( 1 ) THE complainant and the accused in all these three criminal appeals are one and the same, and as such, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. ( 2 ) THE complainant filed these appeals challenging the acquittal of the accused by the VIII Metropolitan Magistrate, vijayawada, for the offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments act, 1881 (for short the NI Act ). ( 3 ) NARROWLY stated, the facts of the case are - the complainant is a Daily Newspaper, owned by M/s. Ushodaya Publications, and the accused is the proprietor of M/s. Triveni advertisements. The accused got published certain advertisements in the newspaper of the complainant in the months of December, 1992 and January, 1993, and as a result of such transaction, the accused owned a sum of Rs. 2,53,977-85 ps. to the complainant. The accused issued eight cheques (Cheque nos. 232869 dated 10-1-1993, 233037, dated 22-1-1993, 232859, dated 3-1-1993,233027 and 233028, dated 9-1-1993, 232263, dt. 17-12-1992, 232269, dated 19-12-1992, 232853, dated 26-12-1992) for different amounts, drawn on indian Bank, Vijayawada. When the complainant presented the cheques for encashment on different dates, they were dishonoured. The complainant informed the accused about the dishonour of cheques. The accused requested the complainant to present the cheques again. Again, when the cheques were presented, they were dishonoured with an endorsement insufficient funds in the account of the accused. The complainant got issued registered legal notice to the accused complaining about the dishonour of cheques and requested him" to arrange payment within 15 days of receipt of the notice. As the accused neither replied to the said notice nor paid the amounts, the accused filed three different complaints against the accused before the trial court. ( 4 ) BEFORE the trial Court, the complainant contended that the accused issued eight cheques for different amounts towards the dues, which he incurred on account of his getting published in their newspaper certain advertisements, and that when they were presented, they were dishonoured and that though he got issued legal notice, the accused neither replied nor paid the amounts, and therefore, the accused is guilty of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. On the other hand, the accused contended that there does not exist any relationship between the complainant and the accused, that the persons who filed the complaints in not authorised to file the complaints, that the complainant did not file any documents in support of his case that the accused owes certain amounts to the complainant. ( 5 ) ON behalf of the complainant P. Ws. 1 to 4 were examined and certain documents, including cheques said to have been issued by the accused, were marked, whereas, on behalf of the accused none were examined and no exhibit was marked. ( 6 ) THE learned trial Court upon considering the evidence and the material placed before it dismissed the complaints holding that the complainant failed to prove the debt of the accused in relation to the cheques issued by him, and accordingly acquitted the accused of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. Hence, these appeals by the complainant. ( 7 ) THE learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-complainant submitted that the accused got published certain advertisements in the newspaper of the complainant in the month of December, 1992 and January, 1993, and in the course of such transaction, the accused owed to the complainant a sum of Rs. 2,53,977-85 ps. , and in order to discharge such debt, the accused issued eight cheques for different amounts, and when presented, they were dishonoured. When the accused neither replied nor paid the amount within 15 days from the date of issue of legal notice by the complainant, the complainant filed complaints, and the learned trial Judge fell in error in acquitting the accused holding that the complainant failed to prove the debt of the accused. He further submitted that under Sections 118, 138 and 139 of the NI Act, a mandatory presumption can be placed that the cheques issued by the accused relate to the recovery of a legally recoverable debt, and in support of this submission, he placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in Hiten p. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee. account of the accused. When the accused failed to pay the amount within 15 days from the date of issue of notice, as contemplated under the Act, the complainant filed the complaints alleging that he cheques issued by the accused were in relation to the discharge of legally recoverable debt. account of the accused. When the accused failed to pay the amount within 15 days from the date of issue of notice, as contemplated under the Act, the complainant filed the complaints alleging that he cheques issued by the accused were in relation to the discharge of legally recoverable debt. The contention of the accused that the cheques issued by him were not in relation to the legally recoverable debt, even if accepted to be true, having regard to the judgment of the apex Court in Hiten P. Dalai, the Court can statutorily presume the liability under sections 118, 138 and 139 of the NI Act that such a presumption can be rebutted or disproved by the accused. The prosecution has to prove by adducing evidence that the cheques were issued in relation to the discharge of debt or other liability. Even if the contention of the accused that the cheques issued by him were by way of security and not in relation to discharge of any other liability of the complaint, is accepted, still the court can presume that the cheques were issued in relation to legally recoverable debt under Sections 118,138 and 139 of the Act. The presumption, thus, is not final for it can be rebutted by the accused by adducing satisfactory evidence. The Apex Court in hiten P. Dalai, went further and observed that the complainant need not prove that the cheques are issued in discharge of legally recoverable debt, that the Court can drawn statutory presumption that the cheques are issued by relation to discharge of legally recoverable debt, and such presumption can be rebutted by adducing evidence. That a fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. Therefore, the rebuttal need not be conclusively established, but such evidence must be adduced before the Court in support of the defence that the Court must either believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably probably, the stand of reasonability being that being of a prudent man. Therefore, the rebuttal need not be conclusively established, but such evidence must be adduced before the Court in support of the defence that the Court must either believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably probably, the stand of reasonability being that being of a prudent man. ( 12 ) IN the instant case, the accused simply denied in his reply notice that the cheques issued by him were in relation to the legally enforceable debt, but (has not) entered the witness box to rebut the presumption. Therefore, the Court below ought to have presumed that the eight cheques were issued in relation to the discharge of legally enforceable debt instead of dismissing the complaints on the ground that the cheques were not issued in relation to legally recoverable debt. Thus, the prosecution in the absence of rebuttable evidence on the above said presumption that the cheques were not issued in relation to legally recoverable debt, has proved its case. ( 13 ) INSOFAR as the contention of the learned counsel for the accused that the person who filed the complaints is not authorised to do so, and as such, the complaints are liability to be dismissed, is concerned, the Apex Court in M/s. MMTC v. Medchal Chemicals and pharma (P) Limited, has held that if any special statute prescribes offences and make any special provision for taking cognizance of such offences, under the statute, then the complaint requesting the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence must satisfy the eligibility criterion prescribed by the statute. The only eligibility criterion prescribed by section 142 is that the complaint under section 138 must be by the payee or the holder in due course of the said cheque. This criterion is satisfied as the complaint is in the name and on behalf of the appellant company who is the payee of the cheque. Merely because complaint is signed and presented by a person, who is neither an authorised agent nor a person empowered under the articles of Association or by any resolution passed by the Board to do so, is no ground to quash the complaint. It is open to the de jure complainant company to seek permission of the Court for sending any other person to represent the company in the Court. It is open to the de jure complainant company to seek permission of the Court for sending any other person to represent the company in the Court. Thus, even presuming, that initially there was no authority, still the company can, at any stage, rectify that defect by sending a person who is competent to represent it. ( 14 ) IN these circumstances, it cannot be said that the person who made the complaint was not an authorised officer to represent the complainant company for the complaints were filed in the name of the payee, Eenadu daily Newspapers, a Division of Ushodaya publications, Vijayawada. In view of the judgment of the Apex Court in M/s. MMTC, i am unable to appreciate the contention of the learned Counsel for the accused that the complaints are liable to be dismissed for lack of authority to file. ( 15 ) THE above facts clearly go to show that a mandatory presumption can be placed that the cheques issued by the accused are towards discharge of the legally recoverable debt of the complainant. Thus, the prosecution, in my opinion, has proved beyond reasonable doubt, the charge levelled against the accused under Section 138 of the NI Act. ( 16 ) FROM the above discussion, I am satisfied that the order passed by the Court below is liable to be set aside, and it is accordingly set aside. However, having regard to the fact that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable that the accused has issued the cheques towards discharge of legally recoverable debt, which were dishonoured, this Court instead of sending the accused to prison feels it appropriate to direct the accused to pay compensation to the complainant. ( 17 ) IN the result, I allow the three criminal appeals, filed by the complainant, holding that the accused is guilty of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. However, instead of sentencing the accused to undergo imprisonment, I direct him to pay to the complainant in all these three appeals a sum of Rs. 2,54,000/- under Sec. 544 (?) of the code of Criminal Procedure, 1972.