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2001 DIGILAW 1561 (AP)

Mohd. Jakeer v. Ch. Koti Reddy (complainant)

2001-11-30

B.SUDERSHAN REDDY

body2001
B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an application filed under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the proceedings in C. C. No. 87 of 1999 on the file of the learned I Additional Munsif magistrate, Narasaraopeta, in which the petitioner herein is the sole accused. ( 2 ) THE first respondent herein filed a complaint against the petitioner herein for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short the Act )- In the said complaint, it is inter alia stated that the petitioner herein issued a cheque on 27-1-1999 for a sum of rs. 50,000/- towards the part payment of a legally enforceable debt to the respondent complainant. The said cheque was presented by the respondent-complainant through his banker for collection of the amount on 24-3-1999, but on the very same day it was returned along with a Memo stating that there are no sufficient funds. The respondent-complainant immediately on 25-3-1999 got issued a statutory notice as is required under clause (b) of Section 138 of the Act. The said notice was returned un- served. The respondent-complainant thereafter issued a second statutory notice on 28-4-1999 and the same was received by the petitioner-accused. It is alleged that the petitioner-accused herein requested the respondent-complainant to wait up to 4-6-1999 and promised to arrange the money. The respondent-accused presented the said cheque again on 5-6-1999, but the same was again returned for want of funds. This was followed by another notice, which was returned un-served on 22-6-1999. The complaint is filed on 7-7-1999. ( 3 ) SRI E. V. Bhagiratha Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the cause of action, if any, for filing the complaint under Section 138 of the Act had arisen on 25-3-1999 when the first statutory notice was issued to the petitioner herein and which was returned un-served. The cause of action arises only once immediately after the required statutory notice is issued and served upon the drawer of the cheque. ( 4 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner would place reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar. The Supreme Court in the said judgment, after an elaborate consideration of the matter, held that "a cheque can be presented any number of times during the period of Its validity by payee. ( 4 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner would place reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar. The Supreme Court in the said judgment, after an elaborate consideration of the matter, held that "a cheque can be presented any number of times during the period of Its validity by payee. On each presentation of the cheque and its dishonour a fresh right - and not cause of action - accrues in his favour. He may, therefore, without taking pre-emptory action in exercise of his such right under clause (b) of Section 138, go on presenting the cheque so as to enable him to exercise such right at any point of time during the validity of the cheque. But, once he gives a notice under Clause (b) of Section 138 he forfeits such right for in case of failure of the drawer to pay the money within the stipulated time he would be liable for the offence and the cause of action for filing the complaint will arise. " (Emphasis is of mine ). ( 5 ) IN the circumstances, the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the complaint filed in the instant case on 7-7-1999 is clearly barred by time, since the cause of action for filing the complaint under Section 138 of the Act had arisen when the first statutory notice was issued on 25-3-1999. ( 6 ) SRI O. Manohar Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent-complainant, however, would place reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in m/s. Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. , v. M/s. Galaxy Traders and Agencies Ltd. ( 7 ) IN my considered opinion, in m/s. Dalmia Cement, the Supreme Court has not taken any contrary view to that of its earlier view in Sadanandan Bhadran (supra ). The facts in M/s. Dalmia Cement may have to be carefully noticed to appreciate the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent that the Supreme Court had taken slightly a different view other than the one taken in Sadanandan Bhadran (supra ). In M/s. Dalmia Cement, the cheque dated 26-5-1998 was presented on the very same day for realisation and the same was returned dishonoured along with a Memo dated 2-6-1998. Then immediately, a statutory notice in terms of Clause (b) of section 138 of the Act was issued on 13-6-1998. In M/s. Dalmia Cement, the cheque dated 26-5-1998 was presented on the very same day for realisation and the same was returned dishonoured along with a Memo dated 2-6-1998. Then immediately, a statutory notice in terms of Clause (b) of section 138 of the Act was issued on 13-6-1998. The drawee received the postal acknowledgment on 15-6-1998. But, the drawer by a letter dated 20-6-1998 informed the drawee that he received only empty envelope without the contents sent by the drawee and that was received by the drawee on 30-6-1998. The drawee of the cheque represented the cheque as an abundant caution as statutory notice dated 13-6-1998 was expiring on 1-7-1998. The cheque was once again returned dishonoured on 2-7-1998 and this was followed by a statutory notice under clause (b) of Sec. 138 of the Act, which was received by the drawer on 27-7-1998. The complaint was filed on 9-9-1998. The Supreme Court in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case came to the conclusion that the statutory notice dated 13-6-1998 is not a notice at all in the eye of law, since the drawer of the cheque specifically raised an objection that what he received was only an empty envelope without the contents of the notice. The drawer accordingly requested the drawee to send him the contents of the notice. Accordingly, the cheque was again presented by the drawee and then followed by a statutory notice. Subsequent notice was construed to be a valid statutory notice. ( 8 ) IN the circumstances, it cannot be said that the Supreme Court took a different view in M/s. Dalmia Cement (supra) other than the one taken in Sadanandan Bhadran (supra ). The law declared by the Supreme court in Sadanandan Bhadran (supra) is categorical and clear that the cause of action for filing the complaint under Section 138 of the Act arises only once and the time for filing the complaint would start running from the date of service of notice issued under clause (b) of Section 138 of the Act. It is the first notice that is material. It is true that the cheque can be presented any number of times. But, once the law is set in motion by issuing the statutory notice under clause (b) of Section 138 of the Act, the cause of action begins for filing the complaint under Section 138 of the Act. It is the first notice that is material. It is true that the cheque can be presented any number of times. But, once the law is set in motion by issuing the statutory notice under clause (b) of Section 138 of the Act, the cause of action begins for filing the complaint under Section 138 of the Act. ( 9 ) FROM the facts in hand, it is clear that the cause of action had begun on 25-3-1999 when the respondent-complainant got issued a legal notice as is required under clause (b) of Section 138 of the Act. Therefore, the complaint filed on 7-7-1999 is evidently barred by limitation. ( 10 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, the complaint in C. C. No. 87 of 1999 on the file of the learned I Additional Munsif Magistrate, narasaraopeta is liable to be quashed and the same is accordingly quashed. ( 11 ) THE Criminal Petition is accordingly allowed.