( 1 ) THE appellant in the present appeal is the plaintiff in OS No. 13 of 1982 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Razole. The appellant, - plaintiff, is Sri Krutakurtya Rameswaraswamyvari Devasthanam Gudimula, represented by its Special Officer-Assistant Commissioner. The appellant-plaintiff had instituted the suit OS No. 13 of 1982 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Razole, for declaration of title and for possession and also for recovery of past profits and subsequent profits. ( 2 ) THE case of the appellant-plaintiff is that the plaintiff-Devasthanam is the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property which, in fact, had been granted to the plaintiff long time back and it is a specific endowment belonging to the deity and so registered in the Diglot register and also the other revenue records. It was also pleaded that there was no trust board prior to 1956 and as such the Archakas of the temple have been managing the properties and have been realising the income by leasing out the lands to the tenants. The then Archaka had inducted the respondents-defendants into possession of the plaint schedule lands. It was also further pleaded that in the year 1956, the Executive Officer was appointed and due to some mistake, these properties were included in the register maintained under Section 38 of the A. P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, and the previous Executive Officer had not taken steps for realisation of the income or for recovery of possession of the property and on enquiry and from records, the Special Officer came to know that the plaint schedule properties belong to the deity and he demanded the respondents-defendants to surrender possession and also to pay profits for 3 years prior to the suit and had also issued notice on 24. 10. 1981 and except the second respondent-second defendant, other defendants gave replies pleading ignorance about the title of the deity to the lands and stating that they have been in possession of the lands since times immemorial and had perfected their title by adverse possession and thus denied the title of the appellant-plaintiff. It is also the case of the appellant-plaintiff that the respondents-defendants have not perfected their title by adverse possession at all and they are the cultivating tenants of the plaint schedule properties and a Special Officer had been posted by the Commissioner of Endowments on 15. It is also the case of the appellant-plaintiff that the respondents-defendants have not perfected their title by adverse possession at all and they are the cultivating tenants of the plaint schedule properties and a Special Officer had been posted by the Commissioner of Endowments on 15. 4. 1981 and he had been in regular charge of the appellant-plaintiff temple and hence the appellant-plaintiff had filed a suit seeking the relief of declaration of title relating to the plaint schedule properties belonging to the temple and for possession with past profits at the rate of 29 bags of paddy per year and also damages for use and occupation and future profits till possession is delivered. ( 3 ) THE first defendant in the suit had filed a written statement denying all the allegations and claiming title from the time of his predecessors and also pleading about their possession from times immemorial. The first defendant had specifically pleaded that he was not aware of the entries in the revenue registeres or Diglot register and however the landlord and tenant relationship was specifically denied and it was also pleaded that the Special Officer taking the advantage of certain entries in the revenue records had issued notice for which a suitable reply was given and it was also specifically stated that the defendants are in possession of distinct plots and the suit is bad for misjoinder of parties and causes of action. A separate written statement was filed by the defendants 3, 4, 5 and 6 adopted by second defendant. It was stated that they have been in possession of Item No. 3 of plaint schedule properties from times immemorial and they are not aware of the title of the plaintiff and the defendants and their ancestors have been in possession in their own right and perfected their title by adverse possession and each of them is cultivating Ac. 0. 53 cents in Item No. 3. It was also stated that the entries in the revenue register do not confer any title on the appellant-plaintiff and hence they are not relevant. All the other aspects also were specifically denied. The Court below on the respective pleadings of the parties had settled the following issues: (1) Whether the plaintiff deity has got title to the plaint schedule property? All the other aspects also were specifically denied. The Court below on the respective pleadings of the parties had settled the following issues: (1) Whether the plaintiff deity has got title to the plaint schedule property? (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of declaration and possession of the plaint schedule property? (3) Whether the title of the defendants perfected by adverse possession? (4) Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this suit and whether the Special Officer alone has jurisdiction to entertain the suit? (5) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to claim any profits and if so for what amount? (6) Whether this suit is barred by limitation? (7) To what relief is the plaintiff entitled? ( 4 ) ON behalf of the appellant-plaintiff, the clerk of the plaintiff institution was examined as PW1 and Exs. A1 to A14 were marked on their behalf and on behalf of the respondents-defendants, DWs. 1 to 4 were examined and Exs. Bl to B16 were marked on their behalf. The Court below had discussed all the issues at paragraphs 6 to 14 and had ultimately arrived at a conclusion that the appellant-plaintiff is not entitled to any of the reliefs and had accordingly dismissed the suit with costs. The appellant-plaintiff, aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, had preferred the present appeal. ( 5 ) SRI N. V. Suryanarayana Murthy, the learned senior Counsel representing the appellant-plaintiff, had vehemently contended that the plaintiff is a deity and while deciding the matters of this nature, where the temple properties are involved, the Courts are expected to be more conscious and careful. The learned Counsel also had strenuously contended that the evidence of PW1 and also Exs. Al to A14 clearly establish the title of the appellant-plaintiff and the Court below had totally erred in dismissing the suit filed by the appellant-plaintiff. The learned Counsel also had contended that the entries in Ex. A14 clearly point out that the appellant-plaintiff alone is the absolute owner of the plaint schedule properties. Al to A14 clearly establish the title of the appellant-plaintiff and the Court below had totally erred in dismissing the suit filed by the appellant-plaintiff. The learned Counsel also had contended that the entries in Ex. A14 clearly point out that the appellant-plaintiff alone is the absolute owner of the plaint schedule properties. The learned Counsel also had further contended that as far as the respondents-defendants are concerned, they are all independent trespassers and though it was pleaded that at a particular point of time they were tenants, and in the light of the specific stand taken by them, it can be taken that they are independent encroachers on the temple land and it being a personal action, there cannot be any total abatement of the appeal, though certain of such independent trespassers died and the legal representatives were not brought on record. The learned Counsel also had pointed out that respondent-6 being a representative of respondent-2, there is no abatement of appeal as against respondent-2. The learned Counsel also had submitted that in peculiar facts and circumstances as against respondent-1 also, since the applications were not filed, the delay has to be condoned and the legal representatives of respondent-1 also were to be brought on record. The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to Sections 75 and 103 of the A. P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966 (Act No. 17 of 1966) and also Sections 83, 84, 85, 86 and 143 of A. P. Charitable, and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, Act No. 30 of 1987 (i. e. , the present Act ). The learned Counsel also had contended that the remedies as against the encroachers are specified by the provisions of the Special Enactment itself. But, however, this remedy was invoked by the appellant-plaintiff by instituting a regular suit. The learned Counsel, placing strong reliance on Ex. A14 and also on the judgments reported in Raja Rajinder Chand v. Mst. The learned Counsel also had contended that the remedies as against the encroachers are specified by the provisions of the Special Enactment itself. But, however, this remedy was invoked by the appellant-plaintiff by instituting a regular suit. The learned Counsel, placing strong reliance on Ex. A14 and also on the judgments reported in Raja Rajinder Chand v. Mst. Sukhi and others, AIR 1957 SC 286 , Dakas Khan and others v. Ghulam Kasim Khan and others, AIR 1918 PC 4, and Kisheera Ramalingeswara swamy v. Nandula Buchi ramayya and others, AIR 1977 AP 160 , had contended that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court below should have arrived at a conclusion that the appellant-plaintiff had established title to the plaint schedule properties, especially, in the light of the fact that the plea of adverse possession pleaded by the respondents-defendants had not been substantiated at all. ( 6 ) SRI V. L. N. G. K. Murthy, the learned Counsel representing the respondents 3 to 6, had raised a preliminary objection stating that respondent-1 died on 20. 10. 1986, and the arguments were heard on 4-11-1986, 17-11-1986, and the judgment was delivered on 24. 11. 1986 and ultimately the suit was dismissed. Hence, the legal representatives of respondent-1 should have been brought on record even before the Court of first instance and since the appellant-plaintiff had not brought on record the legal representatives of respondent-1 in the trial Court, the findings had attained finality and hence the remedy of the appellant-plaintiff is lost once for all. The learned Counsel placed strong reliance on Mohd. Safdar Shareef and others v. Mohammed AH, 1993 (1) ALT 522 (DB ). The learned Counsel also had brought to my notice that CMP No 16290 of 1995 was filed on behalf of respondent-2 to bring on record the proposed legal representatives, but it is doubtful whether respondent-6 can be said to be one of the legal representatives of respondent-2 even to invoke the doctrine of representation . The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to CMP No. 16291 of 1995 to bring on record the legal representatives of respondent-1 and had poirted out that the date when the arguments were heard had not been disclosed and however the learned Counsel had pointed out the series of events by drawing my attention to the counter-affidavit. The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to CMP No. 16291 of 1995 to bring on record the legal representatives of respondent-1 and had poirted out that the date when the arguments were heard had not been disclosed and however the learned Counsel had pointed out the series of events by drawing my attention to the counter-affidavit. The learned Counsel also had submitted that subsequent thereto, an application CMP No. 16664 of 2000 was filed to condone the delay of 3034 days in filing the application to bring on record the legal representatives of respondent-1 and the learned Counsel also had contended that absolutely there are no reasons to condone such incordinate delay. The learned Counsel also had further contended that even the 5th respondent died pending the appeal and no application was filed to bring the legal representatives on record and hence, inasmuch as the cause of action averred in the plaint is joint and indivisible and in the light of the fact that there was abatement as against certain of the respondents, the abatement should be taken as one of total abatement in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case. The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to the judgment in C. V. Purushotham v. Chinna Jeeyangar Mutt, Tirupathi, 1975 (2) An. WR 114, and also to the oral evidence of DW1 to DW4 and also, Exs. B1 to B16. The learned Counsel on facts also had contended that the finding of adverse possession recorded by the Court below is based on evidence, which need not be disturbed in this appeal. ( 7 ) HEARD both the learned Counsel at length and also perused the material available on record. The points which arise for consideration in this appeal are: (a) Whether the abatement of the appeal in the facts and circumstances of the case can be said to be total abatement? (b) Whether the Court below had arrived at the correct conclusion relating to the title of the appellant-plaintiff of the plaint schedule properties? (c) Whether the Court below had arrived at correct conclusion relating to the plea of adverse possession? (d) Whether the Court below had appreciated the question of bar of limitation properly? (e) Whether the Court below had properly appreciated the question of profits? (f) To what relief? (c) Whether the Court below had arrived at correct conclusion relating to the plea of adverse possession? (d) Whether the Court below had appreciated the question of bar of limitation properly? (e) Whether the Court below had properly appreciated the question of profits? (f) To what relief? ( 8 ) POINT No. (a): The first question which, in fact, was vehemently argued by Sri V. L. N. G. K. Murthy, is that inasmuch as the cause of action pleaded is an indivisible one, there is total abatement of the appeal and hence there is no question of entering into the merits and demerits of the matter or appreciating the other evidence available on record. On the material available on record, no doubt, it is now revealed that respondent-1 died on 20. 10. 1986 and the arguments were heard on 24,11. 1986 and 7. 11. 1986 and the judgment was pronounced on 24. 11. 1986, and ultimately, the suit was dismissed. It is also true that CMP No. 16291 of 1995 was filed to bring on record the legal representatives of respondent-1. In paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the counter-affidavits of the proposed legal representatives, it was specifically averred as follows: "it is humbly submitted that the present application is not maintainable under Order 22, Rules 3 and 4 CPC. The petitioner is put to strict proof of the allegation that the late Suryarao died subsequent to the date of reserving the case for judgment. The affidavit of the petitioners is silent on the date when the judgment was reserved. As the proposed legal representatives were not parties to the proceedings at that time, we are not aware of the date on which the judgment is reserved. The petitioner is bound to state and prove the date on which the judgment was reserved. This counter-affidavit is being filed dealing with both the alternatives. If it is a fact that the late Suryarao passed away after the judgment was reserved, the appeal should have been filed against the legal representatives. The appeal which was filed against a dead person is incompetent. The defect could have been cured by filing an application to implead the legal representatives, before the expiry of the period of limitation for filing the appeal. The appeal which was filed against a dead person is incompetent. The defect could have been cured by filing an application to implead the legal representatives, before the expiry of the period of limitation for filing the appeal. It is humbly submitted that the appeal must be deemed to have been filed on the date on which an application is made to bring us on record. The appeal, so far as we are concerned, is hopelessly time barred. There is no application to condone the inordinate delay and the delay has not been properly explained. The present application is therefore liable to be rejected as misconceived. If the late Suryarao died before the judgment was reserved, the suit itself abated and this Hon ble Court is not the Forum to bring on record the legal representatives. The petitioner having failed to bring on record the legal representatives before the lower Court, must suffer the consequences. The present application is therefore not maintainable. " ( 9 ) NO doubt, in the light of the stand taken in the counter-affidavit, an application CMP No. 16664 of 2000 was filed for condonation of delay of 3034 days in filing an application to bring on record the legal representatives of respondent-1. It is pertinent to note that in view of the dates stated supra, respondent-1 died even during the pendency of the suit. In the judgment cited (supra), it was held that an appeal will abate as a whole if the case is of such nature that the appeal cannot proceed in the absence of the legal representatives of the deceased appellant. The basis of this rule is that to decide an appeal without bringing the legal representatives on record in a case of that nature, will produce two inconsistent and contradictory decrees in the same litigation with respect to the same subject-matter. It is also pertinent to note that as far as respondent-2 is concerned, the learned Counsel for the appellant had contended that by virtue of doctrine of representation, since respondent-6 is already there on record which was not disputed by the contesting respondents, it cannot be said that as against respondent-2 also there is abatement of appeal. But, however, on the material available on record, it is doubtful whether respondent-6 can be the legal representative of respondent-2. But, however, on the material available on record, it is doubtful whether respondent-6 can be the legal representative of respondent-2. It is also pertinent to note that the 5th respondent also died pending the appeal and an application to bring on record the legal representatives had not been filed at all. However, it is brought to my notice that the death of respondent-5 was not intimated to the Counsel for the appellant. ( 10 ) UNDER Order 22, Rule 10-A of the Code of Civil Procedure dealing with duty of pleader to communicate to Court the death of a party reads as follows: "wherever a pleader appearing for a party to the suit comes to know of the death of that party, he shall inform the Court about it, and the Court shall thereupon give notice of such death to the other party, and, for this purpose, the contract between the pleader and the deceased party shall be deemed to subsist. " ( 11 ) APART from it, in view of Order 22, Rule 9 (1) of CPC, where a suit abates or is dismissed under this Order, no fresh suit shall be brought on the same cause of action. In the present case, in the written statement filed by the parties, specific stand had been taken that they are in independent possession of the respective properties and hence in the light of the stand taken by the respondents, as defendants in the suit, now the question that has to be decided is relating to the abatement of the appeal in toto. ( 12 ) IN P. M. M. Pillayathiri Amma v. K. Lakshmi Amma and others, AIR 1967 Ker. 135 , where an ex pane decree was passed against defendant who was not alive at the passing of decree and an application by plaintiff under Section 151 CPC was filed for restoration of suit for disposal of the same after bringing the legal representatives of the deceased-defendant on record, such application was held to be maintainable. ( 13 ) HERE is a case where the appellant-plaintiff is devasthanam and the stand taken by the respondents-defendants in their written statements relating to the respective and separate enjoyment of the properties, is clear and categorical. ( 13 ) HERE is a case where the appellant-plaintiff is devasthanam and the stand taken by the respondents-defendants in their written statements relating to the respective and separate enjoyment of the properties, is clear and categorical. That being the position, and in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that there is total abatement in the light of the clear stand taken by the respondents-defendants in their written statements. ( 14 ) POINTS Nos. (b) to (e) : Points Nos. (b) to (e) for the purpose of convenience can be dealt with together. The Court below, no doubt, after detailed discussion of the evidence of PW1 and Exs. Al to A14 and DWs. 1 to 4 and Exs. B1 to B16, had arrived at a conclusion that the appellant-plaintiff is not entitled to any relief as prayed for. Ex. A14 is a crucial document on which much reliance was placed and also reliance was placed on decisions cited (supra ). ( 15 ) THE Court below, however, except taking a stand that from times immemorial the respondents-defendants have been in possession of the plaint schedule properties, the commencement of the adverse nature of the possession and from what point of time, the evidence on record does not disclose this aspect. Ex. B1 passbook, Exs. B2 to B16, the revenue receipts and also the evidence of DWs. l to 4 also may not be sufficient to clinchingly establish and substantiate the plea of adverse possession, since several of these only are revenue receipts for just one, two, or three years as the case may be. It is needless to point out that the possession should be continuous, uninterrupted and hostile to the knowledge of the true owner to constitute adverse possession. It is needless to point out that the possession should be continuous, uninterrupted and hostile to the knowledge of the true owner to constitute adverse possession. Apart from this aspect of the matter, Section 103 of the A. P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966 dealing with the property of charitable or religious institution or endowment not to vest under the law of limitation after commencement of this Act (Act 17 of 1966) reads as follows: "nothing in any law of limitation for the time being in force shall be deemed to vest in any person the property of funds of any charitable or religious institution or endowment which had not vested in such person or his predecessor in title before the 30th September, 1951 in the Andhra Area of the State and on the date of commencement of this Act in the remaining areas of this State. " ( 16 ) APART from it, Section 75 Act 17 of 1966 read as follows: "encroachers by persons on land or building belonging to charitable or religious institutions or endowment and the eviction of encroachers : (1) Where the Assistant Commissioner having jurisdiction, either suo motu or upon complaint made by the trustee, has reason to believe that any person has encroached upon (hereafter in this Chapter referred to as encroacher) any land, building, tank, well, spring or water-course, or any space belonging to the institution or endowment, wherever situated, the Assistant Commissioner shall report the fact together with relevant particulars to the Deputy Commissioner having jurisdiction over the division in which the institution or endowment is situated. Explanation :for the purpose of this Chapter (i) the expression person shall include an institution, and (ii) the expression encroacher shall be deemed to include any person or institution who continues to remain in the land or building after the expiry or the termination or cancellation of the lease, mortgage or licence in respect thereof granted to him or it. Explanation :for the purpose of this Chapter (i) the expression person shall include an institution, and (ii) the expression encroacher shall be deemed to include any person or institution who continues to remain in the land or building after the expiry or the termination or cancellation of the lease, mortgage or licence in respect thereof granted to him or it. (2) Where, on a perusal of the report received by him under sub-section (1), the Deputy Commissioner finds as there is a prima facie case of encroachment, he shall cause to be served upon the encroacher a notice specifying the particulars of the encroachment and calling on him to show-cause before a certain date why an order requiring him to remove the encroachment before the date specified in the notice should not be made. A copy of the notice shall also be sent to the trustee of the institution or endowment concerned. (3) The notice referred to in sub-section (2) shall be served in such manner as may be prescribed. (4) Whereafter considering the objections, if any, of the encroacher received during the period specified in the notice referred to in sub-section (2) and after conducting such enquiry as may be prescribed, the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that there has been an encroachment, he may, by order require, the encroacher to remove the encroachment and deliver possession of the land or building or space encroached upon to the trustee before the date specified in such order. (5) The order of Deputy Commissioner under sub-section (4) shall be in writing and shall contain the grounds on which he has passed the order. ( 17 ) IN Chenchu Kami Reddy and another v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, AIR 1986 SC 1158 , the Apex Court observed as follows: "more often than not detriment to what belongs to many , collectively, does not cause pangs to any , for no one is personally hurt directly. That is why public officials and public minded citizens entrusted with the care of public property have to show exemplary vigilance. What is true of public property is equally true of property belonging to religious or charitable institutions or endowments. That is why public officials and public minded citizens entrusted with the care of public property have to show exemplary vigilance. What is true of public property is equally true of property belonging to religious or charitable institutions or endowments. " ( 18 ) AS already stated supra, no doubt, findings had been recorded by the Court below both on question of title and also on question of bar of limitation and had arrived at a conclusion that the appellant-plaintiff is not entitled to any one of the reliefs. It is also unfortunate that the officers, who are expected to be more diligent in a matter of this nature, have not been diligent at all in bringing the legal representatives of the deceased parties on record. However, the extreme contention of Suryanarayana Murthy that in the case of independent trespassers there is no necessity of bringing the legal representatives at all, cannot be accepted since even in such cases, the legal /epresentatives of a deceased party necessarily have to be brought on record. In the present case on hand, as already observed, it is doubtful whether as against respondent-2, the cause survives or not since it is also doubtful whether respondent-6 is one of the legal representatives of respondent-2. It is needless to state that respondent-1 died even during the pendency of the suit and no doubt there appears to be some controversy as to when actually the arguments were heard in the suit and the judgment was reserved. However, even during the pendency of the appeal, respondent-5 died and it appears that it was not brought to the notice of the appellant-plaintiff and hence no legal representatives were brought on record. Hence, in view of the several technical defects involved in the further prosecution of the litigation, Sri V. L. N. G. K. Murthy vehemently contended that it should be taken that there is total abatement of the appeal as such in the facts and circumstances of the case. Hence, in view of the several technical defects involved in the further prosecution of the litigation, Sri V. L. N. G. K. Murthy vehemently contended that it should be taken that there is total abatement of the appeal as such in the facts and circumstances of the case. As already observed by me supra, the stand of the respective defendants itself being clear, it can be definitely said that the cause of action in the said case cannot be said to be indivisible one and in the facts and circumstances of the case, to what extent the appeal is abated, also may be a question to be decided on adducing further evidence in this regard while deciding the other questions i. e. , the question of title, the question of limitation, the question of adverse possession and also the question of profits and other like connected questions involved in the suit. ( 19 ) POINT No. (f) : In the light of the foregoing discussion, and also in the light of the facts and circumstances, especially inasmuch as several disputed questions relating to the very legal representatives had been raised by the contesting parties, I do feel that in the interests of justice, the matter has to be remanded to the Court below for the purpose of deciding the matter afresh in the light of the observations specified supra. ( 20 ) IN the light of the foregoing discussion, the matter is remanded to the Court below for the purposes indicated above. It is also made clear that all the questions are left open and the parties are at liberty to agitate all the questions before the Court below. ( 21 ) WITH the above directions, the matter is disposed of. In the facts and circumstances of the case, no order as to costs.