Judgment :- 1. These three appeals arise out of the judgment in O.S. No 192/80, 213/80 and 221/80 all on the file of Sub Court, Chidambaram. The defendant in each of those suits are the respective appellants and the respective plaintiff is the respondent in each of the appeals. Heard Mr. G. Sukumar, learned Special Government Advocate for the appellant in each case and Mr. S. Ashok Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent in each appeal. 2. These appeals were heard a few days before the hearing date today. The main thrust of the argument of the learned Special Government pleader for the appellant at that time was, which he continued to reiterate even today, that the respective suits must fail because of non-joinder of necessary parties. A question arose in my mind on hearing that argument as to what would be the result of the appeal if such an argument advanced on the plea of non-joinder of necessary parties is accepted. Only two results are possible namely, either the suits must be dismissed or if the facts warrant, then instead of dismissing the suit, this Court would be in a position to remit the suits back to the trial Court with a direction to the plaintiff in each suit to implead the necessary parties and then dispose of the suit in accordance with law. When this Court was applying its mind to the two situations referred to above, it had come across a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case reported in (Chengazhisseri etc. v. Board of Commissioners for HRE) Vol. 61 M.L.J. LXI 862 = 34 L.W. 848. That Judgment arose under Section 84(2) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act II of 1927, hereinafter referred to as the “former Act”. In that Judgment it was held as follows. “The Court has no authority under Section 84(2) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act to direct a remand and re-hearing of a case. That Judgment arose under Section 84(2) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act II of 1927, hereinafter referred to as the “former Act”. In that Judgment it was held as follows. “The Court has no authority under Section 84(2) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act to direct a remand and re-hearing of a case. The powers conferred on the Court by that section are only to modify or set aside the decision of the Board and to dismiss the application.” Taken aback by this Judgment, I wanted to probe further as to whether the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the above referred to Judgment would come in the way of this Court, exercising appellate Jurisdiction, from remanding the suit to the trial Court for disposal in accordance with law. Mr. S. Gopalarathinam, Learned Senior Counsel was present in Court in connection with some other appeals. I requested the learned Senior Counsel to help this Court to understand its powers as an appellate Court. In spite of his heavy schedule of work, Mr. S. Gopalaratnam learned Senior Counsel readily agreed to assist this Court. 3. Today Mr. S. Gopalaratnam learned Senior Counsel, by taking me through the “former Act” submitted that the Judgment of this Court referred to supra would not be taken to mean that the appellate Court also has no power of remand. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the Judgment of this Court referred to earlier was dealing with a factual position of the District Court exercising power under Section 84(2) of the “former Act” and only in that context held that the District Court has no power to remand, as the powers of the District Court are circumscribed in the very Section itself. By taking me through the relevant provisions in the present Act namely, the Hindu Religious Charitable Endowments Act 22/59 as amended upto date (hereinafter referred to as the Act) it is contended by the learned Senior Counsel that through the power to be exercised by the Civil Court under Section 70(1) of the Act is similar to the power to be exercised by the District Court under Section 84(2) of the “former Act”, yet the learned Senior Counsel would contend that when a Court exercises an appellate power, it exercises all the powers which it exercises as an ordinary appellate Court and available in the Code of Civil Procedure. Both the “former Act” and the present Act provides for an appeal to the High Court and as such the Statute itself provides for an appeal to the High Court. The powers to be exercised by the High Court as an appellate Court are not limited either under the “former Act” or under the present Act and therefore, to reiterate, the learned Senior Counsel would contend that all the ordinary powers of the appellate Court, which includes a power of remand, are available to this Court in hearing these appeals as well. In support of his argument, the learned Senior Counsel brought to my notice the following Judgments: (a) 45 L.W. 695 = 1937 2 M.L.J. 175 (Marudamuthu Poosari & another v. The Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras) (b) 61 L.W. 52 (P.C.) = 1948 1 M.L.J. 41 (Adaikkappa Chettiar v. Chanarasekara Devar) In 45 L.W. 695 = 1937 2 M.L.J. 175 it had been held as follows: “It is in a sense right to say that the Religious Endowments Act is self contained, that is, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code will not by their own force apply to every inquiry to be conducted by the authorities appointed or constituted under the Act. But when the Act allows suits or applications to be filed in a Civil Court in relation to matters arising under the Act the principle that the Act is self contained is irrelevant to the question of the procedure to be followed by the Civil Court in dealing with such applications or suits. But when the Act allows suits or applications to be filed in a Civil Court in relation to matters arising under the Act the principle that the Act is self contained is irrelevant to the question of the procedure to be followed by the Civil Court in dealing with such applications or suits. On the other hand, it will be illogical to expect in the Endowments Act a provision to the effect that a suit brought in a civil Court will be governed by Civil Procedure Code. Applications in a Civil Court will not stand on a different footing. All that can be said is that in dealing with suits, the Court will follow the procedure applicable to suits and in dealing with applications, the Court will follow the procedure applicable to applications. It is on the principle that once a matter comes before a regular Civil Court its further course will be governed by the provisions of the Code, that Second Appeals have been permitted from decisions of District Courts in cases under Rent Recovery Act and in appeals under the Forest Act.” That was a case where an aggrieved party, against the order of the Endowment Board, presented a petition under Section 84 of the “former Act” before the District Court for appropriate reliefs. The petition was dismissed for default. Later the party, who suffered the order of dismissal for default, filed an application under Order 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure to restore it. The District Court in that case thinking that it has no powers to be exercised in favour of the petitioner before it as prayed f or, dismissed it. Only in that context, a learned Judge of this Court laid down the law as above. 4. The Judgment reported in 1948 1 M.L.J. 41 = 61 L.W 52 (PC) is that of the Privy Council. Among other things, the question that was involved in the case was whether an order under Section 19 of Tamil Nadu Act IV of 1938 is appealable or not. Based on the earlier Full Bench Judgment of this Court, it was held by the High Court that the appeal filed by the Judgment debtor against the latter order on the application filed under Section 19 of the Act was incompetent. Based on the earlier Full Bench Judgment of this Court, it was held by the High Court that the appeal filed by the Judgment debtor against the latter order on the application filed under Section 19 of the Act was incompetent. But however allowed the judgement debtor to convert that appeal into a Civil revision petition and on merits the revision was allowed. It is this order, along with another connected order, that was challenged before the Privy Council. Their Lordships of the Privy Council had applied their mind to the earlier Full Bench Judgment of this Court reported in 1941 1 M.L.J. 164 =53 L.W. 79 (FB) (Nagappa Chettiar v. Annapoorani Achi) and held that they are not in agreement with that judgment. In the context of the above facts, it was laid down by the Privy Council as follows: “Where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary courts of the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies, if authorised by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special Statute which does not in terms confer a right of appeal.” The emphasis of the law laid down is that, when ordinary Court of the country are called upon to decide a dispute, the said Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto. Therefore the judgments brought to my notice by Mr. S. Gopalaratnam learned Senior Counsel leave no room at all to doubt that this Court exercising powers as an appellate Court would be in a position to exercise all powers available to it as it normally exercises as an appellate Court. I am in entire agreement with the learned Senior Counsel that the Judgment of this Court reported in Vol 61 M.L.J. LXI 862 = 34 L.W. 848) was decided in a totally different set of circumstances. In that case the District Court remanded the matter to the Endowment Board. Therefore I have no doubt at all in my mind that this Court has the power to order remand if a case is made out. 5. There was one application under Section 63(c) of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) which was on the file of the Deputy Commissioner, Madras. Therefore I have no doubt at all in my mind that this Court has the power to order remand if a case is made out. 5. There was one application under Section 63(c) of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) which was on the file of the Deputy Commissioner, Madras. The relief prayed for in that application is to declare the properties forming the subject matter of that application as religious endowment and for appropriate direction to secure the income for the temple and for taking possession by the trustees and for such other appropriate orders. Five persons in that application were petitioners and the first petitioner was the Managing Trustee and the other four petitioners were described as the trustees. 19th respondent in that application was also a trustee and rest of the respondents, 1 to 18 were either alienees or persons in possession of the properties comprised in that original application. Later on this application jurisdictionwise was transferred to the Deputy Commissioner, Trichy under the Act and renumbered as O.A. No. 146/74. By Order dated 22.10.76 (annexure) the Deputy Commissioner held that the properties described in the agreement dated 24.1.1898, exhibited as Ex.A1 before him constitute a religious endowment as contemplated under Section 63(c) of the Act and ordered the application as prayed for. There were three appeals before the Commissioner, Madras under the Act. The appeal numbers are A.P. 12/77, A.P. 217/77 and A.P. 218/77. The appellants before the Commissioner are the 20th respondent, 7th respondent and the first respondent respectively. The appeals were dismissed on merits. Therefore, each one of them had filed a separate suit as contemplated under Section 70 of the Act. To all the suits the Deputy Commissioner being the original authority and the Commissioner being the Appellate Authority under the Act alone had been added as parties. A joint trial was conducted and evidence was recorded in common. On the side of the plaintiffs four witnesses were examined as P.Ws. 1 to 4 which includes the respective plaintiff in the three suits as P.Ws. 1, 2 and 4. On the side of the plaintiffs 27 exhibits had come to be marked as Exs.A1 to A27. On the side of the defendant, an ex-trustee had been examined as D.W.1 and 16 exhibits had come to be marked as Exs.B1 to B16. 1 to 4 which includes the respective plaintiff in the three suits as P.Ws. 1, 2 and 4. On the side of the plaintiffs 27 exhibits had come to be marked as Exs.A1 to A27. On the side of the defendant, an ex-trustee had been examined as D.W.1 and 16 exhibits had come to be marked as Exs.B1 to B16. In substance the issues framed by the learned trial Judge are as follows: 1. Whether the “will” dated 8.5.65 executed by Sundaresan Pillai is true and valid? 2. Whether the agreement dated 24.1.1898 is valid, enforceable and binding on the plaintiff? 3. Whether the predecessors in title of the plaintiff in the suit were in possession of the suit property and whether they perfected title by adverse possession? 4. Would not the judgment of the High Court in A.S. No. 150/61 bind the plaintiff? 5. Whether the orders passed by the original authority and the appellate authority are liable to be set aside? 6. Is not the suit bad in law for non-joinder of necessary parties? On the issue raised relating to non-joinder of necessary parties the learned trial Judge proceeded to hold in paragraph 22 of the judgment that the original authority and the appellate authority constituted under the Act are the only necessary parties as they have the necessary machinery to sustain the order and therefore, the suit is not bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. On the other issues he proceeded to hold that the suit property originally belonged to one Subramania Pillai at least from the year 1915 or so and that the properties mentioned in the agreement dated 24.1.1898 are not correlated as the suit properties and therefore, the said agreement would not affect the rights of the parties of the suit over that property. The learned trial Judge also held that though the suit properties would have belonged to the deities prior to 1915, yet the deities have lost the title by a hostile right and title vested with the predecessors in interest of the plaintiff and thus the predecessors in title of the parties to the suit have perfected title by adverse possession. Applying his mind to Section 109 of the Act the learned trial Judge held as the properties are shown to have vested with the individuals prior to 13.9.51, the plaintiffs are entitled to have their reliefs granted by the Court. Applying his mind to Section 109 of the Act the learned trial Judge held as the properties are shown to have vested with the individuals prior to 13.9.51, the plaintiffs are entitled to have their reliefs granted by the Court. The learned trial Judge also upheld the validity of the “will” dated 8.6.85 and consequently set aside the order of the original as well as the Appellate Authority under the Act. 6. The appeals were argued at length by the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned counsel for the respondent in each appeal. I went through the materials with utmost care and caution. Both the original authority and the appellate Authority were called upon to consider the question whether the properties forming the subject matter of the application before the original authority are religious endowment or not as provided for under Section 63(c) of the Act. “Religious endowment” is define d in Section 6(17) of the Act as properties belonging to or given or endowed for the support of temples or given or endowed for the purpose of any service, charity of a public nature connected therewith etc. The learned trial Judge in my considered opinion, in view of the nature of the controversy between the parties before the original authority ought to have framed a vital issue namely, whether the properties forming the subject matter of the original application constitute a religious endowment or not? I find that the learned trial Judge had not framed the said vital issue which had definitely affected his judgment. The entire appreciation of the controversy between the parties based on oral and documentary evidence would definitely revolve round the question whether the properties constitute a religious endowment or not and whether there is any endowment at all and if so at what point of time. The learned trial Judge framed an issue in O.S. No. 192/80 (issue No. 3) namely, whether the properties belong to the deities of Agatheeswarar Swamy, Varadaraja Perumal and Selli Amman. But a specific issue as to whether it constitutes a religious endowment or not would be totally different from whether the properties belong to the temple itself. The learned trial Judge framed an issue in O.S. No. 192/80 (issue No. 3) namely, whether the properties belong to the deities of Agatheeswarar Swamy, Varadaraja Perumal and Selli Amman. But a specific issue as to whether it constitutes a religious endowment or not would be totally different from whether the properties belong to the temple itself. Therefore, I have no doubt at all in my mind that the framing of Issue No. 3 as referred to above, would not by itself enable the learned trial Judge to appreciate the controversy in its proper perspective. The learned trial Judge proceeded to hold that assuming that the properties belonged to the three deities prior to 1915 (lines 40 to 45 in para 19 of the printed judgment), yet proceeded to hold that the title had been lost by adverse possession. For this the learned trial judge holds that the individuals other than the temples got vested with the property prior to 30.9.51 as provided for in Section 109 of the Act. Though an objection had been raised, as already stated, about non-joinder of necessary parties, the learned trial Judge held, in my opinion, erroneously that there is no non-joinder of necessary parties and therefore the suit would not fail. 7. In the context of the above controversy and the light of the decision which I intend to take on non-joinder of necessary parties, I am of the considered opinion that this Court need not say anything on merits on the rival claims of the parties to the suit since anything said is likely to affect their rights. Admittedly the original application was presented before the Deputy Commissioner seeking reliefs by five trustees in office of all the three deities. They are the best persons to protect the interest of the temple and there cannot be any doubt about it. They succeeded before the original authority. There is no dispute before this Court that when three of the respondents in the original application filed three separate appeals before the appellate Authority under the Act, erstwhile trustees who moved Deputy Commissioner have lost their office and a fit person came to be appointed and therefore, the fit person alone was shown as the respondent in the appeals. The appellate Authority also affirmed the order of the original authority. The appellate Authority also affirmed the order of the original authority. In such circumstances, when the aggrieved appellant before the appellate Authority files a suit before the Civil forum, it is but necessary that persons interested must be made as parties to the suit and the persons are the trustees who were holding office on the date of the suit and if there are no trustees, any other fit person or Executive Officer appointed by the Government in their place. Now time had passed and therefore, whoever is in office as on date in respect of three temples have to be necessarily made as parties to the suit so that they would be in a position to file their written statement and bring in evidence so that the civil Court would be in a position to dispose of the controversy between the parties after giving full hearing and opportunity to all the parties concerned and who have interest in the properties of the temple. The conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Judge that the original authority and the appellate authority are commanding enough machinery under the Act and therefore, they would protect the interest of the temple cannot be that easily accepted since the evidence, both documentary and oral, which the persons interested in the affairs of the temple would bring before Court may be or may not be available with the department. Though it may be true that D.W.I is a trustee, yet it appears from his evidence that he was not the trustee on the day when the suit was filed. His evidence shows that he was a trustee only between 1957 and 1962 and after that there were successive new appointments of trustees. Therefore, D.W.I would not be having any access to the entirety of the records of the temple and therefore, to that extent the temple and the trustees holding office had been denied the opportunity to defend their case before the civil forum. I have no doubt at all in my mind that in the absence of either the trustees or any other persons appointed by the government in the place of trustees, there cannot be a complete and full adjudication of the rights between the parties especially when the question is whether there is a religious endowment or not. I have no doubt at all in my mind that in the absence of either the trustees or any other persons appointed by the government in the place of trustees, there cannot be a complete and full adjudication of the rights between the parties especially when the question is whether there is a religious endowment or not. Therefore, I have no doubt at all in my mind that the decision rendered by the learned trial judge that the suit is not bad for non-joinder of necessary parties cannot be sustained and it is accordingly set aside. Consequently, necessary parties must be brought on record as defendants in the suit. Realising this difficulty, on behalf of the respondent in each appeal three Civil Miscellaneous Petitions are before this Court namely, C.M.P. No 11417/2000 (A.S. No. 83/84) C.M.P. No 11442/2000. A.S. No. 84/84): and C.M.P. No. 11582/2000 (A.S. No. 85/84) to implead the deities represented by the trustees. Impleading these persons in the appeal would not amount to providing the desired opportunity to the persons having interest in the temple and therefore, I deem it fit that all the suits must be remitted back to the learned trial Judge to comply with the directions to be enumerated hereunder and then dispose the suits. Accordingly, all the three Civil Miscellaneous Petitions are dismissed as unnecessary at this stage. 8. All the three appeals are accordingly allowed and the judgment under challenge is set aside on the sole ground that non-joinder of necessary parties had affected the decision of the learned trial Judge. In as much as the decision on merits had come to be given in the suit in the absence of necessary parties, consequent to my finding on the issue of non-joinder of necessary parties, the finding rendered by the learned trial Judge on all the other issues in all the three suits are also set aside. The respective suits namely, O.S. No. 192/80, 213/80 and 221/80 would stand remitted back to the file of the learned sub Judge, Chidambaram for fresh disposal in accordance with law and in so doing the learned trial Judge is directed to comply with the following directions: a) The plaintiff in each suit shall be directed to implead in each suit the respective trustees/executive Officer/fit person in charge of the affairs of the temple in question. b) The newly impleaded persons shall be permitted to file written statement within a short time as may be fixed by the learned trial Judge., c) On such written statement coming on record the learned trial Judge shall also give time to the plaintiff to file reply statement if they so desire. d) A de novo trial is ordered. Fresh evidence, both oral and documentary, are permitted to be brought on record by all the parties to the suit. The documentary evidence to be brought on record would include the documents already exhibited which again have to be re-exhibited in the manner to be decided by the Court. e) Since the suits are of the year 1980, the learned trial Judge is directed to dispose of all the three suits giving top priority in any event not later than 30.9.2002 and send a report about the same to this Court. Any deviation in the time schedule fixed will be taken serious note of. 9. The Registry is directed to draft the decree in all the three appeals on or before 26.11.2001 and remit the entire records along with a copy of the judgment and decree to the learned trial Judge in any event not later than 30.11.2001. All the appeals are accordingly allowed. No costs. R. Balasubramanian, J.: — (12th, December, 2001- A.S No. 83 to 85 of 1984): — These appeals are before me for “being mentioned” at the request of Mr. S. Gopalratham, learned Senior Counsel. Mr. Gopalratham said that the suits are of the year 1980 and to give an opportunity to the plaintiffs to implead the necessary parties at this belated stage ie., after the expiry of atleast 21 years would not advance the ends of justice and therefore, this Court may exercise suo motu power of revision and dismiss the suits itself. 2. I applied my mind carefully to the submission made at the bar by Mr. S. Gopalratnam, learned Senior Counsel. In as much as I have passed a judicial order remanding the suits to the trial Court with certain directions to be complied with and as the said remand cannot be said to be unjust, I am of the considered opinion that following safeguards, if made, in the judgment of this Court, would meet the ends of justice. Accordingly, the following further directions are given. 3. Accordingly, the following further directions are given. 3. In paragraph 8 of my judgment, I have given certain directions enumerated as (a) to (e) to be complied with and these directions need not be understood in the sense that the proposed parties shall be impleaded without even being heard. In other words, I make it clear that when the plaintiff in each suit takes steps to implead the proposed parties, each of the proposed parties shall be heard on merits on all points available in law and on facts to them. When disposing of the application on merits, the judgment of this Court shall not stand in the way of the learned trial Judge to appreciate any contention that may be raised by either parties to the application filed for impleading necessary parties.