JUDGMENT M.R. Hariharan Nair, J. 1. The dispute to be settled in this Appeal by the defeated plaintiff revolves around Ext.B9 will dated 7-4-1981 executed by her father, the deceased Velayudhan. The question is whether Ext.B9 Will standing in the name of Velayudhan is genuine and duly executed in which case his rights over the schedule property will go to the defendants 3 to 6 who are the legatees and sons of the 2nd defendant. There is also a question as to the precise rights which the said testator actually had over the schedule property. 2. Sri. Velayudhan died at the age of 70 years in the year 1983 leaving behind the 1st defendant, who is his widow and 2nd defendant, who is his only son and the plaintiff, who is his only daughter. On 7-4-1981 i.e., 2 years before his death he executed Ext.B9 Will which was duly registered by D.w.5, who is the Sub Registrar but not having jurisdiction over the area where the property is situated. 3. The plaintiff brought partition suit O.s.No.84/84, the judgment in which is impugned herein, as though the Will was not in existence or at least not within the knowledge of the plaintiff. 4. The defendants 1 and 2, in their joint written statement filed on 18-2-1985, pointed out that the plaint 'A' schedule property was not the individual property of Velayudhan; that he was bound by the Hindu Mithakshara Law and also pointed out that the devolution of the rights with regard to the assets left behind by Velayudhan will normally be in favour of defendants 2 to 6 who are the male descendants. Ext.B9 will, genuinely executed, excludes the 2nd defendant and provides that defendants 3 to 6 alone are entitled to the rights of Velayudhan. There were some other minor contentions also including alleged tenancy in respect of some items in favour of the 2nd defendant; but it is not necessary to go into those aspect as they were not urged during arguments raised before us. It was based on the aforesaid contention, that defendants 3 to 6 were impleaded as additional defendants. There were some other minor contentions also including alleged tenancy in respect of some items in favour of the 2nd defendant; but it is not necessary to go into those aspect as they were not urged during arguments raised before us. It was based on the aforesaid contention, that defendants 3 to 6 were impleaded as additional defendants. Thereupon the plaintiff got the plaint amended by incorporating the prayers and denying execution of any Will by Velayudhan and also contending that if at all any such Will had been brought into existence, it must be the result of manipulation at the instance of the 2nd defendant. 5. It was also contended by the plaintiff that at the time when the Will was allegedly executed, Velayudhan was not in possession of sufficient mental and physical capacity in so far as his legs had been amputated; he was weak and was incapable of understanding what he was doing and totally dependent on the 2nd defendant. The plaintiff thus maintained that what is produced is not a genuine Will validly executed by Velayudhan. 6. In the joint written statement, the defendants 3 to 6 contended that the deceased Velayudhan was in a fit state of mind at the time of execution of the Will and that Ext.B9 expresses the free will of Velayudhan with regard to the disposition of his property. 7. The 1st defendant also filed a separate written statement on 7-10-1988 deviating from her earlier stand and raising a contention that the property belonged to Velayudhan in his individual capacity and that in the event of partition, the 1st defendant is entitled to one share as admissible to the plaintiff and 2nd defendant. She also expressed readiness to allot her said share in favour of the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant in the event of partition. The Court below, on a consideration of the issues raised in the case, and in the light of the findings obtained from the Land Tribunal based on the reference of the question of tenancy raised by the 2nd defendant with regard to item Nos.9, 11, 12 and 17 and also considering Exts.B1 to B9, Ext.Cl and the depositions of P.W.1 arid D.Ws.l to 6 found that the Will was genuine and accordingly denied partition. The suit was dismissed. 8. Mr. The suit was dismissed. 8. Mr. M.C. Sen, who argued the case of the appellants - plaintiffs, argued that the circumstances of the case would show that the deceased was under the care of the 3rd defendant at the time when the Will was executed and that there are serious discrepancies in the oral evidence forthcoming with regard to the manner of execution of registration of the Will. 9. In the cross objection filed by defendants 2 to 6 the judgment of the Trial Court is challenged in part. According to them, the court should have held that the deceased had only 1/6 right over the joint properties and also disinherited the plaintiff and 1st defendant totally. The points that arise for decision in the case are: (1) Whether Ext.B9 Will is duly executed by the deceased Velayudhan? (2) Whether the Will suffers from any infirmity as alleged by the plaintiffs? (3) Whether the impugned judgment warrants any modification? 10. Point Nos. 1 and 2: These are considered together for the sake of convenience. At the very out set it has to be mentioned that Ext.B9 is a Will which, according to the oral evidence of the 5th defendant - Sub Registrar, was duly registered. One of us (Sri P.K. Balasubramanian (J)) held in R. Radhakrishnan Nair v. Sreedevi ( 1993 (2) KLJ 670 ) that when a Will is denied the burden to prove testamentary capacity and due execution is on the propounder. But then a presumption of genuineness is attached to the proceedings before the Registrar in case of a registered Will as evident from the decision in Veerankutty Haji v. Kunhalan Kutty (1989 (2) KLT SN70 - Page 59) and Varghese v. Oommen ( 1994 (2) KLT 620 ). Pathu v. Katheesa Umma (1990 (2) KLT SN 49 Page 35) is authority for the proposition that when execution of a document is proved, and when no disabling factor or vitiating circumstance stands proved, proof of signature with necessary formalities will be proof of execution with knowledge of contents, albeit prima facie, for shifting the burden. Pathu v. Katheesa Umma (1990 (2) KLT SN 49 Page 35) is authority for the proposition that when execution of a document is proved, and when no disabling factor or vitiating circumstance stands proved, proof of signature with necessary formalities will be proof of execution with knowledge of contents, albeit prima facie, for shifting the burden. It was also held therein that when a person's signature appears at the place where the executant would normally sign, the signature may be accepted, prima facie, as having been put in token of execution and that there is a presumption under S.114 of the Evidence Act that a person only puts his signature in a document in token of execution. The said decision is also authority for the proposition that when it is proved that the document was executed and registered, the presumption is that all formalities were properly and regularly done and it is for the other party to prove that a fraud was played on the Sub Registrar. 11. One of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants is that there is difference between the signatures appearing in various pages of the Will and in the signatures affixed before the Sub Registrar at the time of alleged registration. The contention is that there was possibility of impersonation. It is to be mentioned here that at the time of registration finger print of the person who admitted execution of the Will before the Sub Registrar was obtained and it was open to the plaintiffs to seek comparison of the finger print with the admitted finger print of the testator. No such attempt was made and in view of the clear evidence of D.W.5 with regard to the details of the events that led to registration of the document, the case of impersonation has to fail. We may also mention that we find no substantial variation between the signatures of Velayudhan as they appear in the body of the document as also at the portion relating to execution on the one hand and the signatures appearing at the portion relating to admission for registration on the other. 12. A perusal of Ext.B9, in the light of oral evidence adduced in this case shows that the testator had exercised due volition in the matter of disposition of his property. 12. A perusal of Ext.B9, in the light of oral evidence adduced in this case shows that the testator had exercised due volition in the matter of disposition of his property. All the assets of Velayudhan were not conveyed to the defendants 3 to 6 who are his grandchildren. On the other hand, there is specific recital in Ext.B9 that the properties that he got from his mother will go to his sisters and that the defendants 3 to 6 are made the legatees because they are the children of his only son - the 2nd defendant and as he is governed by the Mithakshara Law. It was also stated that he had the expectation that his daughter would get the properties of his wife and that was the reason why no property was set apart for the plaintiffs in the Will. The 2nd defendant, as the only son, was appointed executor of the Will. 13. No doubt, the deceased was aged about 70 years at the time of execution of the Will and both his legs had been amputated before that date. However, there is clear evidence forthcoming in the case to show that in spite of physical deformity and consequent disabilities, he was in possession of a strong mind and was capable of managing his affairs. Necessary admissions in this regard are forthcoming in the evidence of D.W.6 who is none other than the wife of the testator. She stated that Velayudhan was a person of high reputation and was possessing sufficient mental capacity and a person of strong will. She also stated that in spite of surgery and amputation of both legs, his mental capacities remained unaffected and that Velayudhan was not a person who could be taken for a ride by any one. According to her, 21 grams of gold had been pledged under the Gold Bond Scheme in a Bank at Quilandy and about two or three years before his death (that is, around the period when the Will was allegedly executed) Velayudhan had himself gone over to the said Bank and got back the gold. These aspects show that Velayudhan was in possession of sufficient mental capacity in spite of his old age to execute a testament bequeathing his rights over the property. There is also sufficient oral evidence in support of this fact forthcoming from the other witnesses examined in the case. 14. These aspects show that Velayudhan was in possession of sufficient mental capacity in spite of his old age to execute a testament bequeathing his rights over the property. There is also sufficient oral evidence in support of this fact forthcoming from the other witnesses examined in the case. 14. There is merit in the contention of the appellant that the propounder of Ext.B9, being the beneficiary therein, is bound to establish that there are no suspicious circumstances surrounding the will. The 3rd defendant has discharged his burden by himself going to the box and giving evidence as DW-2. He admitted that at the time of execution of Ext.B9, he was also staying with the testator. He happened to join the testator in the trip to Kozhikode at the request of the testator himself. D.W.2 himself drove the car. The direction was to take him to the Sub Registry and once they reached Kozhikode he was asked to find out the Sub Registrar's Office. Then the direction was to find out a scribe. DW-2, after enquiries, informed the testator that a scribe was available at the 1st floor of 'Hotel Paragon' and on direction from the testator he was taken there. The further direction was that the scribe should be asked to come to the car to meet the testator, as he could not walk upstairs due to his physical disability. Once he was brought, the testator himself gave directions to the scribe which the latter noted down. After some time, the scribe (D.W.3) brought the draft of the Will prepared by him which was read over to the testator, the correctness of which was confirmed by the testator. The scribe then wanted two identifying witnesses. The testator told him that a person by name Raman (DW-4) was available in the locality, that he could be brought and that the other witness can be fetched by the scribe. DW-2 was sent by the testator himself to bring DW-4 and in the meantime, the scribe left for preparing the original Will. DW-4 was brought by DW-2 as instructed and he agreed to be a witness to the Will. After the lunch break DW-3 came and informed that the Will was ready and thereupon the testator went over to the Sub Registrar's Office along with DWs.2 and 3. The witnesses were brought there. DW-4 was brought by DW-2 as instructed and he agreed to be a witness to the Will. After the lunch break DW-3 came and informed that the Will was ready and thereupon the testator went over to the Sub Registrar's Office along with DWs.2 and 3. The witnesses were brought there. At the verandah of the Sub Registrar's Office whereto the testator was moved in a wheel chair the original Will, prepared by the scribe, was read over to the testator in the presence of the witnesses and the testator signed in the same after confirming the correctness of the recitals. After due execution of the Will registration of the same followed. 15. The reliability of DW-3 is challenged only on the ground that he is an interested person. At the same time, nothing has been 'brought' out in the cross examination to show that the Will is the result of any manipulation on the part of DW-3 or for that matter, on the part of any other beneficiary. It is true that a power of attorney in favour of D.W.1 which had been executed by the testator earlier was got registered after bringing the Sub Registrar to the residence of the testator whereas for registering Ext.B9 he went all the way to Kozhikode. The question whether a person would go to the Sub Registry or whether the Sub Registrar should be brought to the residence of a person for registration, will depend upon the circumstances available. Merely because at one stage, one option was exercised, it does not mean that on another occasion the same practice should be followed. The testator might have decided to go Kozhikode for registering the Will to ensure confidentially of the document lest the excluded normal heirs might turn hostile to him till the end of his life. 16. True, the testator was without his legs and incapable of walking on the date of execution of Ext.B9; but that does not at all mean that his mental condition should be weak. The circumstances brought out in the cross examination of RW. 1 and DW-3 do not at all indicate that the testator was a person of weak mind. 16. True, the testator was without his legs and incapable of walking on the date of execution of Ext.B9; but that does not at all mean that his mental condition should be weak. The circumstances brought out in the cross examination of RW. 1 and DW-3 do not at all indicate that the testator was a person of weak mind. In fact, the evidence of his own wife P.W.1 already discussed supra shows that even after the surgery, the testator continued to look after his affairs and that he had himself gone over to the Bank concerned to redeem the gold which had been pledged by him. The fact that the testator did not arrange for bringing the Registrar to his residence or that he did not take any of his friends to be witnesses to the testament do not mean that the document is the result of any manipulation on the part of the beneficiary. Likewise, the fact that the testator chose to go to a Sub Registry within the jurisdiction of which the properties were not situated also is not a sufficient ground to shake the consistent version of the witnesses with regard to the execution and registration of the Will. 17. DW-4, who is the attesting witness to the Will, has given reliable evidence in support of due execution and registration. He has deposed that he had known the testator as his customer purchasing cigars from his shop. The fact that testator was a smoker of cigars is seen from the evidence of his own wife. DW-4 has deposed that at the time of execution of the will, the testator was having sound testamentary disposition. He has also stated that even to the Sub Registrar who examined the testator, the testator gave satisfactory answers and also expressed his desire to register the Will after admitting execution. Of course, DW-4 had admitted that he had in his life signed in about 15 documents as witness; but that does not make him an unreliable witness, especially, when he is actually a petty trader running a pan shop. 18. Yet another contention of the appellant is that there is total disinheritance of heirs. This is also not true. Of course, DW-4 had admitted that he had in his life signed in about 15 documents as witness; but that does not make him an unreliable witness, especially, when he is actually a petty trader running a pan shop. 18. Yet another contention of the appellant is that there is total disinheritance of heirs. This is also not true. What is seen from the evidence is that the testator applied his mind on all relevant aspects and that the plaintiff was excluded only because she was to get the properties of her mother. It is pertinent that as per Ext.B9 itself the properties obtained by the testator from his mother have been directed to be given to his sisters and this also shows that he exercised his will and desire in the allotment of his properties. It is not a case where all the properties of the testator were given to the children of the 2nd defendant alone. 19. There is controversy between the parties as to whether the deceased was governed by Hindu Mithakshara Law and whether the properties bequeathed as per Ext.B9 are joint family properties. Ext.B9 does not, specifically state either way. Neither side has adduced reliable oral evidence on the aspect of custom. The parties are Thiyyas of Malabar and in the absence of special proof the parties have to be taken as governed by normal system of succession applicable to Thiyyas. However, it is an admitted fact that in the Land Ceiling Case contention was raised that the parties are governed by the Hindu Mithakshara Law. In C.R.P.No. 3557/82 the present plaintiff did not raise any contention to the contrary. Ext.B4 shows that the A.I.T. authorities also recognized Velayudhan as the head of a Hindu undivided family. Exts. B6 and B7 are also to the same effect. In the absence of any reliable evidence to the contrary the said version can be accepted. 20. Even assuming that the parties were previously governed by the Hindu Mithakshara system, the Kerala Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 (Act 30/1976) has brought about a change with regard to the rights of Velayudhan as on Ext.B9 date (7-4-1981). Due to operation of Sec.4 of Act 30/76 the members of the coparcenary have to be treated as tenants-in common with effect from the notified date of 1-12-1976. Due to operation of Sec.4 of Act 30/76 the members of the coparcenary have to be treated as tenants-in common with effect from the notified date of 1-12-1976. Velayudhan has to be treated as holding his share under the deemed partition separately with effect from 1-12-1976. However, the said aspect may have relevance only if intestate succession takes place. If Ext.B9 Will is invalid, decision as to the nature of rights or the property may have little , relevance because whatever be the right of the deceased it will pass only to the legatees and the plaintiff and her mother being not beneficiaries in Ext.B9 Will will stand excluded from succession. 21. The fact that it was DW-3 who brought the other attesting witness -Raghavan and that he was a stranger to the testator, has little impact. DW-3 has given convincing evidence with regard to the circumstances in which he was made to fetch Raghavan. The testator had known only the other witness DW-4 and it was the testator who wanted DW-3 to find out one more witness. The said circumstance does not throw any serious doubt on the correctness of the version of the defence witness with regard to due execution and registration of Ext.B9. 22. It was brought out from the evidence of DW-1 that he had obtained blank papers signed by the testator and that he is still in possession of those papers. The contention is that some of such papers might have been used for cooking up of Ext.B9. The contention has to fail because here is a registered Will and it is not possible to infer that the signatures given before the Sub Registrar also could have been obtained in blank papers. No attempt was made by the plaintiff to subject the finger print impression recorded in Ext.B9 at the time of registration to scrutiny by an expert. The presumption regarding genuineness of the transaction applies to the case. Even assuming that there is any doubt in the matter of signature of the executant as it appears at the registration endorsement portion, that cannot throw any serious suspicion since finger print is also taken and no evidence is let in to show that it is not that of the testator. Even assuming that there is any doubt in the matter of signature of the executant as it appears at the registration endorsement portion, that cannot throw any serious suspicion since finger print is also taken and no evidence is let in to show that it is not that of the testator. The clear evidence of the Sub Registrar with regard to due registration and affixing of the signatures in his presence at the time of registration removes all possible doubts in the matter. 23. More or less similar contentions were considered by the Apex Court in Rabindranath Mukherjee and another v. Panchanan Banerjee (1995) 4 SCC 459 = AIR 1995 SC 1684 ). There also deprivation of natural heirs and suspicious circumstances were highlighted. The Court held that deprivation of shares to normal heirs should not raise any suspicion because the whole idea behind execution of a Will is to interfere with the normal line of succession. It was also held that where a Will is registered and the Sub Registrar certifies that it had been read over to the executor who, on doing so, admitted the contents, the fact that the witnesses to the document are interested loses significance and that no suspicion to the genuineness of a Will would arise in such a case and also that a total view has to be taken in such matters. 24. Here is a case where the plaintiff does not specifically allege impersonation behind creation of Ext.B9; the case is only that it is the result of fraud. Gangamoyi Debi v. T.N. Chowdhry (ILR 1906 Vol.33 Calcutta 537) is authority for the proposition that registration of a document is a solemn act to be performed in the presence of a competent official appointed to act as Registrar whose duty it is to attend the parties during the registration and see that the proper persons are present and are competent to act and are identified to his satisfaction and that all things done before him in his official capacity and verified by his signature will, unless it be shown that a deliberate fraud on him has been successfully committed, be presumed to be done duly and in order. There is no such evidence of fraud adduced in the present case. As such and on the evidence available in the case Ext.B9 has to be found as a genuine Will duly executed. 25. There is no such evidence of fraud adduced in the present case. As such and on the evidence available in the case Ext.B9 has to be found as a genuine Will duly executed. 25. Point No.3:- The suit for partition as brought forth in the case, proceeds on the assumption that Velayudhan died intestate. That it was not so, is clear from Ext.B9. The impact of Ext.B9 is to exclude the plaintiff, who is the daughter from inheritance of the assets of Velayudhan. It is not shown that Velayudhan had left behind any asset which was capable of inheritance by the plaintiff. 26. As far as the Cross objection is concerned, the contention raised is that Velayudhan has only 1/6 share over the property. The contention will have any relevance only if partition is effected on non testamantary basis. Since Ext.B1 has been found to be valid, the question of his exact rights does not fall for consideration in this case. Suffice it to say that as on the date of Ext.B9 the testator had become a tenant in-common over the coparcenary property. As he had only one son, viz., the 2nd defendant, each of them had 1/2 right and defendants 3 to 6 though coparcenars, can claim joint rights only over the 1/2 right of the 2nd defendant. Viewed from this perspective, the finding regarding joint rights is correct and there is no merit in the cross objection. In the circumstances, we affirm the decree of dismissal of the suit passed , by the Trial Court and dismiss the appeal and cross objection.