ORDER: Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties. The petitioner in each of these writ petitions has prayed for the issuance of a direction to the respondents to make a reference under Sec.18 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). After the lands of the petitioners had been acquired and Award had been passed by the Land Acquisition Collector, the petitioners had not filed the application under Sec.18 of the Act for making a reference within the stipulated period. However, a proceeding under Sec.30 of the Act for deciding about the entitlement of the Award was pending. It is stated that after the disposal of such proceeding under Sec.30 of the Act, an application was filed for making a reference. Since no reply was received, the petitioners filed several applications thereafter and ultimately issued Advocate’s notice. The departmental authorities refused to refer the matter under Sec.18 of the Act stating that the application for making a reference had not been filed within the stipulated period and, as such, no reference could be made. This is being challenged in the present writ petitions. 2. Sec.18 of the Land Acquisition Act reads as follows: "18. Reference to Court: (1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. (2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken: Provided that every such application shall be made- (a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector ar the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector’s award; (b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Sec.12, Sub-sec.(2), or within six months from the date of the Collector’s award, whichever period shall first expire. 3. A bare perusal of Sec.18 of the Act makes it clear that the application for making a reference claiming higher compensation has to be filed within the stipulated period as contemplated in Proviso (a) or (b) as the case may be. 3. A bare perusal of Sec.18 of the Act makes it clear that the application for making a reference claiming higher compensation has to be filed within the stipulated period as contemplated in Proviso (a) or (b) as the case may be. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that an oral protest had been made at the time of the Award and such oral protest could have been considered for the purpose of making a reference under Sec.18 of the Act. I am afraid such a contention cannot be accepted. For making a reference under Sec.18 of the Act, it is necessary that a written application must be filed and that too within the stipulated period. It is of course true that in addition to making the written application, it has to be established that the person concerned has not "accepted" the award. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in A.I.R. 994 A.P. 5 and contended that the oral protest to the Award is also sufficient. While it is true that the protest to the award may be written or oral, the necessity of filing an application for making a reference under Sec.18 of the Act cannot be overcome by merely proving that moral protest had been made. In other words, apart from making protest either oral or in writing, a written application has to be filed within the stipulated period. 5. It is now well settled that the Collector while considering the question of making a reference under Sec.18 of the Act does not function as a Court and, as such, provisions of Sec.5 of the Limitation Act are not applicable to such application for making a reference under Sec.18 of the Act. (See: Officer on Special Duty v. Shah Manilal Chendulal, J.T. (1996)2 S.C. 278 followed in Benudhar Senapati v. Zone Officer, (2000)1 O.I.R. 289. In other words, any belated application for making a reference under Sec.18 of the Act cannot be entertained nor is there any power to condone the delay in filing of such application, as provisions of the Limitation Act relating to condonation of delay are not applicable. 6. In the present case, the application had been filed beyond the stipulated period of limitation. 6. In the present case, the application had been filed beyond the stipulated period of limitation. The learned counsel for the petitioners, however, submitted that the application had been immediately after the disposal of the proceedings under Sec.30 of the Act. Sec.30 of the Act provides for having a reference for determining the entitlement of rival parties claiming a right to get compensation, whereas, Sec.18 envisages reference to a Court for determination of higher compensation as well as for determination of the right claimants. The disposal of a proceeding under Sec.30 cannot be construed as a staring point for limitation for making an application for reference under Sec.18. Thus this contention of the counsel cannot be accepted. In the present case, the refusal of the authority to make a reference cannot be held to be illegal, as the application was admittedly filed beyond the period of limitation. 7. Even if the battle is lost, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is not prepared to concede the war. He has submitted that application subsequently filed by the petitioners could have been treated as an application under Sec.28-A and the matter could have been dealt with by the Collector in accordance with law. 8. Sec.28-A of the Act is extracted hereunder: "28-A: Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court: (1) Where in an award under this part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Sec.11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under Sec.4, Sub-sec.(1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under Sec.18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court: Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. (2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under Sub-sec.(1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants. (3) Any person who has not accepted the award under Sub-sec.(2) may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of Secs.18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under Sec.18". 9. There is no dispute that the application or the representation filed by the petitioners or the advocate’s notice does not purport to be an application under Sec.28-A. The application under Sec.28-A has to be filed within the period of three months from the date of the subsequent Award enhancing compensation as has been clarified by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 2259. It has been observed by the Supreme Court in the said decision as follows: "A perusal of the provisions contained in Sec.(1) of Sec.28-A of the Act would show that after an award is made under Part III whereby the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Sec.11, a right accrues to a person interested in the other land covered by the same notification under Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.4, who is also aggrieved by the award of the Collector but who had not made an application to the Collector under Sec.18, to move an application before the Collector for re-determination of the amount of compensation payable to him on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court. This application for re-determination of compensation is required to be made within three months from the date of the award of the Court. The right to make the application under Sec.28-A arises from the award of the Court on the basis of which the person making the application is seeking re-determination of the compensation. This application for re-determination of compensation is required to be made within three months from the date of the award of the Court. The right to make the application under Sec.28-A arises from the award of the Court on the basis of which the person making the application is seeking re-determination of the compensation. There is nothing in Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.28-A to indicate that this right is confined in respect of the earliest award that is made by the Court after the coming into force of Sec.28-A. By construing the expression where in an award under this Part in Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.28-A to mean where in the first award made by Court under this part, the word ‘first’, is not found in Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.28-A, is being read therein and thereby the amplitude of the said provision is being curtailed so as to restrict the benefit conferred by it. In the matter of construction of a beneficent provision it is not permissible to judicial interpretation to read words which are not there and thereby restrict the scope of the said provision. (See: Jnan Ranjan Sen Gupta v. Arun Kumar Bose, (1975)2 S.C.C. 526 at 530: A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1994 at 1996)." 10. It is possible to visualize a situation where in the first award that is made by the Court after the coming to force of Sec.28-A the enhancement in the amount of compensation by the said award is not very significant for the reason that the person who sought the reference was not able to produce adequate evidence in support of his claim and in another reference where the award was made by the Court subsequently such evidence is produced before the Court and as much higher amount is awarded as compensation in the said award. By restricting the benefit of Sec.28-A to the first award that is made by the Court after the coming into force of Sec.28-A the benefit of higher amount of compensation on the basis of the subsequent award made by the Court would be denied to the persons invoking Sec.28-A and the benefit of the said provision would be confined to re-determination of compensation on the basis of lesser amount of compensation awarded under the first award that is made after the coming into force of Sec.28-A. There is nothing in the wording of Sec.28-A to indicate that the legislature intended to confer such a limited benefit under Sec.28-A. Similarly, there may be a situation, as in the present case, where the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act covers lands falling in different villages and a number of references at the instance of persons having lands in different villages were pending in the Court on the date of coming into force of Sec.28-A and awards in those references are made by the Court on different dates. A person who is entitled to apply under Sec.28-A belonging to a particular village may come to know of the first award that is made by the Court after the coming into force of Sec.28-A in a reference at the instance of a person belonging to another village, after the expiry of the period of three months from the date of the said award but he may come to know of the subsequent award that is made by the Court in the reference at the instance of a person belonging to the same village before the expiry of the period of three months from the date of the said award. This is more likely to happen in the cases of inarticulate and poor people who cannot be expected to keep track of all the references that were pending in Court on the date of coming into force of Sec.28-A and may not be in a position to know, in time, about the first award that is made by the Court after the coming into force of Sec.28-A. By holding that the award referred to in Sec.28-A(1) is the first award made after the coming into force of Sec.28-A, such persons would be to deprive of the benefit extended by Sec.28-A. Such a construction would thus result in perpetuating the inequality in the payment of compensation which the legislature wanted to remove by enacting Sec.28-A. The object underlying Sec.28-A would be better achieved by giving the expressing "an award" in Sec.28-A its natural meaning as meaning the award that is made by the Court in Part III of the Act after the coming into force of Sec.28-A. If the said expression in Sec.28-A(i) is thus construed, a person would be able to seek re-determination of the amount of compensation payable to him provided the following conditions are satisfied: (i) An award has been made by the Court under Part III after the coming into force of Sec.28-A; (ii) By the said award the amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Sec.11, has been allowed to the applicant in that reference; (iii) The person moving the application under Sec.28-A is interested in other land covered by the same notification under Sec.4(1) to which the said award relates; (iv) The person moving the application did not make an application to the Collector under Sec.18; (v) The application is moved within three months from the date of the award on the basis of which the re-determination of amount of compensation is sought; and (vi) Only one application can be moved under Sec.28-A for re-determination of compensation by an applicant. 12. 12. Since the cause of action for moving the application for re-determination of compensation under Sec.28-A from the award on the basis of which re-determination of compensation is sought, the principle that "once the limitation begins to run, it runs in its full course until its running is interdicted by an order of the Court" can have no application because the limitation for moving the application under Sec.28-A will being to run only from the date of the award on the bases of which re-determination of compensation is sought." 11. Admittedly, the petitioners in those petitions have not filed any formal application. It is apparent in the aforesaid decision that the application under Sec.28-A has to be filed within the period of three months from the date of the Award, on the basis of which higher compensation is claimed. It is also made clear that only one such application can be filed by the tenant. Since admittedly the petitioners had not filed any application under Sec.28-A of the Act, it is open to the petitioners to file such an application subject to other conditions being fulfilled. It goes without saying that if any such application under Sec.28-A of the Act would be filed, such application has to be considered by the competent authority in accordance with law. 12. The petitioners had earlier filed the application for making a reference under Sec.18 of the Act. Since such an application was admittedly barred by time, in law it must be treated that there was no such application. Sec.28-A of the Act makes it clear that the application under Sec.28-A can be considered even if no application was filed under Sec.18 of the Act. 13. Subject to the aforesaid observations, the writ petitions are disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.