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2001 DIGILAW 1555 (AP)

APPLE CREDIT CORPORATION LIMITED, SECUNDERABAD v. State Of A. P.

2001-11-28

T.CH.SURYA RAO

body2001
T. SURYA RAO, J. ( 1 ) SINCE the petitioner is same in both these Revision Cases, they can be disposed of together by this common judgment. ( 2 ) CRL. RC (SR) No. 17775 of 2001 is filed assailing the order passed by the learned metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad dated 30-3-2001 in Crl. MP No. 52 and 56 of 2001. ( 3 ) CRL. RC No. 1300 of 2001 is filed assailing the order dated 10-9-2001 passed by the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge in Crl. MP No. 651 of 2001. ( 4 ) IN Crl. M. P. No. 56 of 2001 the petitioner sought interim custody of two maruthi Cars bearing Nos. AP-10k-6303 and ap-10k 6319 on the premises that both the cards have been under Hire Purchase agreement with the petitioner, who is the financier, and therefore under law and in terms of the Hire Purchase Agreement entered into between the petitioner and the 2nd respondent herein inter se, he is the owner of the said vehicles and therefore, the vehicles should be given interim custody of to him pending adjudication of the case against the 2nd respondent. ( 5 ) IN Crl. M. P. No. 651 of 2001 the petitioner sought permission to sell the cars and to deposit the sale proceeds into the Court to the credit of the case, which would be eventually for the benefit of the successful party. ( 6 ) UNDER the common impugned order passed by the learned Metropolitan sessions Judge, Hyderabad both the Maruthi cars were ordered to be given to the interim custody of the petitioner on condition of his executing a bond for Rs. 1,00,000/- with two solvent sureties for like sum each and on further condition that the petitioner shall not transfer the vehicles in favour of anybody and he shall not part with the possession of the same until further orders. The petitioner is assailing that part of the order which created an embargo for transfer of the vehicles. ( 7 ) IN Crl. MP No. 651 of 2001 permission for selling the vehicles sought for by the petitioner was refused on the ground that the provision and rule under which the application came to be filed have no application, and in the absence of. any other provision, the petition could not be allowed. ( 7 ) IN Crl. MP No. 651 of 2001 permission for selling the vehicles sought for by the petitioner was refused on the ground that the provision and rule under which the application came to be filed have no application, and in the absence of. any other provision, the petition could not be allowed. ( 8 ) OBVIOUSLY the petitioner is the Financier and the 2nd respondent herein obtained loans under two Hire Purchase agreements from the petitioner company. There is no gain saying that the 2nd respondent committed default in paying the instalments due and therefore, under the terms of Hire Purchase Agreement the petitioner is entitled to seize the vehicles and even sell the vehicles for realisation of the loan amounts due. ( 9 ) NOW in that capacity when the petitioner sought for interim custody of the vehicles, the learned Metropolitan Sessions judge granted the same. It is thus obvious that the petitioner being the Financier is entitled to interim custody of the vehicles and the interim custody of the vehicles has been given to him under the impugned orders. ( 10 ) IT is appropriate at this stage to consider Section 2, clause 30 of the Motor vehicles Act, 1988, which reads as under: "owner" means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase, agreement, or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement". ( 11 ) A perusal of the above section shows that the Financier with whom the vehicle is held under Hire Purchase agreement is the owner for all practical purposes. Under Section 51 of the said Act, an obligation is created for entering the name of the Financier in the Registration certificate of the vehicle. Thus the legal provisions amply show that the Financier is the owner of the vehicle, so long as the finance amount has not been cleared. The learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge refused permission to sell the vehicle on the ground that Section 459 Cr. PC has no application. For brevity and for better understanding of the matter, Section 459 Cr. Thus the legal provisions amply show that the Financier is the owner of the vehicle, so long as the finance amount has not been cleared. The learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge refused permission to sell the vehicle on the ground that Section 459 Cr. PC has no application. For brevity and for better understanding of the matter, Section 459 Cr. PC may be extracted herein, thus:"power to sell perishable property :if the person entitled to the possession of such property is unknown or absent and the property is subject to speedy and natural decay, or if the Magistrate to whom its seizure is reported is of opinion that its sale would be for the benefit of the owner, or that the value of such property is less than ten rupees, the Magistrate may at any time direct it to be sold, and the provisions of sections 457 and 458 shall, as nearly as may be practicable, apply to the net proceeds of such sale. " ( 12 ) A perusal of the said provision shows that the properties seized by the police may be sold, not only when it is in the nature of a perishable one, but also in the opinion of the Court that the sale would be for the benefit of the owner. The learned metropolitan Sessions Judge has not considered the second part of the section. In view of the embargo created under the common impugned order by the learned judge, that the petitioner shall not transfer and shall not part with possession of the vehicles in any manner, no purpose would be served by keeping the vehicles with him idle. What all the petitioner wants is repayment of the loans and he is not interested in the vehicles. In that view of the matter, and also in terms of the conditions stipulated in the hire purchase agreements, the petitioner is entitled under law to get the vehicles sold for realisation of the loan amounts due. Therefore, the petitioner can legitimately seek sale of the vehicles. Here in this case, the petitioner specifically seeks permission to sell the vehicles and to deposit the sale proceeds into the Court and the same shall have to be appreciated by the Court. Therefore, the petitioner can legitimately seek sale of the vehicles. Here in this case, the petitioner specifically seeks permission to sell the vehicles and to deposit the sale proceeds into the Court and the same shall have to be appreciated by the Court. Having regard to the legal position as discussed supra, the petitioner becomes owner of the vehicles having been in possession of the same, as given by the Court and pursuant to the terms of the Hire Purchase Agreements, can legitimately ask for the sale of the vehicles. ( 13 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent while opposite the request of the petitioner for sale of the vehicles seeks to place reliance upon a judgment of the Apex Court in Ganga Hire Purchase private Limited v. State of Punjab and others, 2000 (1) ALD (Crl.) 320. That was a case under the NDPS Act. The Apex Court held that, a Financier under a Hire Purchase agreement cannot claim to be its owner and cannot therefore, contend that unless it is established that the vehicle was misused with his consent or connivance, it is not liable to be confiscated. According to the facts in that case, when the vehicle was found containing Narcotic drugs in transit, it was seized by the authorities under the act. The vehicle was confiscated under section 60 of the Act and opposing the attempt to confiscate the said vehicle, the petitioner therein sought return of the property on the premise that he was the owner. Repelling that contention, in view of the peculiar facts of the case, the Apex court observed that he was not the owner and he cannot stall the confiscation of the property. ( 14 ) AS against the said view of the Apex Court, the learned Counsel for the petitioner herein seeks to place reliance upon another judgment of the Apex Court in charanjit Singh Chahda and others v. Sudhir Mehra, 2001 (7) Supreme 239 . That was a case wherein loan was obtained pursuant to the terms of Hire Purchase agreement and when there was default on the part of the hirer, the vehicle was sought to be seized by the Financier. A complaint under Sections 406 and 420 IPC was lodged against the Financier. That was a case wherein loan was obtained pursuant to the terms of Hire Purchase agreement and when there was default on the part of the hirer, the vehicle was sought to be seized by the Financier. A complaint under Sections 406 and 420 IPC was lodged against the Financier. The Apex Court while reviewing the law under the Hire purchase system held that the financier being the owner cannot be held to have committed misappropriation or cheating. ( 15 ) AS can be seen from the judgments of the Apex Court supra, there appears to be some divergent views, one holding that the Financier cannot be the owner and the other holding that pursuant to the terms of the Hire Purchase Agreement, he becomes the owner. In view of the definition of owner as given under Section 2, clause 30 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 read with section 51 of the said Act, the law laid down by the Apex Court in the later case shall have to be preferred. According to the law of precedents, when there is a conflicting opinion between two judgments rendered by two co-equal Benches, the one which lays down the law correctly shall have to be preferred over the other. I see every force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Financier is the owner of the vehicle so long as the loan is not cleared and he can exercise his rights conferred under the terms stipulated under the Hire Purchase Agreement inter alia. ( 16 ) HERE in this case, a case has been registered against the 2nd respondent under sections 3 and 5 of the A. P. Protection of depositors of Financial Establishment act, 1999, which is a State Enactment. There has been no provision envisaged under the Act for confiscation of the properties. The Act inter alia provides for attachment of the properties of the Financial establishments when there is infraction of any of the provisions of the said Act. In this case, the applicability of the said Act is quite doubtful, in view of the fact that the petitioner herein is the company having been duly incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act. In this case, the applicability of the said Act is quite doubtful, in view of the fact that the petitioner herein is the company having been duly incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act. That apart, the petitioner is not seeking permission to sell away the vehicles once for all and to appropriate the sale proceeds towards realisation of the loans due to him. On the other hand, he seeks permission for sale of the vehicles and to deposit the sale proceeds into the Court till the disposal of the case, which would eventually for the benefit of the successful party. I, therefore, see no embargo whatsoever either under the A. P. Protection of Depositors of Financial establishments Act, 1999 or under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or under the terms of the Hire Purchase agreement. The request of the petitioner therefore, appears to be genuine and can be considered. ( 17 ) IN the result, both the revision cases are allowed and the impugned order passed by the learned Metropolitan Sessions judge in Crl. MP No. 651 of 2001 is hereby set aside and consequently Crl. M. P No. 651 of 2001 stands allowed in modification of the order passed by the learned Metropolitan sessions Judge in the other petition Crl. M. P. No. 56 of 2001. It is for the Court to pass appropriate orders as regards the second request of the petitioner.