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2001 DIGILAW 160 (PNJ)

Gurpreet Singh v. State of Punjab

2001-01-30

JAWAHAR LAL GUPTA, N.K.SUD

body2001
JUDGMENT Jawahar Lal Gupta, J. (Oral) - The office of village Headman provides the bone of contention. The dispute between the parties had commenced in the year 1993. They have had more than one round of litigation including the earlier writ petition before this Court. Finally, vide order dated May 12, 1998, the Financial Commissioner has directed the Collector to proceed afresh by inviting applications for post. Aggrieved by the order, the petitioner, who was one of the candidates, has approached this Court through the present writ petition. He prays that the order of the Financial Commissioner be set aside. 2. The petitioners father was working as a Lambardar. He passed away on February 18, 1993. Thereafter, the process of appointment of a new Lambardar was taken up. Initially, the 4th respondent was appointed in 1994. Ultimately, by the order dated March 12, 1996, the Collector had selected the petitioner. A copy of this order is on record as Annexure P2. Aggrieved by this order, Kuldeep Singh-respondent No. 4 had filed an appeal before the Commissioner. On consideration of the matter, the Commissioner had accepted the appeal vide his order dated May 7, 1997. A copy of this order is at Annexure P3 with the writ petition. He inter alia found that the petitioners father had been "dismissed from the post of Lambardar vide Collectors order dated 3.9.1991 for wrong verification of caste certificate". It was noticed that the Commissioner had stayed the operation of that order. Yet, it was considered that the Collector could have refused to appoint any of the heirs of a dismissed employee. It was also noticed that the father of the petitioner was "defaulter of four Banks.......". There were allegations against the petitioners mother as well. On this basis, the Commissioner found that the petitioner was not suitable. He, thus, accepted the appeal and ordered that Kuldeep Singh-respondent No. 4 was entitled to be appointed. The petitioner filed a revision petition before the Financial Commissioner. It was contended that the petitioner was entitled to a preferential treatment as his father was a Lambardar in the village. Various other contentions were also raised. The Financial Commissioner four that the petitioners connection "to the Ex-Lambardar Tejinder Singh is a liability rather than an asset because Tejinder Singh was found to be defaulter of four Banks when he died". Various other contentions were also raised. The Financial Commissioner four that the petitioners connection "to the Ex-Lambardar Tejinder Singh is a liability rather than an asset because Tejinder Singh was found to be defaulter of four Banks when he died". It was further noticed that the petitioner had inherited the property but "made no attempt to clear the default promptly. Tejinder Singh died in 1993 but till late 1995, the default had still not been cleared. In fact, the entire family was in default on that date". It was also noticed that "the father of Gurpreet Singh had been dismissed for wrongly verifying one Amarjit Singh as belonging to Scheduled Caste". After a thorough consideration of the matter, she found that there was "intense rivalry between the two" contenders and that there was "no reason why the Administration should feel compelled to restrict its choice in this manner". Thus, the orders of the Collector appointing the petitioner and those of the Commissioner appointing respondent No. 4 were set aside and a direction for inviting fresh applications was given. 3. Mr. G.S. Bal, counsel for the petitioner contends that all the loans having been cleared, there was no impediment in the way of his being appointed to the office of the village Headman. The Financial Commissioner has erred in ordering a de novo consideration of the matter. The claim made on behalf of the petitioner has been controverted by Mr. Ashok Singla, counsel for respondent No. 4. 4. The circumstances of the case speak for themselves. It has been found as a fact that the petitioners father had taken substantial amounts of loan from different banks. The total amount was in excess of Rs. 2 lacs. There was default in repayment. The petitioner had without doubt inherited the property in the year 1993. He had, however, failed to make the payments and clear the liabilities at least till the year 1995. Still more, the two contenders have fought relentlessly since the year 1993. In this situation we are not surprised that the Financial Commissioner took the view that fresh applications should be invited and that the most suitable candidate should be selected and appointed. 5. Mr. Still more, the two contenders have fought relentlessly since the year 1993. In this situation we are not surprised that the Financial Commissioner took the view that fresh applications should be invited and that the most suitable candidate should be selected and appointed. 5. Mr. Bal contends that in view of the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Inderaj v. Financial Commissioner, 1994 PLJ 473, the suitability of a person has to be seen on the date of appointment. If on that date, there is no outstanding amount, the person cannot be considered to be suffering from any disqualification. 6. We have perused the judgment. It is no doubt true that according to the rule laid down by their Lordship, the date of appointment and not the last date for submission of applications, is the crucial date. However, it is the admitted position that the appointment to the post of Lambardar had been made for the first time in the year 1994. Following the rule laid in Inderajs case (supra), it cannot be said that the petitioner was free from liability or disqualification on the date of appointment. The liability of his father had not been cleared by him till the year 1995. Thus, this decision is of no assistance to the petitioner. 7. It is true that the petitioners desire to be appointed as a Lambardar has not been fulfilled. However, keeping in view the sequence of events, the Financial Commissioner has taken a possible view. It is not in violation of any rule or provision of law. It is not arbitrary or unfair. In fact, it is aimed at selecting the most suitable person out of those who may offer their services. In our view, the order does not call for any interference in proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. 8. No other point has been raised. 9. In view of the above, we find no merit in this petition. It is, consequently, dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.