ORDER: The Management has filed this writ petition seeking for a writ of certiorari to call for the records of the first respondent/ Industrial Tribunal passed in A.P. No.71 of 1997 (sic. 1987) and to quash the same. 2. The case of the petitioner is that the 2nd respondent is employed as a driver in the petitioner/Corporation with effect from 1.3.1982. The charges against the 2nd respondent were that he had driven the Bus No.A 155 on 21.9.1986 under the influence of liquor and stopped the bus near Thalavaipuram. The petitioner was issued with a charge memo dated 23.9.1986 for the charges: (1) While he was working as a driver in the Bus No.A155, he had driven the vehicle under the influence of liquor; (2) he stopped the bus near Thalavaipuram due to his drunken condition and could not drive the bus further; (3) This has affected the routine work of the Corporation; (4) Due to stoppage of bus, passengers were put to inconvenience and the reputation of the corporation was affected, and (5) he had violated the rules of the Corporation and called upon the 2nd respondent to submit his explanation. The explanation offered by the 2nd respondent was not satisfactory, the Management has appointed an enquiry officer. The enquiry officer found that the charges against the 2nd respondent were proved. On receipt of the report of the enquiry officer, the Management had issued a second show cause notice for which the 2nd respondent also sent his reply. Taking into account the findings of the enquiry officer and also the past conduct of the 2nd respondent, the Management has dismissed the 2nd respondent from service with effect from 25.9.1986. The petitioner has filed a reference petition under Sec.33(2)(B) of the Industrial Disputes Act in Petition No.71 of 1997 before the first respondent for approval. The first respondent after going through the records dismissed the said petition. Aggrieved by the order of the first respondent, the Management has come forward with this writ petition. 3. The 2nd respondent has denied the consumption of liquor and also the alleged drunken state. Further stated that if really he was in drunken mooed, the Management would have handed over him to the Police or atleast obtained a certificate from a Doctor by producing him. 3. The 2nd respondent has denied the consumption of liquor and also the alleged drunken state. Further stated that if really he was in drunken mooed, the Management would have handed over him to the Police or atleast obtained a certificate from a Doctor by producing him. The conductor namely Mr.Karuppusamy, who was on duty on that day in the bus admitted that he himself paid some amount and brought medicines which are urgently required for his painful disease. Due to his illness, he rightly stopped the bus to avoid any untoward incident, which was evident that he acted with great care and responsibility. 4. The Tribunal, after hearing both sides and considering the oral and documentary evidence let in before it had come to the conclusion that the charges framed against the 2nd respondent were not proved. When an allegation against the second respondent is that he was under the influence of liquor, the Management ought to have produced him before a Doctor and obtained necessary Certificate, but nothing was done. No complaint was filed against the 2nd respondent with the police. Considering that material, the tribunal has refused to grant approval and dismissed the petition filed under Sec.33(2)(b) on the ground that no prima facie case was made out and the findings of the enquiry officer was perverse. 5. The learned counsel for the Petitioner Mr.Sanjay Mohan has argued that under Sec.33(2)(B) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the first respondent has no jurisdiction to re-appraise the evidence. It has exceeded its jurisdiction and the first respondent erroneously passed the order rejecting the approval on the plea that there was no prima facie case made out. On the other hand, the petitioner has proved the case by filing documents to say that a proper enquiry was conducted and there was enough evidence to prove that the second respondent was under the influence of liquor while driving the bus. The learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that the oral and documentary evidence let in by the petitioner proved all the charges against the 2nd respondent beyond reasonable doubt. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the following decisions in support of his contentions: State of Haryana and another v. Rattan Singh, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1512: (1977)2 S.C.J. 1408, wherein in para.4 it is held thus: "4. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the following decisions in support of his contentions: State of Haryana and another v. Rattan Singh, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1512: (1977)2 S.C.J. 1408, wherein in para.4 it is held thus: "4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and administrative tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition, it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case law and other authority by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objecitivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the Courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. The ‘residum’ rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain passages from American jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the passage from Hallsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence-not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular Court proceedings but in a fair common sense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the Court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of the flying squad, is some evidence which has relevance to the charge levelled against the respondent. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the Court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of the flying squad, is some evidence which has relevance to the charge levelled against the respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the order is invalid on that ground.“ In Cholan Roadways Corporation Limited v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras and another, (1994)1 L.L.J. 1076 (Mad.), wherein para.9, it was held thus: ”9. In Lord Krishnan Textile Mills v. Its Workmen, (1996)1 L.L.J. 211, the Apex Court has ruled that the question about the adequacy of evidence or its sufficiency or satisfactory character can be raised in a Court of facts and may fall to be considered by an appellate Court which is entitled to consider facts, but these considerations are irrelevant where the jurisdiction of Court is limited as under Sec.33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act.“ In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Siddheshwar Shivaji Kamble and others, (1999)2 C.L.R. (Bom.) 99, in para.7, it was held thus and the relevant portions are extracted below: ”.....Any one who has taken some liquor is betrayed by his breath first and then other symptoms such as red eyes, trembling of the body and incoherent speech would follow. He need not be sent to a Doctor or a hospital for examination for the purpose whether he should be allowed to drive a vehicle and particularly a Public Transport Vehicle carrying 100 passengers in crowded roads of the city of Mumbai. Even in the absence of a formal medical certificate if the employer finds the aforesaid symptoms of the body of his driver he can very well refuse to continue him in employment as driver.... .....There is further no good reason to say that some passengers should have been examined. A domestic enquiry is not a criminal trial. We also have to bear in mind and we can never forget that the delinquent driver was employed to drive a public bus through the public streets. .....There is further no good reason to say that some passengers should have been examined. A domestic enquiry is not a criminal trial. We also have to bear in mind and we can never forget that the delinquent driver was employed to drive a public bus through the public streets. The petitioner as employer is always held liable for any accident that would take place on the road and such employer has a distinct privilege to decide whether a person who is betraying the symptoms of being under the influence of alcohol to ask him not to drive a public bus on the road. There need not be any proof to the hilt in the form of medical certificate and the medical reports of blood and urine examination on the basis of which alone the employer can get rid of such a driver..... .....According to me, no reasonable man would employ a person as a driver who is in the habit of taking liquor who is under the influence of alcohol while driving a vehicle, which may be either private or public. This law should be strictly enforced as the safety and security of public at large is concerned. In such matters if benefit of doubt is required to be given it should not be in favour of the delinquent but it should be in favour of the petitioner employer." 7. The learned counsel for the second respondent relied on a decision in Lalla Ram v. Management of D.C.M. Chemical Works Limited and another, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1004 and the relevant portions in para.12 of the judgment is extracted hereinbelow: "12. The learned counsel for the second respondent relied on a decision in Lalla Ram v. Management of D.C.M. Chemical Works Limited and another, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1004 and the relevant portions in para.12 of the judgment is extracted hereinbelow: "12. The position that emerges from the above quoted decisions of this Court may be stated thus: In proceedings under Sec.33(2)(b) of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal is confined to the enquiry as to: (i) whether a proper domestic enquiry in accordance with the relevant rules, standing orders and principles of natural justice has been held, (ii) whether a prima facie case for dismissal based on legal evidence adduced before the domestic tribunal is made out, (iii) whether the employer had come to a bona fide conclusion that the employee was guilty and the dismissal did not amount to unfair labour practice and was not intended to victimise the employee regard being had to the position settled by the decision of this Court in A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1892, that though generally speaking the award of punishment for misconduct under the standing orders is a matter for the management to decide and the Tribunal is not required to consider the propriety or adequacy of the punishment or whether it is excessive or too severe yet an inference of mala fides may in certain cases be drawn from the imposition of unduly harsh, severe, unconscionable or shockingly disproportionate punishment (iv) whether the employer has paid or offered to pay wages for one month to the employee, and (v) whether the employer has simultaneously or within such reasonably short time as to form part of the same transaction applied to the authority before which the main industrial dispute is pending for approval of the action taken by him. If these conditions are satisfied, the Industrial Tribunal who grant the approval relates back to the date from which the employer had ordered the dismissal. If these conditions are satisfied, the Industrial Tribunal who grant the approval relates back to the date from which the employer had ordered the dismissal. If however, the domestic enquiry suffers from any defect or infirmity, the labour authority will have to find out on its own assessment of the evidence adduced before it whether there was justification for dismissal and if it so finds it will grant approval of the order of dismissal which would also relate back to the date when the order was passed provided the employer had paid or offered to pay wages for one month to the employee and the employer had within the time indicated above applied to the authority before which the main industrial dispute is pending for approval of the action taken by him." 8. Sec.33(2) provides statutory safeguard to the employees against action of the employer for their discharge or dismissal otherwise disguising it as a legitimate disciplinary action whereas it may be intended to victimize the employee. The safeguard provides for a limited scrutiny of matter by the tribunal for the purpose of satisfying itself that the action by the management was justified and bona fide. 9. When the tribunal deals with application under Sec.33(2)(b) merely to consider prima facie aspect of the matter it either grants permission or refuses it accordingly. Permission should be refused if the tribunal is satisfied that the managements action is not bona fide or that the principles of natural justice have been violated or that the matters on the basis of which the management came to a certain conclusion could not justify any reasonable person in coming to such a conclusion. If there is victimisation and unfair trade practice or if the management has been guilty of basic error or violation of principles of natural justice or if on the materials, finding is perverse in the sense that on such materials no reasonable man could arrive at the impugned findings, permission should be refused. 10. In case, the findings is perverse, it is open to the tribunal to reject the approval or otherwise it has to be grant approval sought for by the employer. 10. In case, the findings is perverse, it is open to the tribunal to reject the approval or otherwise it has to be grant approval sought for by the employer. If the domestic enquiry suffers from any defect or infirmity, the labour authority will have to find on its own assessment of the evidence adduced before it whether there was a justification for dismissal, if it so finds it will grant approval of the order of dismissal, as laid down in Lalla Ram v. Management of D.C.M. Chemical Works Limited, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1004, which was also extracted above. 11. Now we look into the materials considered by the enquiry officer to arrive at the conclusion finding guilty against the employee. The materials placed before the enquiry officer by the petitioner/ Management were that the foreman’s report about the incident to the Branch Manager dated 22.9.1986 Ex.M-1, the Conductor Karuppusamy’s report dated 21.9.1986 Ex.M-2, the report of the Controller of Tiruchendur to the Branch Manager dated 21.9.1986 stating that the 2nd respondent was under the influence of alcohol and unable to drive the bus from Kayamozhi Ex.M-3, the report of the substitute driver dated 21.9.1986 who has driven the vehicle from the point at which it was stopped. Ex.M-4, to show that driver of another bus and some passengers took the 2nd respondent and placed him in the Bus A562, report of driver Ponniah Ex.M-5, the order of suspension as well as the charge sheet given to the 2nd respondent Ex.M-6, the 2nd respondent’s explanation dated 21.9.1986 Ex.M-7, the medical certificate dated 21.9.1986 produced by the second respondent Ex.M-8, the medical certificate dated 26.9.1986 produced by the 2nd respondent for a period of 36 days from 22.9.1986 Ex.M-9, the proceedings of the enquiry officer Ex.M-10, the findings of the enquiry officer Ex.M-11, second show cause notice issued to the 2nd respondent Ex.M-12, the explanation of the second respondent Ex.M-13 and the dismissal order dated 13.1.1987 Ex.M-14. 12. The conductor Karuppusamy is the author of Ex.M-2, who himself has deposed that he was sent by the 2nd respondent to purchase medicines as he was unwell and after taking the said medicines he drove the bus from Tuticorin to Thalavai. The medical certificate, Ex.M-8 also corroborates the evidence of Karuppusamy. 12. The conductor Karuppusamy is the author of Ex.M-2, who himself has deposed that he was sent by the 2nd respondent to purchase medicines as he was unwell and after taking the said medicines he drove the bus from Tuticorin to Thalavai. The medical certificate, Ex.M-8 also corroborates the evidence of Karuppusamy. The facts and circumstances involved in the case on hand is different from the matrix of facts involved in the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Indeed, I am inspired and gained strength from the decisions of Honourable Supreme Court, State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1512: (1977)2 S.C.J. 1403, where their Lordships have held, “....Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good..” “....Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available to the Court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record....” 13. Considering the said documents and the oral evidence of the conductor Karuppusamy and also the failure on the part of the management in obtaining a certificate form a Doctor by producing the 2nd respondent and also the 2nd respondent has driven the bus from Tuticorin to Thalavai after consuming the medicines purchased and given by the conductor Karuppusamy and also the medical Certificate Ex.M-8 produced by the 2nd respondent and the other witnesses examined by the Management were not eye witnesses and no evidence has been placed by the management before the enquiry officer to contravene the same the tribunal found that the domestic enquiry report was perverse and no prima facie case made out by the management against the 2nd respondent. The said finding of the tribunal is perfectly within the purview of Sec.33(2)(b) of the Act and valid and the Tribunal on its own assessment of the evidence adduced before it has rightly rejected the approval. 14. Particularly, when an employee is awarded with a capital punishment of dismissal from service, that too with attached stigma of misconduct, the management shall prove their case with sufficient materials, whereas the petitioner/ Management brought all the evidence except the relevant evidence required to prove the charges against the 2nd respondent. 14. Particularly, when an employee is awarded with a capital punishment of dismissal from service, that too with attached stigma of misconduct, the management shall prove their case with sufficient materials, whereas the petitioner/ Management brought all the evidence except the relevant evidence required to prove the charges against the 2nd respondent. Hence, the domestic enquiry is perverse besides it suffers from defect and infirmity and the tribunal has applied its mind and rightly found on its own assessment of evidence adduced before it and dismissed the petition. 15. Hence no interference is warranted against the findings of the first respondent/ tribunal and as such the writ petition is liable to be dismissed and accordingly dismissed. No costs. Connected W.M.P., is also closed.