P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) THE unsuccessful tenant filed the present CRP under Section 22 of the a. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) control Act, 1960, hereinafter referred to in short as act . ( 2 ) THE respondent-landlord filed r. C. C. No. 1/96 on the file of the Principal junior Civil Judge-Rent Controller, srikakulam, seeking eviction of the tenant on two grounds viz. , (1) wilful default, and (2) bona fide personal requirement. The court of first instance by an order dated 21. 12. 1999. had negatived both the grounds and aggrieved by the same, the landlord had preferred C. M. A. No. 5/2000 on the file of the Principal Senior Civil judge-Appellate Authority, Srikakulam, and the appellate authority by an order dated 4. 8. 2000 while discussing point No. 1 had arrived at a conclusion that the tenant is liable to be evicted on the ground of wilful default. But, however, while discussing point no. 2 had negatived the relief of the landlord on the ground of bona fide personal requirement and the tenant aggrieved by the impugned order had preferred the present revision. ( 3 ) SRI P. Veera Reddy, the learned counsel representing the revision petitioner-tenant had contended that the findings of the appellate authority at paragraph Nos. 7 to 11 dealing with the ground of wilful default are totally unsustainable. The learned counsel also had pointed out that the evidence of PW1 itself is clear that even relating to the alleged default of January, february, 1996, in fact, money orders had been sent and the conduct of the landlord clearly reveals that the landlord has been evasive for the purpose of creating a ground of wilful default to throw the tenant out of the premises. The learned counsel also had pointed out the findings recorded by the Court of first instance on the ground of wilful default and also had pointed out the admissions made by PW1 in cross-examination. The learned counsel also had pointed out the findings recorded by the Court of first instance on the ground of wilful default and also had pointed out the admissions made by PW1 in cross-examination. The learned Counsel further contended that as far as the pleading on the aspect of wilful default is concerned, it is very vague and the learned counsel had further contended that in the light of the facts and circumstances, the appellate authority should have appreciated that the burden is on the part of the landlord to prove the non-payment of rent and also wilful default and the appellate authority should have appreciated the facts of the case, especially in the light of the cross- examination of PW1. The learned Counsel had further pointed out that as far as bona fide personal requirement is concerned, concurrent findings had been recorded by both the Courts below and apart from this aspect, it was also pointed out that it was conceded by the landlord before the appellate authority that he was not successful in establishing the ground of bona fide personal occupation and hence, the landlord cannot be permitted to urge this ground at the revisional stage. ( 4 ) SRI Ramana Murthy representing sri D. Ramalingaswamy, the learned Counsel appearing for the landlord had strenuously contended that the question of wilful default is a mixed question of fact and law and the appellate authority, in fact, had discussed this aspect in detail and had arrived at a conclusion that the tenant had committed wilful default and hence, the detailed findings recorded by the appellate authority on this ground need not be disturbed. The learned Counsel also had pointed out to the specific stand taken by PW1 relating to wilful default in his cross-examination and the learned Counsel also had commented that the learned Rent Controller was more guided away by the stray admission made by PW1 in cross-examination. The learned counsel also had pointed out the way in which the matter was dealt with by the learned Rent Controller, who had not even framed the specific points for consideration of both the grounds. The learned Counsel also had further contended that as far as the bona fide personal requirement is concerned, not only that concurrent findings had been recorded by both the courts below, the learned Counsel had also submitted that this ground. The learned Counsel also had further contended that as far as the bona fide personal requirement is concerned, not only that concurrent findings had been recorded by both the courts below, the learned Counsel had also submitted that this ground. In fact, was given-up even before the appellate authority. ( 5 ) HEARD both the Counsel and also perused the material available on record. The facts in brief are that the petition schedule premises is a residential house in srikakulam Municipality and the landlord had let out the same to the tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 300/- and it is the stand of the landlord that from July, 1995 onwards, the tenant had committed wilful default in payment of rents. But, however, he had sent money order for two months and the landlord refused to receive the same. It was also pleaded by the landlord that he intended to celebrate the marriage of his son and provide separate residence and hence, he requires the premises for bona fide personal occupation. The landlord had issued a notice to the tenant on 12. 1. 1996, marked as Ex. A1 in which he has called upon the tenant to pay all arrears of rent @ rs. 300/- w. e. f. July, 1995 and also vacate the premises not only on the ground of wilful default, but also on the ground of bonafide personal requirement and the tenant had issued a reply notice, marked as Ex. A2. The tenant had admitted the jural relationship of landlord and tenant, but had denied all the other allegations. The learned Rent controller had framed the points for consideration as follows: 1. Whether the petitioner is entitled for the reliefs as prayed for? 2. To what relief? it is, no doubt, true that the appellate authority had framed specific points on both the grounds, which read as follows: 1. Whether the tenant has committed wilful default in payment of rent? If so, whether the default is not wilful? 2. Whether the landlord requires the premises for his personal occupation? the proceedings under the Act are summary in nature. But, however, even the courts or the Tribunals, as the case may be, and also even the statutory authorities conferred with quasi-judicial powers are expected to follow proper procedure. The following of the methodical and systematical procedure always may be essential for the proper disposal of a matter. the proceedings under the Act are summary in nature. But, however, even the courts or the Tribunals, as the case may be, and also even the statutory authorities conferred with quasi-judicial powers are expected to follow proper procedure. The following of the methodical and systematical procedure always may be essential for the proper disposal of a matter. The rigour of strict rules of evidence as such or all other procedural technicalities may not necessarily be observed in such cases in strict sense. However, it is made clear that even the Rent controller or the Appellate Authority while deciding a matter, such authorities in the act are expected to frame specific points for consideration and it is always desirable that if specific points are framed in relation to each and every ground, so that the matters can be decided in a better way. Hence, it is always desirable that even in such summary proceedings, the Rent Controller or the appellate Authority, as the case may be, shall frame specific points for consideration so as to enable them to record proper findings. As can be seen from the record, before the learned Rent Controller, the landlord was examined as PW1 and the tenant was examined as RW1 and Exs. Al to A3 had been marked. The Appellate authority had discussion the evidence of rw1 at Paragraph No. 8 of its judgment. The Appellate Authority at paragraph nos. lo (a) and 11 had observed as follows:"10 (A ). Two conclusions can be reached from these circumstances. If notice is true, the tenant would have mentioned the payment of rent of January and February, 1996 atleast in his notice Ex. A3 which was issued in the fourth week of April, 1996. The second conclusion is that had he lent any amount to the landlord he would have obtained payment endorsement crediting those two months rents towards the amount due under the promissory note. Ex. A3 notice supplies a strong inference that the pronote must have been pressed into service with an evil design to cause threat to the landlord. No other purpose will be served by such notice. 11. By taking false plea of payment of rent for January and February, 1996 the tenant has proved that the failure is desperate and wilful and therefore, the tenant is liable to be evicted from the schedule premises. No other purpose will be served by such notice. 11. By taking false plea of payment of rent for January and February, 1996 the tenant has proved that the failure is desperate and wilful and therefore, the tenant is liable to be evicted from the schedule premises. The finding of the learned Rent Controller on this aspect is reached without appreciating the evidence of RW1 vis-a-vis his counter and Exs. Al to A3 together. Hence that finding, rejecting the plea of the petitioner, is erroneous and hence, it is liable to be set aside. " ( 6 ) THESE findings of the Appellate authority, in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, in my considered opinion as such may not constitute wilful default within the meaning of the Act. However, it was seriously contended by the learned Counsel appearing for the landlord that a stray admission in the cross-examination of PW1 alone cannot be considered and the whole evidence of pw1 as such should be taken into consideration. It is needless to point out that as far as bona fide personal requirement is concerned, the ground, in fact, was given-up by the landlord himself before the Appellate authority and hence, it does not require any consideration. However, as far as the aspect of wilful default is concerned, the evidence adduced on behalf of both the parties i. e. , the evidence of PW1 and RW1. it is oath against oath, and except this evidence, there is no other evidence. Hence, in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case and especially, in the light of the stand taken by the landlord before this Court, the matter is remitted back to the Appellate authority for giving further opportunity to both the parties to let in further evidence on the aspect of wilful default, if any, and dispose of the matter in accordance with law. ( 7 ) HENCE, for the reasons recorded above, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted back, for the purpose specified supra, to the Appellate Authority. The CRP is allowed to the extent indicated above. No order as to costs.