ORDER: This judgment will dispose of W.P.Nos.5420 to 5443 of 1997 as a common question is involved in all these writ petitions. In fact, all these petitioners had individually filed industrial disputes which were of the identical nature, which industrial disputes came to be disposed of by a common award passed by the Labour Court, Vellore. 2. All the petitioners, at the relevant time, were engaging themselves as ‘labourers’ at various bus-stands and their case is that they were engaged by the respondent- Pattukottai Azhagiri Transport Corporation, Vellore and that they were illegally terminated. They, therefore, claimed reinstatement with backwages and continuity of service. They had also filed claim petitions under Sec.33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act (in short ‘I.D.Act’) claiming bonus for the immediate last five years prior to their filing of the applications. Even those claim petitions came to be dismissed by the aforementioned common award whereby the Labour Court firstly held that there was no ‘master-servant’ relationship between the Corporation and the petitioners and as such they could not be said to be the ‘employees’ of the Corporation and therefore, there was no question of considering their allegedly illegal termination of service. Since they were not held to be the employees of the Corporation even the claim petitions under Sec.33-C(2) of the I.D. Act came to be rejected by the Labour Court. It is this common award which is in challenge before me in these twenty-four writ petitions. Needless to mention that all the persons who had originally filed the industrial disputes and claim petitions have not chosen to file writ petitions as originally there were as many as 33 petitions filed whereas only 24 out of them have chose to come by way of these writ petitions. However, it is an admitted position that all the writ petitioners were before the Labour Court is the aforementioned industrial disputes and the claim petitions. 3. A common case was separately pleaded before the Labour Court. For the sake of convenience, I am taking the facts pleaded in I.D.No.29 of 1993 filed on behalf of R.Dakshinamoorthy, who pleaded that he joined the services of Pallavan Transport Corporation Limited, District Wing as “loader” in 1978 and was in continuous service with them till 31.12.1982, when the District Wing of the said Corporation was renamed as Pattukottai Alagiri Transport Corporation. It is his claim that he continued as “loader” at Chetput bus stand of the respondent- Corporation. He then pleaded that he had completed more than 480 days of ‘continuous service’ which entitled him for the ‘permanency’ under the Tamil Nadu Conferment of Permanent Status, to Workmen Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as Act 46 of 1981). He then alleged that he along with other loaders complained to the labour authorities through their Union against the failure to make them permanent employees of the Corporation and angered by this, the management had summarily and wrongfully terminated him and other loaders from service on and from 25.5.1998, which was illegal and in gross violation of the provisions of Sec.25-F of the I.D. Act inasmuch as they were neither given any show cause notice nor were given any retrenchment compensation. It is then complained that they wrote several letters to the management for the reinstatement and were ultimately driven to the Labour Court because of the adament attitude on the part of the respondent Management by way of petitions under Sec.2-A(2) of the I.D.Act. The claim of the other petitioners is more or the less same with the difference that these workers claimed to be working as “loaders” in the different bus-stands of various other transport Corporations such as Thanthai Periyar Transport Corporation, Pallavan Transport Corporation and other transport Corporations. In short, it can be seen that petitioners herein were laying their claims against Pattukottai Alagiri Transport Corporation, Vellore District which alone is a party- respondent to the present writ petitions. It is again to be noted that by way of subsequent event even the said respondent Corporation does not any more existing as all the transport Corporation including the respondent Corporation have already been merged into the State Express Transport Corporation. However, that is not relevant for the purpose of deciding the controversy involved herein. 4. The claim of the petitioners came to be equally vehemently resisted by the second respondent Corporation by claiming that the petitioners were never in service of the respondent Corporation much less as “loaders” as claimed by them. It was suggested that the post of “loader” does not and did not exist any time in the said transport Corporations. 4. The claim of the petitioners came to be equally vehemently resisted by the second respondent Corporation by claiming that the petitioners were never in service of the respondent Corporation much less as “loaders” as claimed by them. It was suggested that the post of “loader” does not and did not exist any time in the said transport Corporations. The claim that the petitioners were engaged in the daily wages of Rs.8 was also denied suggesting that there was never any contract of service with the petitioners. It was then pointed out in paragraph 5 of the common counter that some times the Branch Managers of respondent Corporation engaged some “casual workers” on daily wages paid from out of the “imprest fund” maintained by the Branch Managers. However, the daily attendance of these casual workers was not compulsory and it was only whenever they helped the conductors, they were paid for the day. The claim that the petitioners had worked continuously for more than 480 days days was also refuted. Naturally, the contention of victimisation and retrenchment, etc., in breach of Sec.25-F of the I.D. Act was also denied. 5. On the backdrop of these pleadings, evidence was adduced before the Labour Court wherein, all the applicants offered themselves as witnesses. The Management also examined few witnesses to refute the claim. On the basis of the evidence, the Labour Court has come to the conclusion that it was not proved that the petitioners were ever in the employment or service of the respondent Corporation much less in the capacity as “loaders”. The Labour Court also recorded a finding that there was no retrenchment as initially itself the petitioners had failed to prove that they were employees of the respondent Corporation. In that view, the Labour Court dismissed all the applications both under Sec.2-A(2) and Sec.33-C(2) of the I.D.Act. 6. In support of the petitions, Mr.Vasudevan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, very strongly pleaded that the finding of fact reached by the Labour Court was perverse inasmuch as the Labour Court had failed to take into account the various admissions made by the Management in its pleadings as also in their evidence. The learned counsel very persuasively took me through the whole evidence to point out the said admissions. The learned counsel very persuasively took me through the whole evidence to point out the said admissions. The mainstay of the argument was that there was no question of insisting upon appointment letters or termination orders as these appointments could not be said to be the ‘civil posts’ where such formalities could be necessary. It was argued that all these petitioners were “casual labourers” and what was liable to be seen was whether they were actually working as casual labourers for a particular period at the instance of the Management. It was tried to be suggested that the management had failed to produce the documents and records regarding their appointments and the Labour Court should have insisted on the Management’s producing such records because it was primarily the burden of the Management. It was also suggested that the “continuous service” rendered by these petitioners as “loaders” sometimes at the instance of the Management’s representatives like Branch Managers and Conductors would entitle them to the status of “casual workers” which the Labour Court had failed to see. Various rulings were pressed into service before me, important amongst them being Silver Jubliee Tailoring House v. Chief Inspector of Shops and Establishments, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 37, Pandiyan Roadways Corporation Limited v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, (1995)1 L.L.J. 236 , Dharanghadhra Chemical Works Limited v. State of Saurashtra, (1997)1 L.L.J. 477 and S.Murugesan v. First Additional Labour Court, (2001)2 L.L.N. 457. 7. On the other hand, Mr.Kabilan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Corporation pointed out at the out set that an identical claim of the loaders was rejected by a learned single Judge of this Court (E.Padmanabhan, J.) in Thiruvalluvar Pokkuvarathu Kazhaka Anna Sumai Thookuvor Pothu Nala Sangam, Express Bus Stand v. State Express Transport Corporation (Tamil Nadu) Limited, W.P.No.14169 of 1999. He pointed out that the factual situation in that writ petition was not only similar but also identical with the factual situation in the present writ petitions. Relying very heavily on that judgment, Mr.Kapilan pressed for the dismissal of the writ petitions. 8. The further argument on behalf of the respondent Corporation was that under the factual circumstances could the petitioners be held to be the “employees” of the Corporation as, at no point of time, were their services accepted as such by the respondent Corporation. Relying very heavily on that judgment, Mr.Kapilan pressed for the dismissal of the writ petitions. 8. The further argument on behalf of the respondent Corporation was that under the factual circumstances could the petitioners be held to be the “employees” of the Corporation as, at no point of time, were their services accepted as such by the respondent Corporation. Mr.Kabilan argued that the petitioners, even if it was established that they were working and helping the conductors in loading and unloading the luggage or canvassing passengers for the respondent transport Corporation, could not establish nexus between them and the respondent Corporation. He pointed out that the Branch Managers did not have any authority to “appoint” any persons much less as “loader” because of the prevailing rules of the Corporation. He was at pains to point out that the post of “loader” never existed in the respondent Corporation. There was no “salary” or “wages” attached to that post also. He then argued that even if these petitioners were working for the conductors, it was only for their own benefit and they were never paid out of the funds of the Corporation. According to the learned counsel, even if it was proved that some of these persons at some point of time were paid out of the “imprest fund” maintained by the Branch Managers, such payments could be said to be the sporadic payments which would not cover any status of an “employee” or even “casual worker” as against the respondent Corporation itself. Mr.Kabilan also relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court to which I was party, in The Workmen of Nilgiris Co-operative Marketing Society Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2001)2 C.T.C. 236 , wherein a view was taken in respect of the labourers engaged by the society for loading, unloading, grading and sorting the potatoes and other vegetables brought by the growers to the society’s yard could not be said to the “employees” of the society. 9. On these conflicting grounds, it is to be considered whether the Labour Court was right in rejecting the claim of the petitioners and whether the petitioners can succeed before this Court. 10. At the outset, it has to be borne in mind that what is being asked by way of these petitions is to re-appreciate the evidence adduced before the Labour Court. 10. At the outset, it has to be borne in mind that what is being asked by way of these petitions is to re-appreciate the evidence adduced before the Labour Court. Learned counsel for the petitioners very heavily relied upon the evidence led and pointed out that the case of the petitioners was proved to the hilt and yet the Labour Court wrote the findings which could not have been reached ordinarily. In this, the learned counsel also suggested that the Labour Court had ignored certain important aspects of the evidence. It is trite law that under jurisdiction under Art.226 ‘reappreciation of the evidence’ is impermissible nor can this Court sit as an ‘appellate Court’ over the award passed unless of course, it is shown that the appreciation of evidence was perverse. In the present case, seeing the evidence as a whole, no such complaint can be made against the award passed. The Labour Court, on the other hand, has taken an extremely reasonable view of the evidence led and has made a thorough attempt to appreciate the evidence in all possible manner. The Labour Court has not only taken the stock of the oral evidence but has also considered few documents which were filed before it in support of the petitioner’s claim. 11. Speaking about the documentary evidence, the Labour Court has referred to Ex.P-300 where one of the petitioners, viz., V.Narayanan was permitted by an order by the Branch Manager of G.T. Bus Depot of Thanthai Periyar Transport Corporation to work as a “broker”. Now such a permission cannot be taken to be issued on behalf of the respondent Corporation and it cannot also be viewed to be an “appointment order” or in any way acknowledging the said petitioner as a “servant” of the respondent Corporation. The Labour Court has also considered Ex.P-273 which is a similar kind of order passed by the Branch Manager permitting the petitioner to work as a “loader”. The Labour Court has pointed out that under Ex.R-1 the Board of Management had empowered the General Manager alone to be the “appointing authority” under the working rules and, therefore, this could not be said to be an “appointment” at all or for that matter a “regular appointment”. The Labour Court has taken a view and in my opinion correctly that mere permitting few of these petitioners to work as “brokers”, “loaders”, etc. The Labour Court has taken a view and in my opinion correctly that mere permitting few of these petitioners to work as “brokers”, “loaders”, etc. would not confer them status of an “employee”. Mr.Vasudevan, wanted to urge that this proved that they were actually working with the connivance of the Branch Managers of the respondent Corporation and were as such in the service or could be termed as at least the casual workers. He argues that the question of appointment is applicable only to the civil posts and not to the casual workers. I do not think that such a broad proposition can be accepted that in case of a casual worker one need not look for any document. It is an admitted case that all these transport Corporations’ were the Government run Corporations and were being governed by the particular rules and regulations and as such it could not be countenanced that there would be appointments without following the rules and regulations particularly quoted above in the shape of the resolution contained in Ex.R-1. The Labour Court, in my opinion, was right in insisting upon some records suggesting that the respondent Corporation itself had acknowledged these persons as its “employees”. Nothing is to be found on that account. 12. The oral evidence has been considered by the Labour Court wherein the petitioners claimed to be “appointees” by the Branch Managers and conductors on ad hoc basis or casual basis. The Labour Court has rightly considered this situation that they were never paid any “wages” from out of the permanent fund of the Corporation nor were any accounts kept of such payments. Surely there would have been some documentation had these petitioners been working as “regular employees” or at least as “casual labourers”. It is obvious from the oral evidence adduced that the petitioners were never asked by the Branch Managers to be present for particular hours on particular days; they were never compelled to apply for leave, etc., if they wanted to remain absent and even if they were paid in some sporadic cases some “commission” by the Branch Managers, it cannot be give any handle to a claim against the respondent Corporation itself. A reference has been made to the cross-examination of few witnesses wherein it was admitted that they were paid by the agents and they get some “commission” for the service rendered by them. A reference has been made to the cross-examination of few witnesses wherein it was admitted that they were paid by the agents and they get some “commission” for the service rendered by them. The Labour Court has come to the conclusion that though these persons were used some times sporadically by the Branch Managers and conductors, there was no authorisation on behalf of the respondent Corporation for such a user and these persons could not be said to be working “regularly” for and on behalf of the respondent Corporation. 13. The Labour Court has also taken stock of the other documents which suggested that some attendance was noted. However, the Labour Court has rightly discarded these documents as they were maintained by the petitioners themselves wherein there are some jottings about the arrival timing of the buses and the buses in respect of which the petitioners concerned worked. It is to be seen that there are “regular porters” in the service of the respondent Corporation to handle the luggage of the passengers and these petitioners were only engaged by way of an arrangement made by the Branch Managers and conductors for handling luggage and attracting more number of passengers with a view to increase the collection which would result in their receiving more incentives based on the daily collection. The Labour Court has rightly rejected the documents as not being maintained by the Branch Managers and has rightly concluded that had these petitioners been in the “regular service” of the respondent Corporation, all these documents could have been maintained by the Corporation. Learned counsel for the petitioners earnestly argued that it was for the Corporation to produce its records and the respondent Corporation to produce its records and the respondent Corporation alone was to be blamed for not producing those records. There was no request made to the Labour Court for producing those records and, in fact, the transport Corporation denied the existence of any such record. There is no reason to dispute that claim. Much was made that out of these registers, which were maintained none else by the petitioners, at some point of time, some Branch Managers and conductors had put their signatures. There is no reason to dispute that claim. Much was made that out of these registers, which were maintained none else by the petitioners, at some point of time, some Branch Managers and conductors had put their signatures. But, that would not make any difference because initially there was no burden on the petitioners that they must have remain present for a particular number of days and they could not absent themselves.The Labour Court has rightly observed that if they were present, their services could be utilised by the Branch Managers and conductors and if they were not present nobody could question them. Even their working hours were not fixed and they could also work for the buses owned by the private owners even while remaining at the busstands. There was no compulsion that they must work only for the buses owned by the respondent Corporation. 14. Much was made that the Labour Court had rejected some of the documents as being the photo copies and in fact those documents were the appointment registers maintained by the respondent Corporation. About those documents also, there do not appear to be any signatures of the officers of the Corporation nor were those photocopies of the so-called attendance registers bearing the seal of the Corporation. It was also not the claim of the petitioners that they were made to put their signatures on the attendance registers which were maintained for the other staff. The Labour Court had drawn the correct inference that the notebooks were probably maintained only to authenticate the payments made by the Branch Managers out of the imprest fund. The Labour Court, therefore, recorded a finding that the documents would go to show that the amounts have been paid by the conductors from out of the collection money or by the branch managers from the imprest cash and that the signatures were made by some of the officers only for verification of the actual payments made to these persons and though they are more or the less in the nature of vouchers the said documents could not be said to be the “attendance registers” helpful in establishing the relationship of “employer- employee” between the Corporation and the petitioners. On the basis of this elaborate discussion of the evidence, the Labour Court has come to a finding as it did. On the basis of this elaborate discussion of the evidence, the Labour Court has come to a finding as it did. The argument, therefore, that evidence was not appreciated or the findings were perverse loses its rigour. 15. Much was made of the evidence of P.W.26, Rangabashyam, who was working as a Checking Inspector. But even he had to admit in his evidence that the attendance can be maintained only by the Branch Managers and the signature of the Branch Managers was not to be found in the exhibits which were put to him, viz., Exs.P-27, P-28 and P-29. The learned counsel also relied upon the evidence of R.W.1, Natarajan, who deposed that the petitioners stood in the bus stand and loudly announce to the public and passengers as to the destination of the buses and they used to do the same for the buses of the respondent Corporation also for which they used to be paid Rs.2. It was tried to be suggested from the cross-examination of this witness that the petitioners were some times paid Rs.2 and that they used to be paid by the Branch Managers and the Timekeepers used to maintain the records and calculate their wages on the monthly basis and Ex.P-22 series was one such an abstract prepared by the Timekeeper. He also suggested that the wages used to be paid from out of the imprest fund maintained by the Branch Managers. This evidence will be of no consequence because in the cross-examination this witness clearly said that the staff was given bonus whereas the petitioners did not have this concession and that it worked out be said as to whether each of the petitioner had worked for 240 days. In fact, the evidence of R.W.3 Nagarajan suggests that the respondent Corporation had filed the whole staff list before the Court vide Ex.R-3 wherein the petitioners name were not to be found. There is hardly any cross-examination worth the name to that witness. In short, it cannot be said that the petitioners had established their case in any manner. The so-called admissions made either in the pleadings or by the witness could not be said to be the clinching admissions and the Labour Court has taken a correct note thereof. It cannot therefore, said that the findings of the Labour Court were perverse. In short, it cannot be said that the petitioners had established their case in any manner. The so-called admissions made either in the pleadings or by the witness could not be said to be the clinching admissions and the Labour Court has taken a correct note thereof. It cannot therefore, said that the findings of the Labour Court were perverse. This is apart from the fact that this Court would not look into the evidence and would not reappreciate the same which attempt is being made by the petitioners at this stage. 16. Let me now take the stock of the reported decisions cited before me by the parties. 17. Very heavy reliance was placed by Mr.Vasudevan, on the reported decision of the Apex Court in Silver Jubliee Tailoring House case, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 37, wherein the Apex Court has held that the "right to control the manner of work" is not the exclusive test for determining the relationship of employer and employee and it is also to be considered as to who provides the equipments. The observations regarding the "control" not being the exclusive test can really have no exception as it is the law pronounced by the Apex Court, which is binding on me. However, it may be pointed out that that it is not the only factor which has been taken into consideration while deciding as to whether the aforementioned petitioners were in the service of the respondent Corporation. Even as regards the control, it cannot be said that it is not at all a relevant consideration. The factual panorama in the aforementioned decision is different. This is apart from the fact that the factor of control has not been viewed as the exclusive factor for determining the relationship of "master-servant". In the present case, there is absolutely no control either in the manner of the work or even regarding the presence or absence of the petitioners, their working hours, etc. It is up to them to work or not to work and again to work in a particular manner. The judgment is of no help to the petitioners. 18. In the present case, there is absolutely no control either in the manner of the work or even regarding the presence or absence of the petitioners, their working hours, etc. It is up to them to work or not to work and again to work in a particular manner. The judgment is of no help to the petitioners. 18. Great reliance was thereafter laid on the judgment of the learned single Judge of this Court (Venktaswami, J., as His Lordship then was) in Pandiyan Roadways Corporation Limited, (1995)1 L.L.J. 236 and more particularly on the observations by the Lordship in paragraph 11 wherein His Lordship had quoted the excerpts of the Labour Court that there was no specific order of appointment dealing with the nature of responsibilities and duties. The Labour Court had also in that case written a finding that there were only five types of employment, but the workers therein were employed by the management for doing a particular type of work as ticket canvasser and that they were being paid daily wages for that work over which the management had a right of superintendence and control. His Lordship had accepted the workmen in that case as employees of the transport Corporation. Mr.Vasudevan tried to rely on the fact that this was a case of the worker who was working as a ticket canvasser and there was a stray admission that some of the petitioners were working as a "Canvassers" in the sense that they used to attract the passengers so that the transport Corporation is benefitted. In so far as those admissions are concerned, they are extremely stray and sporadic. It cannot be said to be the admissions because even the witnesses have not been consistent on that issue and that is not the case of the petitioners. Therefore, evidence contrary to the pleading would lose its significance though even such evidence is extremely scanty. Again the fact remains that in the very same judgment His Lordship has sounded a caution on the basis of the Division Bench ruling in The Management of Indian Bank v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, (1990)1 L.L.J. 50 , that the question whether such relationship of master-servant exists between the parties is a pure question of fact and the decision of the tribunal on the question of fact should be taken to be final unless such decision is totally unsupported by evidence. I have already discussed the evidence in details and I have found that even the Labour Court had gone into the question of appreciation of evidence in great details. Therefore, this judgment cannot be of any help to the petitioners. 19. The decision in Murugesan’s case, (2001)2 L.L.N. 457, has no bearing on the question. Mr.Vasudevan, tried to invite my attention towards the observations of the Supreme Court quoted in this judgment regarding the test to be applied which were termed as a "Gandhian guideline" that whenever the Court is in doubt the Court is expected to recall the face of the poorest and the weakest man and ask itself if the step which is contemplated by it is going to be of any use to him. In the first place, this Court is not in doubt at all nor can it be said that even the Labour Court was in any doubt. This decision is of no consequence. 20. The decision in Dharanghadhra Chemical Works case, (1997)1 L.L.J. 477 was also pressed into service to determine the test whether a person is a "workman" or an "independent contractor". The Supreme Court termed such a question as a "question of fact". This was a case where agaries employed by the salt manufacturers were held to be "workers" and not the "independent contractors". This judgment was also relied upon by Mr.Vasudev to show that the "control test" is not the final test. A fine distinction by Denning, L.J. between contract "of" service and contract "for" service was relied upon in this case. A reference was made to the four features of a contract "of" service, viz., (a) the master’s power of selection of his servant; (b) the payment of wages or other remuneration; (c) the master’s right to control the method of doing the work; and (d) the master’s right of suspension or dismissal. When the facts of this present case are viewed from this test, which was accepted in Short v. J. & W. Henderson Limited, (1946)62 T.L.R. 427, 429, the answer essentially goes against the petitioners. When the facts of this present case are viewed from this test, which was accepted in Short v. J. & W. Henderson Limited, (1946)62 T.L.R. 427, 429, the answer essentially goes against the petitioners. This was not a case where the respondent Corporation had "selected" the petitioners though it had such power; there was no question of payment of "wages" or other remuneration by the transport Corporation, there was practically no "control" of the mode of doing the work; and there was no question of there being any right vis-a-vis these petitioners of their "suspension" or "dismissal" from service. The Supreme Court again quoted with approval the decisions in Simmons v. Health Laundary Company, (1910)1 K.B. 543, 549, 550, wherein it was held that this was a question of fact which is to be decided by all the circumstances of the case and the greater the amount of direct control exercised over the person rendering the services by the person contracting for them, the stronger the grounds for holding it to be a contract "of" service. In the aforementioned case, the Supreme Court on the basis of the evidence came to the conclusion that merely because these agaries had the freedom to engage others to assist them and pay for them was not to deprive them of their status as workmen. There can be no dispute about the principle but, in my opinion, this decision would help the respondent more than the petitioners for the reasons stated above. 21. Last but not the least, a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Management of State Bank of India v. V.M.Mahapurush, (1995)1 L.L.J. 644. 22. As against this, a learned single Judge of this Court (E.Padmanabhan, J.), has taken a view in W.P.No.14169 of 1999, that such persons as petitioners could not be viewed as the "employees" of the Corporation. The learned single Judge was considering the question of the porters who were working at the various busstands. Such porters had to pay a licence fee of Rs.10 and the licences had to be renewed annually. The porters were given authorisation to work freely without hindrance and were also given the identity cards. They have to wear a green overshirt and their duties were given by the duty officer in each shift and the rates for lifting the luggage were also notified. The porters were given authorisation to work freely without hindrance and were also given the identity cards. They have to wear a green overshirt and their duties were given by the duty officer in each shift and the rates for lifting the luggage were also notified. There could be complaints made against the porters by the passengers. On these grounds, the porters sought the declaration since they had been working for more than 480 days, they entitled to the permanency under the Tamil Nadu Act 3 of 1981. The learned single Judge has held these porters only as "licensed porters". The learned Judge also given a finding that there was no control excepting the licensing and regulating the porters and fixing the rates for lifting the luggage. The learned Judge also came to the conclusion that it could not be said to be the relationship of “employer- employee” between the transport Corporation and the porters. The learned Judge ultimately came to the conclusion that these porters could not be said to be the workmen. Ultimately though the learned Judge held that the proof of disputed questions of fact were involved in the matter, which could not be settled in the writ jurisdiction, the learned Judge clearly held that on the evidence available before him, the porters could not be viewed as “employees” much less “employees” of the Corporation. The situation is slightly different in the present petitions but there are number of similarities. Here, even such licences are not there. There is absolutely no control over either the entry or the exist. All that is done is some times in some sporadic cases the Branch Managers or the conductors as the case may be made some sporadic payments to these loaders. There is no post of “loaders” in the respondent Corporation nor is there any “appointment order” issued to them. All these factors which have been considered by the Labour Court go against the petitioner. 23. A view was expressed by a Division Bench of this Court to which I was a party. In The Workmen of Nilgiris Co-operative Marketing Society Limited case, (2001)2 C.T.C. 236 regarding the nature of “employer- employees” relationship. That was also a case where the claim was made by the “coolies” who used to do the work of loading, unloading, grading and sorting the potatoes and other vegetables brought by the growers to the society. In The Workmen of Nilgiris Co-operative Marketing Society Limited case, (2001)2 C.T.C. 236 regarding the nature of “employer- employees” relationship. That was also a case where the claim was made by the “coolies” who used to do the work of loading, unloading, grading and sorting the potatoes and other vegetables brought by the growers to the society. The factual situation was practically identical in so far as the absence of appointment orders, absence of control, the manner of doing the work, etc. was concerned. On the other hand, in that case, the management had come “discretion” regarding the work of sorting and grading the potatoes and vegetables which is absent in this case. In that case, the workers were to be engaged and there was a “leader” and the said leader was to be paid for the work done by the workers under him. IN paragraph 10 of that judgment, a whole factual stock of all the questions regarding “burden of proof” have been answered by the Division Bench wherein the earlier judgments of the Apex Court including the judgment of Silver Jubliee Tailoring House case, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 37, were considered by the Division Bench. After considering the entire factual panorama and the Apex Court’s judgments including Dharanghadhra Chemical Works case, (1997)1 L.L.J. 477, the Division Bench came to the conclusion that the Industrial Tribunal had rightly held those workers not to be the “workmen” or “employees” of the society, as the case may be. The factual scenario is completely applicable to the present case. Mr.Vasudevan tried to suggest that this was a case of the contract workers. In that case, though the Division Bench used the terminology “contractors” it is clear that it is only one of the workers, who is the group leader, was termed as “contractor”. Therefore, that objection is not valid. In my view, the ratio applies on all fours. 24. In that view, I hold that the writ petitions have no merits and they must be dismissed. They are accordingly ordered to be dismissed but without any orders as to the costs.