JUDGMENT P. K. MISRA, J. — This appeal is directed against the order passed by the Second Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Cuttack, directing return of the plaint for presentation before proper Court having territorial jurisdiction to try the suit. 2. The plaintiff-appellant has filed Title Suit No. 272/92 for the following reliefs : “ 26. The plaintiff therefore prays : (a) Let it be declared that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the properties given in Schedule ‘A’. (b) Let it be declared that the plaintiff is the custodian of the Schedule - ‘C’ property of which her son is the owner. (c) Let is be declared that the land and building as given in Schedule ‘B’ is jointly possessed by the plaintiff and her husband which has been acquired and constructed from the joint income of both. (d) Let the defendants to permanently restrained not to bring any proceeding in any Court of law for confiscating the properties in Schedule ‘A’ to ‘C.’ (e) Let the defendants to directed to release the properties given in Schedule ‘A’ and ‘C’. (f) Let the cost of the suit be decreed in favour of the plaintiff. (g) Any other relief/reliefs to which the plaintiff is entitled to may also be decreed.” It is claimed that ‘A’ Schedule moveable properties are her own properties and ‘C’ Schedule properties are the properties of her minor child which were under her control. “B” Schedule properties are admittedly immovable properties in mauza Nakhara within the district of Puri (presently Khurda district). It is not disputed that Cuttack Vigilance P.S. Case No. 5/90 under Sec. 13 (2) read with Sec. 13 (1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) was registered against the husband of the plaintiff-appellant and moveable properties had been seized in connection with the said case pursuant to order of search issued by the Court at Cuttack. Even though the immovable properties are admittedly situated within Khurda district as well as the moveable properties were seized from the house under occupation of the appellant and her husband at Bhubaneswar, the suit was filed at Cuttack. Defendant No.2, the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Cuttack Division, filed written statement, inter alia, challenging the territorial jurisdiction of the Cuttack Court. Even though the immovable properties are admittedly situated within Khurda district as well as the moveable properties were seized from the house under occupation of the appellant and her husband at Bhubaneswar, the suit was filed at Cuttack. Defendant No.2, the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Cuttack Division, filed written statement, inter alia, challenging the territorial jurisdiction of the Cuttack Court. The aforesaid objection was taken up as a preliminary issue and it was held by the trial Court that it has no territorial jurisdiction to deal with the matter and accordingly the plaintiff was directed to take return of the plaint for presentation before the proper Court. 3. The trial Court examined the matter by considering the applicability of Sec. 20, Code of Civil Procedure (in short, the “C.P.C.”) as according to the plaintiff, the other provisions, namely Secs. 16 to 19 of the C.P.C. were not applicable. The trial Court found that since the defendants were the State of Orissa and the Superintendent of Police, Clauses (a) and (b) of Sec. 20, C.P.C. were not applicable. The trial Court further opined that the cause of action did not arise either wholly or in part within the local limit of the Cuttack Court. The aforesaid order is being challenged in this appeal. 4. The provisions contained in Sec. 20, C.P.C. are extracted hereunder: “20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises - Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdic¬tion - (a) the defendants, or each of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part arises. Explanation - A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in India or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place.” By their own terms, the provisions contained in Sec. 20(a) or (b), C.P.C. cannot apply to the present case, as State of Orissa and Superintendent of Police who has admittedly been arrayed in his official capacity not being natural persons cannot be said to be actually or voluntarily residing within the jurisdiction of the Cuttack Court. At any rate, the Capital of the State of Orissa being Bhubaneswar and the office as well as residence of the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Cuttack Division, being at Cuttack, even otherwise, Sec. 20 (b) would not ipso facto apply, as there is nothing to show that leave of the Court, as contem¬plated in Sec. 20 (b) was obtained, nor there is anything to indicate that, in fact, there has been any acquiescence in such institution of the suit at Cuttack. 5. The trial Court has held that no part of the cause of action had arisen within Cuttack even though the order of search was passed by the Magistrate at Cuttack. The question of legality of the order of the Magistrate at Cuttack is not a matter to be decided in the suit and as such it cannot be said that merely because an order of search was issued from the Court at Cuttack, cause of action had arisen in part within Cuttack. The effect of search and seizure was in relation to the properties within Bhubaneswar. Therefore, even though the Cuttack Court had issued order relating to search, since the search and seizure were effected within Bhubaneswar, the cause of action must be taken to have arisen within Bhubaneswar and not within Cuttack. 6. The observation of the trial Court that merely because Sec. 80, C.P.C. notice had been issued from Cuttack, it cannot be said that part of cause of action had arisen within the territo¬rial jurisdiction of Cuttack, is justified. 6. The observation of the trial Court that merely because Sec. 80, C.P.C. notice had been issued from Cuttack, it cannot be said that part of cause of action had arisen within the territo¬rial jurisdiction of Cuttack, is justified. Though there is some divergence of opinion expressed by various High Courts on this aspect, it appears that most of the High Courts have held that though statutory notice under Sec. 80, C.P.C. is required to be given, issuance of such notice from a particular place does not form part of the cause of action for the suit itself, as the notice merely paves the way for institution of the suit on the basis of cause of action which had already arisen. In this con¬nection, the decisions reported in A.I.R. 1954 Bombay, 129 (Bata Shoe Co. Ltd. v. Union of India); A.I.R. 1957 Punjab, 27 (FB) (Union of India v. Firm Balwant Singh Jaswant Singh); A.I.R. 1955 Madrass, 345 (Azizuddin and Co. by Managing Partner, P.M. Azizuddin v. Union of India (Central Government) owning the South Indian Railway, represented by the General Manager, Tiruchirapal¬li Junction); A.I.R. 1960 Calcutta, 391 (Niranjan Agarwalla v. Union of India); A.I.R. 1973 Madya Pradesh, 233 (Firm Sitaram Shyamsundar v. Ganpatalal Sharma and another) and A.I.R. 1970 Patna, 212 (Union of India as owner of the Eastern Railway Admin¬istration v. Kedar Prasad) may be seen. The discordant note expressed in the decisions reported in A.I.R. 1956 Assam, 85 (Pratap Chandra Biswas v. Union of India) and A.I.R. 1956 Calcut¬ta, 66 (Purnendu Bh. Deb Burman v. Union of India and others) cannot be accepted in preference to the opinion expressed in the aforesaid cases. In such view of the matter, the order passed by the trial Court cannot be said to be illegal. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.2 also contended that even assuming that a part of cause of action had arisen within Cuttack, even then the suit could not have been filed before the Court at Cuttack, in view of the provisions contained in Sec. 16, C.P.C. He has placed reliance upon the provisions contained in Sec. 16 (d) and (f), which are extracted hereunder : “16. Suits to be instituted where subject matter situate - Subject to the pecuniary or other limitations prescribed by any law, suits - (d) for the determination of any other right to or interest in immovable property, (f) for the recovery of movable property actually under distraint or attachment shall be instituted in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate : Provided that a suit to obtain relief, respecting, or com¬pensation for wrong to, immovable property held by or on behalf of the defendant may, where the relief sought can be entirely ob¬tained through his personal obedience, be instituted either in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate, or in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant actually and voluntarily re¬sides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain. Explanation - In this section ‘property’ means property situate in India.” Sec. 16 (d) relates to determination of any other right to or interest in immovable property. In the present case, the plain¬tiff has sought for a declaration that the property described in Schedule-B belongs to her and her husband jointly and, therefore, it can be said that such prayer is squarely covered under Sec. 16 (d). Sec. 16 (f) relates to recovery of moveable property actual¬ly under distraint or attachment. If it is held that by search and seizure the property is under attachment and prayer is made for recovery of such moveable property, there cannot be any doubt that Sec. 16 (f) is applicable. If the suit is required to be filed at the place indicated in Sec. 16, Sec. 20, C.P.C. would not be applicable, as Sec. 20 itself starts with the clause “Subject to the limitations aforesaid”, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdic¬tion, the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, Thus, where the matter is governed under earlier provisions including provi¬sion under Sec. 16, C.P.C., Sec. 20, C.P.C. would not be applica¬ble. Only where a suit is not required to be filed under Sec. 16, C.P.C. or other provisions with which the present case is not concerned at all, the provisions under Sec. 20, C.P.C. may be taken resort to for the purpose of determining territorial juris¬diction. Only where a suit is not required to be filed under Sec. 16, C.P.C. or other provisions with which the present case is not concerned at all, the provisions under Sec. 20, C.P.C. may be taken resort to for the purpose of determining territorial juris¬diction. If a matter is covered under other provisions, it would not be covered under Sec. 20, C.P.C. This is very clear in view of the observation of the Supreme Court in the decision reported in A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court, 1 (R. Viswanathan and others v. Rukn-ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajit since deceased and others, etc.), where it was observed after referring to similar provisions contained in the Mysore Code of Civil Procedure, at page 16 : “Undoubtedly, these rules deal with the territorial juris¬diction of Courts in respect of all suits other than those relat¬ing to immovable property or for recovery of moveable property under distraint or attachment...........” Thus, in either view of the matter, it can be said that the Court at Cuttack did not have the territorial jurisdiction to deal with the matter. The appellant shall now take return of the plaint from the trial Court and present the same before the appropriate Court having territorial jurisdiction. The appellant should take return of the plaint from the trial Court on or before 25th April, 2001. 8. The Misc. Appeal is accordingly dismissed, subject to the aforesaid observation. There will be no order as to costs. Misc. Appeal dismissed.