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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2001 DIGILAW 164 (HP)

STATE OF H. P. v. PANKJU RAM

2001-07-26

M.R.VERMA

body2001
JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J.—Since both these petitions arise out of the same case, therefore, these are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Brief facts leading to the presentation of these petitions are that Pankju Ram and Suraj (hereafter referred to as the respondents) are accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 307, 326, 506/ 34 IPC. The case of the prosecution against them, in brief, is that on 26.7.2000 at about 7.50 p.m., when Manik Sharma was coming back to his house after playing football match at Yol Camp, he was apprehended by the respondents and they threw acid on his face and fled away from the scene. Manik Sharma was removed to Dr. Rajindera Prasad Medical College, Dharamsala from where he was referred to CMC, Ludhiana and finally to PGI, Chandigarh. As a consequence of the incident, FIR No. 134/2000 dated 26.7.2000 was registered at Police Station, Dharamsala for the commission of the aforesaid offences by the respondents. At present, they are facing trial. 3. Respondent Pankju Ram filed an application under Section 439 Cr.P.C. (Bail Application No. 149 of 2000) which was heard and allowed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (2), Kangra at Dharamsala on 13.9.2000. Feeling aggrieved, the State has preferred the present Criminal Revision No. 148 of 2000 for setting aside the said order dated 13.9.2000. Respondent Suraj also preferred an application under Section 439 Cr.P.C. for his release on bail which was heard and dismissed by the same Additional Sessions Judge vide his order dated 19.10.2000. Respondent Suraj then preferred an application under Section 439 Cr.P.C. for grant of bail in this Court which was heard and allowed vide order dated April 20, 2001 in Cr. M.P. (M) No. 398 of 2001. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Brij Kumar Sharma, father of the injured has preferred Cr.M.P. (M) No. 776 of 2001 praying for cancellation of bail granted by this Court to respondent Suraj. 4. I have heard the learned Assistant Advocate General for the State, the learned Counsel for the petitioner Brij Kumar Sharma and the learned Counsel for the respondents and have also gone through the material placed on record and the investigation records. 5. 4. I have heard the learned Assistant Advocate General for the State, the learned Counsel for the petitioner Brij Kumar Sharma and the learned Counsel for the respondents and have also gone through the material placed on record and the investigation records. 5. It was contended for the petitioners that the offences committed by the respondents are of very grave nature and had been committed in a most brutal manner leading to a situation where the victim is struggling between life and death and even if he survives, he would be rendered incapable of leading a normal life due to the after effects of the acid having been thrown on his face, affecting his eyes and some acid had been forced inside his throat and stomach. The punishment provided for the offence committed by the respondents is very severe, therefore, keeping in view the gravity of the offence, the manner of its commission and the severity of punishment, the bail should not have been granted to the respondents. It was further contended that the accused had been threatening the prosecution witnesses and even on this score, the bail already granted to them is liable to be cancelled. 6. On the other hand, it was contended for the respondents that there is no law that in a case under Sections 307 and 326 IPC, bail should not be granted at all. The grant or refusal of bail in such cases is a matter of discretion and once that discretion has been exercised in favour of the respondents, bail cannot be cancelled unless such circumstances coming into being after the grant of bail are brought on record which may render the bail liable for cancellation. It was also contended that the alleged threats by the accused to the prosecution witnesses were pressed into service by the petitioner State at the time of consideration of bail application of respondent Pankju Ram also but were not believed, though liberty was reserved to the prosecution to approach the Court granting the bail for cancellation in case any kind of threat was given to the family members of Manik Sharma by respondent Pankju Ram. However, no application for cancellation on the alleged threats was ever made to the Court granting the bail, but a revision petition has been preferred on the ground that this was not a fit case for grant of bail because of the gravity of the offence and the severity of the punishment which alone, is no reason for cancellation of the bail already granted. 7. Be it stated at the very outset that gravity of the offence and severity of punishment provided therefore cannot be the sole ground for cancellation of bail already granted. By now, it is well settled that rejection of bail at the initial stage and cancellation of bail already granted have to be considered and dealt with on different considerations. The Court may cancel the bail already granted only when some supervening circumstances rendering it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to remain on bail during trial are clearly made out. The grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly speaking, are interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse the freedom granted by bail in any other manner or the possibility of the accused absconding to evade the trial. Unless any one of the aforesaid conditions are satisfied or there is any glaring illegality committed in granting the bail which may pervert the course of justice, the bail once granted cannot be cancelled in a mechanical manner. It is against this background that the present petitions have to be considered. 8. The respondents are alleged to have committed offences punishable under Sections 307 and 326 IPC by pouring acid on the face and in the mouth of the victim. After due consideration of the facts and circumstances, the bail was granted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge to respondent Pankju Ram, though he refused it to respondent Suraj on the ground that though the case of the prosecution is that the acid was poured on the mouth of the injured by both the respondents, but the principal offender is respondent Suraj. This Court granted bail to Suraj on the principle of parity as the case of the prosecution is that the acid was so poured by both the respondents. Therefore, Suraj alone could not be termed as the principle offender. This Court granted bail to Suraj on the principle of parity as the case of the prosecution is that the acid was so poured by both the respondents. Therefore, Suraj alone could not be termed as the principle offender. Now the question is whether the bail ought not to have been allowed at all to the respondents keeping in view the gravity of the offence and the severity of the punishment alone. The answer to the question is simple no. In case bail is refused simply on the grounds that the offence alleged to have been committed by the accused is of a grave nature and the punishment provided therefor is very severe, then it will tantamount to punish them for the offence itself by denying bail to them and detaining them in custody which the court must avoid. 9. The offences under Sections 307 and 326IPC, though serious offences are not such offences where bail cannot be granted at all. The gravity of the offence and the severity of the punishment are only such factors, amongst others, which may be kept in view while considering grant or rejection of bail, the fundamental considerations being the availability of the accused to face the trial and to ensure that if released on bail, the accused should not, in any manner, thwart the course of justice. Once the fundamental requirements of availability of the accused to face the trial and the possibility of the liberty not being used for perverting the course of justice in any manner by the accused are satisfied, the other considerations like gravity of offence and severity of punishment may loose much of its significance in the matter of grant of bail. It is more so when the accused had been available throughout to the investigating agency for custodial interrogation and other purposes of investigation and thereafter had remained in custody for long spell of time. In the instant case, the respondents were arrested in July 2000 and initially remained in police custody for the purposes of interrogation and thereafter were remanded to judicial custody. At the time when they moved the bail applications, they were not required for the purpose of investigation and were in judicial custody. This factor has weighed in favour of grant of bail to the respondents and rightly so. 10. At the time when they moved the bail applications, they were not required for the purpose of investigation and were in judicial custody. This factor has weighed in favour of grant of bail to the respondents and rightly so. 10. It is true that during the course of hearing of the bail application of Pankju Ram in the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, an allegation was made that the members of the family of the respondents are threatening the family members of the victim. It was not spelt out as to who are those members when, at the material time, both the respondents, father and the son, were in judicial custody. In any case, there was no allegation that the respondents had, in any manner, extended such threats and therefore, the contention was rejected by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. A statement of facts made by Pankju has been placed on file of the revision petition by the State which is dated 3.4.2001 and allegations have been made that Pankju Ram had threatened the complainant and his wife of dire consequences if the case is not compromised and they off and on threaten them. This statement of fact is not in the form of an affidavit and in the facts and circumstances of the case, such general allegations cannot be taken into account particularly because of the admitted enmity between the parties which can, if afford ground to the respondents to be violent against the complainant party, at the same time, can be a cause for the family of the victim to ensure that the respondents remain in jail even prior to the day when they are either found guilty of the commission of the offences complained against or are acquitted thereof. 11. Once the allegations of the threats are made, those must be substantiated and must preferably be in the form of an affidavit stating on oath or solemn affirmation the facts constituting such threats, which has not been done here. 12. As per the statement of facts made by the father of the victim, Pankju Ram respondent threatened him and his wife on the next day of the order granting him bail i.e. on 13.9.2000. He, however, disclosed it for the first time in the said statement dated 3.4.2001 after more than six months. 12. As per the statement of facts made by the father of the victim, Pankju Ram respondent threatened him and his wife on the next day of the order granting him bail i.e. on 13.9.2000. He, however, disclosed it for the first time in the said statement dated 3.4.2001 after more than six months. Had the facts as averred in the statement of facts been true, immediately on such threats having been extended by the respondents, the allegedly threatened persons ought to have made a proper application to the trial Court or would have brought it to the notice of the prosecuting agency for taking appropriate action in the matter which was not done. In the case of respondent Suraj, no such allegation appears to have been brought to the notice of the prosecution or trial Court nor the State has preferred any application for cancellation of bail granted to Suraj. 13. The above discussion leads me to the conclusion that no such supervening circumstances are made out which may render the bail already granted to the respondents liable to be cancelled. 14. Learned Counsel for the respondents had referred to certain material collected by the police and relied upon by the prosecution to prove the charge against the respondents and has pointed out certain deficiencies therein. It may not be proper to analyse such material and effect of such deficiencies at this stage because it may amount to expression of opinion thereon nor it is otherwise necessary to analyse such material to find out whether the bail has been rightly granted to the respondents or not because the discretion to grant bail to the respondents had been exercised after perusal of the records and there is no supervening circumstance to render it liable for cancellation. In these circumstances, I refrain from making any observation on this aspect of the matter. 15. It was also contended by the learned Assistant Advocate General that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has made certain observations in the bail order which may be prejudicial to the prosecution. In these circumstances, I refrain from making any observation on this aspect of the matter. 15. It was also contended by the learned Assistant Advocate General that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has made certain observations in the bail order which may be prejudicial to the prosecution. Be it stated that though conclusive observations regarding material aspects on merits of the case must be avoided at the time of hearing of the bail applications, nevertheless, as and when some expression of opinion is given, it is only for the purpose of disposal of the bail application and does not mean an expression of opinion on the merits of the case which has to be recorded only after the trial. In any case, the learned trial Judge will not be influenced by anything said in the bail orders passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge or by this Court. 16. The above discussion leads me to the conclusion that there is no merit and substance in the present petition and the application for cancellation of bail and both of them merit dismissal. 17. As a result, both, the revision-petition and the application for cancellation of bail are dismissed. Petition dismissed.-