JUDGMENT Tarun Chatterjee, J. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against an order being Order No.9 dated 7th of September, 2000 passed by the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal (in short 'Tribunal') by which the prayer of the writ petitioners for stay of the proceedings pending before the Tribunal till a decision is arrived at by the Supreme Court of India in a matter where a demand of interest on arrear cess is now under re-consideration before it. 2. In this connection we have heard Mr. Sakti Nath Mukherjee, the learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the writ petitioners and Mr. Lakshmi Gupta appearing for the respondents. We have also carefully examined the order under challenge in this writ application. From the above it is now clear the only question that needs to be decided in this writ petition is whether the Tribunal ought to have passed an order directing that the pending proceeding before it should remain stayed till a decision is arrived at by the Supreme Court on the question of validity of demand of interest on arrear cess in a case where such question was referred to a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court. In our view, in the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal was fully justified in rejecting the prayer of the writ petitioners. The West Bengal Legislature enacted the West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1973 and West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976 ostensibly to provide education and employment in rural areas. For raising funds for this purpose the said Legislature imposed purported cess upon certain lands and buildings in the State. The 1973 Act levied what is called Primary Education Cess and the 1976 Act levied what is called Rural Employment Cess. The original section 4 of the 1976 Act provided for levy of Rural Employment Cess on all immovable properties on which roads and public works cesses are assessed according to the provisions of Cess Act, 1980. The said section 4(2) also provided that Rural Employment Cess should be levied annually at different rates depending on the purpose for which the land and/or mine was used. The West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1981 amended the 1976 West Bengal Act and by section 7(b) thereof amendments were made in section 4(2) of the West Bengal Act with effect from 1st April, 1981. The West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1981 amended the 1976 West Bengal Act and by section 7(b) thereof amendments were made in section 4(2) of the West Bengal Act with effect from 1st April, 1981. Thereafter, the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1982 was enacted with effect from 1st of October, 1982. Section 4(2) of the 1976 West Bengal Act was amended and under clause (aa) thereof, the first provision was omitted. The constitutional validity of the aforesaid amendments and imposition of cess on despatches of tea in 1973 and 1976 West Bengal Acts and the notifications issued thereunder were challenged, inter alia, by the writ petitioner No.1 as well as one, Buxa Dooars Tea Co. Ltd. by way of writ petitions on which interim orders were passed by the Supreme Court on 16th June, 1983, which is as follows: "Rule Nisi. There will be no order on stay application but if the petitioner succeeds in the writ petition, the State of West Bengal will refund the amount of cess collected with interest thereon @ 12% per annum from the date of collection." 3. The Supreme Court thereafter finally disposed of the writ application on 12th May, 1989 by a judgment and order whereby the Hon'ble Supreme Court allowed the writ petition and struck down the amendments of the West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976 effected by amending Acts of 1981 and 1982 so far as it purported to relate to tea estates. The writ petitioners were held to be entitled to refund of cess paid by them under the impugned statutory provisions. As such, the refund of the paid amounts and interest calculated @ 12% per annum on such amount became due and payable to the writ petitioner No.1 on 12th May, 1984 which the respondents failed and neglected to pay to the petitioner No.1 inspite of demands. After a lapse of about three months from the date when the refund and payment of accrued interest became due and payable by the respondents to the writ petitioner No.2 on 8th August, 1989 the Government of West Bengal issued an Ordinance called the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 1989 with effect from 8th August, 1989. The said ordinance was later replaced by the West Bengal Taxation Laws (2nd Amendment) Act, 1989. The said ordinance was later replaced by the West Bengal Taxation Laws (2nd Amendment) Act, 1989. By the said Ordinance which later became an Act, the West Bengal Legislature amended the provisions of 1976 Act and 1973 Act purporting to cure the defects pointed out in the aforesaid case by the Supreme Court. The validity of the aforesaid West Bengal Taxation Laws (Second Amendment) Act, 1989 was again challenged before the Supreme Court, inter alia, by the writ petitioner No.1 by way of writ petition being No. 1215 of 1989. In the said writ petition an interim order was passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 25th January, 1990 which is as follows: "Issue notice. In the meantime the assessment may be made as usual but there will be no enforcement of any demand under the Act or Rules. Status quo to be meintained as far as refunds are concerned." 4. The aforesaid writ petition filed by the writ petitioner No.1 was finally disposed of by the Supreme Court by a judgment and order dated 25th November, 1994 whereby the writ petition was dismissed and the writ petitioner No.1 was directed to payoff cess payable under the impugned Act with interest @ 12% per annum. An application for review of this judgment was also filed but the same was also dismissed by the Supreme Court in the following manner: "We have perused the review petition, we find no merit. The Review Petition is dismissed accordingly." In terms of the 2nd Amendment being West Bengal Taxation Laws (Second Amendment) Act, 1989 the writ petitioner No.1 has made payment of entire principal amount on account of cess both under the 1976 Act as well as under the 1973 Act. But no interest was paid by the writ petitioner No. 1. Accordingly a notice was received by the writ petitioner No.1 from the Agricultural Income-tax Officer, Calcutta Range directing the writ petitioner No.1 to pay interest on outstanding amounts of Rural Employment Cess and Primary Education Cess. Be it mentioned herein that such demand was made on the basis of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed on 25th November, 1994 challenging the aforesaid notice. A petition was moved before the Tribunal under section 8(1) of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987 which is still now pending. Be it mentioned herein that such demand was made on the basis of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed on 25th November, 1994 challenging the aforesaid notice. A petition was moved before the Tribunal under section 8(1) of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987 which is still now pending. It appears from the statements of the writ petitioner that a number of writ petitions were moved under Article 32 of the Constitution before the Hon'ble Supreme Court challenging the correctness of the said decision in the case of Goodricke Group Ltd. vs. State of W.B., 1995 Supp (1) SCC 707 (the writ petitioner No.1). These writ petitions were taken up for hearing by a subsequent bench of the Supreme Court and by a judgment which is reported in 2000 (1) SCC 710 (State of W.B. vs. Kesoram Industries Ltd. & Ors.), the Apex Court stated the law in the following manner: "Great emphasis has been placed by learned Counsel for the State of West Bengal upon the judgment of a Bench of three learned Judges in Goodricke Group Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal. Quite apart from the fact that there are pending proceedings in this court seeking to reconcile the judgment in Goodrickes' with that in State of Orissa vs. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd., we find some difficulty in accepting as correct the view taken in Goodricke particularly having regard to the earlier decision (of a Bench of two learned Judges) in Buxa Dooars Tea Co. Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal. We think, therefore, that these matters should be heard by a Constitution Bench. The papers and proceedings may, accordingly, be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for appropriate directions." 5. Thereafter, in the pending petition under section 8 of the We1it Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987 the writ petitioner No.1 made an application for stay of the proceedings before the Tribunal. By the impugned order, the prayer of the writ petitioner was rejected and, therefore, the writ petitioner was aggrieved and has come to this Court challenging the impugned order under Article 226 of the Constitution. In our view, the Tribunal was fully justified in rejecting the prayer of the writ petitioner. By the impugned order, the prayer of the writ petitioner was rejected and, therefore, the writ petitioner was aggrieved and has come to this Court challenging the impugned order under Article 226 of the Constitution. In our view, the Tribunal was fully justified in rejecting the prayer of the writ petitioner. There is no dispute that in the case between the parties before the Tribunal the aforesaid judgment was rendered by the Supreme Court in which directions have been given that the respondents were entitled to interest on the standing amounts at the rate of 12% per annum. This judgment has not yet been differed by the Supreme Court in which the writ petitioner was a party and, therefore, this judgment must be binding on the parties. It is true that the question that was decided in the aforesaid decision Goodricke Group Ltd. vs. State of W.B., 1995 Supp(l) SCC 707, has been referred to a larger Bench of the Supreme Court. That does not mean that the judgment that has been delivered by the Supreme Court in between the same parties would cot bind the writ petitioner. In any view of the matter, the question of staying the proceeding before the Tribunal cannot arise at all only because the question decided in the aforesaid Goodricke Group Ltd. vs. State of W.B., 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 707, has been referred to a Constitutional Bench. The judgment in the Goodricke Group Ltd. (supra) is binding on the parties and is the law of the land unless and until the Supreme Court reverses the said judgment in the Constitutional Bench. Therefore, there is no need to stay the proceedings pending before the Tribunal till a final decision is arrived at by the Supreme Court. In the case of Mohd. Abdul Khader vs. A.P.S.R. T Corporation, 1984 Lab. I.C. 90, a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has observed: "Mr. Prakash a Rao, the learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation, however, on the strength of the observations made in the judgment of the Kerala High Court in H.M. T Limited Kalamassery vs. Labour Court, Ernakulam, 1983 1 Serv LJ 20 : 1984 Lab.I.C 65, stated that the view expressed by the Supreme Court in L. Robert D'Souza vs. Executive Engineer, Southern Railways, AIR 1982 SC 854 : 1982 Lab. I.C 811, has now been referred to a larger Bench and, therefore, we may await the decision of the larger Bench of the Supreme Court, such a representation did not find favour with the Kerala High Court and in our opinion rightly so. Merely because a particular view taken by the Supreme Court which constitutes the law of the land is sought to be examined again in some cases and the same is referred to a larger Bench, the law as laid down does not cease to be binding on this Court. In view of the law of the land as it stands declared in L. Robert D' Souza vs. Executive Engineer, Southern Railways, in AIR 1982 SC 854 , we must hold that termination of the services of the petitioners in these cases constitutes retrenchment and for failure to comply with the requirements of section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. such' termination orders cannot be sustained. The impugned orders are accordingly quashed and the writ petitions are allowed, but in the circumstances, without costs." 6. Again in the case of Basudev Khadanga vs. Union of India, AIR 1973 Orissa 136, a Division Bench of Orissa High Court has held that a decision of - the Supreme Court, till it is altered by it, is binding between the parties and its effect cannot be whittled down because the matter was under re-consideration before the Supreme Court. That being the position, we are unable to hold that the proceedings before the Tribunal shall remain stayed till a decision is arrived at by the Supreme Court in its Constitutional Bench. In our view, the prayer of the writ petitioner cannot also be stated to be bona fide as we find that more than 2 crores of rupees are now dues of the respondents in terms of the original judgment reported in 1995 Supp (1) SCC 707 (Goodricke Group Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal) and in order to stall the realisation of the aforesaid sum of Rs. 2 crores, the present application has been filed by the writ petitioner before us and also before the Tribunal. 2 crores, the present application has been filed by the writ petitioner before us and also before the Tribunal. In any view of the matter, directions have already been given by the Tribunal to expedite the hearing of the matter and in the event the application under section 8(1) of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987 is rejected by the Tribunal, it would be open to the writ petitioner to take steps to challenge the said order in a higher forum and ask for stay of the order till such decision is made by the said higher forum. Accordingly, we do not find any merit in this writ application. However, before we part with this order, let us consider the only decision cited by Mr. Mukherjee in support of the case of the writ petitioner. Mr. Mukherjee relied on a decision of the Single Bench of this court in the case of Smt. Debala Mukherjee vs. Sujit Singh, 1977 (2) C.L.J. 35. In our view, that decision or the principle laid down in the said decision is/are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. In that decision it was held by a learned Judge of -this Court that once a judgment is delivered by the Supreme Court that would be the law of the land at that point of time and the decision would be binding on the courts even then the said decision if altered by a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court would not allow the person to review the earlier judgment on the ground that the law enunciated by the Supreme Court in the earlier decision was changed by the subsequent judgment. This question at this stage cannot arise in our case because the Larger Bench of the Supreme Court has not yet decided the correctness of the decision of its earlier decision reported in 1995 Supp(l) SCC 707. That apart the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1995 Supp (1) SCC 707 was a decision between the writ petitioner and the State-respondents. Therefore, that decision is very much binding on the writ petitioners. Accordingly, the Single Bench decision of this court as cited by Mr. Mukherjee cannot be applied to the facts and circumstances of this case. 7. For the reasons aforesaid, the writ petition is rejected. 8. There will be no order as to costs. Writ petition dismissed.