Sudheshwari Singh @ Sudheshwari Prasad Singh v. Arbind Prasad Singh
2001-01-08
P.K.DEB
body2001
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment P.K.Deb, J. 1. Both these petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have been preferred by the same petitioner against the same opposite parties on the orders being passed in the case No. 698 of 1998 under Section 145/146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the S.D.M. at Banka. 2. The proceedings, as mentioned above, was initiated under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on a petition being filed by the opposite party Arbind Pd. Singh contending that the disputed arose when the petitioner along with his sons and others were making attempt for forceful dispossession of the opposite party from 34 acres spread in 35 plots of Khata No. 140 of village Kakwara thana No. 7/1. According to the opposite parties, the disputed land along with other lands comprising the total area of 1.20 acres in plot No. 725 was originally belonging to Mangani Marhiya and he left behind three sons. namely, Dhaturi Marhiya Mathuri Marhiya and Lochan Marhiya and all the three brothers were enjoying possession of the properties and afterwards they had enjoyed their shares separately being 1 /3rd each and opposite parties had purchased from the shares of Mathuri Marhiya by two sale-deeds in the year 1977. But as the whole property was only recorded in the name of one brother Dhaturi Marhiya, the petitioner had purchased the whole of the lands and were creating disturbances in the peaceful possession of the opposite parties. It appears that on previous occasion also there was a proceeding under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure being case No. 385 of 1998 between the opposite parties and Manoj Kr, Singh and others of the petitioners side and that 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure proceeding Was dropped as it was held that on the basis of cases of the parties it could at best be a case of partition between the parties and, as such, they were referred to civil Court but only after a few days the present petition was filed from the side of the opposite parties on which a proceeding was again drawn up under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and an interim restraint order was also passed.
It is the contention of the petitioner that notices were not properly served oh all the parties except to one of the second party member and in absence of appearance of the petitioners side on and off date a proceeding under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been transformed into a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure vide an order dated 27.10.1998 in the absence of the petitioners side. Again an order was passed in the absence of the petitioner on 16.2.1999. Attachment order was passed under Section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and then on 2.8.1999 a receiver was appointed and all were made in absence of the petitioners side. Against the order passed of conversion, a revision petition was preferred before the Sessions Judge in criminal revision No. 726 of 1998 but the said revision-petition was dismissed vide order dated 21.8.1999. Hence, these petitions are filed challenging both orders passed on 27.10.199C and 16.2.1999 together with 2.8.1999. 3. Once a dispute arose in course of argument before this Court as to whether the order of conversion was passed on an off date or not. To verify that the original records were called for, I have scrutinised the records of the Court below and it could be found that the order of conversion was definitely passed on an off date. On 27.10.1998 1st party appeared and the second party (petitioners side) Were absent and the case was fixed on 29.10.1998. But by mentioning continued (lagatcu) order was passed of conversion to 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and in the continued order next date was fixed on 5.12.1998. If the continued order was passed on 27.10.1988 then there was no reason for fixing any date changing the next date from 29.10.1998 to 5.12.1998. Either the continued order was passed on 29.10.1998 or on an off date in between 27.10.1998 and 29.10.1998. So definitely there is irregularity in maintaining the order.
If the continued order was passed on 27.10.1988 then there was no reason for fixing any date changing the next date from 29.10.1998 to 5.12.1998. Either the continued order was passed on 29.10.1998 or on an off date in between 27.10.1998 and 29.10.1998. So definitely there is irregularity in maintaining the order. The conversion order ought not to have been passed in such a manner and when it was within the knowledge of the learned Court below that there was earlier proceeding under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as is revealed from the later orders then it ought to have been verified as to whether there was really existence ef apprehension of breach of peace or not on the date of conversion itself. Moreover, the police report, which was originally called for, did not even suffice to a proceeding under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. By one report the police had suggested for drawing up proceeding under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and by another report it was stated that it was not a case either for 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or for 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But still then proceeding was drawn up under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code. So the satisfaction of apprehension of breach of peace for a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not there before the Court. Even if it is construed giving go by to the irregularly committed by the learned S.D.M. then also legally it remains that on the date the conversion was made, there was nothing before the Court below regarding the continuance of apprehension of breach of peace in respect of the proceeding land (sic) rather the police report was totally otherwise. So the satisfaction made for drawing up a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was definitely wrong and hence, the same cannot be sustained. It appears that the learned Sessions Judge has not considered the matter in its proper perspective while disposing of the revision petition. 4. It has been strenuously argued by Mr. Ram Ch.
So the satisfaction made for drawing up a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was definitely wrong and hence, the same cannot be sustained. It appears that the learned Sessions Judge has not considered the matter in its proper perspective while disposing of the revision petition. 4. It has been strenuously argued by Mr. Ram Ch. Jha, learned counsel appearing for and on behalf of the opposite parties, that the earlier proceeding was not in between the parties and it is not on record as to for which land the earlier proceeding under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was drawn up and the same was dropped by referring the parties to the civil Court. On going through the copy of the earlier petition for 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure it could be found that at least some of the parties were there in the earlier proceedings as they were in the present proceeding and the lands are also almost the same and the nature of dispute was also same. It appears from the factual aspect that the parties have purchased from different co-sharers while one party says that the land belonging to Dhaturi then the other party says that the lands belonging to three brothers. Even if contention of the opposite parties is true that the land was belonging to the three brothers then also the petitioners purchase cannot be said to be illegal at least in respect of the share of Dhaturi. In that way, the earlier decision of the S.D.M. Banka, in the proceeding under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was correct decision and the matter was rightly been referred to the civil Court. Thus, on perusal of the records of the lower Court I find that the drawing up of proceeding under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and then its conversion to 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was totally uncalled for. Regarding the later part of the order of attachment under Section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and then appointment of receiver, Mr. Ram Ch. Jha, senior counsel, has fairly submitted that against those orders he is not arguing regarding its validity. When the whole proceeding itself is a misnomer as discussed above then the whole proceeding should go together with the subsequent orders of attachment etc. 5.
Ram Ch. Jha, senior counsel, has fairly submitted that against those orders he is not arguing regarding its validity. When the whole proceeding itself is a misnomer as discussed above then the whole proceeding should go together with the subsequent orders of attachment etc. 5. Thus, both these petitions are hereby allowed and the whole of the proceeding under Sections 144, 145 and 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in case No. 698 of 1998 before the S.D.M., Banka, is hereby quashed.