the authorities may change the land-use, to subserve the public interest. In this context, we have already referred to some of the decisions of Honble the supreme Court. The judgments cited and extracted above, have also been cited by Shri R.K. Dhawan, for the above proposition. Shri Dhawan has submitted that where the Government has carefully considered all the ecological and other matters, the Court will not interfere and a public interest petition will not lie, where the decision is wednesbury reasonable. He relied in this context, on the decision of the Apex Court, in case of Sachidanand Pandey (supra), and in particular, on paras 21, 23, 40 and 41. He relied in this context, on the decision of the Apex Court, in case of Sachidanand Pandey (supra), and in particular, on paras 21, 23, 40 and 41. Shri Dhawan, therefore, submitted that the settlement oriented towards the preservation of a golf-club and polo-ground, is consistent with the broad public purpose, delineated in the statute and Master Plan and, therefore, we are of the opinion that no objections can be taken to the decision of the Government to use the area as a golf-course, polo-ground and city level park. Issue No. (e) - (81). Whether the Government could constitute a committee to deal with the utilisation of the land of Rambagh Complex by way of order dated 18.4.2000? Issue No. (f) - (82). Whether arrangements can be with the Polo Club and Golf Club without taking recourse to tender procedure of auction mechanism? Issue No. (g) - (83). Whether the impugned action of the Government is justifiable? (84). Since all these three issues are inter-connected, we prefer to decide the same, together. Before considering these issues, the following provisions of the JDA Act, 1982 are very relevant to be noticed. We have already extracted Sections 2(2), 2(17), 4(3), 16, 21(2), 21(9), 43, 54 and 90 of the JDA Act, in paragraphs (supra). The aforesaid provisions clearly show that building sports and recreation facilities and open areas, is one of the elementary functions of the JDA. Further, since the State Government is the owner of the entire land and the land after acquisition is placed by the State Government, in the hands of the Trust/Authority, control and power of the State Government, under Section 90 clearly shows that the State Government has the ultimate control and power to issue directions. Section 54 of the Act has been amended in 1999, and under the amended provisions, the Authority has power to dispose of the land by way of allotment, regularisation or auction. In view of the amendment, it is not necessary that the land can be disposed of only by tender or auction. It can be granted by way of allotment or regularisation also. The High Powered Committee constituted by the State Government, under its order dated 18.4.2000, is comprised of Ministers and senior functionaries of the Government. In view of the amendment, it is not necessary that the land can be disposed of only by tender or auction. It can be granted by way of allotment or regularisation also. The High Powered Committee constituted by the State Government, under its order dated 18.4.2000, is comprised of Ministers and senior functionaries of the Government. The said Committee, in our view, cannot be held to be lacking in legal sanction and the same is in exercise of the executive power, vesting in the Government, under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. (85). The learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the High Powered Committee was constituted, so as to secure resolution of the dispute, in relation to the utilisation of the land of the Rambagh Complex. Section 90 of the Act permits the State Government, to exercise control over the Authority. The constitution of the High Powered Committee can thus be justified, on this premise as well. Apart from the above, the State Government has a broad executive power to subserve public interest, which includes the power to enter into negotiations and settlements. (86). Shri Rajendra Prasad, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner, raised an objection that since the decision has not been taken in the name of the Governor, hence, the settlement is illegal and cannot be enforced. We are unable to countenance to the said submission. It is needless for us to say that the said submission is absolutely baseless. The requirements of Article 166 (1), in respect of ``executive action being taken in the name of the Governor, does not relate to the myriad of decisions taken everyday, but only where a formal order or notification is required. If this was not so, governance would be impossible. (87). Shri Jagdeep Dhankhar also submitted that the arrangement, formulated under the order dated 11.8.2000 cannot be impeached on the ground that it has been secured without calling for tenders. First, it will be seen that u/Sec. 16 of the Act, the main object of the authority is to secure the integrated development of the Jaipur Region and towards fulfilling that object, the Authority is legally competent under Section 16(1), to enter into contracts, agreements or arrangements, with any person, or organization, as the Authority may deem necessary for performing its functions. (88). (88). A similar arrangement came to be approved by the Apex Court, in the case of Netai Bag (supra). In that case, the Apex Court held as under:- ``.....Non-floating of tenders or not holding of public auction would not in all cases be deemed to be the result of the exercise of the executive power in an arbitrary manner. Making an exception to the general rule could be justified by the State executive, if challenged in appropriate proceedings. The constitutional courts cannot be expected to presume the alleged irregularities, illegalities or unconstitutionality nor the courts can substitute their opinion for the bona fide opinion of the State executive. The courts are not concerned with the ultimate decision but only with the fairness of the decision- making process. The Government is entitled to make pragmatic adjustments and policy decision which may be necessary or called for under the prevalent peculiar circumstances. The court cannot strike down a policy decision taken by the Government merely because it feels that another decision would have been fairer or wiser or more scientific logical. In State of M.P. vs. Nandlal Jaiswal (1996) 4 SCC 55), it was held that the policy decision can be interfered with by the court only if such decision is shown to be patently arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide. (89). The Government, under the scheme of our Constitution, has the executive authority, to enter into negotiations and settlements, as held by the Apex Court, in the case of Raj Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapoor vs. State of Punjab (34). (90). Shri Rajeev Dhawan, in support of his contention that the requirements of Article 166(1) are not mandatory in character, has placed strong reliance on the following decisions:- (91). State of Bombay vs. Purushottam Jog Naik (35), L.G. Chaudhary vs. The Secretary, L.S.G. Department, Govt. of Bihar and others (36), P. Joseph John vs. State of Travancore-Cochin (37), M.V. Srinivasa and others vs. State of A.P. and others (38), State of M.P. and others vs. Dr. Yashwant Trimbak (39), Inhwarlal Girdharilal Joshi etc. vs. State of Gujarat and another (40), and State of Rajasthan and another vs. Spripal Jain (41). of Bihar and others (36), P. Joseph John vs. State of Travancore-Cochin (37), M.V. Srinivasa and others vs. State of A.P. and others (38), State of M.P. and others vs. Dr. Yashwant Trimbak (39), Inhwarlal Girdharilal Joshi etc. vs. State of Gujarat and another (40), and State of Rajasthan and another vs. Spripal Jain (41). In the case of Purushottam Jog Naik (supra), Honble the Supreme Court has held as under:- ``One of the meanings of ``expressed is to make known the opinions or the feelings of a particular person and when a Secretary to Government apprehends a man and tells him in the order that it is being done under the order of the Governor, he is in substance saying that he is acting in the name of the Governor and, on his behalf, is making known to the detenu the opinion and feelings and orders of the Governor. The Constitution does not require a magic incantation which can only be expressed in a set formula of words. What the court has to see is whether the substance of the requirements of Art. 166(1) is there. (92). In the case of L.G. Chaudhary (supra), Honble the Supreme Court has held as follows:- ``In the absence of a formal order drawn up in terms of Article 166 of the Constitution it was certainly open to the appellant to prove by evidence aliunde that he had been appointed on permanent and substantive basis. In Chitralekha vs. State of Mysore ( 1964 (6) SCR 368 ) it was pointed out that the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution were only directory and not mandatory and, if they were not complied with it could be established as a question of fact that the order was issued by the State Government. (93). In case P. Joseph John (supra), it was held by the Supreme Court as under:- ``Clauses (1) and (2) of Art. 166 are directory only and non-compliance with them does not result in the order being invalid, and in order to determine whether there is compliance with these provisions all that is necessary to be seen is whether there has been substantial compliance with those requirements. Held that the notice signed by the Chief Secretary of the State and expressed to be on behalf of the Government and giving opportunity to the petitioner to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him was in substantial compliance with the provisions of the article. (94). In the case of M.V. Srinivasa (supra), Honble the Supreme Court held as under:- ``The power to grant any special allowance and amenities to those employees who serve the Government and are posted in places with unfavourable conditions is within the discretion of the Government. Considering the nature of duties discharged by those who have been posted with a project area as well as non- availability of several basic amenities of life, the Government would be well within its power to grant some incentives like project allowance and other amenities like free quarters, free electricity and free water supply. But such incentives and amenities cannot be claimed as of right by all the employees who might have been employed in the project but are stationed outside the project area and are serving in Taluk Headquarters or elsewhere. It is the place of work which entitles a group of employees to get incentives and amenities in question and not the employment in the project itself. There is no discrimination in the matter of grant of project allowance and amenities to those employees who are posted in the project site itself. After examining the original file, the State Administrative Tribunal found that the decision relating to withdrawal of the amenities was taken by the Minister of the Department concerned who was empowered under the Rules of business to pass such order. Therefore, there is no force in the contention that the impugned letter dated 20.8.1987, not being a letter in terms of Article 166 of the Constitution, had no force in the eye of law. (95). The case of Dr. Yashwant Trimbak (supra) related to post- retirement departmental enquiry. The order for such enquiry was expressed in the name of the Governor and duly authenticated by the Officer authorised under the authentication rules. The Supreme Court held that such an order is not subject to judicial review, on the ground of not having been executed by the Governor. Yashwant Trimbak (supra) related to post- retirement departmental enquiry. The order for such enquiry was expressed in the name of the Governor and duly authenticated by the Officer authorised under the authentication rules. The Supreme Court held that such an order is not subject to judicial review, on the ground of not having been executed by the Governor. The Supreme Court further held that the order which is expressed in the name of the Governor and is duly authenticated cannot be questioned in any court on the ground that it not made or executed by the Governor. The signature of the Secretary or Under Secretary concerned, who is authosied under the authentication rules, to sign the document, signifies the consent of the Governor as well as the acceptance of the advice rendered by the Minister. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the Administrative Tribunal was wholly incompetent to examine the legality of the impugned order. (96). In the case of Ishwarlal Girdharilal Joshi (supra), it was held by the Supreme Court as follows:- ``.....the business of Government is regulated by the Rules of Business made under Article 166 of the Constitution. Rule 13 of the Rules of Business (Govt. of Gujarat) specifically places all Secretaries on equality for authentication of orders and instruments of Government. Thus, the Under Secretary to the State Government was competent to sign the notification under Section 6 as a Secretary. Further, the Under Secretary would undoubtedly be competent as an officer ``duly authorised by virtue of Rule 13 of the Rules of Business (Govt. of Gujarat) and that is all that Section 6 requires. No further special authentication under the Act was necessary. (97). Thus, where objections have been disposed of under a statute, e.g. Section 52(3), or in this case, in respect of the objections of both the clubs, by the Secretary to the Government, in his decision dt. 18.6.1974, no specific formalisation is necessary. (98). On Issue No. (f), Shri Rajeev Dhawan submitted that the term ``dispose has a wide and different meaning. A term in clause, section or statute would have a diffe- rent meaning in accordance with the context. Thus, the term ``dispose in Sec. 54(1) and the proviso, is broadly used and covers dispositions, including forms of dispositions other than a competitive sale. A term in clause, section or statute would have a diffe- rent meaning in accordance with the context. Thus, the term ``dispose in Sec. 54(1) and the proviso, is broadly used and covers dispositions, including forms of dispositions other than a competitive sale. According to the learned Senior Counsel, auction is not the only method of disposal and it is not applicable where a developmental agreement is entered into to fulfil the purposes of the Act. It is pertinent to mention that consistent with the developmental purpose, no proprietary rights of any kind what- soever other than development use have been created in favour of the clubs. There is close and pervasive control and no proprietary rights existed in favour of the clubs. (99). In answering the submission, made by the learned counsel for the petitioners that Rules 3, 4 and 5 of the Disposal of Urban Land Rules, 1974 are not applicable, Shri Dhawan submitted that those rules have no relevance or applicability, because, the arrangements, contemplated in this case, are not a sale of land or a lease, which creates a proprietary right, but a licence and that the arrangements fall squarely within Section 54, for a developmental purpose. He further submitted that the decision to enter into a settlement, is preliminary to an exercise of power under Section 54, read with Section 90. Since a formal decision under Section 54 cannot be taken pendente lite, Shri Dhawan said, the same is the reason for filing the present applications. (100). Thus, we are unable to appreciate or accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the statutory authority has not taken a decision and the said contention, in our opinion, is without force. It is also not a case, where the acquired land is being given back to the same person, in lieu of or in addition to compensation, therefore, Shri Dhawan submitted that the decision in the case of Daulat Mal Jain (42), is not relevant. It is also very useful in this context to see the role of the State Government, in respect of the decisions under Sections 16(i), 16(s), 46 and 90 of the JDA Act. Thus, the State Government is both generally empowered and under a statutory empowerment and duty to explore the best possible use of the land. It is also very useful in this context to see the role of the State Government, in respect of the decisions under Sections 16(i), 16(s), 46 and 90 of the JDA Act. Thus, the State Government is both generally empowered and under a statutory empowerment and duty to explore the best possible use of the land. Any exploratory exercise or decision, including those, relating to negotiations pendente lite, does not attract Article 166(1). Therefore, Shri Dhawan submitted that the decisions in the cases of Bachittar Singh vs. State of Punjab (43), Doypack System Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India (44), in relation to the formalities of Article 166 (1) or Article 298, are not applicable to this case and are confined to the facts and circumstances of those cases only. We see merit in this submission. (101). So far as mala fides are concerned, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the Golf Club that the allegations of mala fides must be supported by specific pleadings and that the person against whom mala fides are alleged, must be impleaded as a party. Shri Dhawan submitted that mala fides are conspicuously absent in this case and the necessary parties have not been impleaded at all. Significantly, neither in the writ petitions, nor in the intervention application, any allegations of mala fides and bias whatsoever, have been levelled by the petitioners, or the intervention-applicants, against any of the respondents, who took the impugned decisions. (102). A perusal of the aforementioned writ petitions as also the intervention application would reveal that there is no articulation as regards infringement of any legal right of the writ petitioners or any injury to public interest. No factual foundation has come to be laid as regards legality and validity of the decisions taken by the High Powered Committee. At best, the writ petitions as also the intervener seek from this Court, a direction in favour of their ``alternative plan for the use of the Rambagh Complex. (103). It is settled legal proposition that while engaging in exercising of judicial review, Courts do not exercise appellate jurisdiction. In parameters of judicial review in evaluating the policy decision of the Government have been delineated by the Supreme Court, in a catena of judgments. (103). It is settled legal proposition that while engaging in exercising of judicial review, Courts do not exercise appellate jurisdiction. In parameters of judicial review in evaluating the policy decision of the Government have been delineated by the Supreme Court, in a catena of judgments. In Delhi Science Forum vs. Union of India (45), Honble the Supreme Court held as under:- ``What has been said in respect of the legislations is applicable even in respect of policies which have been adopted by Parliament. They cannot be tested in Court of law. The Courts cannot express their opinion as to whether at a particular juncture or under a particular situation prevailing in the country any such national policy should have been adopted or not. There may be views and views, opinions and opinions which may be shared and believed by citizens of the country including the representatives of the people in Parliament. But that has to be sorted out in Parliament which has to approve such policies. Privatization is a fundamental concept underlying the question about the power to make economic divisions. What should be the role of the State in the economic development of the nation? How the resources of the country shall be used? How the goals fixed shall be attained? What are to be the safeguards to prevent the abuse of the economic power? What is the mechanism of accountability to ensure that the decision regarding privatization is in public? All these questions have to be answered by the Vigilant Parliament. Courts have their limitations-because, these issues rest with the policy-makers for the nation. No direction can be given or is expected from the Courts unless while implementing such policies, there is violation or infringement of any of the constitutional or statutory provision. (104). In the State of Punjab vs. Ram Lubhaya Bagga (46), the Apex Court has observed as under:- ``When Government forms its policy it is based on a number of circumstances on fact, law including constraints based on its resources. It is also based on expert opinion. It would be dangerous if Court is asked to test the utility, beneficial effect of the policy or its appraisal based on facts set out in the affidavits. The Court would dissuade itself from entering into this realm which belongs to the executive. (105). It is also based on expert opinion. It would be dangerous if Court is asked to test the utility, beneficial effect of the policy or its appraisal based on facts set out in the affidavits. The Court would dissuade itself from entering into this realm which belongs to the executive. (105). Following reflections in the case of Bain Peanut Company vs. Finson (47), bear relevance:- ``We must remember that the machinery of the Government would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints. (106). In the case of Tata Cellular, Honble the Apex Court quoted with approval, the following reflections by Professor Wade, in administrative law:- ``The point to note is that a thing is not unreasonable in the legal sense merely because the court thinks that it is unwise. (107). The following reflections by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of A.P. Dalit Maha Sabha vs. Government of A.P. and others (48), bear relevance:- ``35. As it is well established that the allegations of mala fides are not to be only made, but it is envisaged that mala fides have to be averred with material particulars and required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. If on the drop of a hat, motives are attributed to the administration, the administration is likely to be not only gagged but the executive or the legislature would not be able to discharge its functions in a free, independent and congenial atmosphere. There cannot be a mechanical process that the public property can only be leased out or disposed of by public auction or inviting tenders. Each case would on the facts and circumstances of the case; requirement of the public at large, urgency involved and some other administrative factors. (108). The following observations of Lord Justice Lawton in Laker Airways (49), bear relevance:- ``In the United Kingdom aviation policy is determined by ministers within the legal framework set out by Parliament. Judges have nothing to do with either policy making or the carrying out of policy. Their function is to decide whether a minister has acted within the powers given to him by statute or the common law. Judges have nothing to do with either policy making or the carrying out of policy. Their function is to decide whether a minister has acted within the powers given to him by statute or the common law. If he is declared by a court, after due process of law, to have acted outside his powers, he must stop doing what he has done until such time as Parliament gives him the powers he wants. In a case such as this I regard myself as a referee. I can blow my judicial whistle when the ball goes out of play; but when the game restarts, I must neither take part in it nor tell the players now to play. (109). Our attention was drawn by Shri Jagdeep Dhankhar, to the principle of judicial review, enunciated in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. vs. Wednesbury Corporation, All England Law Reports (50). The following observations bear relevance:- ``....In the present case we have heard a great deal about the meaning of the word ``unreasonable. It is true the discretion must be exercised reasonably. What does that mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology commonly used in relation to the exercise of statutory discretions often use the word ``unreasonable in a rather comprehensive sense. Once, however, it is conceded, as it must be conceded, that the subject-matter of this condition was one which it was competent for the authority to consider, there, in my opinion, is an end of the case, because, once that is granted, counsel must go so far as to say that the decision of the authority is wrong because it is unreasonable, and then he is really saying that the ultimate arbiter of what is and is not reasonable is the court and not the local authority. It is just there, it seems to me, that the whole argument entirely breaks down. It is perfectly clear that the local authority are entrusted by Parliament with the decision on a matter in which the knowledge and experience of the authority can best be trusted to be value. The subject-matter with which the condition deals is one relevant for its consideration. It has considered it and come to a decision on it. It is perfectly clear that the local authority are entrusted by Parliament with the decision on a matter in which the knowledge and experience of the authority can best be trusted to be value. The subject-matter with which the condition deals is one relevant for its consideration. It has considered it and come to a decision on it. Theoretically it is true to say and in practical it may operate in some cases that, if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere. That, I think, is right, but that would require overwhelming proof, and in this case the facts do not come anywhere near such a thing. Counsel in the end agreed that his proposition that the decision of the local authority can be upset if it is proved to be unreasonable, really meant that it must be proved to be unreasonable in the sense, not that it is what the court considers unreasonable, but that it is what the court considers is a decision that no reasonable body could have come to, which is a different thing altogether. The court may very well have different views from those of a local authority on matters of high public policy of this kind. Some court might think that no children ought to be admitted on Sundays at all, some courts might think the reverse. All over the country, I have no doubt, on a thing of that sort honest and sincere people hold different views. The effect of the legislation is not to set up the court as an arbiter of the correctness of one view over another. It is the local authority who are put in that position and, provided they act, as they have acted here, within the four corners of their jurisdiction, the court, in my opinion, cannot interfere. He certainly does not suggest that the court is entitled to set up its view of the public interest against the view of the local authority. It is the local authority who are put in that position and, provided they act, as they have acted here, within the four corners of their jurisdiction, the court, in my opinion, cannot interfere. He certainly does not suggest that the court is entitled to set up its view of the public interest against the view of the local authority. Once the local authority have properly taken into consideration a matter of public interest such as, in the present case, the moral and physical health of children, it seems to me there is nothing in what ATKIN, J., says which suggests that a court could interfere with a decision because it took a different view of what was the public interest. It is obviously a subject on which different minds may have different views. I do not read him as doing any more than saying the local authority can and should take that matter into account in coming to their decision. In the result, in my opinion, the appeal must be dismissed. I do not wish to repeat what I have said, but it might be useful to summarise once again the principle, which seems too me to be that the court is entitled to investigate the action of the local with a view to seeing whether it has taken into account matters which it ought not to take into account, or, conversely, has refused to take into account or neglected to take into account matters which it ought to take into account. Once that question is answered in favour of the local authority, it may still be possible to say that the local authority, nevertheless, have come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it. In such a case, again, I think the court can interfere. The power of the court to interfere in each case is not that of an appellate authority to override a decision of the local authority, but is that of a judicial authority which is concerned, and concerned only, to see whether the local authority have contravened the law by acting in excess of the powers which Parliament has confided in it. The appeal must be dismissed with costs. (110). The appeal must be dismissed with costs. (110). In Council of Civil Service Unions and others vs. Minister for the Civil Service, All England Law Reports (51), Lord Diplock made the following reflections touching upon legal situations, relating to judicial control of administrative action:- ``My Lords, I see no reason why simply because a decision- making power is derived from a common law and not a statutory source it should for that reason only be immune from judicial review. Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call ``illegality, the second ``irrationality and the third ``procedural impropriety. That is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of ``proportionality which is recognized in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community; but to dispose of the instant case the three already well established heads that I have mentioned will suffice. By ``illegality as a ground for judicial review I mean that the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must given effect to it. Whether he has or not is par excellence a justiciable question to be decided, in the event of dispute, by those persons, the judges, by whom the judicial power of the state is exercisable. By ``irrationality I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as Wednesbury unreasonableness (see Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. vs. Wednesbury Corp (1947 (2) All ER 680 (1948) 1 KB 223). It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. Whether a decision falls within this category is a question that judges by their training and experience should be well equipped to answer, or else there would be something badly wrong with our judicial system. Whether a decision falls within this category is a question that judges by their training and experience should be well equipped to answer, or else there would be something badly wrong with our judicial system. To justify the courts exercise of this role, resort I think is today no longer needed to Viscound Radcliffes ingenious explanation in Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) vs. Bairstow (1955) (3) All ER 48 (1956) AC 14 of irrationality as a ground for a courts reversal of a decision by ascribing it to an inferred though unidentifiable mistake of law by the decision-maker. ``Irrationality by now can stand on its own feet as an accepted ground on which a decision may be attacked by judicial review. I have described the third head as ``procedural impropriety rather than failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision.. (111). Viewed in the light of enunciation of law by the courts in our country, it is apparent that the policy decisions taken by the Government, are in conformity with the parameters defined by the Apex Court. The impugned decisions, by no stretch of imagination, can be labelled as ``Wednesbury unreasonable. The impugned decisions, therefore, in our considered opinion, deserve to be sanctified. (112). The settlement having been arrived at in public interest and the State Government having realised that the decision to construct commercial complexes in the area was detrimental to public interest, and therefore, it would be better to use the land, as set out in the settlement, which is also a public purpose, it would not be proper for this Court, to sit over the decision, as a court of appeal and the State Government should be left free to decide and execute its plan, as envisaged by the settlement. The matter is not open for judicial review at the instance of people, who have no interest in the matter. (113). As already noticed, in the case of Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court held that once the Court is satisfied that the acquisition is for public purpose, no fault can be found with the proceedings on the ground that the land is already being used for some beneficial purpose. (113). As already noticed, in the case of Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court held that once the Court is satisfied that the acquisition is for public purpose, no fault can be found with the proceedings on the ground that the land is already being used for some beneficial purpose. Hence, in our opinion, it cannot be said that in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court, the State Government cannot now permit the land to be utilised as a polo-ground or as a golf-course. (114). Rajasthan Polo Club and Rambagh Golf Club have acquired for itself, international fame and recognition, in relation to polo game and golf game. Few such clubs in the world can rival its reputation and standing. The present polo-ground has come in for appreciation by high dignitaries like General K.S. Thimayya; the first President of the Union, Late Dr. Rajendra Prasad; Prince Phillips of Buckingham Palace of U.K. and prominent polo players. It is known to everybody that important and prestigious polo events of international and national level have been regularly taking place at the present polo ground under the aegis of the Rajasthan Polo Club. There can be no doubt or dispute that the games of polo and golf have immensely contributed towards making Jaipur an important tourist attraction, and the role of the Rajasthan Polo Club and Rambagh Golf Course cannot be over- emphasized. The role of both the clubs in serving public interest and making significant contribution to the cause of tourism in Rajasthan, has come to be acclaimed on numerous occasions. (115). In our opinion, the decision, now taken by the Government, is just and fair, in the interest of both the clubs, which are in continuous possession and enjoyment of the lands in question, for the last so many decades. For the foregoing reasons, we hold: (a) The decision to enter into a settlement, in wednesbury reasonable. (b) No mala fide, in fact, is alleged or proved. (c) The arrangement does not create any title or proprietary rights in the clubs in question, which shall be under the close and pervasive control of the Authority. (d) The arrangement is consistent with and fulfils the Master Plan. (e) The scope of judicial review is limited. (b) No mala fide, in fact, is alleged or proved. (c) The arrangement does not create any title or proprietary rights in the clubs in question, which shall be under the close and pervasive control of the Authority. (d) The arrangement is consistent with and fulfils the Master Plan. (e) The scope of judicial review is limited. The decision is wednesbury reasonable and suffers from no procedural impropriety or illegality; this Court will not substitute its view for that of the Authority and play a secondary role; and there is no legal infirmity in the decision to settle and achieve the developmental purposes of recreation and sports, through golf and polo clubs. (f) The settlement, arrived at by the State Government Rambagh Golf Club and Rajasthan Polo Club, is valid. (g) The State is directed to implement and execute the settlement. (h) Both the Writ Petitions Nos. 4114/2000 and 4692/2000, filed by petitioners Jitendra Shrimali & another and Ved Prakash Bishnoi respectively, are dismissed. No costs. The writ petitions Nos. 6826/94; 6855/94 and 1162/95, filed by Shri K.K. Sharma, M/s. Rambagh Golf Club and Dr. S.C. Kabra and another, are permitted to be withdrawn as the agreement arrived at between the State Government, Ram Bagh Golf Club and Rajasthan Polo Club is in accordance with law. By virtue of our holding that the settlement is valid and our permitting the petitioners to withdraw the writ petitions, the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge dated, 24.5.96, shall not remain in force from today. (116). Before concluding, we wish to point out that the above batch of cases were pending before us for nearly few months. We are happy that we are able to pronounce the judgment today. We heard very learned arguments from the respective counsel. Even though, the cases were adjourned for a number of time because of the inconvenience of the lawyers and Court, we are thankful to all the learned counsel, appearing for the respective parties, in this case, since ultimately, they rendered all assistance to the Court, with their clear expositions of law. We place on record, our appreciation for the services rendered by all.