S. P. KHARE, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Code') for quashing the order dated 1-12-1995 in Criminal Case No. 201 of 1994 of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Satna and also the order dated 4-10-1997 in Criminal Revision No. 7 of 1996 of the Third Additional Sessions Judge, Satna. ( 2 ) APPLICANT Mahendra Kumar Mishra filed a complaint in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Satna. He was examined under Section 200 of the Code. The statements of the five witnesses, produced by him, were also recorded. The case was registered under Sections 294, 323 and 506 (Part II) I. P. C. and under Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The Magistrate found that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused persons and, therefore, issued process against them for their appearance in the Court. The accused persons appeared and submitted an application for their discharge on the ground that the charges against them were groundless. ( 3 ) AFTER hearing the arguments of both the sides the trial Magistrate by the impugned order dated 1-12-1995 dischargded them. The applicant challenged this order in revision before the Third Additional Sessions Judge, Satna in Criminal Revn. No. 7 of 1996. That revision has been dismissed by order dated 4-10-1997. Both the Courts have been given detailed reasons in support of the impugned orders. ( 4 ) IN this petition under Section 482 of the Code it is argued on behalf of the applicant that the Magistrate having once found that there is "sufficient ground for proceeding" against the accused persons could not hold at a later stage on the basis of the same material that the charges against the accused persons were "groundless. " ( 5 ) AFTER perusal of the complaint, the statements of the witnesses, recorded under Section 200 of the Code and the reasons recorded by the Judicial Magistrate First Class and the Additional Sessions Judge in the impugned orders, this Court is of the opinion that there is no valid ground for interference in exercise of the powers under Section 482 of the Code. Section 245 of the Code provides as under :"245. Section 245 of the Code provides as under :"245. When accused shall be discharged.- If, upon taking all the evidence referred to in Section 244, the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction, the Magistrate shall discharge him. (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a Magistrate from discharging the accused at any previous stage of the case if, for reasons to be recorded by such Magistrate he considers the charge to be groundless. " ( 6 ) ORDINARILY (after issuing the process against the accused persons under Section 204 of the Code the evidence of the complainant should be recorded after the accused has appeared. If after recording such evidence the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction, the Magistrate shall discharge him, but sub-section (2) of Section 245 of the Code empowers the Magistrate to discharge the accused even before recording evidence under Section 244 of the Code if for reasons to be recorded by him, he considers the charge to be groundless. Thus the law envisages a situation in which the accused can be discharged at any stage of the proceedings despite issue of process under Section 204 of the Code. He is empowered to discharge the accused even if no witnesses are examined under Section 244 of the Code. If after issue of summons the accused persons appear and show that allegations in the complaint are inherently improbable and false or do not constitute offence, they can claim to be discharged and the Magistrate requires no additional evidence under Section 244 for discharging them under Section 245 (2) of the Code. The formation of the opinion before the issue of the process that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused does not debar the Magistrate to discharge the accused after his appearance before him without recording any further evidence if there are adequate reasons for doing so. ( 7 ) SECTION 245 (2) of the Code had a corresponding provision in Section 253 (2) of the Code of 1898. ( 7 ) SECTION 245 (2) of the Code had a corresponding provision in Section 253 (2) of the Code of 1898. In Cricket Association of Bengal v. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1971 SC 1925 : (1971 Cri LJ 1432) it was held that sub-section (2) of the Section 253 gives ample jurisdiction to the Magistrate to discharge an accused in the circumstances mentioned therein and the order of discharge can be passed at any previous stage of the case. The same view was taken by the Supreme Court in Abhey Dass v. Gurdial Singh, AIR 1971 SC 834 : (1971 Cri LJ 691 ). Again in K. M. Mathew v. State of Kerala, (1992) 1 SCC 217 : ( 1992 Cri LJ 3779) it has been held that even after issue of the process under Section 204 of the Code it is open to the accused to plead before the Magistrate that the process against him ought not to have been issued. The Magistrate may drop the proceedings if he is satisfied on reconsideration of the complaint that there is no offence for which the accused could be tried. It is his judicial discretion. No specific provision is required for the Magistrate to drop the proceedings or rescind the process. The order issuing the process is an interim order and not a judgment. It can be varied or recalled. The fact that the process has already been issued is no bar to drop the proceedings if the complaint on the very face of it does not disclose any offence against the accused. ( 8 ) IN Alok Mitra v. Narendra Kumar ( 1993 MPLJ 759 ) it has been held by this Court that the Magistrate taking cognizance of the matter is entitled to discharge the accused even before any evidence has been taken in support of the charge provided he finds that the charge is groundless. Since this power can be exercised only after the cognizance of the offence has been taken either by registering the complaint or by issuing process against accused persons, neither the order taking cognizance nor the order issuing process is sufficient to decline exercise of this power. Since this power can be exercised only after the cognizance of the offence has been taken either by registering the complaint or by issuing process against accused persons, neither the order taking cognizance nor the order issuing process is sufficient to decline exercise of this power. Indeed, it would appear that at the stage of taking cognizance or issuing process the Magistrate has before him only the version of the complainant but at the stage of Section 245, he has the accused present before him and therefore aware of his defence as well. The accused may raise specific plea while denying the charge or by filing application in this behalf. Exercise of powers under sub-section (2) of Section 245 cannot be declined only because no new material had been brought on record after the particulars of the allegations are explained. If an accused person denies the charge and submits that no prima facie case has been made out against him, it will not be proper answer to his plea that no new material has been placed for consideration of the Court after framing of the charge. In spite of it, no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when a Magistrate will be justified in holding a charge to be groundless. The conclusion will always depend on facts and circumstances of each case. It is however, clear that in every case the Magistrate has to arrive at his conclusion judicially. It appears settled that the Magistrate has the power to discharge accused under this provision if the story related by the complainant himself is of such a nature that it does not disclose a criminal offence. ( 9 ) IN the present case the complainant came out with the story that the accused persons exerted pressure on him in July, 1992 to marry his brother to Mamta, who was daughter of Accused No. 1 Chandra Shekhar Prasad Mishra and accept an amount of Rs. 51,000/- as dowry. It is alleged that the complainant declined to do so. He was abused and threatened by the accused persons. He was pushed by them. The accused persons after their appearance before the Magistrate brought to his notice that a charge-sheet for the demand of dowry has been filed by the Police against the applicant. 51,000/- as dowry. It is alleged that the complainant declined to do so. He was abused and threatened by the accused persons. He was pushed by them. The accused persons after their appearance before the Magistrate brought to his notice that a charge-sheet for the demand of dowry has been filed by the Police against the applicant. The Judicial Magistrate First Class after hearing both the sides gave detailed reasons in the impugned order dated 1-12-1995 for holding that the charges against the accused persons are groundless. It has been recorded by him that the present complaint appears to be a counter blast to the charge sheet filed by the Police against the applicant. According to the police charge- sheet the applicant was demanding more money as dowry and on that ground he refused to marry his brother to Mamta. The Police charge-sheet was pending in his Court and, therefore, he could take judicial notice of it. There are reasons in support of the conclusion that the charges under Sections 294, 506 (Part II) and 323, IPC are prima facie not made out. Similarly the charge under Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 was also found to be without any basis. The story of the complainant was held to be inherently improbable. In this view of the matter the process issued against the accused persons was cancelled. ( 10 ) THE Additional Sessions Judge who heard the revision petition also agreed with the view taken by the Judicial Magistrate First Class. He has also dealt with each charge mentioned in the complaint and found that no prima facie case is made out against the accused persons. ( 11 ) THIS Court has also perused the material available on record and agrees with the view taken by the two Courts below. It will be an abuse of the process of the Court to quash the impugned orders and let the criminal case continue against the accused persons. The petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed. .