Honble LAKSHMANAN, CJ.–Heard Shri Arun Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner. (2). The petitioner is a judicial officer serving in the rank of Additional District Judge. He joined the Service in 1980. According to him, from the year 1980 to 1987, the service record and performance had been unblemished and that there had been no complaint about his work, integrity or otherwise. For the first time on 1.10.1997, the petitioner was served with a charge-sheet (Annex.-1). With reference to the said charge-sheet, the petitioner has made some allegations against one Shri K.L. Vyas. Annexure-2 is the reply to the above charge sheet. Till the month of November, 2000 the petitioner had been served with as many as seven charge-sheets through one Shri Sampat Raj Sharma, who retired in the year 1999. According to the petitioner, a perusal of the records regarding all the charge will show that either Shri Sampat Raj Sharma or Shri K.L. Vyas were involved in the process of issuing the charge-sheets. These charge-sheets have been marked as Annex.11 to 17. According to the petitioner the charge sheet dated 21.12.1999 (Annex.11), though a report was submitted before the Full Court. Again the petitioner received a letter dated 23.3.2001 asking him to submit reply to the charge sheet. This, according to the petitioner, the matter has now been reopened. (3). We have perused the memorandum of charges Annex-1 and Annexures 11 to 17. Annexure-1 (Memo No. 1178 dated 1.10.97):- (4). As regards Annexure-1, Memorandum No. 1178 dated 1.10.97 a departmental enquiry under Rule 17 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short `the CC & A Rules) was initiated against the petitioner. The allegation against the petitioner is that he refused to sign the order-sheets when he was authorised to do so and also refused to obey the request of the District Judge to sign the order sheets on 10.12.96 and on the next day he also refused to sign the order sheets and disobeyed the oral request of the District Judge, conveyed to him through the Reader and Clerk of the Court of Additional District Judge No. 1, Ajmer and this act of the petitioner tantamount to gross disobedience of the orders of the District Judge. Annexure-11: (Memo No. 4470 dated 17.12.99):- (5). For this an enquiry under Rule 16 of the CC & A Rules was initiated against the petitioner. Annexure-11: (Memo No. 4470 dated 17.12.99):- (5). For this an enquiry under Rule 16 of the CC & A Rules was initiated against the petitioner. The charge against the petitioner was that he refused to vacate the government accommodation allotted to him when he was transferred from Ajmer to Sawai Madhopur and that he did not vacate the aforesaid government accommodation which was earmarked for the CJM, Ajmer. He did not seek permission to retain the aforesaid government accommodation from the District Judge. The charge was that he flouted the authority of the District Judge, Ajmer and the Honble High Court while making correspondence with the Govt. of Rajasthan and also disregarded the directions issued by this Court vide Circular No. 12 P.I. dated 9.8.91 and Circular No. 17 P.I. dated 11.8.1998 etc. Annexure-12: (Memo No. 4532 dated 21.12.1999):- (6). An enquiry under Rule 16 of the CC & A Rules was initiated against the petitioner so far this memo is concerned. When the petitioner was posted as Civil Judge (SD) & Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ajmer in 1995, a criminal case State vs. Mrs. Jamila Singh was pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate No. 1. The petitioner withdrew the aforesaid criminal case to his court on a complaint on 22.9.1995 and issued summons and bailable warrants to Mrs. Jamila Singh for procuring her attendence before him on 10.4.95. In the mean time, the petitioner got appointed his wife on the post of teacher in Mayo College, Ajmer, of which College Mrs. Jamila Singh was the Principal by wrongfully influencing her. Thus the petitioner failed to maintain absolute integrity, honesty and devotion to duty and got appointment of his wife Mrs. Anuradha Jain on the post of teacher in the Mayo College, Ajmer by wrongfully misusing his office. Annexure -13: (Memo No. 326 dated 16.2.2000):- (7). Here again, a departmental enquiry was initiated against the petitioner under Rule 16 of the CC & A Rules. When the petitioner was posted as Civil Judge (SD) and Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ajmer in 1996, a Civil Miscellaneous Case No. 240/96 was pending in the court of Civil Judge (JD), Ajmer (North). In this case, an order allotting government accommodation No. 7 temporarily to Vinod Kumar was passed by the then Civil Judge (JD). When the petitioner was posted as Civil Judge (SD) and Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ajmer in 1996, a Civil Miscellaneous Case No. 240/96 was pending in the court of Civil Judge (JD), Ajmer (North). In this case, an order allotting government accommodation No. 7 temporarily to Vinod Kumar was passed by the then Civil Judge (JD). On 2.12.1996, the petitioner called the Reader of the Court and forced him to write in the order sheet of the aforesaid case dated 30.11.96 that the operation of the order is stayed till the next date. The words which were added in the order dated 30.11.96 are mentioned in the charge sheet (in Hindi). Thus he manipulated the proceedings of the aforesaid case by forcing the Reader of the court to make forgery in the order sheet and this act of the petitioner amounts to gross misconduct. Annexure-14 (Memo No. 161 dated 2.3.2000):- (8). This memo is related to enquiry against the petitioner under Rule 17 of the CC & A Rules. When the petitioner was posted as Civil Judge (SD) & CJM Ajmer in the year 1996, a meeting was held in the chamber of the District & Sessions Judge, Ajmer on 28.10.1996 in the Chairmanship of the Secretary of the Legal Aid Board. The allegations against the petitioner are that without the permission and intimation to the District Judge, he left Ajmer for proceeding to Kishangarh and also took Senior Munsrim with him. The next allegation in this memo is that when the petitioner was asked to take over the charge of the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Ajmer and to relieve Mr. G.P. Gupta, the then Addl. C.J.M. No.1, Ajmer immediately, the petitioner flouted the orders of the District Judge. The next allegation is that the petitioner took the file relating to Sessions Case from the court of Miss. Indu Pareek, Addl. Civil Judge (JD) No.2, Ajmer without her permission. Thus the allegation against the petitioner was that he had been disobedient and not devoted to his duties. He showed scant regard to his superiors and used insulting and indecent language for his superior judicial officers and thereby undermined the prestige of his senior officers. All these acts are of insubordination, indecency, disobedience and thus, amount to gross misconduct. Annexure-15: (Memo No. 277 dated 23.3.2000):- (9). This is an enquiry under Rule 17 of the CC& A Rules. He showed scant regard to his superiors and used insulting and indecent language for his superior judicial officers and thereby undermined the prestige of his senior officers. All these acts are of insubordination, indecency, disobedience and thus, amount to gross misconduct. Annexure-15: (Memo No. 277 dated 23.3.2000):- (9). This is an enquiry under Rule 17 of the CC& A Rules. The allegation against the petitioner is that when he was posted as Additional District and Sessions Judge, Beawar, District Ajmer in the year 1998, the Registrar General (Vig.), Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur visited Beawar and inspected the courts situated there at 12.45 p.m. On that day the petitioner addressed a letter to the Registrar General by making baseless and inappropriate allegations against Shri Sampat Raj Sharma, Registrar General (Vig.) Thus, he had scant regard towards his superior officer, he did not maintain proper restraint in writing confidential letters to his superior officers. He castigated an Honble Judge of the High Court also in writing the aforesaid letter, which amounts to act of insubordination, making wild and irresponsible allegations towards his senior officers and this act of the petitioner amounts to misconduct. Annexure-16: (Memo No. Estt. B.2 (iii) 77/2000/9555 dated 1.8.2000):- (10). This is an enquiry under Rule 16 of the CC& A Rules. The allegation against the petitioner was that while he was posted as ADJ, Beawar, he was not found in court on 4.12.1998 at 12.45 PM during surprise inspection of Registrar (Vig.) and whereby he failed to observe the punctuality of time of the Court and violated rule 8 of the General Rules (Civil), 1986. When he was asked to explain about not observing the punctuality of time, he sent a reply alleging that the Registrar General (Vig.) has not inspected his court and has prepared a false report about the inspection conducted. There are few other allegations so far this memo is concerned. Annexure-17: (Memo No. 4196 dated 1.11.2000):- (11). The allegation against the petitioner was that when he was posted as Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Cases, Sawai Madhopur in the year 1998, he took cognizance against Mr. JV Reddy etc. for offence under Sec. 3(I)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, on a criminal complaint filed by Banwari Nayak. The allegation against the petitioner was that when he was posted as Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Cases, Sawai Madhopur in the year 1998, he took cognizance against Mr. JV Reddy etc. for offence under Sec. 3(I)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, on a criminal complaint filed by Banwari Nayak. The allegation against him was that he could not have taken cognizance on the aforesaid criminal complaint directly as the criminal case relating to the aforesaid complaint was not committed to his court by any Judicial Magistrate. Thus, he took cognizance illegally and improperly. The another charge against him was that he entered in the National Park Forest Area Sawai Madhopur without any permission or without any official work and so, after being stopped by forest guards, he wrote a letter to the District Judge showing to have been written earlier for permission to visit the forest area for site inspection. A criminal case was registered against him for the offences under Sections 27 and 28 of the Rajasthan Wild Life Protection Act, 1972. When the criminal case was registered against the petitioner and others then in order to fabricate false evidence in his favour of visiting the forest area on official duty, he procured an application for site inspection from Virendra Singh, arranged witnesses Mr. Rakesh Kumar and Mrs. Alka and wrote down the presence of Shailendra Yadav in the order sheet dt. 26.5.1998, State vs. Shailendra Yadav and also wrote in the order sheet of binding Shailendra Yadav for remaining present in the forest area at the time of site inspection. It is stated that all these facts lead to that the petitioner wanted to cause harm to the Forest Officers. J.V. Reddy etc. The act of the petitioner in this regard was not honest, independent, and judicious Judicial Officer as he acted with malafide intentions, and also conspired with other Judicial Officers in order to cause harm to forest officers. His actions were actuated by bad motive. His conduct of manipulating and fabricating false evidence shows that he was not an upright Judicial Officer as he manipulated the judicial record in order to suit his illegal and improper actions which would amount to gross misconduct. (12). For the above charge sheets, the petitioner had already submitted his replies (Annexure-18 to 23). (13). His conduct of manipulating and fabricating false evidence shows that he was not an upright Judicial Officer as he manipulated the judicial record in order to suit his illegal and improper actions which would amount to gross misconduct. (12). For the above charge sheets, the petitioner had already submitted his replies (Annexure-18 to 23). (13). The grievance of the petitioner is that he was having a peaceful existence during the past 16 years of his service and that he has now been given the charge sheets one after another and that too with some oblique motive. His further grievance is that inspection of records and documents for submitting detailed and proper explanation was allowed after much delay and that if the explanations are considered in right perspective, they will show that none of the charges have legs to stand. It is also his case that in the case of the petitioner that actions had been started on the basis of the mere complaints without having any affidavits in support thereof and that there is inherent bias against him. He would further submit that the disciplinary proceedings hamper the working and mental peace of the petitioner and there seems to be no consistent and set criteria or norm for such actions against judicial officers. It is also his submission that in the enquiry the procedure as prescribed under Rule 16(6)(a) of the CC & A Rules has not been followed and copies of the order sheets in any of the inquiry has not been given to the petitioner even he had applied for the same and that he was not given permission to appoint his defence nominee. He would submit that issuing such a large number of charge sheets one after another is very abnormal phenomenon and that too during the period of three years. It is also stated that the malafides are also evident from the fact that the allegations made against the petitioner all are in one way or other connected with either late Shri K.L. Vyas or Shri Sampat Raj Sharma. The case of the petitioner is that from the facts mentioned by him in the petition and from the documents submitted by him the fact of deep prejudice of these officers against the petitioner is well proved. The case of the petitioner is that from the facts mentioned by him in the petition and from the documents submitted by him the fact of deep prejudice of these officers against the petitioner is well proved. The petitioner has also wrote in ground (J) that the charges levelled against him in all the charge sheets are frivolous on the face of it and that the petitioner had submitted completely satisfactory explanations and that the difficulty is that mind is not applied on those explanations and it has not been mentioned that why the explanations are not accepted. In ground (M), it is stated that the malafides is writ large in the very genesis of the allegations levelled against him and thus, it is one of the exceptional cases where effective judicial action is taken at this stage. (14). Shri Arun Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner at the time of hearing reiterated the above submissions and contentions raised in the writ petition. (15). We have perused all the charge sheets Annexure-1, and 11 to 17 and other documents. In our opinion, the prayer made by the petitioner to quash the charge sheets Annexure-1, and 11 to 17 issued against him cannot at all be countenanced. As already noticed, the charge sheet Annexure-1 was issued on 1.10.1997 and other memorandum of charges were issued subsequently. The petitioner has already submitted his explanations. It is a settled law that it is the execlusive jurisdiction and domain of the competent authority to find out whether the charge levelled against a delinquent is true or false. In the present case in regard to all the memorandum of charges Enquiry Judges have already been appointed and the petitioner has also participated in many enquiries. If the petitioner has any grievance in regard to the matters mentioned in the paragraphs above, he is always at liberty to move the concerned Honble Enquiry Judge for appropriate relief by making appropriate representations. Without doing so, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition to quash the charges levelled against him in the year 1997 and the charge sheets issued against him thereafter. The Last charge sheet was issued under Annexure-17 on 1.11.2000. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition on 7.5.2001 to quash all the charge sheets. Such a prayer cannot at all be entertained. The Last charge sheet was issued under Annexure-17 on 1.11.2000. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition on 7.5.2001 to quash all the charge sheets. Such a prayer cannot at all be entertained. It is for the petitioner to approach the Honble Enquiry Judge for necessary and appropriate relief. It is the bounden duty of the petitioner to participate in the disciplinary enquiry in his own interest. Since he is not co-operating with the enquiry, the enquiries are pending for so long without attaining finality. We have also perused the charge sheets. The charges are very serious in nature. Some vague allegations have been made in regard to the malafides. Therefore, we have no hesitation in rejecting the prayer to quash the charge sheets at this distant of time. (16). In support of his contentions raised at the time of arguments, Shri Arun Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner has cited a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of P.C. Joshi vs. State of U.P. and Others (1). The matter relates to the acts, bonafide and erroneous exercise of judicial power by a judicial officer. The Supreme Court on the facts and circumstances of the above case held that the acts alleged would not amount to misconduct. The said judgment has no application in the facts and circumstances of the present case. (17). The next decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Sukhraj Singh vs. High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan (2). In that case a petition was filed for quashing the charge sheet. The Court held that the High Court is competent to issue writ if the charges are groundless or void ab initio or if it is issued by an authority not competent to issue the same or issue with a malafide use of power. In the facts of the present case we are of the opinion that the said judgment is not applicable. It is not the case of the petitioner that the charge sheet has been issued by an authority incompetent to issue the same or the charge sheets had been issued by malafide use of power. In the facts of the present case we are of the opinion that the said judgment is not applicable. It is not the case of the petitioner that the charge sheet has been issued by an authority incompetent to issue the same or the charge sheets had been issued by malafide use of power. As already noticed general and vague allegations of malafides have been levelled against some of the superior officers of the writ petitioner while he was in service at Ajmer and at other places. We have also perused the memorandum of charges issued against the petitioner and in our view, the charges are of very serious nature and therefore, cannot be quashed at this stage. (18). In para 17 of the writ petition, the petitioner has submitted that he and his wife, who are judicial officers are not given posting at the same place which amounts to deliberately subjecting them to family disturbance and mental agony. (19). In order to satisfy ourselves on the judicial side in regard to the action taken by the High Court, we have perused the records. The records clearly show that posting order was made permitting both judicial officers to work in the same place. (20). While considering item No. 5 of the agenda of the Full Court Meeting held on 5th of September, 2001 in regard to the reply dated 10.07.2001 to the show cause notice No. 581 dated 6th of February, 2001, by Smt. Sushila Nagar, RJS, the Full Court resolved to refer the reply to the Committee of three Honble Judges to be nominated by Honble the Chief Justice. Regarding the complaint of Smt. Sushila Nagar that she was not posted at the place where her husband was posted as per the normal practice, the Full Court has resolved that the committee shall also report after going through the High Court records whether she had given prior intimation of her marriage to the Registry and as to whether prior to marrying her Shri Ajay Kumar Jains earlier marriage recorded in the Registry was legally dissolved. (21). As already noticed, one enquiry was pending before one of the Honble Judges of our High Court. On the date of inquiry i.e. 12.9.2001, the enquiry was fixed at Ajmer. Both the petitioner Ajay Kumar Jain and Smt. Sushila Nagar were not present. The defence nominee was present. (21). As already noticed, one enquiry was pending before one of the Honble Judges of our High Court. On the date of inquiry i.e. 12.9.2001, the enquiry was fixed at Ajmer. Both the petitioner Ajay Kumar Jain and Smt. Sushila Nagar were not present. The defence nominee was present. The Honble Enquiry Judge has observed after seeing the report of the District Judge that the petitioner Ajay Kumar Jain and Smt. Sushila Nagar are avoiding services and adopting delatory tactics and causing harassment to the other co-delinquent Shri Meena, the department and its witnesses, who appear on every date without any fruitful purpose. The Honble Enquiry Judge has also observe that it is difficult to serve them by ordinary procedure and that no other option was left except to serve them by substituted service. Therefore, the Honble Enquiry Judge has ordered service of notices by publication in the newspaper having wide circulation in Rajasthan. The Honble Judge has further observed that since their request for changing the Enquiry Judge stood declined vide order dated 28.5.2001, both the delinquent officers are at liberty to nominate any sitting Judicial/Government Officer as their defence nominee with his consent in writing to be submitted by 25.9.2001. Now the enquiry has been fixed for 3rd and 4.10.2001 in the High Court Bench at Jaipur. Thus, it is seen that the petitioner is avoiding the enquiry by not appearing before the Enquiry Judge concerned and huge public money has been spent in publication of notice in the news paper. The conduct of the officer shows that the allegations made by him are baseless and against the real state of affairs. (22). In case, State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others (3), the Supreme Court held as follows:- ``The order of the High Court quashing the first information report, viewed from any angle, cannot be sustained both on the question of law and facts. Consequently, that part of the judgment of the High Court quashing the first information report is set aside. Consequently, that part of the judgment of the High Court quashing the first information report is set aside. The following categories of cases can be stated by way of illustration wherein the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers u/Sec. 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised: (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers u/Sec. 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Sec. 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Sec. 155 (2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. (23). We have already noticed the allegations, made in the various memoranda of charges. The allegations made, in our opinion, do clearly constitute justifying the initiation of the departmental proceedings against the petitioner. This case, in our opinion, does not fall in any one of the categories of cases, formulated above, calling for the exercise of extraordinary or inherent powers of the High Court, to quash the memoranda of charges. The Supreme Court held that the power of quashing charges, should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. The extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court, to act according to its whim or caprice. The court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations, made in the memoranda of charges. (24). Union of India and Others vs. Upendra Singh (4): In this case, the Central Administrative Tribunal examined the correctness of the charges, against the respondent therein, on the basis of the material, produced by him and quashed the same. Allowing the appeal of the Union of India, the Supreme Court held as follows:- ``In the case of charges framed in a disciplinary inquiry the Tribunal or court can interfere only if one the charges framed (read with imputation or particulars of the charges, if any) no misconduct or other irregularity alleged can be said to have been made out or the charges framed are contrary to any law. At this stage, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the correctness of truth of the charges. The Tribunal cannot take over the functions of the disciplinary authority. At this stage, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the correctness of truth of the charges. The Tribunal cannot take over the functions of the disciplinary authority. The truth or otherwise of the charges is a matter for the disciplinary authority to go into. Indeed, even after the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, if the matter comes to court or Tribunal, they have no jurisdiction to look into the truth of the charges or into the correctness of the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority as the case may be. The jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal is akin to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, the principles, norms and the constraints which apply to the said jurisdiction apply equally to the Tribunal. If the original application of the respondent were to be filed in the High Court it would have been termed, properly speaking, as a writ of prohibition. A writ of prohibition is issued only when patent lack of jurisdiction is made out. It is true that a High Court acting under Article 226 is not bound by the technical rules applying to the issuance of prerogative writs like certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in United Kingdom, yet the basic principles and norms applying to the said writs must be kept in view. (25). Inspector General of Police vs. K.S. Swaminathan (5): The Supreme Court, in the above case, held that the correctness of charges, particularly, at the stage of framing of charges, is beyond the scope of judicial review and that the Tribunal or court has only to see whether statement of facts and material supplied by delinquent, disclose the misconduct alleged, and hence, the order of the Tribunal, quashing charge-memo, on the ground of vagueness of charges, was set aside and the matter was remanded for enquiry afresh. The Supreme Court held as under:- ``It is settled law by a catena of decision of this Court that if the charge memo is totally vague and does not disclose any misconduct for which the charges have been framed, the Tribunal or the court would not be justified at that stage to go into whether the charges are true and could be gone into, for, it would be a matter on production of the evidence for consideration at the enquiry by the enquiry officer. At the stage of framing of the charge, the statement of facts and the charge-sheet supplied are required to be looked into by the court or the Tribunal as to the nature of the charges, i.e., whether the statement of facts and material in support thereof supplied to the delinquent officer would disclose the alleged misconduct. The Tribunal, therefore,was totally unjustified in going into the charges at that stage. It is not the case the the charge memo and the statement of facts do not disclose any misconduct alleged against the delinquent officer. Therefore, the Tribunal was totally wrong in quashing the charge memo. (26). State of U.P. vs. O.P. Sharma (6): The Supreme Court, in the above case, held that the High Court should be loath to interfere at the threshold to thwart the prosecution, exercising its inherent power, u/Sec. 482, Cr.P.C., or u/Art. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, as the case may be and allow the law to take its own course. (27). Rashmi Kumar (Smt.) vs. Mahesh Kumar Bhada (7): In this case, the Supreme Court held that the power of High Court, to quash criminal proceedings at initial stage, should be exercised sparingly and cautiously, to prevent miscarriage of justice or when it would tantamount to abuse of process of court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the said case, it was observed as under:- ``The High Court should sparingly and cautiously exercise the power u/Sec. 482 of the Code to prevent miscarriage of justice. The High Court would be loath and circumspect to exercise its extraordinary power under Sec. 482 of the Code or under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court would consider whether the exercise of the power would advance the cause of justice or it would tantamount to abuse of the process of the court. Social stability and order require to be regulated by proceeding against the offender as it is an offence against the society as a whole. This cardinal principle should always be kept in mind before embarking upon the exercise of the inherent power vested in the court. (28). Social stability and order require to be regulated by proceeding against the offender as it is an offence against the society as a whole. This cardinal principle should always be kept in mind before embarking upon the exercise of the inherent power vested in the court. (28). Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Another vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others (8): In this case, the Supreme Court was considering quashing of criminal proceedings and scope of High Courts power to quash criminal proceedings, in exercise of power under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, or under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court observed as follows:- ``It is settled that the High Court can exercise its power of judicial review in criminal matters. Under Article 227 the power of superintendence by the High Court is not only of administrative nature but is also of judicial nature. This article confers vast powers on the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of law by the inferior courts and to see that the stream of administration of justice remains clean and pure. The power conferred on the High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution and under Sec. 482 of the Code have no limits but more the power more due care and caution is to be exercised while invoking these powers. When the exercise of powers could be under Article 227 or Sec. 482 of the Code it may not always be necessary to invoke the provisions of Article 226. (29). State of Kerala and Others vs. O.C. Kuttan and Others etc. (9): In this case, the Supreme Court observed as under:- ``At the outset, there cannot be any dispute with the proposition that when allegations in the FIR do not disclose prima facie commission of a cognizable offence, then the High Court would be justified in interfering with the investigation and quashing the same as has been held by this Court in Sanchaita Investments case (State of W.B. vs. Swapan Kumar Guha ( 1982 (1) SCC 561 . In the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (1992) (1) SCC 335, this Court considered the question as to when the High Court can quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of its powers u/Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and had indicated some instances by way of illustrations, though on facts it was held that the High Court was not justified in quashing the first information report. This Court held that such powers could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formula and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. But as an illustration, several circumstances were enumerated. Having said so, the Court gave a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing the criminal proceedings should be exercised very sparingly with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in he FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice. It is too well settled that the first information report is only an initiation to move the machinery and to investigate into a cognizable offence and, therefore, while exercising the power and deciding whether the investigation itself should be quashed, utmost care should be taken by the court and at that stage, it is not possible for the court to sift the materials or to weigh the materials and then come to the conclusion one way or the other. In the case of State of U.P. vs. O.P. Sharma ( 1996 (7) SCC 705 , a three-Judge Bench of this Court indicated that the High Court should be loath to interfere at the threshould to thwart the prosecution exercising its inherent power under Sec. 482 or under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, as the case may be, and allow the law to take its own course. The same view was reiterated by yet another three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Rashmi Kumar vs. Mahesh Kumar Bhada ( 1997 (2) SCC 397 , where this Court sounded a word of caution and stated that such power should be sparingly and cautiously exercised only when the court is of the opinion that otherwise there will be gross miscarriage of justice. (30). For the foregoing circumstances, we do not think it appropriate to express any opinion on the materials on record, as that would embarrass the enquiry as well as the delinquent officer, but suffice it to say that it is not a fit case for quashing the charges at the threshold. We refrain from making any further observations in this case, as that may affect the enquiry or the delinquent officer. But, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion, after going through the memoranda of charges/allegations that it is a matter for the Enquirying Judge, to go through the charges and pass appropriate orders. The writ petitioner has raised certain grievances in the writ petition. We have already referred to those, in paragraphs (supra). The writ petitioner is at liberty, to raise those contentions before the Enquiring Judge. In conclusion, we are of the opinion that there are no adequate and compelling circumstances, placed on record in this case, to quash the memoranda of charges. The petitioner has already participated in the enquiry. The enquiry is half-way through before various Enquirying Judge. We hope that good sense would prevail upon the petitioner, to cooperate with the enquiry, so that the enquiry, initiated against the petitioner, which is pending for the last three years, at various stages, can be concluded, as expeditiously as possible. (31). The writ petition is dismissed accordingly.