ORDER: The revision petitioner, who is the prosecution witness No.1 in C.C. 2298 of 1995 on the file of II Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Egmore, Madras has preferred the revision petition aggrieved over the judgment of acquittal of respondents 1 to 4 for the offences under Secs.342, 348, read with 34, 384 read with 109 and 304-A, I.P.C. 2. The case in brief for disposal of the revision petition is as follows: P.W.1. Kabali is an autorickshaw driver by profession and P.W.2 Valli is his wife. The deceased Sathish Kumar aged about 13 years is their son. The deceased was working in a tailoring shop run by P.W.5 Vijayakumar. P.W.3 Muthukrishnan is the Manager of the fancy shop situated at Luz garden, Mylapore. On 8.6.1994. P.W.3 gave a complaint to the Mylapore Police Station stating that a boy aged about 13 or 14 years has committed theft of watches from his shop. The first respondent was then working as Inspector of Police and he received the complaint from P.W.3 and made an endorsement directing P.W.26, Selvaraj, Sub Inspector of Police to register a case and accordingly, it was registered in Crime No. 1253 of 1994 for an alleged offence under Sec. 380, I.P.C. P.W.3 was able to trace out the boy Sathish Kumar, the alleged culprit and he took him and handed over to Mylapore Police Station. 3. P.W.1. returned to the house on the night of 8.6.1994 and enquired with P.W.2 about the whereabouts of their son and P.W.2 replied that he did not turn up and he would have stayed in the shop itself for night duty. On the next day, P.W.1. was informed by one Raghu, P.W.4, that the deceased was detained in the police station. At about 9.30 a.m. P.W.1. went to the police station to see his son who was in illegal custody. The 3rd accused, the Police Constable attached to Mylapore Police Station was there and he had informed P.W.1. that unless P.W.1. gave Rs.2,000 to settle the matter, the boy would not be released. P.W.1. informed him that he was not able to pay any amount and then returned home and also informed P.W.2. On 9.6.1994 at about 1.00 p.m., Sathish Kumar was brought to the house of P.W.1. by the Police Constables including the 4th respondent tying his hands with nylon rope. They searched the house of P.W.1. P.W.1. informed him that he was not able to pay any amount and then returned home and also informed P.W.2. On 9.6.1994 at about 1.00 p.m., Sathish Kumar was brought to the house of P.W.1. by the Police Constables including the 4th respondent tying his hands with nylon rope. They searched the house of P.W.1. and recovered a key chain and a small plastic knife. The 4th respondent also kicked the boy on his backside and later, the boy was again taken to the police station. On the same day, P.W.5 contacted the 2nd respondent, who was functioning as Sub Inspector of Police and requested for release of the boy. However, he also demanded money to settle the matter and P.W.5 informed the same with P.W.1. 4. On 10.6.1994 the third respondent, who was functioning as a Constable happened to meet P.W.1. at 3.00 p.m. near New Woodlands Hotel and called upon him to give the money for release of his son. But P.W.1. was not having money and as such, he did not go to police station. 5. On 11.6.1994 at about 4.45 a.m. P.W.9 Vasantha, a neighbour of P.W.1. woke up P.Ws. 1 and 2 and informed that their son Sathish Kumar was lying unconscious in an autorickshaw near the house. P.Ws.1 and 2 came out of the house and saw their son in an unconscious state and found injuries on his body. He was also taken to Royapettah Hospital and P.W.22 the casualty doctor attached to Royapettah Hospital on seeing him pronounced him as dead. Intimation about the death of the boy was sent to Mylapore Station and P.W.29, the then Inspector of Police incharge registered a case in Crime No. 1295 of 1994 under Sec. 174 of Criminal Procedure Code and requested the R.D.O. to conduct inquest. 6. P.W.27, Rajamani, Revenue Divisional Officer-cum- Additional Executive Magistrate after receiving the copy of the first information report went to Royapettah Hospital and conducted inquest. Ex.P-12 is the inquest report. He also requested the doctor, P.W. 28 to conduct post mortem. Accordingly P.W.28 after conducting autopsy issued the certificate Ex.P-17 and report Ex.P-18 and the body was handed over to the relatives. Ex.P-12 is the inquest report. He also requested the doctor, P.W. 28 to conduct post mortem. Accordingly P.W.28 after conducting autopsy issued the certificate Ex.P-17 and report Ex.P-18 and the body was handed over to the relatives. Since there was no fruitful result in the investigation, P.W.1 filed a complaint on 23.6.1994 before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Ex.P-2 is the complaint and the same was referred for investigation under Sec. 156(3) of Criminal Procedure Code. P.W. 32, C.B.C.I.D. Police Inspector received the complaint and registered a case for offences under Secs.342, 363, 386, 302 and 201 read with 34, I.P.C. The Inspector of Police, C.B.C.I.D. conducted investigation, examined the witnesses, and recorded their statements and after getting sanction Ex.P-20 and Ex.P-21 he filed a charge sheet against respondents 1 to 4 for the offences under Secs.342, 348, 384 and 304-Aread with 34, I.P.C. 7. The prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 32 and marked Exs.P-1 to P-21. On the side of the defence no witness was examined and they denied the occurrence. On conclusion of the trial, the trial Court acquitted respondents 1 to 4 holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the case against them and aggrieved against this. P.W.1 has come forward with the present revision petition. 8. The revision petition was already heard and orders were passed on 10.9.1998 by this Court that having regard to the fact that four years have elapsed, remanding the matter for fresh consideration would not be proper, since almost all the witnesses had turned hostile; though respondents 1 to 4 were responsible for illegal detention and torture the Department is at liberty to take suitable action against them, if so desired, and directed the State Government to pay Rs.2,00,000 by way of compensation to P.Ws.1 and 2 to meet the ends of justice. The said compensation could be recovered from respondents 1 to 4 if the State so desired. Aggrieved against this order, respondents 1 to 4 and the State have preferred appeals before the Apex Court in Criminal Appeals No. 419 to 423 of 1999. Leave was granted and passed the following order: “In the circumstances, we set aside the impugned order and remit the R.C.No. 416 of 1996 to the High Court of Madras to be disposed of in accordance with law by giving opportunity of hearing to all parties concerned. Leave was granted and passed the following order: “In the circumstances, we set aside the impugned order and remit the R.C.No. 416 of 1996 to the High Court of Madras to be disposed of in accordance with law by giving opportunity of hearing to all parties concerned. It would be appropriate that the case be heard by a learned Judge other than the learned Judge who has already disposed of. The learned Chief Justice is required to allot the matter to some other learned single Judge. The appeals are disposed of accordingly”. Under the circumstance the revision petition was taken up for hearing again. 9. Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioner as well as learned counsel for the respondents. 10. The points that arise for consideration in this revision petition are: (1) Whether the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court is proper and correct? (2) Whether the revision petitioner has made out any ground to interfere with the order? 11. Points: The learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that the learned trial Magistrate erred in acquitting respondents 1 to 4 and they ought to have been convicted for the offences committed by them. The trial Court also failed to take note that the deceased boy died in the police custody and the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 has not been properly appreciated and the rejection on the ground that they are interested witnesses are not proper and correct. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that expecting the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2, there is no other witness. In fact, P.Ws. 1 and 2 had not actually seen the offence committed by any of the respondents. The medical evidence also has not supported the case of the revision petitioner. The deceased was seen alive by P.W9 and she had informed P.Ws.1 and 2 and they had also seen the deceased in an autorickshaw in an unconscious state and thereafter only, the deceased was taken to the hospital, wherein the doctor after seeing him declared dead. The trial Court has considered the entire evidence and the overt act attributed are also only against accused 3 and 4 and under the circumstance, the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court is proper and correct and no interference is called for. 13. The trial Court has considered the entire evidence and the overt act attributed are also only against accused 3 and 4 and under the circumstance, the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court is proper and correct and no interference is called for. 13. It is necessary to state that P.Ws.4 to 8, 10 to 15, 17, 20, 24 and 25 turned hostile and did not support the case of the prosecution. Learned counsel for the first respondent stated that P.W.3 gave a complaint about the missing of jewels from his shop with the first respondent, who in turn directed P.W.26, the Sub Inspector of Police to register a case and apart from that he had not done anything. The first respondent is added as an accused on the basis of a common intention for alleged offences under Secs.342 and 348 read with Sec. 34, I.P.C. and also for abetment of offence under Sec. 384 read with Sec. 109, I.P.C. The prosecution has not let in any evidence in respect of the common intention pertaining to the respondents. There is absolutely no evidence in respect of abetment under Sec. 109, I.P.C. even as per the prosecution. It is evidently clear that no offence had been committed by the first respondent. The first respondent has done his official work by directing P.W.26 to register a case and by any stretch of imagination, it cannot be considered that he had committed an offence. Learned counsel further stated that vicarious liability is foreign to criminal jurisprudence. The master may be liable to pay compensation for the negligence of his employees but can never be prosecuted and punished for a criminal offence for the illegal act and illegal omissions of his employees. There is no vicarious liability in criminal law unless statute takes that also within its fold. 14. It is necessary to state that the trial Court after analysing evidence came to certain finding of facts. It came to the conclusion that the deceased was not subjected to any cruelty because P.W.28, the post mortem doctor opined that the death is a natural one. P.W. 16 stated that he saw the deceased at 3.30 a.m., i.e., 2½ hour prior to the time of alleged death and he did not mention about any injury on the deceased. There is no involvement of respondents 2 to 4 also in the case. P.W. 16 stated that he saw the deceased at 3.30 a.m., i.e., 2½ hour prior to the time of alleged death and he did not mention about any injury on the deceased. There is no involvement of respondents 2 to 4 also in the case. P.W.1 the father of the deceased alone went to the police station and had seen the boy detained there but since money was demanded unable to pay the same he returned home. P.W.2 did not visit the police station and she had given reasons also. The third respondent was implicated on the ground that he met P.W.1 on the way and demanded money and so far as the 4th respondent is concerned, he is said to have kicked the boy at the time of house search. Apart from the aforesaid materials, there is no other evidence to implicate these respondent. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents further stated that there is delay of 11 days in giving the complaint. No complaint was given to the higher police officials in respect of the occurrence. P.W.1 had occasion to see the boy in the police station even on 9.6.1994 but he had not chosen to give any complaint or telegram to any police officials and he had not taken any steps to secure the boy forthwith. No doubt, delay in giving the complaint may not be fatal to the case of the prosecution; but at the same time the conduct of P.Ws. 1 and 2 also has to be taken into consideration. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision reported in Ravinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, 2001 A.I.R. S.C.W. 3366 for the principle that mere delay in lodging the first information report cannot be a ground to treat the first information report vitiated. There is no dispute about this principle. Learned counsel also placed reliance upon Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, 2001 A.I.R. S.C.W. 2833, that the testimony of eye witnesses which is consistent and convincing cannot be rejected on mere existence of enmity. There is also no dispute about the principle and it has no application to the case on hand. 17. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner next contended that there is evidence to come to the conclusion that the boy died while in police custody and as such reasonable and adequate compensation can be awarded. There is also no dispute about the principle and it has no application to the case on hand. 17. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner next contended that there is evidence to come to the conclusion that the boy died while in police custody and as such reasonable and adequate compensation can be awarded. In support of his contention he relied on Shri Dilip K. Basu v. State of West Bengal and others, (1997) 2 L. W. (Crl.) 719 relating to custodial violence. He also relied upon Kaptan Singh v. State of M.P., 1997 A.I.R. S.C.W. 2423, But the applicability of these decisions depends upon the facts and circumstances in each case. 18. P.W.1 also in the course of evidence stated that at the time of search the 4th accused was present and he kicked on the back of the boy with his leg. He further stated that he had noticed injury in the stomach of the boy. He had also received a sum of Rs.50,000 by way of compensation from the Government. The evidence of P.W.2 is only hearsay. She admitted that she is a Secretary of Women Association for the last 18 years and the Sangam is affiliated with DYFI. P.W.9 stated that when she saw Sathish Kumar he was alive. P.W. 16 also admitted in the course of cross examination that when he woke up the boy talked to him. 19. P.W.28 Doctor Mr.S. Diwakar conducted autopsy and had noticed scratch injury below the right knee of the deceased. He opined that the death was natural and given reasons for coming to such a conclusion. According to him, he had not noticed any mark on the body of the deceased to infer about the torture. If really the respondents have tortured the boy, naturally the doctor, who conducted the post-mortem could have seen either external or corresponding internal injuries. Excepting a scratch below the right knee of the deceased, nothing was seen by the doctor and considering the opinion of the doctor as well as the evidence only, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the charges against these respondents. 20. The trial Court has considered the entire evidence and ultimately came to the conclusion that the charges were not proved. As adverted to except P.Ws.1 and 2 there is no other evidence. 20. The trial Court has considered the entire evidence and ultimately came to the conclusion that the charges were not proved. As adverted to except P.Ws.1 and 2 there is no other evidence. No doubt, they are parents of the deceased and as such, their evidence have to be scrutinized with due care and caution. The evidence of P.W.1. can be accepted that he had occasion to see the boy inside the police station and later he had seen the boy lying in the autorickshaw. But P.W.2 had not gone to the police station and seen the boy, but she along with P.W.1 had seen the boy lying in the autorickshaw. If really P.W.1 had seen the boy in the police station with injuries, he would have definitely told P.W.2 and naturally P.W.2 being the mother would have rushed up to the station to see the son or she would have taken steps to meet the higher officials or report about the same by telegram or otherwise. The absence of any of these things on the part of P.Ws. 1 and 2 taken together would establish that their evidence cannot be safely accepted in entirety. In view of the scratch mark below the right knee, it was made use of by P.W.1 to give a complaint against the police personnel and apart from that the prosecution has not positively established the case against the accused. 21. 1 and 2 taken together would establish that their evidence cannot be safely accepted in entirety. In view of the scratch mark below the right knee, it was made use of by P.W.1 to give a complaint against the police personnel and apart from that the prosecution has not positively established the case against the accused. 21. Learned counsel for the first respondent relied upon the decision reported in Akalu Ahir and others v. Ramdeo Ram, (1973) 2 S.C.C. 583 : A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2145, wherein it was observed as follows: " ...the High Court is certainly entitled in revision to set aside the order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal, but it was emphasized that this jurisdiction should be exercised only in exceptional cases when "there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice." In the face of prohibition of Sec.439(4), Crl.P.C. for the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, it makes all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial. No doubt, in the opinion of this Court, no criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies for attracting the High Court’s power of ordering retrial can be laid down. This Court, however, by way of illustration, indicated the following categories of cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision: (i) Where the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the accused: (ii) Where the trial Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce; (iii) Where the appellate Court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the trial Court to be inadmissible; (iv) Where the material evidence has been overlooked only either by the trial Court or by the appellate Court; and (v) Where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law. These categories were, however, merely illustrative and it was clarified that other cases of similar nature can also be properly held to be of exceptional nature where the High Court can justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal". This decision is applicable to the case on hand. 22. The revision petitioner has not pointed out any manifest illegality of gross miscarriage of justice. The finding cannot be interfered with merely because the trial Court has taken a wrong view of law or misappreciated the evidence on record. This Court cannot be re-appreciate the evidence and come to a different conclusion totally contrary to one arrived at by the trial Court. 23. Learned counsel for the first respondent also relied on the decision reported in Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, (1973) 2 S.C.C. 583 : A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2145, wherein it was held as follows: "No doubt, the appraisal of evidence by the trial Judge in the case on hand is not perfect or free from flaw and a Court of appeal may well have felt justified in disagreeing with its conclusion, but from this it does not follow that on revision by a private complainant, the High Court is entitled to re-appraise the evidence for itself as if it is acting as a Court of appeal and then order a re-trial. It is unfortunate that a serious offence inspired by rivalry and jealousy in the matter of election to the office of village Mukhia should go unpunished. But that can scarcely be a valid ground for ignoring or for not strictly following the law as enunciated by this Court." The principle in this decision also can be made applicable to the case on hand. 24. Perusal of the judgment of the trial Court clearly indicates that valid and convincing reasons have been given for acquitting the respondents in respect of the charges framed against them. There is no reason to take a different view than the one taken by the trial Court. Hence, I am of the view that the judgment of acquittal passed by the Court below is proper and correct and there is no reason to interfere with the same. 25. After hearing of the revision petition, the revision petitioner also filed a petition not pressing the criminal revision petition. Hence, I am of the view that the judgment of acquittal passed by the Court below is proper and correct and there is no reason to interfere with the same. 25. After hearing of the revision petition, the revision petitioner also filed a petition not pressing the criminal revision petition. According to the revision petitioner, the matter has been amicably settled between the parties out of Court and as per the settlement arrived, they have received a total sum of Rs. 1,90,000 from the respondents and they sought permission to withdraw the criminal revision petition. P.Ws.1 and 2 were also present in Court and they were also enquired with reference to the petition filed by them and they admitted the same as true. Under the circumstance, the petition filed on behalf of the revision petitioner and signed by his counsel are also recorded. 26. For the reasons stated above, the criminal revision petition fails and is dismissed. However, the petition filed by P.W. 1 is recorded.