P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) THE unsuccessful defendant in OS No. 111/79 on the file of the II Additional Subordinate Judge, Visakhapatnam, had filed the present appeal. ( 2 ) THE respondent/plaintiff filed the suit for declaration that the order of termination dated 5. 7. 1976 made by the Managing Director of the appellant/defendant company terminating the services of the respondent/plaintiff as Assistant Purchase Officer is illegal, invalid and opposed to the principles of natural justice and for a consequential relief of directing the appellant/ defendant company to pay Rs. 1,30,000/-towards damages to the respondent/plaintiff. The Court below had decreed the suit for Rs. 1,00,000/- with proportionate costs and the claim for damages of Rs. 30,000/- for mental agony was disallowed. For the purpose of convenience, the parties will be referred to as arrayed in the Court of first instance. ( 3 ) THE allegations made in the plaint are as follows: the plaintiff is an ex-Assistant Purchase Officer (Badge No. 0324) of the defendant company. The plaintiff joined the defendant company as Assistant Purchase Officer on 26. 12. 1968 on a monthly basic salary of Rs. 740/- besides other allowances. The plaintiff was in service of the defendant company till 5. 71976 when the service were wrongfully terminated by the Managing Director of the defendant company. Before the termination of his services the plaintiff was served with a memo dated 5. 2. 1975 by the Managing Director of the defendant-company that it was proposed to hold an enquiry against the plaintiff under Rule 9 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules of the defendant-company and charges were framed against the plaintiff imputing misconduct, misbehaviour in discharge of the duties as an employee under Rule 9 of the conduct Rules of the defendant-company. The charges were that the plaintiff while functioning as Assistant Purchase Officer in the defendant-company during the years 1969 to 1971 has dishonestly and fraudulently drawn false travelling allowance though not actually travelled in first class in respect of the journey performed by him from Ahmedabad to Waltair on 27. 8. 1969, and in respect of the journey from Howrah to Waltair on 6. 8. 1970 and also in respect of the journey from Madras to Waltair on 20. 1. 1971. 8. 1969, and in respect of the journey from Howrah to Waltair on 6. 8. 1970 and also in respect of the journey from Madras to Waltair on 20. 1. 1971. It is alleged in the said charge-sheet that the plaintiff, acts in falsely claiming First Class railway fare, though not actually travelled in First Class exhibited lack of integrity and conduct, unbecoming of a public servant thereby violating Rule 9 of the conduct Rules of the BHPV Ltd. After the charge sheet was served on the plaintiff, the plaintiff submitted his explanation dated 3. 3. 1975 refuting the charges levelled against him and that he had not violated the conduct rules at any time. A departmental enquiry was conducted by Sri C. Babu Rao, Chief Design Engineer of the defendant-Company Sri Babu Rao having been appointed as the Enquiry Officer. After conclusion of the enquiry Sri Babu Rao, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report to the Managing Director, the Disciplinary Authority that the charges were not established. In the said report the plaintiff was exonerated from the charges. The Managing Director (the Disciplinary Authority) disagreeing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, found the plaintiff quality of the charges and terminated the services of the plaintiff by his order dated 5. 7. 1976. The said order was confirmed in appeal by the prescribed Appellate Authority who was the Managing Director himself. The plaintiff submits that the entire procedure adopted is contrary to law and principles of natural justice and the orders of termination was passed with a predetermined mind on the part of the Managing Director to remove the plaintiff from service, that the order of termination is illegal, mala fide and without jurisdiction. The plaintiff, was drawing a basic salary of rs. 1,000/- besides other allowances per month on the date of the initiation of the departmental proceedings. The officers and staff coming under the Supervisory Cadre of the defendant-company were governed by the conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules of the defendant company which came into force with effect from 1. 1. 1978. Under the Central Vigilance Commission Manual it is clearly laid down that if there is any charge of misconduct against an officer drawing" Rs. 1,000/- and above as basic salary per month, the Management shall make a preliminary enquiry into the alleged misconduct and then refer the case to the Central Vigilance Commission. 1. 1978. Under the Central Vigilance Commission Manual it is clearly laid down that if there is any charge of misconduct against an officer drawing" Rs. 1,000/- and above as basic salary per month, the Management shall make a preliminary enquiry into the alleged misconduct and then refer the case to the Central Vigilance Commission. The Officers arid staff of the defendant-company were previously governed by two sets of rules called (1) conduct Rules (2) discipline and Appeal Rules . On and from 1. 1. 1975, the above two sets of rules were superseded by the conduct Discipline and Appeal Rules . The charge-sheet was issued and enquiry was conducted as per Rule 9 of discipline and Appeal Rules though the (Conduct Discipline and Appeal Rules came into force from 1. 1. 1975 ). The enquiry having been conducted in accordance with the extinct and defunct discipline and Appeal Rules is vitiated on this ground alone, as the enquiry was not according to the law in force. At the time of the initiation of the proceedings and during the course of enquiry the plaintiff was not aware of the rule that his case had to be referred to Central Vigilance Commission for conducting enquiry. The said requirement was not notified to the plaintiff at any time. The plaintiff being ignorant of this mandatory duty on the part of the Management had to submit himself to the departmental enquiry conducted by Sri Babu Rao. The plaintiff was deprived of the benefits of an enquiry by the Central Vigilance Commission which conducts the enquiry under the Central Vigilance. Commission Manual in a strictly judicial way. The Enquiry Officer would have been a person unconnected with the management and would have been in better position to dispense justice. The plaintiff would have been able to place his case more effectively and the enquiry report, in that event would have been so strong in favour of the plaintiff, that the Disciplinary Authority would have found it impossible to differ from the findings of the Enquiry Officer. The enquiry having been conducted by a Tribunal other than the one contemplated under law, the consequential order of the Disciplinary Authority terminating the plaintiffs services is wholly without jurisdiction. The enquiry is void and non-est for this reason. The enquiry having been conducted by a Tribunal other than the one contemplated under law, the consequential order of the Disciplinary Authority terminating the plaintiffs services is wholly without jurisdiction. The enquiry is void and non-est for this reason. The plaintiff was also seriously prejudiced by the denial to him of the right to have a defence Counsel of his choice. The plaintiff requested for permission to engage Sri M. V. Shankar Rao who was working in M/s. Hindustan Shipyard Ltd. , another Government of India Undertaking at Visakhapatnam. The management improperly and illegally turned down this request on the ground that defence Counsel employed in another public undertaking cannot be permitted to defend the plaintiff as such a course is not provided for in the discipline and Appeal Rules . The Management invoked the defunct rules in order to deprive the plaintiff of the opportunity to have his case conducted by a Counsel of his choice. The new Rules Rule 27 (6) of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules clearly permit the engagement of any other public servant as a defence Counsel. Even Rule 9 (iii) of the obsolete discipline and Appeal Rules does not prohibit the engagement of a defence Counsel of another public sector undertaking. The restriction is only in respect of a Legal Practitioner. Having deliberately invaded the plaintiffs right to defend himself by a Counsel of his choice with the oblique motive of seriously handicapping the plaintiff and placing him in a position of disadvantage, the management was unfair to the point of supplying destroyed copy of the conduct Discipline and Appeal Rules which came into effect from 1. 1. 1975. The copy of the said rules was supplied to plaintiff officially on 5. 1. 1976 through Sri Philips, a Clerk of the Personal Department. Under the copy of the Rules supplied to the plaintiff Rule No. 27 (6) providing any other public servant as defence Counsel was committed. The plaintiff was thus kept in the dark about his right which was capriciously denied to him by the management. The plaintiff submits that he is a lay man without any knowledge of law or any experience regarding departmental enquires. The charges framed involved complicated questions of fact and a lot of evidence. The prosecution was conducted by a seasoned Vigilance Officer and the plaintiff had to cross-examine all the witnesses himself and conduct his case. The plaintiff submits that he is a lay man without any knowledge of law or any experience regarding departmental enquires. The charges framed involved complicated questions of fact and a lot of evidence. The prosecution was conducted by a seasoned Vigilance Officer and the plaintiff had to cross-examine all the witnesses himself and conduct his case. The plaintiff being not endowed with the ability to do the job or equipped with the experience or knowledge to handle the case was seriously prejudiced as many more glaring facts to prove the innocence of the plaintiff and to establish the vindictive attitude of the defendant, could have been brought out if he had been defended by the Counsel of his choice. The order of termination based upon the materials as made out in the enquiry wherein reasonable opportunity was denied to the plaintiff to defend himself is consequently vitiated under law. As per Rule 27 (3) of conduct Discipline and Appeal Rules the delinquent is required to submit a statement simply whether he admits or denies the charges but in the instant case the Managing Director for reasons best known to himself was strongly biased and prejudiced towards the plaintiff to give his written statement of defence failing which the Enquiry Authority may hold the enquiry against him exparte under the provisions of Rule 9 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules. The demand and the direction of the Managing Director of the defendant company is a gross violation of Rule 27 (3) of Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules and the delinquent cannot be mislead and misdirected quoting the assistance of Rule 9 of discipline and Appeal Rules which have become obsolete by that time. This act on the part of Managing Director clearly reveals that he was not open and fair and that he was biased and prejudiced and the demand to submit of defence under extinct discipline and Appeal Rule 9 even at the initial stage without making available the documents of evidence of witness is arbitrary and high handed and is unjustified and illegal and unwarranted under the well established principles of natural justice and to rules and procedure governing the officers drawing basic salary of Rs. 1,000/- and above per month in public sector establishments including the defendant company. The plaintiff requested the Managing Director in his explanation dated 3. 3. 1,000/- and above per month in public sector establishments including the defendant company. The plaintiff requested the Managing Director in his explanation dated 3. 3. 1975 and also the enquiry officer in the first hearing held on 25. 3. 1975 to make available to him all the documents mentioned in the charge-sheet to enable him to inspect them. But both of them did not comply with the request of the plaintiff and the enquiry officer rules that they would be produced during the enquiry. It is mandatory under Rule 27 (8) (i) that all the documents listed in the charge-sheet shall be made available to him; and under Rule 27 (B) (i) the enquiry officer shall ask the delinquent to submit a list of additional documents and witnesses which the delinquent wants to examine and even this was not done by the enquiry officer. In doing so the lawful process the established conventions administrative proceedings and practice were not only given a go by but were violated resulting in denial of reasonable opportunity to the plaintiff. There is also violation of Rule No. 28 of the Conduct Discipline and Appeal Rules. In the instant case the Discipline authority, referred the case to the Central Vigilance Commission after giving its opinion and thereby prejudicing the independent judgment of the Central Vigilance Commission. The reasons assigned for referring the case of the plaintiff of Central vigilance Commission and the time of referring are not only wrong but also suppression of truth because it was stated by the Managing Director in his remarks that the plaintiff has not crossed his limits of pay for reference to Central vigilance Commission only after the enquiry was started. The said remark of the Managing Director are not true and correct as the plaintiff crossed the limits of his pay for referring his case to Central Vigilance Commission even before the departmental enquiry was initiated. The Enquiry Officer after his enquiry submitted his report on 21. 4. 1976 wherein he stated that a close examination of the documents made available, the depositions of the witnesses, the arguments of the presenting officer and the accused officer and the circumstances and probabilities surrounding the events connected with the charge lead to the conclusion that none of the charges included in the charge memo against the accused (plaintiff) is established. 1976 wherein he stated that a close examination of the documents made available, the depositions of the witnesses, the arguments of the presenting officer and the accused officer and the circumstances and probabilities surrounding the events connected with the charge lead to the conclusion that none of the charges included in the charge memo against the accused (plaintiff) is established. The Managing Director of the defendant-company passed an order on 5. 7. 1976 removing the plaintiff from service which is not valid, tenable and justifiable. No valid reasons are assigned in the said order of removal and the reasons given by the Managing Director are incorrect, unjustified and not in conformity with statutory rules and the award of punishment was vindictive and unwarranted and it is prompted and motivated by bias and prejudice. There is violation of Rule Nos. 27 (l) 27 (11) 27 (12), 30, 34 (1) and 38 of Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules by the Managing Director of defendant-company while issuing the orders of plaintiffs termination. The plaintiff made an appeal to the Managing Director (The Appellate Authority) against the order of removal and the same was rejected by the Managing Director. In the first instance both these positions cannot be held by the same person. The reasons given by the Managing Director who is also the Appellate Authority are not justified because he said that no new facts were brought to his notice. As per Conduct, Disciplinary and Appeal Rules No. 34 (11) the Appellate Authority shall consider whether the Disciplinary Authority s findings are justified i. e. , whether the reasons given by the Discipline Authority for his disagreement with the Enquiry Officer s findings are justified in the light of the protestations made by the delinquent officer i. e. , the plaintiff here. There is no provision in the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules for urging new grounds or for bringing new facts in an appeal. The rejection of an appeal on the ground that no new grounds were made or new facts were submitted is unjustified and improper. It clearly reveals the vindictive nature with which the Managing Director as Appellate Authority disposed of the appeal of the plaintiff against his own (i. e. , as Disciplinary Authority) order in the instant case. The disciplinary authority miserably failed to prove the case against the delinquent. It clearly reveals the vindictive nature with which the Managing Director as Appellate Authority disposed of the appeal of the plaintiff against his own (i. e. , as Disciplinary Authority) order in the instant case. The disciplinary authority miserably failed to prove the case against the delinquent. In fact, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that ingredients of the offences levelled against the plaintiff proved and is not for the delinquent to prove that he is not guilty. There was also discriminatory treatment shown in toto the plaintiff and there are instances where the defendant-company awarded lesser punishment to persons against whom CBI cases for the same offence were proved but terminated the services of the plaintiff for no fault of his though the charges were not proved against him. Senior Executive occupying highest positions and who were involved in CBI cases were promoted and even though the charges were not proved against the plaintiff, he was given the severest punishment viz. , termination of services and in doing so, the management of the defendant-company has ended the career of the plaintiff abruptly in an unceremonious manner without any respect for the natural principles of justice, fair play etc. The plaintiff has become a victim to the bias, prejudice and misconceived suspicion of the then Managing Director of the defendant- company and there were several violations of rule and procedural lapses in removal of the plaintiff from the services of the defendant-company. At the time when termination order was made by the then Managing Director of the defendant-company there was already emergency promulgated and the Managing Director took advantage of the situation then prevailing and the Managing Director has without consideration for facts and without consideration of the record of clean and unblemished services of the plaintiff has terminated the services of the plaintiff much to the mental distress and agony of the plaintiff. The Disciplinary Authority found the plaintiff guilty of the charges though the enquiry officer by a very reasoned order exonerated him all the charges. The Disciplinary Authority in his remarks dated 27. 4. 1976 which constitute the order of the Disciplinary Authority taking a different view is not at all based on the evidence on record and passed on surmises and conjectures not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case. The Disciplinary Authority in his remarks dated 27. 4. 1976 which constitute the order of the Disciplinary Authority taking a different view is not at all based on the evidence on record and passed on surmises and conjectures not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case. The Disciplinary Authority instead of applying his mind to the evidence concerning the each charge and without giving his finding on each of the charges and even without adverting the evidence on record passed a sweeping order erroneously and deliberately throwing to the winds, the principles of burden of proof in such cases and in making a capital-out of the alleged omissions in the diaries of the plaintiff for getting the well established principles that the weakness of the defence does never relieve the prosecution of its responsibility to prove its case. The order of the Disciplinary Authority is vitiated by yet another circumstances namely that he found his order on the views expressed by the presenting officer in his final brief which does not constitute evidence. The impugned order of the Disciplinary Authority which has far reaching consequences adversely affecting the mental peace, the career of the plaintiff, his respect, position and reputation in society and his civil and constitutional rights is ab initio void, in operative and illegal. The Disciplinary Authority under law on grounds of principles of natural justice was bound to give an opportunity to him to show-cause against the proposed action of taking different views of the charges from those of the Enquiry Officer and finding the plaintiff guilty of the charges. No such opportunity was given to the plaintiff and he has been put to irreparable loss and serious prejudice and the plaintiff in such an event would have convinced the Disciplinary Authority that no other view than the one taken by the Enquiry Officer is possible on the materials on record. The impugned order itself bears out how probably wrong and unjustified it is and probably the Disciplinary authority would not have passed such a manifestly perverse order had an opportunity been given to the plaintiff. Therefore, the impugned order is void. The plaintiff has to his credit long period of service of more than 25 years and it was an unblemished career. The plaintiff comes from a respectable family and he is a man of sound financial status. Therefore, the impugned order is void. The plaintiff has to his credit long period of service of more than 25 years and it was an unblemished career. The plaintiff comes from a respectable family and he is a man of sound financial status. He was found not guilty of the charges framed against him by the Enquiry Officer but nevertheless the Managing Director of the defendant-company terminated the services of the plaintiff in the questionable manner. Had the plaintiffs service not been terminated he would have been promoted as Purchase Officer and then as Deputy Materials Manager continued till the end of his retirement as Purchase Officer Deputy Materials Manager and his prospects were marred on account of the invalid and illegal order of the termination of his services by the Managing Director of the defendant-company. The plaintiff was drawing basic salary of Rs. 1,325/- per month besides other allowances on the date of his termination of his services by the Managing Director of the defendant-company. The plaintiff would have gained financial benefit to the tune of Rs. 1,00,000/- by way of salary and other benefits till the end of normal course of his service if he were not terminated in the manner. The plaintiff suffered not only mental agony but also loss of reputation in society on account of the order of the illegal termination made by the Managing Director of the defendant-company. The plaintiff reiterated that a departmental enquiry was conducted under discipline and Appeal Rules which by the date of enquiry have already become obsolete. The Management of the defendant-company suppressed Rule 27 (6) of the conduct Discipline and Appeal Rules which were furnished to the plaintiff by the defendant-company on 5. 1. 1976 which enables the delinquent officer to have the assistance of a defence Counsel of his choice from any public undertaking concern but also was totally denied. In the instant case, the Management of the defendant company failed to refer the matter to the Central Vigilance Commission but resorted to a Departmental Enquiry and subjected the plaintiff to the same for reasons best known to themselves, in violation of valid and legal rules the well established principles of natural justice, fair play and practice and also denial of reasonable opportunities to the delinquent officer is all to the prejudice of the plaintiffs case. Inspite of the fact that the plaintiff had brought to the notice of the then Managing Director the injustice done to him, the Managing Director did not bother to consider the appeal of the plaintiff and insisted on only new facts as he was biased and prejudiced. The defendant company is wholly a Government of India Undertaking company and all its shares being held by the Government of India and is state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The plaintiff was permanent employee of the respondent-company and a public servant. As such, his tenure of office is secured under the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution and cannot be in any manner prejudicially affected save and except by observing the safeguards enshrined in Article 309 to 311 of the Constitution. The plaintiff prayed for a declaration that the order of termination of service is illegal and invalid. He also prayed for necessary relief of Rs. 1,30,000/- as damages. The plaintiff was filed on 3. 2. 1979 at a time when the view taken by judicial decisions was that Corporations including Public Sector Undertakings not come within the ambit of State and other authorities and that the employees of such undertakings even though wrongfully dismissed or removed cannot claim to continue in service and cannot pray for a declaration to that effect their remedy being only to claim damages for wrongfully dismissal or termination of services. In AIR 1984 SC 1361 , the Supreme Court held that Public Sector undertakings came with the ambit of other Authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and further held that an employee of a Public Sector Corporation governed by the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules is entitled to a declaration that he still continues to be in service when once the order of termination is successfully assailed. In view of the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the plaintiff is entitled also to declaration that he continues to be in service. The plaintiff submits that in the normal course but for the impugned order of termination he would have continued to be in service till 30th June, 1980 and he would have earned two more promotions, that he would have got more than Rs. The plaintiff submits that in the normal course but for the impugned order of termination he would have continued to be in service till 30th June, 1980 and he would have earned two more promotions, that he would have got more than Rs. 1,30,000/- as the emoluments taking into consideration the promotions which he would have in the usual ourse got, and therefore, prays for a declaration that he continued to be in service till 30th June, 1980. " ( 4 ) THE defendant filed a written statement with the following allegations:"the allegation that the procedure adopted is contrary to rules of natural justice and the order was passed with predetermined mind is palpably untrue. There is no truth in the contention that order of termination is illegal, mala fide or without jurisdiction. Under law the Disciplinary authority has every right to disagree with the conclusions reached the Enquiry Officer and hence, the order cannot be taken exception to on that ground. In fact, the disciplinary authority gave a reasoned order and clearly mentioned that he was satisfied that the various charges were made out and hence the termination order dated 5. 7. 1976 is legal, valid and proper. Every opportunity was afforded to the plaintiff and the enquiry was a full-fledged enquiry in which reasonable opportunity was afforded to the plaintiff and the rules of natural justice were complied with and as such no exception can be taken to the punishment imposed on the plaintiff. The reference to the Central vigilance Commission manual is irrelevant and uncalled for. It is for the management to follow its own rules and the rules of the Central Vigilance Commission are not mandatory and besides the rules for the disciplinary appeal were finalised by the Bureau of Public Enterprises and the defendant-company as also its officers bound by the same. The Central Vigilance Commission manual is a confidential document and there is no need to adhere to the same in the conduct of departmental enquires. The defendant submits that on 19. 7. 1975 the defendant-Board approved the revised set of rules which were formulated by the Bureau of Public Enterprises as a set of model rules for the conduct of such enquiries and the Board approved the same and they were made retrospectively applicable and therefore no exception can be taken by the plaintiff to the conduct of the enquiry. 7. 1975 the defendant-Board approved the revised set of rules which were formulated by the Bureau of Public Enterprises as a set of model rules for the conduct of such enquiries and the Board approved the same and they were made retrospectively applicable and therefore no exception can be taken by the plaintiff to the conduct of the enquiry. Besides the plaintiff has no vested right that the enquiry should be conducted under any given set of clues so long as the rules of natural justice are complied with and reasonable opportunity is given. The plaintiff cannot take exception to the rules under which the enquiry was conducted. The contention that the matter should be notified to the Central Vigilance Commission is not correct. The question of the plaintiff having a right to have the enquiry conducted by the Central Vigilance Commission proceeds from an erroneous assumption that the defendant is not entitled to conduct an enquiry. The defendant has got a right to conduct an enquiry under its own rules and hence the plaintiff was bound to appear in the enquiry. The question of the plaintiff being not aware of the rules hence assuming but not admitting the same is true, it does not confer on him any right to have the enquiry before the Central Vigilance Commission. In those circumstances, there is no question of deprivation of an enquiry by the Central Vigilance Commission. The contention that the enquiry by the Central Vigilance Commission is conducted in a judicial manner or that the enquiry will be conducted by a person unconnected with the management are all irrelevant issues and do not in any way affect the right of the defendant to conduct an enquiry nor confer any privilege on the plaintiff to have the enquiry conducted by the Central vigilance Commission. The assumption that the enquiry report would have been stronger in favour of the plaintiff in such an event pertains to the realm of pure conjecture. The allegation that the enquiry was conducted by a Tribunal other than the one contemplated by law is not correct. The enquiry was validly conducted by the defendant and hence the order of termination is quite legal and valid and is perfectly within the jurisdiction of the defendant. There is no question of the enquiry being void or non-est as contended by the plaintiff. The enquiry was validly conducted by the defendant and hence the order of termination is quite legal and valid and is perfectly within the jurisdiction of the defendant. There is no question of the enquiry being void or non-est as contended by the plaintiff. The defendant submits that the plaintiff was asked to take the service of a defence Counsel that is service of a co-employee and he never utilized the service of a company employee and participated in the enquiry and as such he cannot now complain that there is a denial of the assistance of a Counsel. The allegation that the request was improperly and illegally turned down is incorrect. The defendant submits that under the rules the plaintiff can utilize the service of only another co-employee and he cannot ask for the services of an outsider. The allegations that a wrong copy of rules was supplied and that the plaintiff was kept in the dark etc. , are all untrue. The further allegations that the plaintiff is a layman and he has no knowledge of law or experience regarding departmental enquiry is also not true. The charges involved are straight charges and no complications are involved and at any rate the plaintiff have not utilised the services of a defence Counsel and not having renewed the request later on cannot now turn round and contend that he was denied of the chance of engaging the services of defence Counsel. It is equally untrue to say that the plaintiff is not endowed with necessary experience to participate in an enquiry. All the said allegations are invented as an after-thought and as there is no question of denial of reasonable opportunity of defending himself. The contention that the then Managing Director was biased and prejudiced against the plaintiff is untrue. The plaintiff nowhere alleges what the bias was or what the prejudice was and making vague generalizations without giving specific instance is clearly proof-positive that there is no true in the assertion that then Managing Director was biased. The contention that the then Managing Director was biased and prejudiced against the plaintiff is untrue. The plaintiff nowhere alleges what the bias was or what the prejudice was and making vague generalizations without giving specific instance is clearly proof-positive that there is no true in the assertion that then Managing Director was biased. There is nothing improper in the notice issued and equally there is no question of misleading the plaintiff of misdirecting merely because assuming a wrong rule was quoted, it does not mean that he has not open or fair mind or that he was biased against the plaintiff, there is no absolutely no question of conducting two enquiries and the procedure follows is quite in accordance with rules and there is no violation to comply with rules of natural justice. In fact, an explanation was called for an he was asked to state his case and throughout the disciplinary authority had a free, fair and open mind and the allegations as such to the contrary and invented for the purpose of the plaint. The plaintiff was allowed inspection of all the documents and even during the course of enquiry again he looked into all the documents and there is absolutely no truth in the assertion that the documents are not made available to him. The plaintiff persued all the documents and the very fact that nowhere during the course of enquiry be stated that the documents were not made available to him clearly proves that the said allegation of not making available document is invented for the first time now as an afterthought. The plaintiff never wanted any additional documents and never sought permission for filing any additional documents and therefore, not he can fall back on Rule 27 (9) sub-rule (2 ). The defendant-company emphatically assets that no rules were violated and no procedural practices were departed from, and there is no denial of reasonable opportunity. The defendant submits that the Central Vigilance Commission is an independent agency and the plaintiff cannot refer the Central Vigilance Commission s enquiry and the defendant denied as false that any incorrect remark were provided to the Central Vigilance Commission after the departmental enquiry was started. It is true that the enquiry officer expressed a view that the charges were not proved. It is true that the enquiry officer expressed a view that the charges were not proved. But, it is for the management to take a sound decision on the report of the Enquiry Officer. It is incorrect to say that the termination orders are invalid and unjustified. Valid reasons were given for the termination and the termination is fully justified. The order of termination is in conformity with the rule and there is nothing vindictive about it nor is it unwarranted. The same is in conformity with the rules in force. The defendant asserts that the rules are non-statutory but however they have been fully complied with and a reiteration that the removal order is motivated by bias and prejudice will not supply any strength to it. The defendant submits that once the disciplinary authority gave out his conclusion in the order, the Appellate Authority on applying his mind can confirm the order and if any new material is brought out can also consider the same merely because that the order states that new point is raised it does not mean that the appellate authority has not considered the matter to the decision of the appellate authority is wrong in that view. In the circumstances the rejection of the appeal by the Appellate Authority is quite in order. The duality of functions exercised is quite valid and there is nothing vindictive in the order passed by the defendant. On the material placed before the Departmental officers in the course of the enquiry, the charges were brought home and the civil does not sit as a Court of appeal, does not sift the material or reassesses the materials. Hence, the plaintiff cannot contend that the decision of the disciplinary authority is wrong. There is no truth in the allegation that discriminatory treatment was given to the plaintiff, and there also no truth in the allegation that senior officers against whom Central Vigilance investigation was there were promoted. When a case proved against the plaintiff it is for the management to impose such punishment as the circumstances warrant and it is not for the plaintiff to decide as to what punishment ought to be imposed. When a case proved against the plaintiff it is for the management to impose such punishment as the circumstances warrant and it is not for the plaintiff to decide as to what punishment ought to be imposed. The defendant submits that in any view of the matter, no discrimination is shown and punishment appropriate to the gravity of the offence was imposed in this case as it is a case of an officer of the company making false T. A. claim. The further allegation that the Emergency was taken advantage of by the then Managing Director is without substance when the charge-sheet was issued, there was no Emergency and subsequently also when the matter was decided on merits, the Emergency had absolutely no effect on the order passed in the instant matter. The financial status or the respectability of the person even if true does not empower him to make a false claim and assuming for a moment but not admitting that an exceptional career was there earlier, it does not amount to a mitigating circumstances in extenuation of the gravity of the offence. The services were not terminated in an questionable manner as asserted in the plaint. The further allegation that the plaintiff would have been promoted to various positions etc. , are based on several uncertainties. The allegation that the plaintiff would have gained more than a lakh of rupees were not his services terminated, all pertain to realm of conjecture. The question of material agony, loss of reputation etc. , are irrelevant in a case of proved misconduct. There is nothing illegal or improper or invalid in the order of termination dated 5. 7. 1976. The plaintiff is not an employee protected by the Industrial Law and is not an employee under the State or an employee enjoying the statutory status and it is a pure case of contract of personal service and hence, he is not entitled to seek any declaration that the termination of the service is illegal. The defendant submits that the entire suit is misconceived and the suit claim is exaggerated and therefore, the suit may be dismissed with costs. The defendant submits that the entire suit is misconceived and the suit claim is exaggerated and therefore, the suit may be dismissed with costs. " ( 5 ) SINCE, the plaintiff was permitted to amend the plaint, the defendant filed additional written statement on 14-4-1982 with the following allegations:"the allegation that the order of the Disciplinary Authority is not based on evidence on record and is based on surmises and conjectures and is not warranted by facts and circumstances of the case, is not at all true. It is equally incorrect to say that the Disciplinary Authority had not applied its mind to the evidence on record and passed an order sweeping in nature erroneously and deliberately throwing to the winds as alleged in the plaint the principles of burden of proof, that capital was made out of the alleged omissions in the dairy. The order passed by the Disciplinary Authority is quite valid and proper and based on material on record. The provisions of Evidence Act have no application and there is no question of burden of proof or strength of the case of one party or weakness of the defence of the others and the principles of the standard and degree of proof either in a civil case or a criminal case cannot be brought into the disciplinary proceedings. The further allegations that the order of the Disciplinary Authority is vitiated and that it is allegedly based on the views of the Presenting Officer, is absolutely incorrect. The allegation that the order is passed on the view of the Presenting Officer in his final brief is not only untrue, but also is not correct. The order was based on the Disciplinary Authority own judgment of the material on record. The contention that the impugned order adversely affects the mental peace, career of the plaintiff in respect of his position etc. , is not very material. The order of the Disciplinary Authority has been passed after following the due procedure and no civil or constitutional rights of plaintiff have been invaded, and it is incorrect to say that the order is ab initio void, inoperative and illegal. The further allegation that the Disciplinary Authority was to give a fresh opportunity. The Disciplinary Authority has every right to differ from the view of the enquiring officer and there is no need for giving another opportunity at that stage. The further allegation that the Disciplinary Authority was to give a fresh opportunity. The Disciplinary Authority has every right to differ from the view of the enquiring officer and there is no need for giving another opportunity at that stage. The question of the plaintiff convincing the Disciplinary Authority does not arise, as the law does not envisage a personal hearing again. The allegation that the order was manifestly perverse or that it is palpably wrong and unjustified, and the plaintiff would have convinced the Disciplinary Authority if an opportunity is given are all matters purely relating to a realm of conjecture. The contention that his tenure is secure under Article 311 cannot have any application to an employee of Public Undertaking, besides the rules and service conditions are not framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, and therefore, such employees do not get the status of public servant and it is still a contractual employment and it is not at all even statutory service. The alleged violations mentioned in the plaint are all not true and there and there is no question of non compliance of the principles of natural justice, denial of giving an opportunity at any stage of the enquiry. The further allegation that the order of removal is wholly illegal are all based on no material whatsoever. There is no violation of Rules 27 (1), 27 (11), 27 (12), 30, 34 (1) and 38 of the Conduct and Discipline Rules, and hence, the defendant prays to dismiss the suit with costs. " ( 6 ) IN fact, the defendant again filed yet another additional written statement, which is to the following effect:"the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of a declaration that he is to be continued in service till 30th June, 1980. Granting such a declaration would amount to a specific enforcement of a contract of personal service which is prohibited under Section 14 (l) (b) of the Specific Relief Act. The allegations that the public sector undertakings are states or other authority is only limited for the purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution and for maintaining a writ under Section 226 of Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The judgment of the Supreme Court cannot be called in aid for the simple reason that the plaintiffs right to sue accrued when the order of termination was passed on 5. The judgment of the Supreme Court cannot be called in aid for the simple reason that the plaintiffs right to sue accrued when the order of termination was passed on 5. 7. 1976. Therefore, the relief cannot now be sought as by the date of the judgment of the Supreme Court, the said relief is barred under law. The defendant states that in any view of the matter, AIR 1984 SC 1361 , could not be available to a person who has already initiated legal action and to a person whose claim is barred under law, that by virtue of passing of the Central Administrative Tribunal order and the constitution of Central Administrative Tribunal. The civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the matter, and that in any view of the matter, relief cannot be now granted. " ( 7 ) ON the respective pleadings of the parties, originally issues 1 to 8 had been settled, which are as follows:1. "whether the termination of services of the plaintiff by the defendant is wrong improper, unjustified, unreasonable, perverse, invalid and illegal and is against the principles of natural justice?2. Whether the charge-sheet and enquiry proceedings, launched by the defendant against the plaintiff vitiated from illegalities, infirmities, for failing to give reasonable opportunity and are against principles of natural justice?3. Whether it is not mandatory for the defendant to refer the matter to Central Vigilance Commission before initiating the procededings?4. Whether the violation of Rules 27 ( 1) (3) (6) (8) sub-clause (1) and (2) (9) 27 (12) 28 (1), 28 (2), 30, 34 (2) of C. D. anda. Rules had resulted in illegal termination of the services of the plaintiff by the defendant ?5. Whether the defendant has shown discriminatory treatment to the plaintiff during the time of enquiry and also in terminating the services?6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration prayed for?7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the damages claimed?8. To what relief? ( 8 ) SUBSEQUENT thereto, on 22. 4. 1982 the following additional issue was framed:"whether the plaintiff is entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution of India?" ( 9 ) FURTHER on 28. 2. 1986 the other following additional issues were also framed:1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim any interest? 2. To what relief? ( 8 ) SUBSEQUENT thereto, on 22. 4. 1982 the following additional issue was framed:"whether the plaintiff is entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution of India?" ( 9 ) FURTHER on 28. 2. 1986 the other following additional issues were also framed:1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim any interest? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the additional relief of declaration that he continued to be in service till 30th June, 1980? 3. Whether the additional relief of declaration that the plaintiff continued to be in service till 30. 6. 1980 is not barred? 4. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit? ( 10 ) ON behalf of the plaintiff PW1 was examined and Exs. A1 to A36 were got marked. On behalf of the defendant, none had been examined and no documents were marked. As already stated supra, the Court below had decreed the suit to an extent of Rs. 1,00,000/- with proportionate costs. Aggrieved by the same, the defendant in the suit had filed the present appeal. ( 11 ) SRI Premraj representing Mr. K. Srinivasa Murthy had confined his submissions only to the limited extent of questioning the quantum of amount granted by the Court below. The learned Counsel had contended, that the respondent, in view of a division of the Apex Court, intended to take advantage and subsequent thereto had amended the pleadings. The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to only the relevant portions of the judgment and had contended that he was of the age of 55 years even on the date of the termination order and even if the termination is held to be illegal, granting of Rs. 1,00,000/- is unsustainable and it will not stand to any reason and the discretion was not exercised properly. The learned Counsel also had placed strong reliance on O. P. Bhandari v. I. T. D. C. Ltd. , (1986) 4 SCC 337 . The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to the decisions reported in A. L. Kalra v. E. Corpn. of India Ltd. , AIR 1984 SC 1361 , Sohan Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 498 and KC. Joshi v. Union of India, AIR 1985 SC 1046 . The learned Counsel also had contended that the Court below could have calculated the compensation equivalent to 3. of India Ltd. , AIR 1984 SC 1361 , Sohan Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 498 and KC. Joshi v. Union of India, AIR 1985 SC 1046 . The learned Counsel also had contended that the Court below could have calculated the compensation equivalent to 3. 33 years salary on the basis of last pay drawn and also had in view of the corpus, if invested, at the preventing rate of interest at 15% will yield 50% of the annual salary and allowance i. e. , he would be getting 50% of what he would have earned if he had been in service. The learned Counsel also had contended that the mere fact that he wrongfully gained employment elsewhere by itself cannot be a ground an he could have worked and earned elsewhere during that period and even in this view of the matter, fixing the compensation at Rs. 1,00,000/- is not in proper exercise of discretion. The learned Counsel also had contended that the reasons assigned by the Court below in awarding Rs. 1,00,000/- are not sustainable. ( 12 ) SRI K. V. Subramanya Narsu, the learned Counsel representing the respondent-plaintiff had strenuously contended that inasmuch as the point that the termination of the employee-plaintiff as held by the Court below being illegal, was not seriously challenged by the Counsel for the appellant-defendant. It is not necessary for him to advance arguments elaborately on all the other issues since, the detailed findings recorded in this regard by the Court below are self-explanatory. The learned Counsel would also further contend that the clear findings had been recorded by the Court below that the order of termination is illegal, in violation of the rules and and also in violation of principles of natural justice. The learned Counsel further contended that the only question which may have to be decided in this appeal is whether the granting of amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- by the Court below is liable to be interfered with in the appeal or not. ( 13 ) THE learned Counsel had pointed out the findings recorded by the Court below. The learned Counsel further contended that the only question which may have to be decided in this appeal is whether the granting of amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- by the Court below is liable to be interfered with in the appeal or not. ( 13 ) THE learned Counsel had pointed out the findings recorded by the Court below. The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to the fact that during the relevant period a finding has been recorded by the court below on the strength of the evidence of PW1 that the respondent-plaintiff was not gainfully employed anywhere else and hence, granting an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/-which may be taken to be the full back wages cannot be said to be either unreasonable or illegal. The learned Counsel had contended that the amendment application was allowed and the order became final and it will relate back to the date of the institution of the suit and hence, the same question cannot be reagitated at this stage. The learned Counsel also had pointed out that the Apex Court, in fact, had laid down how to evaluate the grant of back wages. Hence once discretion was exercised by the Court of first instance recording certain valid reasons, the appellate Court should not interfere and disturb such findings unless some serious illegality is pointed out in this regard. ( 14 ) HEARD both the Counsel and pursued the material available on record. In the light of the submissions and respective contentions made by both the Counsel, the other questions may not survive and only the following points arise for consideration". (A) Whether the awarding of the amount granted by the Court below is liable to be interfered with in the appeal? (b) To what relief? ( 15 ) POINT No. a : In view of the elaborate pleadings of the respective parties, it is needless again to restate all the facts in detail. There is no serious controversy between the parties that the order of termination is illegal and invalid. The question is relating to the entitlement of the back wages only. Here itself, I may point out that apart from the evidence of PW1, Exs. There is no serious controversy between the parties that the order of termination is illegal and invalid. The question is relating to the entitlement of the back wages only. Here itself, I may point out that apart from the evidence of PW1, Exs. Al to A36, the charge memo, the removal order, the conduct rules, the proceedings of enquiry, the appeal, the appellate authority s letter and the other correspondence and also the proceedings of the Enquiry Officer had been marked and the respondent-plaintiff as P. W. I had deposed in detail about all the facts and circumstances and also had explained that he was not otherwise gainfully employed and he is entitled to the relief of compensation amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- and another additional amount of Rs. 30,000/-towards mental agony. But, however, the Court below had granted only Rs. 1,00,000/-and had negatived the relief relating to Rs. 30,000/ -. Against this evidence of PW1, the appellant-defendant had not let in any evidence at all. However, the only question seriously urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that normally 50% of the back wages alone will be granted and the granting of total claim is totally unreasonable and thus, the Court below had not exercised the discretion properly. In A. L. Kalra s case (supra), the Apex Court had observed that where the dismissal was found to be improper and the reinstatement with back wages had been ordered and the delinquent, a highly placed officer in public sector, though not guilty of misconduct, found to have committed lapse in not returning House Building Advance and Vehicle Purchase Advance, he should be paid 50% back wages. In O. P. Bhandari s case (supra) at page No. 344 it was held thus:" (6) Time is now ripe to turn to the next question as to whether it is obligatory to direct reinstatement when the concerned regulation is found to be void. In the sphere of employer-employee relations in public sector undertakings, to which Article 12 of the Constitution of India is attracted, it cannot be posited that reinstatement must invariably follow as a consequence of holding that an order of termination of service of an employee is void. In the sphere of employer-employee relations in public sector undertakings, to which Article 12 of the Constitution of India is attracted, it cannot be posited that reinstatement must invariably follow as a consequence of holding that an order of termination of service of an employee is void. No doubt in regard to blue collar workmen and while collar employees other than those belonging to the managerial or similar high level cadre, reinstatement would be a rule, and compensation in lieu thereof a rare exception. Insofar as the high level managerial cadre is concerned, the matter deserves to be viewed from an altogether different perspective a larger perspective which must take into account the demands of National Interest and the resultant compulsion to ensure the success of the public sector in its competitive co-existance with the private sector. The public sector can never fulfil its life aim or successfully vie with the private sector if it is not managed by capable and efficient personnel with unimpeachable integrity and the requisite vision, who enjoy the fullest confidence of the policy-makers; of such undertakings. Then and then only can the public sector undertaking achieve the goals of, (1) maximum production for the benefit of the community, (2) social justice for workers, consumers and the people, and (3) reasonable return on the public funds invested in the undertaking. (7) It is in public interest that such undertakings or their Boards of Directors are not compelled and obliged to entrust their managements to personnel in whom, on reasonable grounds, they have no trust or faith and with whom they are in a bona fide manner unable to function harmoniously as a team working arm-in-arm with success in the aforesaid three-dimensional sense as their common goal. These factors have to be taken into account by the Court at the time of passing the consequential order, for the Court has full discretion in the matter of granting relief, and the Court can sculpture the relief to suit the needs of the matter at hand. The Court, if satisfied that ends of justice so demand, can certainly direct that the employer shall have the option not to reinstate provided the employer pays reasonable compensation as indicated by the Court. The Court, if satisfied that ends of justice so demand, can certainly direct that the employer shall have the option not to reinstate provided the employer pays reasonable compensation as indicated by the Court. "in Sohan Singh s case (supra) it was held that where the authorities, on the basis that the applicant was accused in criminal case and was likely to be convicted of charge of theft, passing an order of discharging and however, the applicant acquitted of the charge subsequently, it was held that the applicant was entitled to be compensated by payment of lump sum amount in lieu of benefits to which he would have been entitled, had he continued in service for extended periods of six years. Reliance was also placed on K. C. Joshi s case (supra ). In fact, the Court below had appreciated the evidence of PW1 and also the documentary evidence in detail and had given a clear finding that Rs. 1,00,000/- include leave encashment, gratuity, contributory P. P. and also bonus and it is being claimed as damages and on appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence, a specific findings had been recorded that the claim of Rs. 30,000/- towards damages for mental agony cannot be granted and it had been disallowed and only the compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/- had been granted. Here, it has to be considered whether this finding recorded by the Court below is such a finding to be disturbed by the appellate Court. As already pointed out, on appreciation of facts and circumstances in several decisions, no doubt, certain principles had been laid down. But, however, these principles at the best can be said to be illustrative and not exhaustive covering all the cases and each case has to be appreciated on its own facts and circumstances. 1 had gone through the judgment of the Court below and in fact, pains had been taken to discuss elaborately all the facts and circumstances and also the legal position and reasons had been recorded by the Court below for inclining to grant Rs. 1,00,000/ -. 1 had gone through the judgment of the Court below and in fact, pains had been taken to discuss elaborately all the facts and circumstances and also the legal position and reasons had been recorded by the Court below for inclining to grant Rs. 1,00,000/ -. The contentions raised by the appellant at the appellate stage, especially in the absence of any evidence in this regard adduced by the appellant-defendant in the Court of first instance, may not have such an effect so as to the appellate Court to arrive at a different conclusion than the one reached by the Court below. It is needless to point out that this Court, being a Court deciding a first appeal, the facts can definitely be gone into. But, here, the evidence of PW1 alone is available and there is no contra evidence forthcoming from the opposite party. In such circumstances and also in the light of the detailed reasons recorded by the Court below on all these points, as an appellate Court, I am not inclined to disturb those findings, especially in the light of the detailed reasons recorded by the Court below justifying the granting of the quantum fixed by the Court below in this regard. ( 16 ) POINT No. b :for the foregoing reasons and in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appeal is devoid of merits and accordingly, the same is dismissed with costs.