ORDER: This is an application under Sec.9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for an order of interim injunction restraining the respondent, their men, agents etc. from cancelling the agreement with the applicant dated 1.12.1999 with effect from 30.11.2001 or any subsequent date, pending arbitration. 2. ORDER: This is an application under Sec.9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for an order of interim injunction restraining the respondent, their men, agents etc. from cancelling the agreement with the applicant dated 1.12.1999 with effect from 30.11.2001 or any subsequent date, pending arbitration. 2. The affidavit in support of the application alleges as follows: An agreement was entered into between the applicant and the respondents on 1.12.1999, as per the terms of which the applicant has been providing transport service from the year 1999, that there were 18 buses plying for the respondents, that excepting intermittent delays due to traffic and other congestion enroute from Chennai to Maraimalai Nagar, there had been no complaint from the respondents as regards the services of the applicant, that the agreement dated 1.12.1999 provided that the contract was valid for two years effective from 1.12.1999 and renewable for further period either on the same terms and conditions or on terms mutually agreed and acceptable, that the applicant had added several new buses to its fleet and even in June, 2001, the applicant at the request of the respondents, had purchased 4 new bus coaches specifically for the respondents services for a sum of Rs.36,00,000 that to prevent unilateral cancellation or termination of the agreement, the renewal clause had been provided, that the applicant had given a proposal for renewal containing the details as to payment and as to how the services were to be upgraded that the applicant called on the respondents for a meeting to discuss the said proposals for upgrading so that the clause regarding the renewal of the agreement could be acted upon, that to the shock and surprise of the applicant, the respondents by their letter dated 31.10.2001 had unilaterally cancelled the agreement without assigning any reasons, that as contemplated under the agreement dated 1.12.1999 the respondents had agreed to renew the contract for further period after discussions, that the respondents without calling for discussions and without providing reasons, had unilaterally cancelled the agreement with effect from 30.11.2001, that this had put the applicant to great loss and hardship and severe financial strain, that the unilateral cancellation of the agreement would put all the persons who were employed and providing the services also to a great loss and hardship, that there would be no other use for the applicant for the buses, which had been purchased for the exclusive use of the respondents that the cancellation was not correct, that the agreement provided for resolution of disputes by arbitration between the parties and pending arbitration, the applicant had been forced to approach this Court for grant of interim injunction restraining the respondents from cancelling the agreement dated 1.12.1999 with effect from 30.11.2001. 3. Notice was ordered on 15.11.2001 and the matter was posted on 29.11.2001. On that day the respondents entered appearance and filed their counter, which is to the following effect: The applicant was not entitled to any relief and that the relief claimed was barred under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act. The agreement providing for two years would come to an end on 30.11.2001 by efflux of time. Under Clause 22 also either party had a right to terminate the agreement giving not less than one month’s notice. The agreement in its very nature being terminable, it could not be enforced under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act and therefore there could be no injunction. Conceding without admitting that the respondents committed breach of the agreement, the applicant’s remedy would only be to claim damages and could not seek an injunction restraining termination of agreement. Even if a reference was made to the Arbitrator, the final relief that could be granted would not extend to reinstatement or continuation of the contract. In such circumstances, there could be no interim relief. The applicant had not manifested its intention of settlement of the disputes by arbitration. There had been no whisper by the applicant about its intention to have the purported disputes resolved by arbitration. Though it was not necessary for the respondents to specifically give notice of termination, in as much as the agreement itself provides for termination by 30.11.2001, the respondents had issued a month’s notice of termination to the applicant. No breach had been committed by the respondents. On merits it had to be stated that the applicant had conveniently chosen not to mention that the agreement was terminable on a month’s notice, which had to be clarified at the time of arguments. It was not correct to say that there had been no complaint against the applicant as regards its services. The respondents had frequently drawn the applicant’s attention to the deficiency in service rendered by them and the applicant had assured that it would take remedial measures, which it had not done. There had been no agreement by the respondents to renew the contract. It was also denied that 18 buses were operated by the applicant for the exclusive use of the respondents. The respondents did not want to continue the contract with the applicant. It was terminated vide their letter dated 31.10.2001. There had been no agreement by the respondents to renew the contract. It was also denied that 18 buses were operated by the applicant for the exclusive use of the respondents. The respondents did not want to continue the contract with the applicant. It was terminated vide their letter dated 31.10.2001. There were no merits in the application and the same was liable to be dismissed. 4. Mr.R.Krishnaswami, learned senior counsel for Mr.C.Ramesh, counsel for the applicant, drew my attention to the various clauses in the agreement and submitted as per Clause 21 the agreement was renewable for a further period either on the same terms and conditions or on terms mutually agreed and accepted. The learned senior counsel also referred to Clause 26 relating to provision for arbitration. The learned senior counsel particularly relied on the following two judgments: (1) Secretary of State v. Volkart Brothers, I.L.R. 50 Mad. 595: A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 513 and (2) Damodhar Tukaram Mangala-murthi and others v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 639 in support of his contention that the respondents had no alternative other than to renew the contract for a further period of two years and that there could be interim relief in a case where the contract was capable of specific performance. 5. Mr.Krishna Srinivas, learned counsel for the respondents, relied on Clause 22 which provided for termination by either party by giving not less than one month’s notice in writing to the other party. The learned counsel also relied on Secs.14(1)(a) and (c) and 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act and submitted that there could no renewal and there could be no interim relief as a matter of course. He also submitted that the Arbitrator could not restore the contract and in such event, there could be no interim order. He also relied on the following judgments: (1) Indian Oil Corporation Limited v. Amritsar Gas Service and others, (1991)1 S.C.C. 533 and (2) Rajasthan Breweries Limited v. Stroh Brewery Company, A.I.R. 2000 Del. 450. The learned counsel further submitted that there was no manifestation of intention to go for arbitration and the application under Sec.9 was not therefore maintainable. For this proposition, he relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sundaram Finance Limited v. NEPC India Limited, (1999)2 S.C.C. 479 . 6. Let us first take up the question relating to manifestation of intention. For this proposition, he relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sundaram Finance Limited v. NEPC India Limited, (1999)2 S.C.C. 479 . 6. Let us first take up the question relating to manifestation of intention. In the decision of the Supreme Court in Sundaram Finance Limited v. NEPC India Limited, (1999)2 S.C.C. 479 , in paragraph 19 it is stated as follows: “When a party applies under Sec.9 of 1996 Act, it is implicit that it accepts that there is a final and binding arbitration agreement in existence. It is also implicit that a dispute have arisen which is referable to the Arbitral Tribunal. Sec.9 further contemplates arbitration proceedings taking place between the parties. Mr.Subramaniam is, therefore, right in submitting that when an application under Sec.9 is filed before the commencement of the arbitral proceedings, there has to be manifest intention on the part of the applicant to take recourse to the arbitral proceedings if at the time when the application under Sec.9 is filed, the proceedings have not commenced under Sec.21 of the 1996 Act. In order to give full effect to the words”before or during arbitral proceedings“occurring in Sec.9, it would not be necessary that a notice invoking the arbitration clause must be issued to the opposite party before an application, under Sec.9 can be filed. The issuance of a notice may, in a given case, be sufficient to establish the manifest intention to have the dispute referred to an Arbitral Tribunal. But a situation may so demand that a party may choose to apply under Sec.9 for an interim measure even before issuing a notice contemplated by Sec.21 of the said Act. If an application is so made, the Court will first have to be satisfied that there exists a valid arbitration agreement and the applicant intends to take the dispute to arbitration. ......What is apparent, however, is that the Court is not debarred from dealing with an application under Sec.9 merely because no notice has been issued under Sec.21 of the 1996 Act.” 7. Clause 26 of the agreement between the parties provides for arbitration. ......What is apparent, however, is that the Court is not debarred from dealing with an application under Sec.9 merely because no notice has been issued under Sec.21 of the 1996 Act.” 7. Clause 26 of the agreement between the parties provides for arbitration. In the affidavit in support of the application for interim injunction in paragraph 5 it is clearly stated that the agreement dated 1.12.1999 provides for resolution of disputes by arbitration between the parties and pending arbitration, the applicant is forced to approach this Court for grant of an order of interim injunction. In my view, there is clear manifestation of intention on the part of the applicant to go for arbitration. Objection raised on behalf of the respondents regarding absence of manifestation of intention is therefore rejected. 8. Let us now go to the relevant clause in the agreement between the parties relating to renewal. Clause 21, no doubt, provides that the agreement is renewable for further period either on the same terms and conditions or on terms mutually agreed and accepted. The applicant on 20th June, 2001 writes to the respondents that it had gone in for four more new coaches for the respondents, that it had invested Rs.36,00,000 on this score, that it would be operating the said coaches for the respondents company very soon and the hire charges for the same would be higher than what they were charging. This is followed by a letter dated October 20,2001 seeking renewal as per Clause 21 of the agreement. The letter runs as follows: “In accordance with Clause 21 of the agreement dated 1.12.1999 between us, we hereby renew the said agreement for a further period of two years on the same terms and conditions, i.e., the renewed agreement will be valid for a period of two years from 1.1.2002 to 31.12.2004.” On 31st the respondents write a letter to the applicant informing them that the agreement validity period is getting closed by 30.11.2001 and that they are cancelling the contract as on 30.11.2001. 9. The decision of a Bench of this Court in Secretary of State v. Volkart Brothers, I.L.R. 50 Mad. 595: A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 9. The decision of a Bench of this Court in Secretary of State v. Volkart Brothers, I.L.R. 50 Mad. 595: A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 513 relied on by the learned senior counsel for the applicant, has held that, “a contract to grant a renewal of a lease on such conditions as shall be reasonable and proper at the time of such renewal is a contract which is capable of specific performance and such a contract is not void for uncertainty.” The renewal clause in the lease deed in that case provided as follows: “And also he the said Mr.Francis Schuler, his heirs, administrators or assigns fulfilling the covenants and agreements contained in the said indenture and on his part to be performed and yielding at the end and expiration of the aforesaid term of 99 years unto the said United Company, their successors or assigns the full and just sum of 100 pagodas, current money of Fort St. George, then the said lease should and might be renewed for a further term of 99 years upon such terms and conditions as should be judged reasonable.” This clause clearly provides for renewal on payment of 100 pagodas. Apparently, as to what pagodas meant the lessees did not know. They sent Rs.100 and after it was brought to their notice that a rupee was not an equivalent to pagoda, they offered to pay the balance amount and it was held that the lessees were entitled to renewal. This decision of the Division Bench was approved by the Supreme Court in Damodhar Tukaram Mangalmurti and others v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 639 in the following terms: “The learned Judges of the High Court unanimously expressed the view that the lease was not void for uncertainty, and in that view we concur. There is authority in support of the view that a covenant to settle land”at a proper rate“or”upon such terms and conditions as should be judged reasonable“is not void for uncertainty”. See: New Beerbhoom Coal Co. Limited v. Boloram Mahata, 7 I.A. 107 and Secretary of State for India in Council v. Volkart Brothers, I.L.R. 50 Mad. 595: A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 513. 10. In my view, the decisions relied on by the learned Senior Counsel are clearly distinguishable having regard to the terms and conditions of the agreement between the parties in the present case. Limited v. Boloram Mahata, 7 I.A. 107 and Secretary of State for India in Council v. Volkart Brothers, I.L.R. 50 Mad. 595: A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 513. 10. In my view, the decisions relied on by the learned Senior Counsel are clearly distinguishable having regard to the terms and conditions of the agreement between the parties in the present case. Clause 22 clearly provides that the agreement could be terminated by either party by giving not less than a month’s time to the other party. The clause further provides as follows: “Notwithstanding anything contained in any other clause, VISTEON reserves the right to terminate the contract at any time without notice, due to any failure on the part of the CONTRACTOR in discharging his obligations under the contract or in the event of his becoming insolvent or going into liquidation. The decision of VISTEON about the failure on the part of the CONTRACTOR shall be final and binding on the CONTRACTOR”. It is not necessary to interpret the later portion of Clause 22. So far as Clause 22 first sentence is concerned, there is clear right given to either party to terminate the agreement by giving not less than a month’s notice in writing to the other party. Even with regard to this, I do not want to express any opinion except to say that the prayer for injunction cannot be granted at this stage. No doubt, it is argued by the learned senior counsel that what is contemplated is one of prevention and not restoration. Having regard to the provisions of Secs.14(1)(a) and (c) and 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act, an interim order in favour of the applicant cannot be granted. 11. Sec.14(1)(a) provides that a contract for the non-performance of which compensation of money is an adequate relief cannot be specifically enforced. Sub-Clause (c) provides that a contract which is in its nature determinable cannot be specifically enforced. Sec.41(e) provides that an injunction cannot be granted to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced. 12. In Indian Oil Corporation Limited v. Amritsar Gas Service, (1991)1 S.C.C. 533 , the Arbitrator had held that the distributorship was revocable in accordance with Clauses 27 and 28 of the agreement between the parties. Sec.41(e) provides that an injunction cannot be granted to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced. 12. In Indian Oil Corporation Limited v. Amritsar Gas Service, (1991)1 S.C.C. 533 , the Arbitrator had held that the distributorship was revocable in accordance with Clauses 27 and 28 of the agreement between the parties. The Supreme Court observed as follows: “the finding in the award being that the Distributorship Agreement was revocable and the same being admittedly for rendering personal service, the relevant provisions of the Specific Relief Act were automatically attracted. Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.14 of the Specific Relief Act specifies the contract which cannot be specifically enforced, one of which is a contract which is in its nature determinable. In the present case it is not necessary to refer to the other clauses of Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.14 which also may be attracted in the present case since Clause (c) clearly applies on the finding read with reasons given in the award itself that the contract by its nature is determinable. This being so granting the relief of restoration of the distributorship even on the finding that the breach was committed by the Appellant Corporation is contrary to the mandate in Sec.14(1) of the Specific Relief Act and there is an error of law apparent on the face of the award which is stated to be made according to law governing such cases. The grant of this relief in the award cannot therefore, be sustained.” No doubt, the Arbitrator in that case granted the relief of restoration of distributorship which was frowned upon by the Supreme Court. 13. No doubt, as pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel, this is not a case of restoration, but one of termination. But, as already noticed, the clause governing the parties in the case decided by the Bench in Secretary of State v. Volkart Brothers, I.L.R. 50 Mad. 595: A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 513 clearly provided for renewal on payment of some specified money and the terms to be agreed upon. That is not the case here. By its very nature the contract is terminable and Secs.14(1) and 41 of the Specific Relief Act are clearly attracted. 14. In Rajasthan Breweries Limited v. Stroh Brewery Company, A.I.R. 2000 Del. 595: A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 513 clearly provided for renewal on payment of some specified money and the terms to be agreed upon. That is not the case here. By its very nature the contract is terminable and Secs.14(1) and 41 of the Specific Relief Act are clearly attracted. 14. In Rajasthan Breweries Limited v. Stroh Brewery Company, A.I.R. 2000 Del. 450, the Delhi High Court has referred to the decision of Indian Oil Corporation Limited v. Amritsar Gas Service, (1991)1 S.C.C. 533 and followed the same. In that case also the agreements between the parties were terminable by the respondent on happening of certain events and from the very nature of the agreements, which were private commercial transactions, they could be terminated even without assigning any reason by serving a reasonable notice. It was further observed by the Bench of the Delhi High Court that, in case ultimately it was found that the termination was bad in law or contrary to the terms of the agreement or of any understanding between the parties or for any other reason the remedy of the appellants would be to seek compensation for wrongful termination but not a claim for specific performance of the agreement and therefore there could be no injunction, particularly when there was statutory prohibition for grant of injunction with respect to a contract determinable in nature. 15. In view of the discussion above, I do not find any case made out for grant of injunction. The application fails and the same is dismissed. However, the dismissal will not stand in the way of the applicant successfully maintaining the case for damages in the contemplated arbitral proceedings.