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2001 DIGILAW 156 (AP)

Ponnapu Reddy Rama Subba Reddy v. State Of A. P.

2001-02-13

T.CH.SURYA RAO

body2001
T. SURYA RAO, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner in Crl. RC no. 1230 of 2000, who is A7 in Session case No. 473 of 1993 on the file of the additional Sessions Judge, Mahabubnagar, assails the Order dated 2-11-2000 passed in crl. MP No. 1453 of 2000 by the learned additional Sessions Judge, Mahabubnagar, in refusing to give consent to withdraw the case by the Additional Public Prosecutor, mahabubnagar. The State through its Public prosecutor filed the other Revision Case in crl. RC No. 1280 of 2000 assailing the same order. ( 2 ) SINCE both the revision cases arise out of one and the same order, both the revision cases can be disposed of together. ( 3 ) THE State through the Inspector of police, CID, Mahabubnagar, filed the charge- sheet against 11 accused alleging various offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 302 read with 149 and 120-B of the indian Penal Code ( the IPC for brevity ). Eventually, the said case was made over to the Additional Sessions Judge, mahabubnagar, for trial in accordance with law. During the pendency of the said case, a4, A9 and All died. A7 approached the government for the withdrawal of the case. The State Government in G. O. Rt. No. 1442, home (SC-B) Department, dated 21-6-1996 decided to withdraw the case. Pursuant to the said GO the District Collector, mahabubnagar, by his proceedings No. D2/ 1124/96 dated 18-7-1996 directed the public Prosecutor for necessary action. Accordingly, the Additional Public prosecutor filed Crl. MP No. 786 of 1996 under Section 321 of the Criminal Procedure code ( the Code for brevity) seeking the consent of the Court for withdrawal. The consent having been given by the Court, the case against A7 was withdrawn and accordingly A7 was ordered to be acquitted on 25-7-1996. ( 4 ) HAVING been aggrieved by the said order, the affected party namely Duvagudi subba Rao filed a writ petition before this court in WP No. 15765 of 1996. This Court by its Order dated 22-9-2000 allowed the writ petition and set aside the Order of the additional Sessions Judge, Mahabubnagar in Crlmp No. 786 of 1996 dated 25-7-1996 on the premise that the application made by the Public Prosecutor was not in accordance with Section 321 of the Code as interpreted by the Apex Court. Since G. O. Rt. Since G. O. Rt. No. 1442 dated 21-6-1996 was not set aside, it was observed that it was open to the Public Prosecutor to take necessary steps to file another application in accordance with law if so advised. The Public prosecutor, therefore, filed Crl. MP No. 1453 of 2000 under Section 321 of the Code seeking to withdraw the case against A7 mentioning reasons, inter alia, for such withdrawal. The reasons mentioned, inter alia, in the said petition are that no names of the accused were given initially in the first Information Report and that the case was registered against 15 unknown persons said to be the followers of one S. Venkat ram Reddy and R. Siva Reddy and that in the inquest report initially the names of one gundlakunta Rama Krishna Reddy was mentioned in column No. 9 and the same was subsequently corrected as Subba Reddy by removing the words krishna but the name of A7 is Punnapu Reddy Rama Subba reddy and that in column No. 15 again the name has been mentioned as Annapu Rama subba Reddy and that the statements of the eye-witnesses were recorded during the course of investigation at a belated stage on 11-12-1990 whereas the names of the accused appeared in inquest report dated 6-12-1990 and that no identification parade was conducted to identify A7 as there are 12 persons having the same name as rama Subba Reddy as per the voters list of Jammalamadugu Constituency, particularly when the father s name of A7 was not mentioned and that A7 who was MLA, was at MLA Quarters at Hyderabad on the date of occurrence and his plea of alibi was not considered. ( 5 ) AFTER having heard on either side, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, as aforesaid, under the impugned Order dismissed the said petition. While dismissing the petition, it was observed by the learned Judge that he was not persuaded to hold that the Additional Prosecutor had correctly applied his mind as a free agent and, therefore, he saw no merits in the petition. ( 6 ) HAVING been aggrieved by the said order, as aforesaid, A7 filed Crl. RC no. 1230 of 2000 and the State through its Public Prosecutor filed Crl. RC No. 1280 of 2000. ( 7 ) THE said Duvagudi Subba Rao, who filed writ petition before this Court earlier, sought to implead himself in crl. ( 6 ) HAVING been aggrieved by the said order, as aforesaid, A7 filed Crl. RC no. 1230 of 2000 and the State through its Public Prosecutor filed Crl. RC No. 1280 of 2000. ( 7 ) THE said Duvagudi Subba Rao, who filed writ petition before this Court earlier, sought to implead himself in crl. RCNo. 1230 of 2000 by filing Crl. MP no. 6708 of 2000 and that petition having been ordered, he came on record as respondent No. 2. ( 8 ) SRI C. Padmanabha Reddy, learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner a7, contends that the learned Public prosecutor has given good reasons in his application for withdrawal of the case, after having applied his mind to the facts of the case and, therefore, it is not germane for the Court to consider the reasons other than those have been given by the Public Prosecutor inasmuch as it is the opinion of the Public Prosecutor, that is material. The learned senior Counsel further contends that the learned Public prosecutor has come to a clear conclusion that the petitioner A7 was falsely implicated by altering his name in the inquest report. ( 9 ) SRI E. Ayyapu Reddy, learned senior Counsel appearing for the second respondent, contends that the petition for withdrawal was made not in good faith in the interest of public policy and justice, but, to thwart or stifle the process of law and that it is not even averred in the petition that the Public Prosecutor in good faith satisfied on consideration of the relevant material that the withdrawal from the prosecution is in public interest and it will not stifle or thwart the process of law or cause injustice. ( 10 ) HAVING regard to the contentions raised on either side, the point that arises for my determination is whether the executive function of the Public Prosecutor in applying for, and the supervisory function of the Court in granting consent to the withdrawal have been properly performed or not? ( 11 ) THE provision of law germane in the context for consideration is Section 321 of the Code. Section 321 of the Code reads thus:"321. ( 11 ) THE provision of law germane in the context for consideration is Section 321 of the Code. Section 321 of the Code reads thus:"321. Withdrawal from prosecution : the Public Prosecutor or Assistant public Prosecutor incharge of a case may, with the consent of the Court, at any time before the judgment is pronounced, withdraw from the prosecution or any person either generally or in respect of any one or more of the offences for which he is tried, and upon such withdrawal, (a) if it is made before a charge has been framed, the accused shall be discharged in respect of such offence or offences; (b) if it is made after a charge has been framed, or when under this Code no charge is required, he shall be acquitted in respect of such offence or offences : provided that where such offence (i) was against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends, or (ii) was investigated by the Delhi special Police Establishment under the delhi Special Police Establishment act, 1946 (25 of 1946), or (iii) involved the misappropriation or destruction of, or damage to, any property belonging to the Central government, or (iv) was committed by a person in the service of the Central Government while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, and the Prosecutor incharge of the case has not been appointed by the central Government, he shall not, unless he has been permitted by the Central government to do so, move the Court for its consent, to withdraw from the prosecution and the Court shall, before according consent, direct the prosecutor to produce before it the permission granted by the Central Government to withdraw from the prosecution. " ( 12 ) A mere glance at the said section gives no indication as to the grounds on which the Public Prosecutor incharge of the case make an application or the considerations on which the Court has to grant its consent. " ( 12 ) A mere glance at the said section gives no indication as to the grounds on which the Public Prosecutor incharge of the case make an application or the considerations on which the Court has to grant its consent. On the other hand, a perusal of the said section shows three requisites to be complied with, namely, (i) an application should be filed by the Public prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor, as the case may be, (ii) the Public Prosecutor must be incharge of the case, and (iii) the court should give its consent for the withdrawal at any time before the judgment is pronounced. It is not automatic affair when once the three requirements discernible from the said section are complied with to give the consent by the Court. Section 321 of the Code and its predecessor Section 494 of the Old Code, which is almost in pari materia with Section 321 of the New Code, have been the subject-matter of discussion many a time by the Apex Court. The first case of the Apex Court, which has considered section 494 of the Old Code, is State of bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey, AIR 1957 SC 389 = 1957 SCR 279 . In this land mark judgment, the Apex Court has outlined the functions of the Court and the Public prosecutor. It has been held that the Public prosecutor has to exercise his discretion necessarily with reference to such material as is by then available and it is not a prima facie judicial determination of any specific issue. The Apex Court further held that the functions of the Court in such matters are not only supplementary, at a higher level, to those of the executive but are intended to prevent abuse. It is not the responsibility of the Court for a prima facie determination of the triable issue. However, the Apex Court struck a note of caution that, that does not mean that the consent is to be lightly given on the application of the public Prosecutor without a careful and proper scrutiny of the grounds on which the application for consent has been made. However, the Apex Court struck a note of caution that, that does not mean that the consent is to be lightly given on the application of the public Prosecutor without a careful and proper scrutiny of the grounds on which the application for consent has been made. What the Court is expected to satisfy itself is that the executive opinion of the Public prosecutor has not been improperly exercised and that it is not an attempt to interfere with a normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes. ( 13 ) THE next judgment of the Apex court, which is to be considered, is that of rajendra Kumar Jain v. State, AIR 1980 sc 1510 . The Apex Court in the said judgment has laid down eight principles, which may profitably be extracted here under thus:1. Under the scheme of the Code prosecution of an offender for a serious offence is primarily the responsibility of the Executive. 2. The withdrawal from the prosecution is an executive function of the Public prosecutor. 3. The discretion to withdraw from the prosecution is that of the Public prosecutor and none else, and so, he cannot surrender that discretion to someone else. 4. The Government may suggest to the public Prosecutor that he may withdraw from the prosecution but none can compel him to do so. 5. The Public Prosecutor may withdraw from the prosecution not merely on ground of paucity of evidence but on other relevant grounds as well in order to further the broad ends of public justice, public order and peace. The broad ends of public justice will certainly include appropriate social, economic and, political purposes sans tammany Hall enterprise. 6. The Public Prosecutor is an officer of the Court and responsible to the court. 7. The Court performs a supervisory function in granting its consent to the withdrawal. 8. The Court s duty is not to reappreciate the grounds which led the Public prosecutor to request withdrawal from the prosecution but to consider whether the Public Prosecutor applied his mind as a free agent, uninfluenced by irrelevant and extraneous considerations. The Court has a special duty in this regard as it is the ultimate repository of legislative confidence in granting or withholding its consent to withdrawal from the prosecution. The Court has a special duty in this regard as it is the ultimate repository of legislative confidence in granting or withholding its consent to withdrawal from the prosecution. We may add it shall be the duty of the public Prosecutor to inform the Court and it shall be the duty of the Court to apprise itself of the reasons, which prompt the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution. The Court has a responsibility and a stake in the administration of criminal justice and so has the Public Prosecutor, its minister of Justice . Both have a duty to protect the administration of criminal justice against possible abuse or misuse by the executive by resorting to the provisions of Section 321, Criminal Procedure Code. The independence of the judiciary requires that once the case has travelled to the Court, the Court and its officers alone must have control over the case and decide what is to be done in each case. " ( 14 ) THESE two judgments have been quoted with an approval by the Apex Court in Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar air 1987 SC 877 = (1983) 2 SCR 61 . The majority view of the Constitution Bench in that case has been rendered by His Lordship justice Khalid. Concurring with the said view, His Lordship Justice Venkataramiah in Para 45 at the end held that the judgment of a Public Prosecutor under Section 321 of the Code cannot be lightly be interfered with unless the Court comes to the conclusion that he has not applied his mind or that his decision is not bona fide. Rendering the majority view, His Lordship justice Khalid in para 67 held as follows:"when an application under Section 321, cr. PC is made, it is not necessary for the Court to assess the evidence to discover whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. . . . . . . . . . . . All that the Court has to see is whether the application is made in good faith, in the interest of public policy and justice and not to thwart or stifle the process of law. . . . . . . . . . . . All that the Court has to see is whether the application is made in good faith, in the interest of public policy and justice and not to thwart or stifle the process of law. "in para 70 of its judgment, the Apex Court held further as follows:"the initiative is that of the Public prosecutor and what the Court has to do is only to give its consent and not to determine any matter judicially. The judicial function implicit in the exercise of the judicial discretion for granting the consent would normally mean that the Court has to satisfy itself that the executive function of the Public prosecutor has not been improperly exercised, or that it is not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes. "again in para 71 of its judgment the Apex court observed as follows:"when the Public Prosecutor makes the application for withdrawal after taking into consideration all the materials before him, the Court exercises its judicial discretion by considering such materials and on such consideration, either gives consent or declines consent. The section should not be construed to mean that the Court has to give a detailed reasoned order when it gives consent. If on a reading of the order giving consent, a higher Court is satisfied that such consent was given on an overall consideration of the materials available, the order giving consent is necessarily to be upheld. "at the end of para 76 of its judgment, after having made survey of its earlier judgments, the Apex Court held thus:"when the Magistrate states in his order that he has considered the materials, it is not proper for this Court not to accept that statement. The proper thing to do is to hold that the Magistrate gave consent on objective consideration of the relevant aspects of the case. It would be acting against the mandate of Section 321 to find fault with the Magistrate in such cases, unless the order discloses that the Magistrate has failed to consider whether the application is made in good faith, in the interest of public policy and justice and not to thwart or stifle the process of law". It would be acting against the mandate of Section 321 to find fault with the Magistrate in such cases, unless the order discloses that the Magistrate has failed to consider whether the application is made in good faith, in the interest of public policy and justice and not to thwart or stifle the process of law". ( 15 ) THE learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners seeks to place reliance upon a judgment of the Apex Court in V. S. Achutanandan v. R. Balakrishna filial, AIR 1995 SC 436 . The Apex Court held that where an application for withdrawal of prosecution was filed by the Public prosecutor under Section 321 of the Code, the Court should not consider grounds which were not urged by the Public prosecutor or which did not form part of the record because for the purpose of section 321 it is the opinion of the Public prosecutor alone is material and the ground on which he seeks permission of the Court for withdrawal of the prosecution has alone to be examined by the Court while granting permission for withdrawal of the prosecution. ( 16 ) IN R. M. Tewari Advocate v. State (NCT of Delhi) and others, 1996 (2) supreme 366 = 1996 SCC (Crl.) 361, the apex Court quoted its earlier judgment sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar, air 1983 SC 194 and relevant observations made therein in para 11 have been extracted as follows:"from the aforesaid enunciation of the legal position governing the proper exercise of the power contained in section 321, three or four things become amply clear. In the first place, though it is an executive function of the Public prosecutor for which statutory discretion is vested in him, the discretion is neither absolute nor unreviewable but it is subject to the Court s supervisory function. In the first place, though it is an executive function of the Public prosecutor for which statutory discretion is vested in him, the discretion is neither absolute nor unreviewable but it is subject to the Court s supervisory function. In fact being an executive function it would be subject to a judicial review on certain limited grounds like any other executive action, the authority with whom the discretion is vested "must genuinely address itself to the matter before it, must not act under the dictates of another body must not do what it has been forbidden to do, must act in good faith must have regard to all relevant considerations and must not be swayed by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act and not must act arbitrarily or capriciously. . . . . These several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories : failure to exercise a discretion, and excess or abuse of discretionary poser. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive", (Vide, De Smith s Judicial review of Administrative Act 4th Edition pp. 285-86)". "fourthly, the decision in R. K. Jain s case (supra) clearly shows that when paucity of evidence or lack of prospect of successful prosecution is the ground for withdrawal the Court has not merely the power but a duty to examine the material on record without which the validity and propriety of such ground cannot be determined. . . . . ". (in Para 14) ultimately in the said judgment since the public Prosecutor did not fully appreciate the requirements of Section 321 of the Code and made the applications for withdrawal only on the basis of recommendations of the review committee as it was necessary for the Public Prosecutor to satisfy himself in each case, that the case was fit for withdrawal from prosecution in accordance with the settled principles, the Public prosecutor was directed to apply withdrawal from prosecution afresh. ( 17 ) VERY recently, the Apex Court in what is known as famous Veerappan s case i. e. , in Abdul Karim etc. etc. v. State of karnataka and others etc. etc. ( 17 ) VERY recently, the Apex Court in what is known as famous Veerappan s case i. e. , in Abdul Karim etc. etc. v. State of karnataka and others etc. etc. , JT 2000 (Suppl) 2 SC 363, held relying upon its earlier judgment in Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (supra) that what the court has to see is whether the application is made in good faith in the interest of public policy and justice and not to thwart or stifle the process of law and that the court after considering the facts of the case has to see whether the application suffers from such improprieties or illegalities as would cause manifest injustice if consent was given and that when the Public prosecutor makes an application for withdrawal after taking into consideration of the material before him the Court must exercise its judicial discretion by considering such material and on such consideration must either give consent or decline. In para 20 of its judgment, the Apex Court held as follows:"it must follow that the application under section 321 must aver that the Public prosecutor is, in good faith, satisfied, on consideration of all relevant materials, that his withdrawal from the prosecution is in the public interest and it will not stifle or thwart the process of law or cause injustice. The material that the public Prosecutor considered must be set out, briefly but concisely, in the application or in an affidavit annexed to the application or, in a given case placed before the Court, with its permission, in a sealed envelope. The Court has to give an informed consent. It must be satisfied that this material can reasonably lead to the conclusion that the withdrawal of the Public Prosecutor from the prosecution will serve the public interest, but it is not for the Court to weigh the material. The Court must be satisfied that the Public Prosecutor has considered the material and, in good faith, reached the conclusion that his withdrawal from the prosecution will serve the public interest". Again in para 43 of its judgment, the Apex court observed as follows:"true, the power of the Court under section 321 is supervisory but that does not mean that while exercising that power, the consent has to be granted on mere asking. Again in para 43 of its judgment, the Apex court observed as follows:"true, the power of the Court under section 321 is supervisory but that does not mean that while exercising that power, the consent has to be granted on mere asking. The Court has to examine that all relevant aspects have been taken into consideration by the public Prosecutor and/or by the Government in exercise of its executive function. " ( 18 ) FROM a conspectus of the judgments of the Apex Court referred to hereinabove, the following requisites are adducible germane to be borne in mind by the executive and supervisory functionaries and the conditions which are relevant to be considered by the Court in an application for withdrawal : the points to be borne in mind by the public Prosecutor are : (1) Although the initiative emanates from the State, the Public Prosecutor who is incharge of the case shall act independently and shall not surrender his discretion to someone else. (2) The Public Prosecutor should apply his mind to the relevant materials made available to him and should satisfy himself that the facts would warrant the exercise of his discretion. (3) The Public Prosecutor should act fairly uninfluenced by any irrelevant and extraneous considerations, and in good faith in the interest of public policy and justice but not to thwart or stifle the process of law. (4) The Public Prosecutor must aver in his application that he is in good faith satisfied on consideration of all relevant material that his withdrawal from the prosecution is in the public interest and it will not stifle or thwart the process of law or cause injustice, and state briefly in the application or in an affidavit annexed to that application that the material has been considered for withdrawal. When such an application is filed, the following are the considerations for the court: (l) The opinion of the Court is no doubt supervisory but it should satisfy that the material perused by the Public prosecutor should reasonably lead to the conclusion that the withdrawal of the Public Prosecutor will serve the public interest. (2) In the process, the Court is not re- appreciating the grounds, which led the Public Prosecutor to file an application for withdrawal. (2) In the process, the Court is not re- appreciating the grounds, which led the Public Prosecutor to file an application for withdrawal. (3) Both the Court as well as the Public prosecutor are duty bound to protect the administration of criminal justice against the possible abuse or misuse of law by the executive by resorting to the provisions of Section 321 of the Code. (4) The Court cannot lightly interfere with the judgment of the Public prosecutor unless it comes to the conclusion that he has not applied his mind as a free agent uninfluenced by irrelevant and extraneous considerations or that his decision is not bona fide. (5) It is not for the Court to assess the evidence to discover whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. All that the Court has to see is whether the application is made in good faith in the interest of public policy and justice and not to thwart or stifle the process of law. (6) The Court has to satisfy itself that the executive function of the Public prosecutor has not been improperly exercised or that it is not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes. (7) The consent shall not be given lightly on the mere application of the Public Prosecutor without careful and proper scrutiny of the grounds on which the application for consent is made. The following are the indicia germane for consideration in an application for withdrawal for the Court to decide the same: (1) Meagre evidence or paucity of evidence in the case is one of the legitimate grounds for consideration. (2) The other grounds, which would further the broad ends of public justice are public order and peace. The broad ends of public justice will certainly include appropriate social, economic and political purposes sans Tammany hall enterprise. (3) Political purposes and political vendetta also afford a ground for withdrawal. (4) Public interest and public policy afford yet another ground for withdrawal. ( 19 ) BEARING the principles enunciated by the Apex Court in the judgments referred to supra in mind, let us proceed to consider the instant case to see whether the Additional Public Prosecutor has acted in good faith as a free agent in the public interest and justice and the grounds mentioned by him in the petition warrant such interference. He has mentioned six reasons in his petition. The quintessence of the same is that the names of the accused including A7 against whom the case is now sought to be withdrawn have not been mentioned in the First Information Report and even in the inquest report the name of one Gundlakunta Rama Krishna Reddy was sought to be corrected to show that it is rama Subba Reddy, and that the eye witnesses who sought to implicate A7 had been examined six days after the alleged incident, and that the investigating agency failed to conduct any identification parade to identify A7 inasmuch as there are several persons having the same name but with a different fathers names and failed to consider the plea of alibi taken by A7. Presumably, it is the view of the Public prosecutor that these points would tilt in favour of A7. After enumerating the six points it has been averred in the petition by the Additional Public Prosecutor as follows:"the Government of Andhra Pradesh also considered about the antecedents of the accused No. 7 being a representative of one of the Constituency and engineering graduate and alibi taken by the accused and in the public interest decided to withdraw case against A7. "although it has been averred in his petition that he applied his mind and felt it was a fit case to withdraw from the file of the additional Sessions Judge, Mahabubnagar, against A7, conspicuously the Additional public Prosecutor has not recorded his satisfaction upon such perusal of the material on record and the other material made available to him by the Government that the withdrawal is in the public interest and justice but not to thwart or stifle the usual process of law. ( 20 ) IT is obvious, therefore, that the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has been swayed away by the decision of the state Government that it is in the public interest to withdraw the case against A7 and he has not reached independently the said conclusion before proceeding to file the petition for withdrawal. From the averments made in the petition, it is difficult to discern the necessary conclusion of the learned additional Public Prosecutor that the withdrawal of the case is in the interest of public policy and justice, and that it is not to thwart or stifle the process of law. From the averments made in the petition, it is difficult to discern the necessary conclusion of the learned additional Public Prosecutor that the withdrawal of the case is in the interest of public policy and justice, and that it is not to thwart or stifle the process of law. Therefore, it is also difficult to conclude that the application has been made by the Additional Public Prosecutor in good faith and in public interest and he has acted independently, but not on the instructions of the State Government. Although these aspects have not, in detail, been considered by the Court below, which are germane for consideration in a matter of this sort, inasmuch as they are apparent and surfacing themselves up from the record, they can be considered in these revision cases. ( 21 ) TURNING to the other consideration upon which much emphasis is laid by the learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner A7 that the name of A7 has not been mentioned in the inquest report and on the other hand an attempt has been made by making unwarranted corrections to include the name of A7, I am afraid, I cannot accede the said contention for the reason that it involves appreciation of evidence. Furthermore, the contents in column No. 9 of the inquest report, per se are not admissible. It requires that the attention of the concerned is to be drawn to the said corrections and the contents in column No. 9 by confronting the witness with the said document and inviting his explanation for the same, eventually to appreciate the said contention. Such an exercise cannot be undertaken in these revision cases. Above all, whether the case would end in conviction or would ultimately end in acquittal, is not germane for consideration at this stage. ( 22 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, I am of the considered view that the exercise of the discretion by the Additional Public prosecutor is not in good faith and not proper. Therefore, the application made by the Additional Public Prosecutor does not warrant any consideration by the Court so as to give its consent. ( 23 ) IN the result, both these criminal revision cases fail and are dismissed.