JUDGMENT: Defendant in O.S.No.24 of 1986 on the file of the District Munsif, Arakkonam has preferred the present second appeal aggrieved against the judgment and decree made in A.S.No.123 of 1987 on the file of the Additional Subordinate Judge at Vellore, dated 12.7.1989 reversing the decree and judgment of the trial Court dated 26.10.1987. 2. The case of the plaintiff in brief is as follows: Plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of his title to the suit property and for permanent injunction. The portion marked as A, B, C, D, in the plaint plan was the last plot or the Western side after selling the plot to Munikrishna Reddy by Sankara Naidu. The said Sankara Naidu stating that is the last plot flanked on both sides by the property of the said Munikrishna Naidu on the East and Kanniappa Naidu on the West sold the said A, B, C, D, plan marked land by giving all boundaries in favour of M.Ramakrishna Pillai under a sale deed dated 10.10.1946 for valuable consideration and delivered possession of the same. In turn the said Ramakrishna Pillai sold the A, B, C, D, mentioned punja land with the boundaries in favour of the plaintiff under a sale deed dated 17.11.1957. Immediately the plaintiff constructed a house therein and subsequently reconstructed the house as a modern one and fenced the entire area along A, B, C, D, with compound walls. The plaintiffs predecessors in title have perfected their title to the suit property. They submitted a plan and only after approval, the house was reconstructed. The plaintiff availed loan from House Mortgage Bank for reconstruction of the house. The portion marked as E, B, C, F, was kept appurtenant to the main building and had been all these years used by the plaintiff forstoring all his articles, keeping utensils for washing and also for using his cattle heads being stationed there. The plaintiff alone is entitled to the suit property along with the adjoining house. He also had put up a thatched shed in the property and is enjoying the same. The defendant attempted to interfere with his peaceful and absolute possession of the property. Hence, the suit. 3. Defendant admitted that the suit property originally belonged to Sankara Naidu. The disputed site lies to the West of the plaintiff’s house and site and not to the East of it. The defendant attempted to interfere with his peaceful and absolute possession of the property. Hence, the suit. 3. Defendant admitted that the suit property originally belonged to Sankara Naidu. The disputed site lies to the West of the plaintiff’s house and site and not to the East of it. It is not true to state that Sankara Naidu represented that A, B, C, D, portion in the plaint plan was the last plot flanked on both sides by the property of Munikrishna Naidu on the East and Kanniappa Naidu on the West. It is false to state that Sankara Naidu sold the A, B, C, D, portion to Ramakrishna Pillai under the sale deed dated 10.10.1946 and in turn Ramakrishna Pillai sold the property to the plaintiff under sale deed dated 17.11.1957. The plaintiff is not the resident of his house and it is occupied by his tenant. Plaintiff is not entitled to the suit property as the same was not sold by Sankara Naidu to his predecessor in title. There was no thatched shed in the suit property. The plaintiff cannot claim any title by adverse possession in this property. The measurements given in the sale deeds are exact and correct. The property sold by Sankara Naidu to Ramakrishna Pillai was a site measuring 32’ East to West and 75’ North to South. Sankara Naidu sold number of plots East of the property to Ramakrishna Pillai under sale deed dated 10.10.1946 and those plots also measure 32’ East to West. The plaintiff is not entitled to claim a greater extent then what is comprised in his sale deed. The plaintiff has constructed a house to an extent of 22’ 7" out of the East West 32’ portion and keeps the remaining 9’ 9" West of the house at vacant. The plaintiff had never any title to 23’ 6" East to West on the northern side. Taking advantage of misdescription of the Western boundary in the sale deed dated 10.1.1946 in favour of Ramakrishna Pillai, the plaintiff is now laying unlawful claim to the suit property. The report of the Advocate Commission will falsify the allegations that have been made in the plaint. There were stones to demarcate the suit property from the plaintiff’s property which is to the East of the suit property. These stones were removed by the plaintiff before the Commissioner’s inspection of the suit property. The report of the Advocate Commission will falsify the allegations that have been made in the plaint. There were stones to demarcate the suit property from the plaintiff’s property which is to the East of the suit property. These stones were removed by the plaintiff before the Commissioner’s inspection of the suit property. The plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of declaration and permanent injunction. 4. The trial Court framed six issues and on behalf of the plaintiff P.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-9 were marked. On the side of the defendant, D.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Ex.B-1 was marked. The report of the Commissioner and the plan were marked as Exs.C-1 and C-2 respectively. The trial Court dismissed the suit. Aggrieved against, the plaintiff preferred A.S.No.123 of 1987 on the file of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Vellore. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge, after hearing the parties allowed the appeal and set aside the decree and judgment of the trial Court. Aggrieved against this, the defendant has come forward with the present second appeal. 5. At the time of admission of the second appeal, the following two substantial question of law were framed: (1) Whether in the face of measurements, given in the sale deed, the respondent can claim a larger extent? (2) Whether the lower appellate Court was right in its consideration of the decision in Dina Malar v. Tiruchirapalli Municipality, (1984)2 M.L.J. 306 ? 6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 7. The plaintiff filed the suit for declaration and permanent injunction relating to the suit property. The entire suit property is marked A, B, C, D, in the plaint plan. Ex.A-1 dated 1.10.1946 is the sale deed executed by Sankara Naidu in favour of Ramakrishna Pillai. Under Ex.A-2 dated 11.7.1955, Ramakrishna Pillai mortgaged the property in favour of one Narayana Rao. The plaintiff under Ex.A-3 dated 17.11.1957 purchased the property from Ramakrishna Pillai and thereafter the plaintiff had mortgaged the property with Co-operative Society also. There is no dispute relating to the purchase made by the plaintiff but the dispute is whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim the entire area or only a lesser extent. The plaintiff under Ex.A-3 dated 17.11.1957 purchased the property from Ramakrishna Pillai and thereafter the plaintiff had mortgaged the property with Co-operative Society also. There is no dispute relating to the purchase made by the plaintiff but the dispute is whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim the entire area or only a lesser extent. 8.Per contra, learned counsel for the defendant admitted that the suit property originally belonged to Sankara Naidu and the dispute site lies to the West of the plaintiff’s house and the site is not to East of it. The plaintiff is not entitled to the suit property as the same was purchased by the defendant. What was purchased by the plaintiff was a site measuring 32 feet East-West and 75 feet North-South and the plaintiff is not entitled to claim more than that. In fact, the plaintiff has constructed a house to an extent of 22 feet and 7 inches and remaining 9 feet and 7 inches vacant, the plaintiff has no title to 23 feet and 6 inches East-West on the northern side. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand contended that the properties are described with clear boundaries and if there is dispute between the parties relating to the measurement boundary alone will prevail. However, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the recitals in the plaintiff’s sale deed as well as the previous title deeds clearly indicate that the plaintiff had purchased only 32 feet x 75 feet. When specific extent has been clearly mentioned in the sale deeds, it is no longer open to the plaintiff to rely on the boundaries and claim that they are entitled to more area. It is necessary to state that the plaintiff as well as the defendant had purchased the property from common vendor. Now the respondent claims more extent than what is mentioned in the document. There cannot be any adverse possession for the plaintiff in respect of the property. Moreover, the plea of adverse possession raised by the respondent has already been rejected and aggrieved against this neither any appeal nor any cross objection was filed and as such, it is no longer open to the respondent to put forth the claim of adverse possession. There cannot be any adverse possession for the plaintiff in respect of the property. Moreover, the plea of adverse possession raised by the respondent has already been rejected and aggrieved against this neither any appeal nor any cross objection was filed and as such, it is no longer open to the respondent to put forth the claim of adverse possession. No doubt, after purchase made by the plaintiff, plan has been sent for approval and thereafter only construction was made; but this will not improve the case of the respondent in any way. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on Chikkam Koteswara Rao v. Chikkam Subbarao, (1970)2 M.L.J. 127, a decision of the Apex Court, wherein it was observed as follows: “Before the right of a party can be considered to have been defeated on the basis of an alleged admission by him, the implication of the statement made by him must be clear and conclusive. There should be no doubt or ambiguity about the alleged admission. An admission made during cross-examination must be read along with the evidence given in chief-examination in a harmonious manner”. There is no dispute about this principle. 11. Reliance is also placed on Dina Malar v. Tiruchirapalli Municipality, (1984)2 M.L.J. 306 , that only in the absence of definite materials to show the actual extent intended to be sold the boundaries should outweigh the doubtful extent mentioned in the document. If the recitals in the document and the circumstances of the case show that a lesser extent only was conveyed that the area covered by the boundaries and there is clear evidence as to the intention of the parties with reference to the extent conveyed, then the extent should prevail over the boundaries. This decision is also applicable to the case on hand. 12. It has been held in Church of S.I.T.A. v. Raja Ambrose, (1978)2 M.L.J. 620 , as follows: “Where the deed sets out the extent and measurements correctly there can be no difficulty in determining the subject matter of the grant. But where no measurements are given or the extent mentioned in the deed is either vague or is only a rough and ready approximation, one has to look to other indications in the deed in order to fix the identity of the property which is the subject of the grant. But where no measurements are given or the extent mentioned in the deed is either vague or is only a rough and ready approximation, one has to look to other indications in the deed in order to fix the identity of the property which is the subject of the grant. If the deed in question sets out the boundaries of the property conveyed, then these boundaries will have to be accepted as a clear reflection of the intention of the grantor and they will conclude not only the extent positioning of the property conveyed, but also its true extent”. These decisions are applicable to the case on hand. 13. The lower appellate Court misdirected itself and although number of decisions were cited, they were not properly understood. When the respondent had purchased only 32 feet x 75 feet and there is no ambiguity in the measurements, it is not necessary to go into the question of boundaries or the intention of the parties. D.W.2 is the vendor of the appellant as well as the respondent and his evidence only supported the case of the appellant. There is no reason to discard the testimony of D.W.2. The boundary description in the other document was relied upon to show that Sankara Naidu could not have retained any property after conveying under Ex.A-1. Simply because there was some omission in the reference of boundaries, it cannot be concluded that the vendor namely, D.W.2 had no right to convey the property. As adverted to, when the theory of adverse possession has been rejected by the lower appellate Court the case of the respondent mainly depends upon the sale deed, wherein a specific extent along has been conveyed and under the circumstance, the respondent is not entitled to claim more than that taking shelter under the boundaries. The finding of the lower appellate Court is based on mere surmise and conjecture and there was erroneous application of law and, as such, interference is called for. 14. For the reasons stated above, the second appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside and the suit is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.