Judgment :- P. SATHASIVAM, J. As common questions of law and fact arise in this group of appeals, they were heard together and are being disposed of by the following Common Judgment. Writ appeal No. 74/95 is by one Shanmugaraja Spinning Mills Private Limited against the order of the learned Judge dated 31-8-94 in Writ Petition No. 5588 of 86. Writ Appeal No. 421 of 95 is by Kothari Industrial Corporation Limited, Madras-34 against the order of the learned Judge dated 6-4-95 in W.P. No. 12017 of 88. Writ appeal No. 488 of 95 is by Messrs. National Oxygen Limited, Madras-10 against the order of the learned Judge dated 6-4-95 in Writ Petition No. 11661 of 84. Writ Appeal No. 1486 of 95 is by Sree Visalakshi Mills Private Limited, Manalur, against the order of the learned Judge dated 17-4-95 passed in W.P. No. 575 of 90. Writ Appeal No. 10 of 96 is by Messrs. Sambandam Textiles Private Limited, Salem, against the order of the learned Judge dated 14-3-95 in Writ Petition No. 12095 of 85. All these writ petitions filed by the appellants herein were dismissed by the learned Judge (J. Kanakaraj, J.) confirming the action of the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board/Government in claiming consumption charges from the respective concerns. 2. For convenience, we shall refer the parties as described in the writ petitions. The case of the appellant in Writ Appeal No. 74 of 95 petitioner in W.P. No. 5588 of 86 is briefly stated hereunder :- The petitioner is a private limited company, incorporated on 27-8-1980 with the object of running a spinning Mill. It has set up a spinning Mill at National Chittode, Erode District. They applied to the second respondent for supply of H.T. electricity. The second respondent by his communication dated 6-1-82, accorded sanction for supply of H.T. electricity up to 500 K.V. to the petitioner. Power supply was effected on 23-2-84. On 6-1-82, when the second respondent sanctioned supply, the tariff rates were governed by G.O.Ms. No. 1487, Public Works (Electricity) dated 9-10-74. That Government Order passed under Tamil Nadu Act 1/1979 provide for concessional rates of supply for new industries for 5 years after commencement of production. While so, the Government of Tamil Nadu passed another order in G.O. 861, Public Works, Electricity dated 30-4-82, which also provide for concessional rates of power supply. No. 1487, Public Works (Electricity) dated 9-10-74. That Government Order passed under Tamil Nadu Act 1/1979 provide for concessional rates of supply for new industries for 5 years after commencement of production. While so, the Government of Tamil Nadu passed another order in G.O. 861, Public Works, Electricity dated 30-4-82, which also provide for concessional rates of power supply. It also provide for concessional rate of power tariff. In this latter Government Order, there was a condition that the concessional rate would not apply from the year when the industry starts earning profits. In 1984, the petitioner was required by the first respondent to sign an undertaking prepared by the first respondent for the extension of concessional rates. The undertaking stated that the petitioner had taken note of G.O. No. 861, Public Works dated 30-4-82 which specified that concessional rates would not be available for the year when the industry starts earning profits. It also required the petitioner to reimburse the Board in lump sum the concession allowed after expiry of 6 months from the end of accounting year or after finalisation of accounts in case the industry is found to have earned profits. The petitioner signed the undertaking on 8-5-84. In 1985 also, the petitioner gave a similar undertaking to the second respondent. They also accepted the balance-sheet and profit and loss account for the year ended 31-3-85. However, on 16-6-86, the petitioner received a communication from the first respondent stating that tariff concession at 66 per cent had been allowed for the years 1984-85 and 1985-86 based on the undertaking furnished by the petitioner. The balance-sheet produced in October, 1985 showed that the industry had earned profits. For ascertaining profits in a year only the profit and loss account had to be taken into account and the accumulated loss of previous years should not be brought forward. On this analogy, the petitioner had earned a profit of Rs. 1, 06, 399/- during 1984-85. The first respondent called upon the petitioner to repay the entire concession of Rs. 5, 33, 630-50 allowed to him from April, 1984 to March, 1986. The demand raised by the first respondent is illegal and without jurisdiction and the same is contrary to the concession which were provided in G.O. Ms. No. 1487 Public Works (Electricity) dated 9-10-74. The third respondent is not entitled to withdraw the concession offered by G.O. Ms. 5, 33, 630-50 allowed to him from April, 1984 to March, 1986. The demand raised by the first respondent is illegal and without jurisdiction and the same is contrary to the concession which were provided in G.O. Ms. No. 1487 Public Works (Electricity) dated 9-10-74. The third respondent is not entitled to withdraw the concession offered by G.O. Ms. No. 1487 dated 9-10-74. Having promised the petitioner to supply electricity for 5 years at concessional rates, which was acted upon by the petitioner by the establishment of new industrial undertaking, the third respondent is bound to supply electricity at the concessional rates for the full period of 5 years from 23-2-84. 3. The first respondent-Superintending Engineer, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board has filed a counter-affidavit wherein it is stated that for the purpose of allowing tariff concession, the profit/loss of the particular year alone can be taken note of and not the carried forward loss of the previous years. As per the audited balance-sheet for the year ended 31-3-85, the petitioner company has earned a profit of Rs. 1, 06, 399/-. If on the production of the balance-sheet, a company is found to have earned profit, the concession has to be withdrawn from the accounting year in which the company earned profit. As per the audited balance-sheet, the trading results for the year ending 31-3-1984 disclosed loss, and hence the tariff concession was allowed up to 31-3-1984. As per the audited balance-sheet produced by the consumer for the year 1984-85, the industry had earned profit of Rs. 1, 06, 399/- during 1984-85; hence the industry is not eligible for the tariff concession beyond 31-3-1984. The petitioner has given an undertaking on 23-11-1984 and 29-5-1985 undertaking to reimburse the Board in one lump sum the tariff concession allowed, with belated payment surcharge thereon the case their industry is found to have earned profit. 4. The case of the appellant in Writ Appeal No. 421 of 95 petitioner in W.P. No. 12017 of 88 is briefly stated hereunder :- The petitioner company is a public limited company. The company set up a factory at Manali for the manufacture of Caustic Soda which is a High Tension Power Intensive Industry. After deliberations with the respondents from 1974 onwards and after obtaining assurance of a concessional tariff, the company set up the caustic soda industry, which is an energy intensive industry. The company set up a factory at Manali for the manufacture of Caustic Soda which is a High Tension Power Intensive Industry. After deliberations with the respondents from 1974 onwards and after obtaining assurance of a concessional tariff, the company set up the caustic soda industry, which is an energy intensive industry. The supply of electricity to the petitioner's factory and the production of caustic soda commenced in January, 1979. The economy viability of the industry is very sensitive to power tariff. The various tariff concession including the new industries concession offered under the Tamil Nadu Revision of Tariff Rates on Supply of Electrical Energy Act, 1978 (Tamil Nadu Act 1 of 1979) was an incentive and attraction for the petitioner to set up this caustic soda industry at Manali within the State of Tamil Nadu. The original schedule to the Tamil Nadu Act 1 of 1979 under Part 1 H.T. Power supply specified a concessional tariff for a period of 5 years for a new industry including High Tension industries covered by special rates. The caustic soda unit of the company being a power intensive industry, suffered continuous loss from its commencement due to various factors including the power cut, hike in the tariff rates etc. The petitioner company received an undated Notice of the month of October, 1988 along with the monthly consumption bill dated 6-10-88, from the second respondent to the effect that the petitioner had earned profits for the year ending 30-6-82 and that tariff concessions had been wrongly extended after 1-5-82 (date of G.O. Ms. No. 861). A sum of Rupees 82, 77, 622-88 was, therefore, demanded as energy charges from May, 1982 to November, 1983. There was no prior notice withdrawing the concession relying upon the profit shown to have been made by the company and the bill dated 6-10-1988 is void and unenforceable to the extent of the demand for payment of Rs. 82, 77, 622-88. 5. The Superintending Engineer, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board has filed a counter-affidavit, wherein it is stated that the petitioner company in their letter dated 7-5-87 have intimated that only a consolidated profit and loss account and balance-sheet covering all the divisions are available and that division-wise profit and loss account and balance-sheet are not available. 82, 77, 622-88. 5. The Superintending Engineer, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board has filed a counter-affidavit, wherein it is stated that the petitioner company in their letter dated 7-5-87 have intimated that only a consolidated profit and loss account and balance-sheet covering all the divisions are available and that division-wise profit and loss account and balance-sheet are not available. Having regard to the fact that the petitioner has not furnished the particulars in accordance with the undertaking given by them, the action of the respondents cannot be challenged as illegal or irregular. In view of the undertaking given by the petitioner and the factual position explained above, the action taken is perfectly valid. 6. The petitioner has filed a supplementary affidavit at the time of taking of the main writ petition, wherein it is stated that inasmuch as the petitioner had become eligible for new industries concession for a period of five years under the Schedule to the Act as it then existed which did not contain any limitation based on the profit made by the company, the impugned Government Order cannot be applied retrospectively to take away the vested right of the petitioner. The impugned Government Order so far as it alters the basic structure of the new industries concession making it relatable to irrelevant factors is not a bona fide exercise of power. The limitation "starts earning profit" is a vague term. Inasmuch as the said condition is deleted in G.O. Ms. No. 2043 dated 16-12-88, the intention of the legislature when it enacted the original schedule is made clear that the concession was not relatable to any other extraneous factors. Inasmuch as the petitioner, on the basis of the assurance of the respondents, set up the industry and altered its position, the respondents are estopped from going back on their assurance. 7. The case of the appellant in Writ Appeal No. 488 of 95 petitioner in W.P. No. 11661 of 84 is stated hereunder :- The petitioner company was incorporated as a public limited company from 29-9-75 and having his factory at Mathur village, Pudukottai District. The petitioner is engaged in the manufacture of industrial gases. It started its unit at its factory and commenced its production from 15-8-80. The manufacture of oxygen is power intensive, major raw material being power. The petitioner is engaged in the manufacture of industrial gases. It started its unit at its factory and commenced its production from 15-8-80. The manufacture of oxygen is power intensive, major raw material being power. Based on the concession given under the Tamil Nadu Revision of Tariff Rates on Supply of Electrical Energy Act, 1978, the petitioner proceeded further in the matter of implementing the project. The action of the respondents revising the tariff rates and additional condition in the impugned Government Order, is a rude shock to the petitioner. When the accounts for the year ending 1982-83 was prepared and a statement of account as required by the respondents was furnished to them which incidentally showed a net profit of Rs. 7, 07, 572/-. Based on this, the responents, all of a sudden withdrew the concession so far available to the petitioner on the basis that the petitioner has started making profit. The petitioner in establishing its factory and commissioning the same on 15-8-80 on which date supply of energy commended, reasonably and justifiably expected that the concession given for the five year period would be honoured and respected by the State and the Project report on which the industry is based itself proceeded on the expectation that the new unit would enjoy tariff concession as per the schedule to the then recently enacted Act, namely, Act 1/1979. The newly imposed condition "the concession shall not apply from the year when the industry starts earning profits" is arbitrary and unreasonable. 8. The second respondent has filed a counter-affidavit wherein it is stated that the total sanctioned demand to the petitioner industry is 500 KVA. The consumer commenced production on 15-8-80. The tariff concession is applicable only once to a consumer for a new industrial undertaking and will not be available for any subsequent expansion or diversification of production. Subsequently, the Government of Tamil Nadu in exercise of the powers under S. 4 of the Act 1 of 79 amended the tariff schedule in G.O.Ms. No. 861, P.W. Dated 30-4-82 with effect from 1-5-82. Thereby the Government, while revising the rates for various class of consumers, introduced a proviso under clause (1)(a) that the tariff concessions shall not apply from the year when the industry starts earning profits. No. 861, P.W. Dated 30-4-82 with effect from 1-5-82. Thereby the Government, while revising the rates for various class of consumers, introduced a proviso under clause (1)(a) that the tariff concessions shall not apply from the year when the industry starts earning profits. The consumer produced the audited balance-sheet for the year ended 31-3-83, on 31-5-84 which disclosed that the consumer had earned a net profit of Rs. 7, 07, 572/-. The petitioner was duly informed by the Board and the claim made by the Superintending Engineer, Pudukottai Electricity System is in order and the amount should be paid by the petitioner. 9. The petitioner has filed a reply affidavit reiterating the claim made in the affidavit. 10. The case of the appellant in Writ Appeal No. 1486 of 95 petitioner in Writ Petition No. 575 of 90 is as follows :- The petitioner Sree Visalakshmi Mills (P) Limited initially started a textile mills at Vilangudi, availing High Tension supply from the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board. Subsequently, an industrial unit for manufacture of paper was started at Manalur. The paper unit availed high tension supply and under S.C. No. 00454 for a demand on 750 KVA. The High tension supply was effected on 28-5-1983 and commercial production was commenced on 28-8-1983. Manalur, where paper unit is established and declared as an industrially under-developed area by the third respondent and reduction in tariff rates are allowed by the 3rd respondent for new industries located in such backward area. The petitioner Mills is a new industry entitled to the concessional tariff for the first 5 years after the commencement of the production. Section 4 of Act 1 of 1979 provides that the State Government may after taking into account the cost of production of energy and such other materials as may be prescribed by notification, amend the provisions of the Schedule to the Act. The said provision was intended only power to amend the schedule with regard to the rates taking into account the cost of production of energy etc., and the said provision cannot in any way said to confer any power on the Government to amend the schedule to take away the concession granted by the Act in any other manner. The said amendment taking away the concessions already granted is not valid. 11. The said amendment taking away the concessions already granted is not valid. 11. The Tamil Nadu Electricity Board has filed a counter affidavit wherein it is stated that the petitioner industry applied for a new industry concession and also industrially under-developed area concession applicable to new industries in respect of their paper unit and produced their consolidated balance-sheet as on 31-3-1984 and the same were sent to the Registrar of Companies. Since the Registrar of Companies had not accepted the bifurcated balance-sheet showing loss in the paper division, the Board by letter dated 8-5-1984 passed orders holding that the petitioner Mills, Paper Division is not eligible for new industries tariff concession as the company has earned profit for the year ending 31-3-84 and 31-3-1985 as per the combined balance-sheet. As per S. 4 of Act 1 of 1979, the State Government is vested with the power of amending the Schedule to the Act and it is only in execise of that power, the State Government has passed G.O. Ms. No. 861 dated 30-4-1982 imposing a condition that the Tariff concession shall not apply from the year the industry starts earning profit. The amendment to the Schedule is in accordance with the provisions of the Act and as such, the same cannot be attracted as offending Arts. 114 or 19(i)(g) of the Constitution of India. When once the new industry starts earning profit, it means that it has established financially and therefore it does not require any assistance from any source. Hence, the Government Order No. 861 has imposed the condition that the industry when it starts earning profit will not be eligible for tariff concession. 12. The case of the appellant in Writ Appeal No. 10 of 96 petitioner in Writ Petition No. 12095 of 85 is briefly stated hereunder:- The petitioner is a private limited company registered under the Indian Companies Act. The petitioner started a Textile Mill in 1979 with financial aid from Banks and other financial institutions. It started production from 26-7-79. It engaged in the production of textile yarn out of waste cotton. The petitioner company has obtained H.T. power for its textile mill from the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board. The third respondent is supplying H.T. power to new industries at a concessional rate. It started production from 26-7-79. It engaged in the production of textile yarn out of waste cotton. The petitioner company has obtained H.T. power for its textile mill from the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board. The third respondent is supplying H.T. power to new industries at a concessional rate. This concession is given to the petitioner by the 3rd respondent for a period of 5 years from the date of commencement of production. While so, on 11-4-85, the Superintending Engineer, Salem Electricity System, Salem-1, the first respondent, called upon the petitioner to furnish the balance-sheet and profit and loss account for the period ended on 31-12-82 and 31-12-83. The petitioner furnished the same on 10-5-85. The first respondent subsequently issued a letter to the petitioner after considering the petitioner's letter dated 10-5-85 withdrew the concessional rate of tariff by a letter dated 14-10-85. On the ground that the petitioner earned a profit as per the balance-sheet for the year ending 31-12-82 and as per orders in G.O. No. 861 dated 30-4-82, the concession shall not apply from the year when the industry starts earning profits. It is stated that having given a categorical assurance that the petitioner would be entitled to a concessional rate for a period of 5 years from the date of commencement of production, the petitioner is entitled to the said concessional rate for a full period of 5 years irrespective of the fact that it makes profit. The petitioner does not have taxable income in any of the assessment years and hence the first respondent should have considered the assessment order before concluding that the petitioner has profit during the year. 13. The Superintending Engineer, Salem Electricity System filed a counter affidavit, wherein it is stated that extension of H.T. supply was given on 23-7-79 to the petitioner Mill and the concessional tariff rates applicable to new industries as per tariff conditions was extended from 23-7-1979. As per the impugned Government Order, the tariff condition shall not apply from the year when the industry starts earning profit. As per the impugned Government Order, the tariff condition shall not apply from the year when the industry starts earning profit. The petitioner had executed a stamped undertaking on 22-11-82 agreeing to produce the Audited balance-sheet and profit and loss account for the year ending 31-12-82 within 6 months from the date of closure of accounts or date of finalisation of accounts whichever is earlier and to reimburse the amount of concession in one lump sum with belated payment surcharge from the year their industry starts earning profit. The Balance- sheet and Profit and Loss Account produced by the petitioner for the year ending 31-12-82 and 31-12-83 disclosed that they have earned a profit of Rs. 73, 228/- for the year ending 31-12-82 and Rs. 97, 851/- for the year ending 31-12-83. Accordingly, they are not eligible for tariff concession as per G.O.Ms. No. 861 dated 30-4-82 from 1-5-82 onwards. The petitioner is to abide by the tariff rates and conditions as and when they are amended as agreed to by them (petitioner). The new industries tariff concession is allowed to help the industries in the initial stage. As such, when the industry starts earning profit the concession is withdrawn in terms of the notification issued by the Government in exercise of the powers under Act 1 of 1979. 14. The learned single Judge though passed separate orders on different dates, dismissed all the writ petitions upholding the defence taken by the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board. Against the dismissal of their writ petitions, the petitioners therein preferred the present appeals. 15. In the light of the above pleadings, we have heard the arguments of Mr. K. Ramagopal, Mrs. Malini Ganesh and Mr. M. V. Venkataseshan, for appellants and Mr. R. Muthukumarasamy, learned Additional Advocte General, for Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Mrs. Nalini Chidambasram, for 3rd respondent in W.A. No. 421/95 and the learned Additional Government Pleader for some of the respondents/State. 16. The following grounds are urged by the learned counsel for the appellants :- (i) The impugned action is violative of the principles of promissory estoppel; (ii) The amendment brought about by G.O.Ms. Nalini Chidambasram, for 3rd respondent in W.A. No. 421/95 and the learned Additional Government Pleader for some of the respondents/State. 16. The following grounds are urged by the learned counsel for the appellants :- (i) The impugned action is violative of the principles of promissory estoppel; (ii) The amendment brought about by G.O.Ms. No. 861, Public Works Department dated 30-4-82 cannot be retrospective; hence it will not affect the appellants who have already been extended concession prior to the said Government Order; (iii) The impugned action of the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board in denying concession without notice is violative of principles of natural justice; (iv) The reason for denying the benefits have no nexus to the Tamil Nadu Revision of Tariff Rates on Supply of Electrical Energy Act, 1978 (Tamil Nadu Act No. 1 of 1979) and constitute extraneous and improper consideration; (v) In any event, the impugned G.O. Ms. No. 861 dated 30-4-82 will not apply to the appellants who are existing industries and will apply only to industries which commenced production after 30-4-82. 17. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has made the following submissions :- (i) The power to amend Schedule in the Tamil Nadu Act 1 of 79 by the Government in terms of Section 4 of the said Act is in the nature of conditional legislation; hence there can be no promissory estoppel against legislative functions; (ii) In the absence of any specific plea in the affidavit to the effect that the appellants had acted on any promise and set up the Unit, the appellants cannot successfully claim the relief based on the principles of promissory estoppel. In any event, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the alleged promise; (iii) In the interest of the public to ensure that concessions are not extended to persons who do not need them and who are in affluent position to save public funds, the impugned action is well within their powers; hence the question of invoking promissory estoppel does not arise; (iv) Having regard to the fact that all the appellants have given undertakings agreeing to abide by G.O.Ms. No. 861, they are estopped from questioning the said orders. No. 861, they are estopped from questioning the said orders. (v) The impugned order which is brought into effect on a particular date and made to operate from that date cannot be said to be retrospective; (vi) Since the amendment brought about to the Act is in the nature of conditional legislation, no question of violation of principles of natural justice would arise; (vii) Any industry, which has commenced production either before the Government Order or after the Government Order and which has not completed 5 years would fall within Para (i) (a) of the schedule. The explanation to Para (i) (b) makes it clear that the word "existing industries" is relatable only for the said Clause (i) (b) and not for (i) (a); hence the contention that the Govenrment Order will have no application to the industries which have already commenced production prior to 1-5-82 may not be correct. 18. We have carefully considered the rival submissions. 19. The Tamil Nadu Revision of Tariff Rates on Supply of Electrical Energy Act, 1978 (Act No. 1 of 1979) (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") was enacted by the State Legislature. As per sub-Section (2) of Section 1 of the Act, it shall be deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of March, 1978. Section 2 (a) defines "statutory order". According to Section 2 (b), "tariff" means the rate of tariff leviable upon the consumption of any electrical energy in this State supplied by the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and as specified in the Schedule to the Act. Section 4 enables the State Government to amend the Schedule. Since Section 4 has been relied on by both sides, it is useful to refer the same :- "Section 4. Section 4 enables the State Government to amend the Schedule. Since Section 4 has been relied on by both sides, it is useful to refer the same :- "Section 4. Power of the State Government to amend the Schedule - The State Government may, after taking into account the cost of production of energy, and such other matters as may be prescribed, by notification, amend the provisions of the Schedule to this Act." The Act contained the following tariff rates applicable to the appellants/petitioners :- "THE SCHEDULE PART I - H. T. POWER SUPPLY 1 (B) (i)(a)- In the case of new industries, the following concessional tariffs shall be charged for the first five years after the commencement of production :- For the first three years -- 66-2/3 Per cent of the High Tension rates under 1(A), 1(B), as the case may be. For the fourth year -- 80 Per cent of the High Tension rates under 1(A), 1(B), as the case may be. For the fifth year -- 90 Per cent of the High Tension rates under 1(A), 1(B), as the case may be. For the sixth year .. Full Tariff The above concession shall apply to both unit rates and maximum demand charges. This concession shall not, however, be applicable to a consumer who utilises power from his own generating units or makes other arrangements for production purposes and utilises the power supplied by the Board for auxiliary purposes only." By G.O.Ms. No. 861, Public Works Department, dated 30-4-82, the following entries to Clause (i) (a) in the Schedule have been inserted :- "The above concessions shall not apply from the year when the Industry starts earning profits." We have already referred to that Section 4 of the Act gives powers to the State Government to amend the Schedule after taking into account the cost of production of energy and based on other matters by way of notification. 20. First we shall consider the main ground of attack, namely, the impugned action is violative of the principle of promissory estoppel. It is settled law that any one claiming promissory estoppel must raise a specific plea in the affidavit to the effect that the appellants had acted on any promise given by the Electricity Board and set up their Unit. First we shall consider the main ground of attack, namely, the impugned action is violative of the principle of promissory estoppel. It is settled law that any one claiming promissory estoppel must raise a specific plea in the affidavit to the effect that the appellants had acted on any promise given by the Electricity Board and set up their Unit. As observed by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Andhra Steel Corporation Limited v. Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board, reported in, the necessary facts so as to sustain the plea of promissory estoppel are to be pleaded and established by the appellants. The petitioner in W.P. No. 5588 of 86 (appellant in Writ Appeal No. 74 of 95), after referring to the concession provided in G.O.Ms. No. 1487, Public Works, (Electricity) dated 9-10-74, and Clause 1 (b) (i) in particular, has merely stated in Para 13 of his affidavit that, ".......Placing reliance on the above concession and others offered by the third respondent, I took steps for the erection of the textile mill investing over 60 lakhs in Erode District, Tamil Nadu. Hence, I respectfully submit that the third respondent is not entitled to withdraw the concessions offered by G.O. 1487 dated 9-10-1974 and is stopped from withdrawing the concessions........." The same averment has been reiterated in Para 14 also. The petitioner in W.P. No. 12017 of 88 (appellant in W.A. No. 421 of 95) has not specifically averred with regard to the details of assurance and also not averred that they had established their industry based on such assurance by spending huge money. In Para 2, it is merely stated that "the company after long deliberations with the respondents from 1974 onwards and after obtaining assurance of a concessional tariff, set up its Caustic Soda industry at Manali." No doubt, Mrs. Malini Ganesh, learned counsel for appellants in W.A. Nos. 421 and 488/95, brought to our notice certain averments in the supplementary affidavit dated 18-3-95. It is true that in the said supplementary affidavit, the petitioner/appellant herein has stated that the Schedule to the Act held out a promise or assurance to the New Industries that the tariff concession will be available for 5 years. It is further stated that resting the above assurance, the petitioner set up the industry and altered its position and as such the respondents are estopped from going back on their assurance. It is further stated that resting the above assurance, the petitioner set up the industry and altered its position and as such the respondents are estopped from going back on their assurance. As rightly pointed out by the learned Additional Advocate General, the learned Judge has disposed of the said writ petition on 6-4-95 and the supplementary affidavit dated 18-3-95 came to be filed only at the time of hearing/taking of the writ petition. This aspect has not been disputed. There is no explanation for raising such a specific plea in 1988, when the writ petition was filed. We are also satisfied that there is no such specific assurance in the other cases also.In this regard, it is useful to refer a decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Pawan Alloys and Casting Private Limited, Meerut v. U.P. State Electricity Board, reported in wherein it has been held in Para 25 that at page 3923-3924 of AIR, "25..............There is preponderance of judicial opinion that to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel, clear, sound and positive foundation must be laid in the petition itself by the party invoking the doctrine and that bald expressions without any supporting material to the effect that the doctrine is attracted because the party invoking the doctrine has altered its position relying on the assurance of the Government would not be sufficient to press into aid the doctrine. In our opinion, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked in the abstract and the Courts are bound to consider all aspects including the results sought to be achieved and the public good at large, because while considering the applicability of the doctrine, the Courts have to do equity and the fundamental principles of equity must for ever be present to the mind of the Court, while considering the applicability of the doctrine." By applying the said principle and after perusing the affidavit filed in support of the above writ petitions, we hold that the petitioners/appellants failed to lay necessary foundation for invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 21. Even if we accept that there is sufficient plea in the affidavit attracting the principle of promissory estoppel, we shall now consider whether the appellants have succeeded in their attempt. 21. Even if we accept that there is sufficient plea in the affidavit attracting the principle of promissory estoppel, we shall now consider whether the appellants have succeeded in their attempt. Though several decisions have been referred to by the learned counsel for the appellants, they mainly relied on the decision of the Apex Court in M/s. Pawan Alloys and Casting Private Limited, Meerut v. U.P. State Electricity Board, reported in Mrs. Malini Ganesh by extensively taking us through the said decision of the Supreme Court, contended that the respondents are bound to honour the assurance held out to grant concessional tariff to new industries for a period of five years. According to her, their case is fully covered by the aforesaid judgment on all the points. In the case before the Supreme Court, the 3 impugned notifications issued by the U.P. State Electricity Board contained a representation by the Board to the consumers, who were to establish new industrial units in the territories of the State in which the Board was to supply electricity, that on the total bill of electricity consumed by them during the period of first five years of their taking supply they will be getting a rebate of 10 per cent on the total amount of such bills for electricity consumption. It was also assured that this rebate would be available not only to new industrial units which may get established and which may take electric supply from the Board and from the date on which the said last notification came into force, but rebate would be permissible even to those new industries who had earlier established their industries and taken electricity supply from the Board and three years' period earlier granted to them for earning development rebate had remained unexpired on 1st February, 1986 and for that entire unexpired period also the said development rebate was guaranteed by the Board. It was submited before the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court from where the appeal arose that the Board was bound on the principle of promissory estoppel to continue the development rebate to these new industries for a period of three years as indicated in the earlier notifications and consequently the Board could not have arbitrarily withdrawn the said development rebate prior to the expiry of three years' period available to the industries concerned under these earlier notifications. It was also contended that in any case the impugned notification applied prospectively and could not have any retrospective effect on earlier existing new industries. On the side of the Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board, it was submitted that all the writ petitioners-consumers had entered into contracts by way of written agreements with the Board before taking electricity supply at their premises and as per the terms of the said agreements, they had already subjected themselves to all future actions of the Board by which the electricity tariff could be revised by the Board at any time and that would include even the development rebate which could be withdrawn at any time at the Board's discretion as agreed to by all of them. The Division Bench after considering the arguments of the contesting parties, came to the conclusion that the respondent Board was estopped by virtue of the doctrine of promissory estoppel from withdrawing the development rebate before the completion of the period of three years. However, the Court came to the conclusion that the writ petitioners were barred from questioning the impugned notification on the express terminology found in the agreements entered in to by them with the Board for supply of electricity and under those agreements the Board was given full play to revise the tariff rates which included development rebate also from time to time and consequently the impugned notification was not illegal. On the third issue, it was held that the notification dated 31st July, 1986 could not be said to be retrospective. By saying so, the High Court by the common judgment, dismissed all the writ petitions, against which M/s. Pawan Alloys and Casting Private Limited, Meerut preferred Special Leave to the Supreme Court. After referring to the Scheme of the Utter Pradesh Electricity Board as found in the 3 notifications and the assurance made by them as well as the action taken by the petitioner therein, the Supreme Court has held thus (paras 31 and 32) at page 3927 :- "31. After referring to the Scheme of the Utter Pradesh Electricity Board as found in the 3 notifications and the assurance made by them as well as the action taken by the petitioner therein, the Supreme Court has held thus (paras 31 and 32) at page 3927 :- "31. Consequently it must be held that relying upon the representations held out by the Board in these earlier notifications assuring grant of incentive rebate of 10% on the total bill of electricity consumption charges these new industries being assured that for three years this concession will be available had burnt their boats and spent large amounts and had established their industries in the area falling in the operative jurisdiction of the Board in State of U.P. 32. Under these circumstances when no public interest was sought to be pressed in service by the Board for withdrawal of this incentive rebate, as seen earlier, the equity which had arisen in favour of the appellants remained untouched and undisturbed by any overwhelming and superior equity in favour of the Board entitling it to withdraw this development rebate in a premature manner leaving these promises high and dry before the requisite period of three years earlier guaranteed to them by way of development rebate had got exhausted.........." 22. Mr. R. Muthukumaraswamy, learned Additional Advocate General, by drawing our attention to the very same decision, contended that first of all there is no specific plea in the affidavit to the effect that the appellants had acted on any promise and set up their Unit and consequently the alleged promise referred to above is contained in a legislative enactment, hence there can be no estoppel against the statute. Before going further in to the arguments of the learned Additional Advocate General which distinguish the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Pawan Alloys and Casting Private Limited (cited supra) regarding the principle of promissory estoppel, we shall consider the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court referred to by him. By pointing out Section 4 of the Act, the learned Additional Advocate General strenuously contended that the power to amend the Schedule by the Government in terms of Section 4 of the Act is in the nature of conditional legislation. By pointing out Section 4 of the Act, the learned Additional Advocate General strenuously contended that the power to amend the Schedule by the Government in terms of Section 4 of the Act is in the nature of conditional legislation. For the said proposition, he heavily relied on the decision of the Apex Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Sabanayagam, reported in (1998 Lab IC 421). In that case, the State of Tamil Nadu and the State Housing Board had raised a contention, namely, whether the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 will be applicable to the employees of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board during the relevant accounting year 1978-79 onwards. It was contended therein that the employees of the Housing Board will not be entitled to statutory bonus under the Act on twin grounds, firstly in view of the statutory exclusion of the Housing Board from the applicability of the Act, as per Section 32 (v) (c) of the Act; secondly on the ground that the State of Tamil Nadu for the relevant years have exercised its power exempting the Housing Board under Section 36 of the Act from all the provisions of the Act. In the writ petitions filed by the employees of the Housing Board, this Court has taken a view that the Housing Board is not entitled to on the facts of the cases under Section 32 (v) (c) of the Act and the orders of exemption issued by the State of Tamil Nadu in exercise of its powers under Section 36 of the Act in favour of the Housing Board for the relevant years, were not legally sustainable. This Court has also taken the view that in any case the State of Tamil Nadu has no authority to retrospectively grant exemption under Section 36 of the Act for the earlier accounting years. The impugned orders is that the Housing Board has been directed to make payment of statutory bonus to the employees from accounting year 1976-79 onwards. Against the said order, the State of Tamil Nadu preferred the appeals to the Supreme Court. The impugned orders is that the Housing Board has been directed to make payment of statutory bonus to the employees from accounting year 1976-79 onwards. Against the said order, the State of Tamil Nadu preferred the appeals to the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court, the following points arose for consideration : (1) Whether the exemption order dated 23rd November, 1982 is bad inasmuch as it seeks to retrospectively apply to earlier accounting years 1978-79, 1979-80, 1980-81 and 1981-82; (2) Whether the provisions of the Act are not applicable to the Housing Board in view of Section 32 (v) (c) of the Act; and (3) Whether the exemption orders issued by the State of Tamil Nadu from time to time during the relevant years as per Section 36 of the Act are null and void as no hearing was admittedly given by the State of Tamil Nadu to the employees likely to be affected by such exercise of power of exemption before issuing such orders. In that case, the Tamil Nadu Housing Board was exempted from the provisions of the Payment of bonus Act under Section 36 of the Act for the temporary periods up to the end of 1973-74. In that decision, after noting the observation and conclusion of the Constitutional Bench in Jalan Trading Company Private Ltd. v. Mill Mazdoor Union, that Section 36 of the Act is held to be a piece of conditional legislation. Their Lordships have elaborately considered the distinction between the delegated legislation and conditional legislation. The following conclusion are relevant in finding out whether Section 4 of the Act is a piece of conditional legislation or not? (Paragraphs 13 and 19) "13.......... In other words by delegated legislation the delegate completes the legislation by supplying details within the limits prescribed by the statute and in the case of conditional legislation the power of legislation is exercised by the legislature conditionally, leaving to the discretion of an external authority the time and manner of carrying its legislation into effect as also the determination of the area to which it is to extend; (The Queen v. Burah, 1978 (3) AC 889; Russel v. The Queen, 1882 (7) AC 829, 835; King Emperor v. Benoarilal Sarma, (1944) 72 Ind App 57 : 1945 AIR(PC) 48), Sardar Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan. Thus when the delegate is given the power of making rules and regulations in order to fill in the details to carry out and subserve the purposes of the legislation the manner in which the requirements of the statute are to be met and the rights therein created to be enjoyed it is an exercise of delegated legilsation. But when the legislation is complete in itself and the legislature has itself made the law and the only function left to the delegate is to apply the law to an area or to determine the time and manner of carrying in into effect, it is conditional legislation. 19. However, there may be second category of conditional legislations wherein the delegate has to decide whether and under what circumstances a completed Act of the parent legislation which has already come into force is to be partially withdrawn from operation in a given area or in given cases so as not to be applicable to a given class of persons who are otherwise admittedly governed by the Act. When such a power by way of conditional legislation is to be exercised by the delegate a question may arise as to how the said power can be exercised. In such an eventuality if the satisfaction regarding the existence of condition precedent to the exercise of such power depends upon pure subjective satisfaction of the delegate and if such an exercise is not required to be based on the prima facie proof of factual date for and against such an exercise and if such an exercise is to uniformly apply in future to a given common class of subjects to be governed by such an exercise and when such an exercise is not to be confined to individual cases only, then even in such category of cases while exercising conditional legislative powers the delegate may not be required to have an objective assessment after considering rival versions on the data placed before it for being taken into consideration by it in exercise of such power of conditional legislation. For example if a tariff is fixed under the Act and exemption power is conferred on the delegate whether to grant full exemption or partial exemption from the tariff rate it may involve such an exercise of conditional legislative function wherein the exercise has to be made by the delegate on its own subjective satisfaction and once that exercise is made whatever exemption is granted or partially granted or partially withdrawn from time to time would be binding on the entire class of persons similarly situated and who will be covered by the sweep of such exemptions, partial or whole, and whether granted or withdrawn, wholly or partially, and in exercise of such a power there may be no occasion to hear the parties likely to be affected by such an exercise. For example from a settled tariff say if earlier 30% exemption is granted by the delegate and then reduced to 20% all those who are similarly situated and covered by the sweep of such exemption and its modification cannot be permitted to say in the absence of any statutory provision to that effect that they should be given a hearing before the granted exemption is wholly or partially withdrawn." We have already extracted Section 4 of the Act which gives powers to the State Government to amend the Schedule. The Schedule provides tariff rates under various categories. The State Government, considering the cost of production of energy and for other matters, by way of notification, may amend the provisions of the Schedule to the Act. In other words, on the basis of the materials relating to cost of production and for other matters, it would be open to the State Government to vary/modify or withdraw the tariff rates provided in the Schedule by issuing notification in the Gazette. In the course of the argument, it was demonstrated that concessional tariff was provided to new industries, which would be facing problems at the initial stages. If even at the initial stages, such new industries start making profits, they would be comparable to established units and hence would not form part of this class, who are to be offered any concessional benefits. If even at the initial stages, such new industries start making profits, they would be comparable to established units and hence would not form part of this class, who are to be offered any concessional benefits. Having regard to the fact that no person has got any right to claim concessions and also taking note of the fact that there are several categories of consumers who are required to pay at the rates fixed by the Government, it is brought unequitable to extend the concession to such of those new industries, who are making profit. It is in this context that the notification refers to the consumers making profits. There is no dispute that if a tariff is fixed under the Act and exemption is conferred on the delegate whether to grant full exemption or partial exemption from the tariff rate it may involve such an exercise of conditional legislative function wherein the exercise has to be made by the delegate on its own subjective satisfaction. As observed by the Supreme Court, when once that exercise is made whatever exemption is granted or partially granted or partially withdrawn from time to time would be binding on the entire class of persons similarly situated and who will be covered by the sweep of such exemptions, partial or whole, and whether granted or withdrawn, wholly or partially. In the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court in (1998 Lab IC 421) (cited supra), we hold that Section 4 of the Act is a piece of conditional legislation and after satisfying the conditions prescribed therein as well as for other matters as may be prescribed later by way of notification, the State Government can modify the tariff or even withdraw the concession either wholly or partially. 23. In M.P. Sugar Mills v. State of U.P., Their Lordships have held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be applied in teeth of an obligation or liability imposed by law. They also held that promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to compel the Government or even a private party to do an act prohibited by law. They further specifically held that there can also be no promissory estoppel against the exercise of legislative power and that the Legislature can never be precluded from exercising its legislative function by resort to the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 24. They further specifically held that there can also be no promissory estoppel against the exercise of legislative power and that the Legislature can never be precluded from exercising its legislative function by resort to the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 24. In Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Limited, three Judges Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court has held that there can be no promissory estoppel against the Legislature in the exercise of its legislative functions, nor can the Government or public authority be debarred by promissory estoppel from enforcing statutory prohibition, nor can promissory estoppel be used to compel the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which was outside the authority or power of the officer of the Government or of the public authority to make .They further held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires. If it can be shown by the Government or public authority that having regard to the facts as they have transpired, it would be inquitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the person to whom the promise or representation is made and enforce the promise or representation against the Government or public authority. They concluded in saying that the doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case, because on the facts, equity would not require that the Government or public authority should be held bound by the promise or representation made by it. 25. In Shri Bakul Oil Industries v. State of Gujarat ), the following observation is very relevant (para 11) (at page 147 of AIR) :- "11. . . . . . . . We must, however, observe that the power of revocation or withdrawal would be subject to one limitation viz., the power cannot be exercised in violation of the rule of promissory estoppel. In other words, the Government can withdraw an exemption granted by it earlier if such withdrawal could be done without offending the rule of promissory estoppel and depriving an industry entitled to claim exemption from payment of tax under the said rule. In other words, the Government can withdraw an exemption granted by it earlier if such withdrawal could be done without offending the rule of promissory estoppel and depriving an industry entitled to claim exemption from payment of tax under the said rule. If the Government grants exemption to a new industry and if on the basis of the representation made by the Government an industry is established in order to avail the benefit of exemption, it may then follow that the new industry can legitimately raise a grievance that the exemption could not be withdrawn except by means of legislation having regard to the fact that promissory estoppel cannot be claimed against a statute. . . . . . . . ." It is clear from the above decision that the exemption granted by the Government was only by way of concession for encouraging entrepreneurs to start industries in undeveloped areas and, as such, it was always open to the State Government to withdraw or revoke the concession. It is also relevant to refer certain factual details. 26. Mr. K. Ramagopal, learned counsel for the appellant in Writ Appeal No. 74 of 95, argues that G. O. Ms. No. 1487 dated 9-10-1974 alone applies and not G. O. Ms. No. 861 dated 30-4-82. There is no dispute that the former Government Order did not contain a clause that when the company starts making profits, they will become ineligible for the concessional tariff rates. The learned Judge after verifying the various averments from the affidavit of the petitioner, found that since the petitioner Mill got supply with effect from 23-2-84 and by that time G. O. Ms. No. 867 dated 30-4-82 has come into operation, rejected the said contention. We agree with the factual finding rendered by the learned Judge. Equally, we are in agreement with the conclusion of the learned Judge, rejecting the argument of Mr. K. Ramagopal that the company had over a period of two years ending with 31-3-86 suffered only loss, since when the Government Order says that the Company is disentitled for the tariff concession from the year when the industry starts earning profits and of the fact that the petitioner had started making profits for the year 1984-85 ending with 31-3-85. K. Ramagopal that the company had over a period of two years ending with 31-3-86 suffered only loss, since when the Government Order says that the Company is disentitled for the tariff concession from the year when the industry starts earning profits and of the fact that the petitioner had started making profits for the year 1984-85 ending with 31-3-85. The impugned letter dated 16-6-85 which says that the tariff concession from April, 1984 to March, 1986 could not be allowed is perfectly in order. The petitioner in W. P. No. 11661/84 - appellant in W. A. No. 488/95 received a notice dated 25-9-84 stating that for the year ending 31-3-83, the petitioner had earned profits, that the tariff concesssion had been wrongly extended for the period from 1-5-82 to 30-4-84 and that the petitioner has to pay a sum of Rs. 2, 09, 433.30 as balance of energy charges. A final notice was given on 20-11-84 demanding the said amount. The petitioner filed the said writ petition for direction to the respondents to give tariff concession for the full period of five years from the date of commencement of business. Similarly in W. P. No. 12017 of 88 - appellant in W. A. No. 421 of 95, a notice was received in October, 1988 to the effect that the petitioner had earned profits for the year ending 30-6-82 and tariff concessions had been wrongly extended after 1-5-82. A sum of Rupees 82, 77, 622.88 was therefore demanded as energy charges from May, 1982 to November, 1983. The writ petition is to declare the bill dated 6-10-88 is void and unenforceable to the extent of the demand for payment of Rs. 82, 77, 622.88. The petitioner in W. P. No. 575 of 90 - appellant in W. A. No. 1486 of 95 started another industrial unit for manufacture of paper at Manalur and availed high tension electricity supply on 28-5-1983 and they also commenced production on 28-8-83. The new high tension industries are entitled to a tariff concession for the first five years, but subject to the condition that the unit will be denied the concession from the year in which it starts making profits. The dispute arises because the pettioner had filed a consolidated profit and loss account for his textile as well as paper unit, which showed a profit for the years ending 31-3-1984 and 31-3-1985. The dispute arises because the pettioner had filed a consolidated profit and loss account for his textile as well as paper unit, which showed a profit for the years ending 31-3-1984 and 31-3-1985. The impugned order says that the printed copies of published consolidated profit and loss account and the balance-sheet for the years ended 31-3-84 and 31-3-85 showed profits to the tune of Rs. 12, 21, 158/- and Rs. 8, 64, 491/- respectively. Consequently, the respondents denied the tariff concession to the petitioner. The petitioner company in W. P. No. 12095 of 85 - appellant in W. A. No. 10/96 obtained H. T. power supply for their textile mill on 23-7-79 and they started production on 26-7-1979 and as per the existing rules, the petitioner was entitled to get the benefits of concesssional tariff. It is stated that the tariff rates at that time was governed by the rates introduced by G. O. Ms. No. 1487, P. W. (Electricity) dated 9-10-74. By G. O. Ms. No. 787 Public Works (Electricity) dated 30-4-79, the rates were amended and the schedule was also substituted by the provisions of the latter G. O. The schedule to the tariff rates were again amended by G.O.Ms. No. 861 dated 30-4-82. In view of the new clause which was introduced in the said G. O., the first respondent on 11-4-85 called upon the petitioner to furnish the balance-sheet and profit and loss account for the period ending 31-12-82 and 31-12-83. On 10-5-85 the petitioner furnished the said particulars. On the basis of the said particulars, the respondents withdrew the concessional rates of tariff by a letter dated 14-10-85 on the ground that the petitioner earned profit for the year ending 31-12-82. Consequently, it was held that the petitioner was not eligible for tariff concession with effect from 1-5-82. Revising the bills from 1-5-82, a sum of Rs. 74, 019/- was added to the bill dated 17-10-85. It is the defenite case of the appellant that since they started their industry by obtaining a vested right to avail the said concession for a full period of five years and that no other restriction whatsoever was stated under the schedule. Revising the bills from 1-5-82, a sum of Rs. 74, 019/- was added to the bill dated 17-10-85. It is the defenite case of the appellant that since they started their industry by obtaining a vested right to avail the said concession for a full period of five years and that no other restriction whatsoever was stated under the schedule. It is stated that Section 4 of the Act empowers the State Government to amend the schedule after taking into account the cost of production of energy, and for such other matters as may be prescribed by notification. However, according to them, all of a sudden, the respondents introduced a new dimension to the applicability of the concession by stating that the said concession will not be available from the year the industry starts earning profits through the amendment of the schedule by G. O. Ms. No. 861 dated 30-4-82. Learned counsel for the appellants also states that the new industry's concession was meant to help the new industries being set up within the State of Tamil Nadu in the initial period of commencement, irrespective of the fact whether the industry could make profit/loss in the initial years. It is further contended that the industry earning profits, whether notional or substantial even within the period of 5 years will not have relevance for the applicability of the concessional tariff. According to them, seeking to withdraw the concession on account of the industry making profits within the assured period of five years is totally irrelevant and amounts to improper consideration having no nexus to the object of the concession and hence ultra vires. It is also stated that the very fact that by a subsequent order that is G. O. Ms. No. 2043 dated 16-12-88 the original position was revived by deleting the condition shows that profit making was no relevance to the object with which the new industries concession was introduced by the Legislature. Mrs. Malini Ganesh, learned counsel for the appellants in Writ Appeal Nos. 421 and 488, would state that if a statute confers power for one purpose, its use for a different purpose is not a valid exercise of power but totally an exercise of power for an improper purpose which has been described to be broader than mala fides. Mrs. Malini Ganesh, learned counsel for the appellants in Writ Appeal Nos. 421 and 488, would state that if a statute confers power for one purpose, its use for a different purpose is not a valid exercise of power but totally an exercise of power for an improper purpose which has been described to be broader than mala fides. She very much relies upon certain passages from the Administrative Law by Wade-5th Edition; Administrative Law by Jain and Jain - 4th Edition; and Principle of Statutory Interpretation by G. P. Singh-6th Edition. She very much pressed into service the following passages from the learned author :- ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . 'discretion' means when it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities that that something is to be done according to the rules of reasons and justice, not according to private opinion. Rooke's case; according to law and not humour. It is to be, not arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and regular. And it must be exercised within the limit, to which an honest man competent to the discharge of his office ought to confine himself. . . . . . . . . . . . . . The discretion of a statutory body is never unfettered. It is a discretion which is to be exercised according to law. That means at least this : the statutory body must be guided by relevant considerations and not by irrelevant. If its decision is influenced by extraneous considerations which it ought not to have taken into account, then the decision cannot stand. No matter that the statutory body may have acted in good faith; nevertheless the decision will be set aside. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . But the Courts have consistently taken the view that while a legislature may enact laws with retrospective effect, a delegate cannot exercise a similar power and give retrospectivity to the rules made by it unless the parent statute gives it a power to do so either expressly or by necessary implication. . . . . . . . . . But the Courts have consistently taken the view that while a legislature may enact laws with retrospective effect, a delegate cannot exercise a similar power and give retrospectivity to the rules made by it unless the parent statute gives it a power to do so either expressly or by necessary implication. . . . . . . It may be mentioned here that the parliamentary committee on sub-ordinate legislation also objects to retrospective operation being given to rules without there being authority for the purpose in the relevant parent Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To curb such a tendency, the Court has now ruled that the retrospective operation of a rule will be struck down if there exists no reasoanble nexus between the concerned rule and its retrospectivity. . Power may be conferred to make sub-ordinate legislation in the shape of rules, bye-laws, etc., which have retrospective operation. Such a power may be either conferred in express words or may be inferred by necessary implication. In the absence, however, of an express or necessarily implied power to that effect, sub-ordinate legislation, be it a rule, a bye-law or a notification, cannot have retrospective operation. . . . . . . . ." 27. Similar passages have been referred to by Mr. K. Ramagopal which we are not reproducing the same once again. For the sake of repetition, we may say the power to amend the Schedule by the Government in terms of Section 4 is in the nature of conditional legislation, and if the Government is not satisfied with the conditions therein, undoubtedly, they can vary, modify or cancel the tariff rates provided in the Schedule. We have already referred to the fact that in view of the fact that tariff rates have been fixed by way of a legislature power and in the light of the reserve made in Section 4, taking note of the cost of production and energy and other matters as may be prescribed, the Schedule can be amended. We have already referred to the fact that in view of the fact that tariff rates have been fixed by way of a legislature power and in the light of the reserve made in Section 4, taking note of the cost of production and energy and other matters as may be prescribed, the Schedule can be amended. Learned Additional Advocate General has also relied on certain passages from Administrative Law by S. P. Sathe, wherein at page No. 29, the "conditional legislation" has been explained in the following manner :- ii) Conditional Legislation - The legislature makes the law but leaves it to the executive to bring the Act into operation when conditions demanding such operation are obtained. The executive has to decide whether the necessary conditions required for the law to be in operation have been satisfied or not and if they have been so, it should issue a notification bringing the law into operation. This is called conditional legislation. The conditional legislation is of three types : (a) legislation to bring an Act into operation; (b) legislation to extend the application of any Act in force in one territory to another territory; and also the executive may restrict and make modifications in the original legislation to suit the exigencies of the territory under its control. (c) to extend or to exempt from the operation of an Act certain categories of subjects or territories. Such power is of two kinds. One is whether the legislature declares that the Act will apply for a particular duration but gives power to the executive to extend its life by a notification. The other is where the legislature makes the Act applicable to specified objects but empowers the executive to extend its application to other similar objects or exempt any of these from its application. The Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act of 1948 was an example of the first kind of delegation. The other is where the legislature makes the Act applicable to specified objects but empowers the executive to extend its application to other similar objects or exempt any of these from its application. The Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act of 1948 was an example of the first kind of delegation. Examples of the second kind of delegation are : S. 27 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1952, which empowers the Central Government to add to the Schedule containing a list of industries to which the Act is to apply, any industry which, in its opinion, should be covered by the Act and S. 29B of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, which empowers the Central Government to exempt any industrial undertaking from the requirement of obtaining licence prescribed under that Act. This legislation is called conditional legislation because in fact the power delegated to the executive is also subjective, as it has to decide whether certain conditions which are pre-requistie for the application of or extension of or exemption from an Act is obtained. It does not involve any law making as such. " By applying the said principle and in view of the language used in Section 4, it is clear that certain powers have been entrusted to the executive to provide flesh and bones through sub-ordinate legislation. However, the power delegated to the executive is also subjective, as it has to decide whether such conditions which are pre-requisite for the application of or extension of or exemption from an Act is obtained. As rightly observed by the learned Author, it does not involve any law making as such. 28. We have already stated that the learned counsel appearing for the appellants very much relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Pawan Alloys and Casting Private Limited (cited supra). No doubt, in the said decision, the Supreme Court has held that the Board is estopped from pre-mature withdrawing the incentive who have commenced the production before the notification of withdrawal was introduced. The Supreme Court has also held that the impugned notification could only be prospective and all those who have obtained supply from the Electricity Board would not be affected and would get the rebate for the full period of 3 years. The Supreme Court has also held that the impugned notification could only be prospective and all those who have obtained supply from the Electricity Board would not be affected and would get the rebate for the full period of 3 years. The distinguishing fact, as rightly pointed out by the learned Additional Advocate General, in our case, is the tariff for electrical energy supplied by the Electricity Board was governed by Tamil Nadu Act 1 of 79. The Schedule which sets out the different tariffs to be paid by the consumers is part of the legislative enactment. The power to amend the schedule by the Government in terms of Section 4 is in the nature of conditional legislation, which we have already referred to that the decision of the Supreme Court in K. Sabanayagam's case (cited supra) supports the said claim. In other words, we hold that the power to amend the schedule by the Government under Section 4 of the Act will have to be held as conditional legislation. It is well established that there can be no promissory estoppel against legislative functions. On this aspect, we have already referred to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in and, As rightly argued by the learned Additional Advocate General, in the cases relied on by the appellants there has been specific incentive package. On the other hand, in all our cases, the alleged promise is found under the Act of Legislature. The condition which has now been imposed and which is questioned are conceived in public interest so as to restrict the concessional tariff only to those new industries who are not able to earn any profit. Having regard to the fact that the Board is supplying energy to the various types of consumers on various tariffs and that the Board is suffering loss and the Government is making good the said losses from the public funds, it would be in the interest of the public to ensure that concessions are not extended to persons who do not need them and who are in affluent position to save public funds. This would undoubtedly be in public interest and hence the question of invoking promissory estoppel does not arise. 29. It is not disputed that all the appellants have given undertaking agreeing to abide by G. O. Ms. No. 861 (after the amendment). This would undoubtedly be in public interest and hence the question of invoking promissory estoppel does not arise. 29. It is not disputed that all the appellants have given undertaking agreeing to abide by G. O. Ms. No. 861 (after the amendment). As the undertaking is more or less similar to the case of W. P. No. 11661/84 (W. A. No. 488/95), the same is extracted hereunder :- (i) We M/s. National Oxygen Limited, represented by Mr. G. N. Saraf, Managing Director note that as per the orders of the Government in G. O. Ms. No. 861, P. W., D/- 30-4-82 Tariff concessions specified under the H. T. Tariff-I (i)(a) admissible to new industrial undertaking will not be available from the year when the industry starts earning profit. (ii) We hereby declared that our financial year ending with 31-3-1983 has disclosed loss as per our books of accounts. The required certificate from our Auditors M/s. Singhi and Company, Madras, will be submitted in due course. (iii) We undertake to purchase audited balance-sheet and profit and loss account in proof of our unit not earning profit for the year ended 31-3-83. (iv) On the basis of the above undertaking we request you to extend the concessions referred to in para 1 supra. (v) We hereby undertake to reimburse to the Board in lump sum the concession allowed with belated payment surcharge thereon as per the terms and conditions of supply immediately after expiry of the period of 6 months from the accounting year ended or the date of finalisation of the accounts whichever is earlier in case our industry is found to have earned profit. (vi) We note that the concessions allowed to us from 1-4-83 will be provisional and subject to production of documentary proof referred to in clause 3 supra and the same will be withdrawn at any time without notice. (vii) We agree the amount allowed as concession shall be considered as an arrears of current consumption charges and the Board will be at liberty to disconnect the supply for non-payment of the said amount found due from us." The undertaking in all our cases is a specific one given knowing fully well of the content of the order, unlike the general undertaking referred to in Pawan Alloy's case. On this ground also the conclusion arrived at by the Supreme Court in Pawan Alloy's case is distinguishable. On this ground also the conclusion arrived at by the Supreme Court in Pawan Alloy's case is distinguishable. Having given a specific undertakings agreeing to abide by G. O. Ms. No. 861 they are estopped from questioning the said orders. 30. As regards the question of retrospectivity is concerned, the said point is also covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pawan Alloy's case. The said aspect has been considered by Their Lordships in para 53 of the judgment. By the said judgment, the Supreme Court has held that an order which is brought into effect on a particular date and made it operative from that date cannot be said to be retrospective. In these circumstances, the contrary contention made by the learned counsel for the appellants is to be rejected. 31. So far as the contention of violation of principles of natural justice, we are of the view that since the amendment brought about to the Act is in the nature of conditional legislation, no question of violation of principles of natural justice would arise. This is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Sabanayagam, wherein Their Lordships, after referring to the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Cynamide India Limited, have made the following observations in paragraphs 15 and 20 (at pages 356-357 of AIR 1998 SC) :- "15. . . . . . . . . . In that case the Court was concerned with the question whether price fixation under Paragraph 3 of Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1979 was an executive function or a legislative function. Treating it to be a legislative function Chinnappa Reddy, J., speaking for the Court observed that the legislative action, plenary or subordinate, is not subject to rules of natural justice. In the case of Parliamentary legislation, the proposition is self-evident. In the case of sub-ordinate legislation, it may happen that Parliament may itself provide for a notice and for a hearing in which case the substantial non-subservance of the statutorily prescribed mode of observing natural justice may have the effect of invalidating the sub-ordinate legislation. But, where the legislature has not chosen to provide for any notice or hearing, no one can insist upon it and it will not be permissible to read natural justice into such legislative activity. . . . . 20. But, where the legislature has not chosen to provide for any notice or hearing, no one can insist upon it and it will not be permissible to read natural justice into such legislative activity. . . . . 20. In the aforesaid first two categories of cases delegate who exercise conditional legislation acting on its pure subjective satisfaction regarding existence of conditions precedent for exercise of such power may not be required to hear parties likely to be affected by the exercise of such power. Where the delegate proceeds to fill up the details of the legislation for the future - which is part of the integrated action of policy-making for the future, it is part of the future policy and is legislative. But where he merely determines either subjectively or objectively depending upon the "conditions" imposed in the statute permitting exercise of power by the delegate - there is no legislation involved in the real sense and therefore, in our opinion, applicability of principles of fair play, consultation or natural justice to the extent necessary cannot be said to be foreclosed. Of course, the fact that in such cases of 'conditional legislation' these principles are not foreclosed does not necessarily mean that they are always mandated. In a case of purely ministerial function or in a case where no objective conditions are prescribed and the matter is left to the subjective satisfaction of the delegate (as in categories one and two explained above) no such principles of fair play, consultation or natural justice could be attracted." 32. Regarding the other contention that the impugned action is arbitrary and there is no nexus sought to be achieved, it is seen that concessional tariff is provided for new industries which would be facing problems at the initial stages. As rightly argued by the learned Additional Advocate General, if even at the initial stages, such new industries start making profit, they would be comparable to established units and hence would not form part of this class, who are to be offered any concessional benefits. As rightly argued by the learned Additional Advocate General, if even at the initial stages, such new industries start making profit, they would be comparable to established units and hence would not form part of this class, who are to be offered any concessional benefits. Having regard to the fact that no person has got any right to claim concessions and also taking note of the fact that there are several categories of consumers who are required to pay at the rates fixed by the Government, it is brought unequitable to extend the concession to such of those new industries, who are making profit. It is in this context that the notification refers to the consumers making profits. Though the word industrial units have been referred to in the Notification, it would be seen that the profit is spoken to with reference to the consumers. It would be perfectly valid and justified to deny the concession to the consumers whether it be an individual or a company, if they make profit. Such a criteria cannot be said to be irrelevant or extraneous, particularly having regard to the cost of production of energy. Hence the contention of the appellants that the action of the respondents is arbitrary or extraneous deserves to be rejected. 33. By drawing our attention to certain factual details, Mrs. Nalini Chidambaram, learned senior counsel and Mr. K. Ramagopal would contend that on proper interpretation of the amendment brought about by G. O. Ms. No. 861 dated 30-4-82, the same will have no application to the existing industries. They also referred to us the words occurring in para 1(b) of the impugned G. O. The said contention is liable to be rejected. Tariff concession is referred to in para (i)-(a) of Part A of the Schedule. There is no distinction made in the said para. Any industry, who has commenced production, either before the Government Order or after the Government Order and which has not completed 5 years would fall within the said para. Para (i)(b) deals with further concession for industries which work during night shifts. It is only in those cases that the words "new industries" and "existing industries" are used. The explanation to para (i)(b) makes it clear that the word "existing industries" is relatable only for the said clause (i)(b) and not for (i)(a). Para (i)(b) deals with further concession for industries which work during night shifts. It is only in those cases that the words "new industries" and "existing industries" are used. The explanation to para (i)(b) makes it clear that the word "existing industries" is relatable only for the said clause (i)(b) and not for (i)(a). In the circumstances, the contention that the impugned Government Order will have no application to the industries who have already commenced production prior to 1-5-82 may not be correct. 34. Before winding up, it is our duty to say that the grant of concessional rate of supply are governed by statutory orders issued under the Act. Therefore, the appellants/industries know very well that such statutory orders are being changed from time to time and new conditions are either imposed or deleted from the Schedule to the Act. It is only subject to the policy of the Government that the electricity supply was extended to industries right from the year 1974 onwards. As rightly observed by the learned Judge, merely because the Act as it stood on 1-3-1978 contained a Schedule which prescribe the tariff rates for High Tension industries in a concessional method subject to certain conditions, does not mean that the Government cannot change the conditions based on experience and the necessity to extend concession to industries in a uniform manner. We are satisfied that the change brought out in the impugned G. O. Ms. No. 861 dated 30-4-82 was primarily to extend the concession only to industries which were unable to stabilise themselves and which were incurring loss. When the industries start earning profit, where is the need to provide tariff at concessional rate at the cost of Electricity Board? In view of the policy decision of the Government, Electricity Board is supplying electricity free of cost to agriculturists and also offering various other concessions to economically and socially weaker sections. Such matters had impelled the Government to withdraw the concession to those industries which were making profits. In our considered opinion, the decision was quite reasonable and in public interest. We have already concluded that the appellants have not established that they had set up their factories only on the basis of concessional tariff. We also observed that it is unjust to extend the concession to flourishing industries at the cost of the Electricity Board. In our considered opinion, the decision was quite reasonable and in public interest. We have already concluded that the appellants have not established that they had set up their factories only on the basis of concessional tariff. We also observed that it is unjust to extend the concession to flourishing industries at the cost of the Electricity Board. We also referred to the undertakings voluntarily signed by all the appellants which would not entitle them from getting any relief. 35. Under these circumstances, we are unable to accept the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants and we are in agreement with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judge. Net result, all the appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed. No costs. All connected W. M. Ps., are closed. Appeals dismissed.