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2001 DIGILAW 1647 (MAD)

V. K. Nandagopal v. K. Gunabhooshanam

2001-12-14

K.SAMPATH

body2001
Judgment :- 1. The facts leading to the above applications are as follows: “O.P.No.718/2000 was filed by respondents 1 and 2 in A.No. 4213/2001 for Letters of Administration in the matter of the last Will and Testament of A.K. Govindaraja Mudaliar and Smt. Abidagujambal, both deceased. Govindaraja Mudaliar was the grandfather of respondents 1 and 2. He purchased the property subject matter of the Will in the name of his wife, Abidagujambal in 1943. The applicants herein were respondents 1 and 2 in O.P.No.718/2000. The third respondent is a son of Govindaraja Mudaliar. The four th respondent is the mother of the petitioners and respondents 5 to 7 their sisters. Govindaraja Mudaliar and Abidagujambal executed a Will on 13.3.1967 in favour of the petitioners. Govindaraja Mudaliar died on 5.6.1969 and Abidagujambal died on 16.1.2000. Respondents 3 to 7 in the O.P. gave their consent affidavits for issuing Letters of Administration in favour of the petitioners. Respondents l and 2/applicants herein were served, but they had not filed any caveat. The Will was drafted by one Loganathan. The attesting witnesses having passed away the son of one of the attesting witnesses filed an affidavit of proof for proving the signature of his father in the Will. Paper publication was also effected. There were no objectors present. The Will was held to be proved and Letters of Administration were directed to be issued to the petitioners on 16.4.2001. 2. So far as O.P.No.719/2000 is concerned, the petitioners applied for Letters of Administration in the matter of the last Will and Testament of Govindaraja Mudaliar. The petitioners are respectively the son G. Bather and daughter-in-law B. Rajeswari of the testator Govindairaja Mudaliar. The applicants herein were impleaded as respondents 1 and 2. The other respondents were the first petitioner’s brother’s wife and children. Respondents 3 to 8 gave consent affidavits. The applicants were not represented though they had been served. The first petitioner examined himself as P.W.1 and marked the original Will. The son of one of the attesting witnesses had given an affidavit stating that he was identifying the signature of his father in the Will. The son of the scribe had also given his affidavit identifying the signature and handwriting of his father in the Will. Both the attesting witnesses and the scribe were no more at the time when the Will was sought to be proved. The son of the scribe had also given his affidavit identifying the signature and handwriting of his father in the Will. Both the attesting witnesses and the scribe were no more at the time when the Will was sought to be proved. Publication was also effected as required. The learned Judge accepted the evidence of the first petitioner as well as the affidavits filed on his side and held that the Will had been duly proved and directed issuance of Letters of Administration by order dated 15.4.2001. 3. The applicants had taken out the present-application stating as follows: They were not served with the copy of the original petition when notices were served on them through Court. They served a lawyer notice dated 25.1.2001 on the Counsel for the petitioners in the two petitions informing him that they had valid and legal objections for the grant of Letters of Administration in favour of the petitioners and that they were taking suitable steps for filing caveats in the O.Ps. They had not been furnished with copies of the petition along with the above O.P. They had suppressed the same and obtained the order granting Letters of Administration in their favour. The same had been obtained in collusion with the other respondents by making false statements that Govindaraja Mudaliar and Abidagujambal executed the Wills with full knowledge of the contents and in sound state of mind and voluntarily and that the petitioners, had not cared to explain the suspicious circumstances regarding the execution of will by Govindaraja Mudaliar and Abidagujamba1. They had not explained as to why all the properties belonging to the deceased executants were not included in the Will and in those circumstances, the grant of Letters of Administration had to be revoked. 4. The allegations in the other application are also identical. 5. Detailed counters have been filed in both the applications and the points raised in the counter are as under: There was no collusion in getting the orders in the petitions for issuance of Letters of Administration. The applicants had notice of the O.Ps. 4. The allegations in the other application are also identical. 5. Detailed counters have been filed in both the applications and the points raised in the counter are as under: There was no collusion in getting the orders in the petitions for issuance of Letters of Administration. The applicants had notice of the O.Ps. in advance, that they had notice would be evident from the fact that they had filed C.S.No. 249/2000 for partition of the houses concerned in the O.P. and the connected O.P. along with movables and in A.Nos.587 and 588 of 2000 they had prayed for injunction restraining the petitioners from alienating the properties and for appointment of receiver to collect the monthly rental and to deposit the same into Court to the credit of the suit. The said applications were resisted by the petitioners contending that the properties had been bequeathed under the Wills concerned in the O.Ps. The applicants filed a reply contending that the un-probated Will could not be relied upon by the Court as per the provisions of the Indian Succession Act and the O.Ps. had been filed by that time and the same was brought to the notice of the Court and after taking time, the O.Ps. were numbered and numbers given to the Court in the presence of the present Counsel of the applicant and one Thiruvenkatam, husband of the second applicant, who was present in Court on that day. After, considering the merits of the applications, they were dismissed on 9.10.2000. Thus the applicants had notice of the O.Ps. Thereafter, notice was served on the applicants through Court giving the dates of the hearing of the O.Ps. The first applicant received notice in the O.Ps. on 17.1.2001 and the second appl icant on 8.12.2000. Paper publication giving the date of hearing of the O.Ps. as on 20.2.2001 had been published in an English Daily and a Tamil Daily. Thus they had notice of the filing of the O.Ps. Again Order 25, Rule 51 of the Original Side Rules enjoins any person interested to oppose grant of Probate or Letters of Administration to file a caveat in the Registrar’s Office in Form No.69. An affidavit is to be filed in support of the caveat as per Rule 52. Thus despite having knowledge of pendency of the above O.Ps. applicants failed to file caveat before hearing of the O.Ps. An affidavit is to be filed in support of the caveat as per Rule 52. Thus despite having knowledge of pendency of the above O.Ps. applicants failed to file caveat before hearing of the O.Ps. The Court was satisfied that the Wills had been duly proved. The present applications, after grant of Letters of Administration, were not maintainable. Both on the ground that the applicants had not filed caveat before grant of Letters of Administration and on the ground that the Letters of Administration had been granted according to law, the present applications to revoke are not maintainable. The applicants had been disinherited under the Will on the ground that they being the two daughters in the family had been married off well and as such the two house properties were given to the two sons of the family. As far as the non-furnishing of copy of the petition in the O.P. is concerned, notice was not required to be complied with in law. The applicants ought to have filed the caveat and on filing caveat they would be entitled to get copies of petitions in the O.Ps. As far as the respondents knew, the applicants had indeed been furnished copies of petitions in the O.Ps. along with notice of hearing of the above O.Ps. through Court. Whether there were other properties or not and whether they should have been added in the Will had no bearing for granting Letters of Administration in respect of the Wills. The other allegations were false. 6. The point for consideration in both the applications is whether the Letters of Administration granted in the main O.Ps. have to be revoked for the reasons set out in the applications ? 7. Mr.A.R. Raja Masilamani, learned Counsel for the applicants, vehemently submitted that the applicants are entitled to have the Letters of Administration revoked in view of the fact that they had not been served with copies of the petitions by the learned Counsel for the petitioners in the O.Ps., that this would be a just cause in terms of Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 for revocation of the Letters of Administration. The learned Counsel laid great stress on Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the Explanation to Section 263. The learned Counsel also relied on a number of judgments in support of his contention. The learned Counsel laid great stress on Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the Explanation to Section 263. The learned Counsel also relied on a number of judgments in support of his contention. The judgments referred to by the learned Counsel are: (1) H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma and Others, AIR 1959 SC 443 : 959 SCJ 507. (2) Gorantla Thataiah v. Thotakura Venkata Subbaiah and Others, AIR 1968 SC 1332 . (3) Dr.(Mrs.) Ruth Annamalai v. Valliammai Achi and another, 2000 TLNJ 172. (4) V. KesavaReddiar v. Sarojini Ammal and another, 2000 (2) TLNJ 249. 8. Per contra, Mr.M. Kalyanasundararm, learned Senior Counsel for the contesting respondents, submitted that the applicants had been given notice of the proceedings, that they had been made parties and that they ought to have filed caveat and contested the petitions. The mere fact that they had issued notice through Counsel for copies of the original petitions would not absolve them of their obligation to file the necessary caveat and contest the proceedings. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that when they had knowledge of the proceedings, it was not open to them to complain that they had not been furnished with copies of the petitions. If only they had filed the caveats, they would have been furnished with copies and they would have contested the proceedings. No just cause had been made out. There was no prima facie case either. On merits, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the Wills were executed on 13.3.1967 and that Govindaraja Mudaliar died on 5.6.1967 and Abidagujambal died on 16.1.2000. Based on the Will the mortgages were discharged. The houses were reconstructed. The Will specifically provided that the daughters/applicants herein had been married off well and therefore they were disinherited. The applicants had received notice of the O.Ps. was admitted. Publications were effected. Master recorded evidence and on being satisfied that the Wills had been duly proved, this Court passed orders granting Letters of Administration. In as much, as it has been held that the Wills had been satisfactorily proved to have been executed by the testator/testatrix, the revocation even if it is to be granted would be an unnecessary exercise. There was no fraud committed and absolutely no case had been made out for revocation of the Wills. In as much, as it has been held that the Wills had been satisfactorily proved to have been executed by the testator/testatrix, the revocation even if it is to be granted would be an unnecessary exercise. There was no fraud committed and absolutely no case had been made out for revocation of the Wills. The learned Senior Counsel relied on the following judgments in support of his contentions: (1) Anil Behari Ghosh v. Smt. Latika Bala Dassi and others, AIR 1955 SC 566 . (2) Smt. Rukmani Devi and Others v. Narendra Lal Gupta, AIR 1984 SC 1866 : 1985(1) SCC 144 . (3) Mrs. Nalini Navin Bhagwati and Others v. Chandravadan M. Mehta, AIR 1997 SC 1055 . (4) R. Ramachandran v. G. Hariharan, 2001(2) LW 218 : 2001(2) MLJ 417 . 9. It has been held in Mrs. Nalini Navin Bhagwati and Others v. Chandravadan M. Mehta, AIR 1997 SC 1055 , that, “applications for revocation cannot be treated as suit under Section 295 of the Indian Succession Act and they have to be treated as miscellaneous applications and disposed of according to given fact situation in an appropriate case either summarily or after recording evidence. ........... The burden will be on the applicant to prove the facts to revoke the probate or letter of administration and the respondent who obtained probate or letter of administration has to disprove the contentions of the applicant. In that situation, based upon the given facts situation, it will be for the Court to dispose it of either summarily or after giving opportunity to both the parties to adduce evidence and consideration thereof. Under these circumstances it is not necessary that the application for revocation of the probate or letter of administration would be treated as a suit as contemplated under Section 295 of the Act.” 10. Let us now examine the provisions of Section 263 providing for revocation or annulment for just cause. The Section runs as follows: “The grant of probate or letters of administration may be revoked or annulled for just cause. Let us now examine the provisions of Section 263 providing for revocation or annulment for just cause. The Section runs as follows: “The grant of probate or letters of administration may be revoked or annulled for just cause. Explanation : Just cause shall be deemed to exist where - (a) the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance; or (b) the grant was obtained fraudulently by making a false suggestion, or suggestion, or by concealing from the Court something material to the case; or (c) the grant was obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential in point of law to justify the grant, though such allegation was made in ignorance or inadvertently; or (d) the grant has become useless and inoperative through circumstances; or (e) the person to whom the grant was made has wilfully and without reasonable cause omitted to exhibit an inventory or account in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of this Part, or has exhibited under that Chapter an inventory or account which is untrue in a material respect. Illustrations: (i) The Court by which the grant was made had no jurisdiction. (ii) The grant was made without citing parties who ought to have been cited. (iii) The will of which probate was obtained was forged or revoked. (iv) A obtained letters of administration to the estate of B as his widow, but it has since transpired that she was never married to him. (v) A has been taken administration to the estate of B as if he had died intestate but a Will has since been discovered. (vi) Since probate was granted, a letter Will, has been discovered. (vii) Since probate was granted, a codicil has been discovered which, revokes or adds to the appointment of executors under the Will. (viii) The person to whom probate was or letters of administration were, granted has subsequently become of unsound mind. 11. The learned Counsel for the applicants concentrated on Clauses (a), (b) and (c) and according to him a ‘just cause’ has clearly been made out. 12. In several decisions it has been held that the explanation of the term ‘just cause’ is only illustrative and not exhaustive and therefore, an application for revocation need not fall under one or more of the said grounds. 12. In several decisions it has been held that the explanation of the term ‘just cause’ is only illustrative and not exhaustive and therefore, an application for revocation need not fall under one or more of the said grounds. The emphasis in Section 263 is on the just cause and not mere default, if any, committed by the applicant at an earlier point of time unless, having regard to the circumstances of the case, such default disentitled the applicant to establish just cause in a proceedings under Section 263 of the Act. The words ‘just cause’ in Section 263 enjoins the necessity for the Court to see that if there are circumstances other than those categorised as (a) to (e) in explanation to the said Section. 13. It is now settled by a Division Bench of this Court in Gita alias Gita Ravi v. Mary Jenet James alias M.J. James and Others, 1995(1) MLJ 467 , that the Court is not fettered by the Explanation in Section 263, while deciding whether there is ‘just cause’ for revocation of a grant. It is seen that the Court has to find out whether at the time of granting the application for probate, the relevant facts had been considered before the Court arrived at the conclusion that the Will in question was genuine. 14. In G. Shanmugham Chetti and Another v. Chinnammal, AIR 1978 Madras 304, it was held that, “the expression ‘just cause’ explained in Section 263 of the Act is obviously illustrative and not exhaustive.” The Bench observed as follows: “There may be cases where a just cause for revocation or annulment is available, even though they may not strictly come within the frame-work of the Illustrations given in Explanation to Section 263 of the Act. A mere error in form and procedure but not in substance cannot vitiate an earlier grant. If in a given case fraud is alleged or a material concealment is suggested such fraud must not only be pleaded, but also be proved at least prima facie to enable the Court to react and issue a direction by way of a citation to the primary grantees to lodge the original letters of administration in Court. Vague suggestions about concealment which do not go to the root of the matter and which are not material in the case, cannot also be considered as a just cause for revocation. Vague suggestions about concealment which do not go to the root of the matter and which are not material in the case, cannot also be considered as a just cause for revocation. In effect, therefore, there must be abundant material which is acceptable to a reasonable person to come to the conclusion that the Court has been misled in making the original grant and that there was a deliberate design and a motive for the making of untrue allegations of facts which are essential in point of law. No doubt, the propounders of the Will cannot take shelter by pleading that an untrue allegation of fact, which is essential in point of law, was ignorantly or inadvertently made. If an allegation has been proved to be untrue and if that fact formed, as it were the basis for the grant in law, then also the statute assumes by way of a fiction that there is just cause for revocation. 15. In S. Govindaraj and Another v. K.R. Ramamani and Another, 1991(2) LW 390 , it has been held as follows: “Section 263 of the Act deals with the circumstances under which a grant of probate or letters of administration may be annulled or revoked. If the Section has merely stated that the following are the circumstances under which a grant or probate or letters of administration may be revoked if may be contended that unless the circumstances for revocation come within the categories mentioned in the Explanation to the said Section. But it is to be noticed that the Section begins saying that the revocation or annulment must be for a just cause. The words ‘just cause’ enjoins the necessity for the Court to see if there are circumstances other than those categorised as (a) to (e) in the Explanation to the said Section requiring for annulment or revocation. But it is to be noticed that the Section begins saying that the revocation or annulment must be for a just cause. The words ‘just cause’ enjoins the necessity for the Court to see if there are circumstances other than those categorised as (a) to (e) in the Explanation to the said Section requiring for annulment or revocation. In my opinion, the circumstances set out under Explanations (a) to (e) of Section 263 of the Act do not exhaust the circumstances under which the Court can revoke or annul.” The learned Judge went on to say as follows: “ I do not feel that this Court is fettered by restrictions in the matter of interpretation of what is a just cause (a) to (e) in the Explanation to Section 263 state no more than the circumstances set out therein shall be considered by the Court as those where just cause shall be deemed to exist. The word ‘deemed’ is by itself indicative that the interpretation of the words ‘just cause’ shall not be construed as inapplicable to the circumstances set out in (a) to (e) of the Explanation. In other words, when the Section says that circumstances under (a) to (e) of the Explanation point to a finding that just cause shall be deemed to exist, it imports that there may be other circumstances under which a just cause shall not merely be deemed to exist but shall also exist thereby indicating that Section is not exhaustive of the circumstances under which a revocation or annulment may be made of a probate or letters of administration.” 16. This view was approved by the Bench of this Court in Gita alias Gita Ravi v. Mary Jenet, etc., 1995(1) MLJ 467 , already referred to. It would be worthwhile to reproduce paragraph 33 of the judgment of the Bench. “We have referred to almost all the rulings on Section 50 of the Probate and Administration Act V of 1881 and Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 in view of the fact that in none of the cases there, was a detailed discussion on the question whether the explanation in Section 263 is exhaustive or i1lustrative, it was only in Annoda Prosad Chatterjee ’ s case, ILR 24 Cal. 95, there was a reasoning for holding that the Explanation in Section 50 of the Act V of 1881 was the explanation, was held to be exhaustive, simply chose to follow that judgment or other judgments, which had followed the same. In Shanmugham Chetti’s case, AIR 1978 Madras 304, though there was an observation that the Explanation was illustrative and not exhaustive, there was not much of discussion. It was only in S. Govindaraj’s case, 1991(2) LW 380 , the language of Section 263 was considered at some length. While agreeing with the reasoning found in that judgment, we wish to add that there cannot be any doubt as to the interpretation of the Section in that the explanation is only illustrative and not exhaustive. We have already referred to the fact that in Section 234 of Act of 1865 and Section 50 of Act V of 1881, the explanation read in such a way that the words “just cause” were defined in the five clauses which followed the sam e. Explanations in Section 234 of Act X of 1865 and Section 50 of Act V of 1881 were identical in terms. They read as follows: “Just cause” is 1st, that the proceedings to obtain a grant were defective in substance; 2nd, that the grant was obtained fraudulently by making a false suggestion or by concealing from the Court something material to the case; 3rd, that the grant was obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential in point of law to justify the grant though such allegation was made in ignorance or inadvertently; 4th, that the grant has become useless and inoperative through circumstances.” It was in 1889 the 5th clause was added in Section 50 of the later Act. In fact, some of the decisions under the old Act referred to the explanation as the definition of the expression ‘just cause’. See: In the matter of the petition of Bhobosoonduri Daber Nobeen Chunder Sil and Others v. Bhobo Soonduri Daber, ILR 6 Cal. 460 and Bal Gangadhar Tilak’s case, ILR 25 Bom. 792. But, when Section 263 was enacted, the Legislature thought fit to introduce a change in the language, which itself proves that the legislature did not intend the explanation to be exhaustive. 460 and Bal Gangadhar Tilak’s case, ILR 25 Bom. 792. But, when Section 263 was enacted, the Legislature thought fit to introduce a change in the language, which itself proves that the legislature did not intend the explanation to be exhaustive. The words “just cause shall be deemed to exist where” would only mean that in cases where one of the circumstances set out in Clauses (a) to (e) is present, a legal fiction comes into existence to the effect that in such cases, there is just cause for revocation. It there are circumstances which do not fall within the ambit of Clauses (a) to (e) but which warrant or necessitate the revocation of the grant, the Court is entitled to revoke the grant or annul the same even though there is no legal fiction. The discretion granted in the main Section to the Court is in no way controlled by the explanation as it reads in the present Section. It can also be said that, the definition in the two old Acts was exhaustive while the definition in the present Act is only inclusive. The view expressed by the. Calcutta High Court in Annoda Prosad Chatterjee’s case, ILR 24 Cal. 95, that the fact that the legislature added Clause (e) in 1889, i.e . eight years after the passing of the original Act indicated that the legislature did not consider the explanation to be merely illustrative as otherwise there would have been no necessity to add Clause (e) may be correct. But, once the legislature has chosen to change the wording of the explanation and introduce a legal fiction, it goes without saving that the Legislature intended to alter the law that prevailed previously. Hence, under Section 263 of the present Act, the explanation is only illustrat ive providing for a legal fiction in the cases set out in Clauses (a) to (e) and not exhaustive of the circumstances in which the grant may be revoked or annulled for just cause. Hence, we reject the main contention of the appellants, that the respondents are bound to establish any one of the circumstances set out in Clauses (a) to (e) of the Explanation in Section 263 before seeking the revocation of the probate.” 17. Hence, we reject the main contention of the appellants, that the respondents are bound to establish any one of the circumstances set out in Clauses (a) to (e) of the Explanation in Section 263 before seeking the revocation of the probate.” 17. In S. Govindasamy and Another v. K.R. Ramamani and Another , 1991(2) LW 380 , already referred to the Counsel omitted to file caveat given by the applicants due to misplacement of paper. It was held to be a sufficient cause to order revocation. The learned Judge reasoned that justice should not fail, for wrongs even if true occasioned by the default of the Advocate in a matter very vital to the interests of parties. The law has vested a judicial discretion in the Court, to revoke a grant, where the Court may have prima facie reasons to believe that it was necessary to have the will proved afresh in the presence of interested parties. 18. We have therefore to examine whether there are prima facie reasons in the present case that would necessitate the proving of the Will afresh in the presence of the present applicants. In that case, the mistake was committed by the Advocate. He omitted to file the caveat papers that had been entrusted by the parties. This is a case where the applicants in my view, ought to have filed the caveat and received the copies of petitions as a matter of entitlement and contested the case. The question now boils down to whether we can say that the present proceedings taken for Letters of Administration are defective in substance. 19. In Banga Chandra De and Others v. Smt. Menaka Sundari De, AIR 1933 Calcutta 74, it was held that failure to mention the existence of the relatives who had claimed in the estate and to have them represented and cited is defect sufficient to revoke the probate. 20. In Smt. Yuvrani Tank Rajeshwari Devi v. Harilal and Others, AIR 1978 Madhya Pradesh 201, it has been held that : absence or non-service of citation is not defect of substance so as to constitute just cause under Section 263 where non-cited party has knowledge of probate proceedings and contested them or where he is not prejudicially affected thereby.” 21. In Narenra Nath and Another v. SM. In Narenra Nath and Another v. SM. Fakirmani Dassi and Others, AIR 1952 Calcutta 20, where the party entitled to citation is not cited and he was not aware of the pendency of the proceedings also and in those circumstances it was held that Letters of Administration granted were liable to be revoked on the application of that party. 22. In Bal Govind v. Shri Ram and Another, AIR 1947 Allahabad 372, it was held that, “where a Will has been proved to be genuine, the grant of the letters of administration could not be revoked merely on the technical ground that the grant was made without citing proper parties .” 23. As already noted, the applicants were put on notice about the original petitions. They brought it on themselves by not filing a caveat and allowing the proceedings to go on enabling the petitioners to prove the Wills before the Court. 24. Order XXV, Rule 51 of the Original Side Rules provides as follows: “Any person intending to oppose the issue of a grant of probate or letters of administration must either personally or by his advocate file a caveat in the Registrar’s Office in Form No.69. A caveat in addition to the particulars prescribed by Section 284(4), Schedule V of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, shall state the name, place of abode, description, occupation and the address for service of the caveator. Such address for service must be within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court and shall hold good in interlocutory proceedings, throughout the appellate stages and for one year after final decision. No caveat shall affect any grant made on the day on which the caveat is filed. When a caveat against the grant of probate or letters of administration is filed, the Registrar shall give notice thereof in Form No. 70 to the petitioner by leaving the same at or by sending the same by post, in prepaid cover directed to, the address for service of the petitioner.” Rule 52 provides as follows: “Where a caveat is entered after an application has been made for grant of probate or letters of administration the affidavit in support of the caveat shall be filed within eight days of the caveat being filed. Such affidavit shall state the right and interest of the caveator and the grounds of the objections to the application.” Rule 53 provides as follows: “Where an application for grant of probate or letters of administration is filed after a caveat has been filed, the Registrar shall forthwith issue notice to the caveator calling upon him to file his affidavit in support of his caveat within eight days from the service of such notice.” Rule 54 provides as follows: “When the caveator fails to file affidavit in support of his caveat in compliance with the last two preceding rules, the caveat may be discharged by an order of Court.” Rule 55 provides as follows: “Upon the affidavit in support of the caveat being filed (copy whereof has been given by the caveator to the petitioner), the proceedings shall be numbered and registered as a suit in which the petitioner shall be the plaintiff and the caveator shall be the defendant.” 25. The applicants, in my view cannot complain that they had not been furnished with copies of the petitions. What the applicants said through their Counsel in their letter dated 25.1.2001 is as follows: “(1) My clients state at the outset, that they have valid legal objections for the grant of letters of Administration to the petitioners in the above mentioned two petitions and that they are taking all suitable steps for filing caveats in both the said petitions. Hence this letter is seat to you. (2) My clients are very much surprised and shocked to find that you have not filed copies of the petitions and hence they could not obtain the same from the office concerned. Hence my clients hereby request you to furnish true copies of the petitions filed in the above mentioned two petition to me forthwith.” 26. It cannot be assumed that the petitioners had not filed copies of the petitions and that the applicants had not received the same. In my view, it should be assumed that sufficient copies had indeed been filed into Court and that the applicants had received the same. For reasons best known to them, they deny having received copies. It cannot be assumed that the petitioners had not filed copies of the petitions and that the applicants had not received the same. In my view, it should be assumed that sufficient copies had indeed been filed into Court and that the applicants had received the same. For reasons best known to them, they deny having received copies. Even assuming that they had not received copies and the Counsel for the petitioners had not supplied them with copies, they could still have filed caveats after which they would have had opportunity to contest the claim by filing the necessary affidavits as required under Order 25, Rule 51 of the Original Side Rules. I do not think that there had been any defect in the proceedings. 27. Sofar as Clause (b) of the Explanation to Section 263 is concerned, it provides that it would be a just cause if the grant was obtained fraudulently by making a false suggestion or by concealing from the Court something material to the case. Absolutely nothing is shown as to any fraudulent or false suggestion or concealment of something material was made to the Court before obtaining the Letters of Administration. Clause (b) of explanation to Section 263 cannot be pressed into service by the applicants. Clause (c) provides that in case the grant was obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential in point of law to justify the grant, though such allegation was made in ignorance or inadvertently. The applicants have not been able to substantiate that any untrue allegation of a fact was made to justify the grant. 28. The decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for the applicants do not in any way help the case of the applicant. The decision in Venkatachala Iyengar’s case, AIR 1959 SC 443 : 1959 SCJ 507, deals with the require-ments and onus relating to proof of Will. In fact, it is held in that case that : “when the evidence adduced in support of the will is disinterested, satisfactory and sufficient to prove the sound and disposing state of the testator’s mind and his signature as required by law. Courts would be justified in making a finding in favour of the propounder. In fact, it is held in that case that : “when the evidence adduced in support of the will is disinterested, satisfactory and sufficient to prove the sound and disposing state of the testator’s mind and his signature as required by law. Courts would be justified in making a finding in favour of the propounder. The propounder would be called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the Will was signed by the testator, that the testator at the relevant time was in a sound and disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and put his signature to the document of his own free Will.” No legitimate suspicion has arisen in this case regarding the genuineness of the Will propounded. 29. In Gorantla Thataiah v. Thotakura Venkata Subbaiah and others, AIR 1968 SC 1332 , it was held that: “in a case in which a Will is prepared under circumstances which raise the suspicion of the Court that it did not express the mind of the testator, it was for those who propounded the Will to remove that suspicion and that as to what were suspicious circumstances must be judged in the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” The applicants in this case have not been able to show the existence of any suspicious circumstances in the execution and illustration of the Will. 30. In Dr.(Mrs.) Ruth Annamalai v. Mrs. Valliammai Achi and another, 2000 TLNJ 172, it has been held that in case where natural heirs had not been provided for and property bequeathed had not been given in detail, those would be suspicious circumstances and the mere fact that the Will was registered would not be sufficient. This decision also does not help the case of the applicants. Equally, the decision in V. Kesava Reddiar v. Sarojini Ammal and another , 2000(2) TLNJ 249, also does not help the case of the applicants. 31. No doubt, it has been held in Elizabeth Antony v. Michel Charles John Chown Lengera, 1990(3) SCC 333 , that finding of absence of caveatable interest cannot prevent invocation of Section 263. In that case, he Will was not filed before Court. Later probate of the Will was granted by another Court. It was not known whether citations were issued to all the persons interested. The party concerned had no notice about the probate proceedings. In that case, he Will was not filed before Court. Later probate of the Will was granted by another Court. It was not known whether citations were issued to all the persons interested. The party concerned had no notice about the probate proceedings. It was upto the person invoking Section 263 to satisfy the Court about the existence of a just cause. It is well established that unless grant of probate is revoked, it would operate as judgment in rem. 32. Though the applicants had asked for copies of the petitions through counsel by letter dated 25.1.2001, they had not been furnished with copies. The letter by Counsel, however, does not say that their taking suitable steps for filing caveats in the petitions depended on their being furnished with copies. This is even conceding that copies of the petitions had not been sent to them along with Court notice. There, is absolutely no justifiable or acceptable reason given by them for not filing caveats and contesting the original petitions. 33. In Shanmugham Chetti v. Chinnammal , AIR 1978 Mad. 304 , already referred, the Division Bench held that, “an applicant who had the full opportunity of putting forward her just cause even at the time when she was served with the citation and did not do so for reasons known to her, then she could not be permitted to invoke the just and equitable rule in Section 263 of the Act and ask the Court to revoke the original grant.” There is absolutely no doubt that the applicants had full knowledge of the proceedings initiated by them in Court and they had failed to make any effort to enter caveats and it must be deemed that they had avoided contention. 34. Indeed, it has been observed by Jayasimha Babu, J. In A.C. Bopanna v. Dr. K.T. Achaya and others, 1997(2) LW 726 , commenting on the Division Bench decision in Shanmugham Chetti’s case, as follows: “The conclusion reached by the Division Bench did not rest solely on the ground, that the application under Section 263 was not maintainable in view of the caveat not having been filed despite service of citation. K.T. Achaya and others, 1997(2) LW 726 , commenting on the Division Bench decision in Shanmugham Chetti’s case, as follows: “The conclusion reached by the Division Bench did not rest solely on the ground, that the application under Section 263 was not maintainable in view of the caveat not having been filed despite service of citation. The fact that, a person served with citation had failed to file caveat and follow-up the same with an affidavit is an important circumstance to be taken into account in deciding as to whether a just cause is made out.” The learned Judge goes on to observe as follows: “The application cannot be dismissed solely on the ground that the applicant had an opportunity to file caveat but did not do so irrespective of the reason for such failure. Section 263 of the Act does not place an embargo on the person who had failed to file caveat, in time making an application for revocation if they are able to show just cause for the same. Similarly Order 25, Rule 62 of the Original Side Rules does not also prohibit the persons who had failed to file caveat in time subsequently filing application for revocation on the ground of just cause for such revocation exists.” As pointed out by the learned Judge, Section 263 of the Succession Act does not prohibit an application being made for revoking the probate for just cause if the applicant had suffered an ex parte order and had failed to invoke Order 9, Rule 13 to have the same set aside. The emphasis in Section 263 is on the just cause and not mere default, if any, committed by the applicant at an earlier point of time unless the Court finds that having regard to the circumstances of the case, such default disentitled the applicant to establish the just cause in a proceeding under Section 263 of the Act. 35. In the present cases Letters of Administration were granted on 16.4.2001 and 18.4.2001. The present applications were moved in August 2001. The delay, if any, in filing the applications cannot be regarded as so inordinate as to result in the applications being dismissed at the inception. 36. Let us therefore have a look at the sequence of events. There were two Wills executed on 13.3.1967. The present applications were moved in August 2001. The delay, if any, in filing the applications cannot be regarded as so inordinate as to result in the applications being dismissed at the inception. 36. Let us therefore have a look at the sequence of events. There were two Wills executed on 13.3.1967. There were two settlement deeds and two release deeds, all four came into existence on 21.10.1983. As to why the applicants were disinherited is explained in both the Wills. They had been married off well long before the Wills were executed and there was indeed no need to provide anything additional for them. Thereafter, in 1983 settlements and releases came to be executed. In one of the settlement deeds, the first applicant is an attestor. Satisfactory reasons are given as to why the settlement deeds were being executed. The applicants also released their rights under two release deeds on the same day after receiving some consideration. In my view, it does not lie in the mouth of the applicants to dispute the Wills on the ground that they had been disinherited for extraneous reasons that the Wills were defective in that they did not include all the properties. 37. I am satisfied that on merits the applicants do not have a case. There is no just cause made out. 38. As pointed out in Anil Behari Ghosh v. Smt. Latika Bala Dassi and others, AIR 1955 SC 566 , the Court may refuse to grant annulment in cases where there is no likelihood of proof being offered that the Will admitted to probate was either not genuine or had not been validly executed. 39. For all the reasons stated above, I reject the contentions raised on behalf of the applicants and dismiss the applications. No costs.