JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, CJ.—The petitioner, who was a Judicial Officer in higher judiciary in the State of Himachal Pradesh, has approached this Court by invoking extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing and setting aside departmental proceedings and an order of dismissal passed against her being illegal, ultra vires and unconstitutional. Consequential reliefs have also been claimed. 2. The case of the petitioner is that she joined judicial service in the State of Himachal Pradesh in September, 1974. She was promoted as Additional District and Sessions Judge in September, 1986 and in December, 1989, she was appointed as District and Sessions Judge. In September, 1994, she was granted Selection Grade. In September, 1995, she was transferred and posted as District and Sessions Judge, Hamirpur It appears that on 7th May, 1996, an anonymous complaint was made to the Honble Chief Justice of this Court by "litigants and under-trials" making grievances against the conduct and administrative work of the petitioner. It was alleged that the evidence in serious matters were not recorded simultaneously in vernacular and in English language. One Mr. M.K. Bansal, real nephew of the petitioner had served at Hamirpur as Subordinate Judge for more than three years and was transferred on the basis of complaints made by lawyers. When appeals in cases decided by Mr. Bansal came up for hearing, the petitioner took keen interest in deciding them. It was, therefore, thought fit by the applicants to draw the attention of the Honble Chief Justice for taking appropriate action in the matter, as the judiciary was the only hope of the people. It appears that on the basis of the said representation, a communication was addressed by Mr. R.L. Raghu, the then Registrar (Vigilance), on the next day, i.e. 8th May, 1996 to the petitioner to offer comments at the earliest on the allegations made in the petition. On 22nd May, 1996, a reminder was sent to the petitioner stating therein that the comments of the petitioner had not been received by the Registry. A request was, therefore, made to the petitioner to offer her comments. On 13th June, 1996, still in one more communication, it was stated that the petitioner should sent her comments, if any, latest by 29th June,-1996, failing which the matter would be decided on the assumption that the petitioner had nothing to say. A request was, therefore, made to the petitioner to offer her comments. On 13th June, 1996, still in one more communication, it was stated that the petitioner should sent her comments, if any, latest by 29th June,-1996, failing which the matter would be decided on the assumption that the petitioner had nothing to say. On 25th July, 1996, similar communication was again sent and the petitioner was asked to send her comments, if any, to the Registry within ten days from the receipt of the letter. 3, On 10th September, 1996, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner, inter alia, alleging that vide a confidential letter dated 8th May, 1996 by the Registrar (Vigilance), followed by subsequent reminders, the petitioner was called upon to offer her comments regarding the allegations levelled in a complaint, but there was no response from the petitioner. The matter was considered by the Honble Full Court on 6th September, 1996 and a decision was taken to issue show cause notice to the petitioner as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against her for gross misconduct, disobedience and defiance of the directions issued by the High Court. It was also stated that the petitioner should file her reply within two weeks from the date of receipt of the notice. The matter was directed to be placed before the Full Court on the expiry of the time granted or on receipt of the reply from the petitioner, whichever would be earlier. In case no reply was received within the stipulated time, it was to be presumed that the petitioner had nothing to say and follow up action would be taken. In the notice issued under the signature of Additional Registrar (Administration), the petitioner was asked to file her reply within two weeks from the date of receipt of notice. It was specified that if no reply will be given by the petitioner within the stipulated time of two weeks, it would be presumed that she had nothing to say in the matter. It appears that again a reminder was sent by the Additional Registrar (Administration) on 21st September, 1996. On 4th November, 1996 (Annexure P-4), a Memorandum of Charges was levelled against the petitioner. It appears that again a reminder was sent by the Additional Registrar (Administration) on 21st September, 1996. On 4th November, 1996 (Annexure P-4), a Memorandum of Charges was levelled against the petitioner. It was stated that the High Court had proposed to hold an enquiry against the petitioner under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the Central Rules). The substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour in respect of which the inquiry was proposed to be held was set out in the enclosed Statement of Articles of Charges. A statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour in support of each article of charge was also enclosed. List of documents and a list of witnesses by whom, the articles of charge were proposed to be proved were also enclosed. The petitioner was directed to submit within ten days of the receipt of the memorandum, a written statement of her defence and also to state whether she desired to be heard in person. 4. The Statement of Articles of Charge framed against the petitioner was as under : "Statement of Articles of Charge framed against Ms. Kiran Aggarwal, District and Sessions Judge, Hamirpur (H.R). ARTICLED That the said Ms. Kiran Aggrawal, presently District and Sessions Judge, Hamirpur, while functioning as such during the period May, 1996 onwards> failed to offer her comments on the allegations made against her in a complaint a copy whereof was sent to her by the Registrar (Vigilance) pursuant to the orders dated 7.5.1996 of Honble the Chief Justice along with confidential letter No. HHC/VIG/CM/135/87-1247 dated May 8, 1996 for comments in spite of reminders dated May 22/23rd, 1996, June 13, 1996 and July 25, 1996. AND the said Ms. AND the said Ms. Kiran Aggrawal has thus disobeyed the orders of Honble the Chief Justice by not sending her comments as desired and has also violated the instructions issued by the High Court vide circular letters dated June 14, 1979, March 20, 1984 and July 10, 1984 requiring the Judicial Officers to attend to all communications from the High Court promptly and within the stipulated period and thus has failed to maintain devotion to duty and has therefore acted in a manner unbecoming of a public servant and thereby has committed breach of Rule 3(1) (ii) and (iii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 thereby rendering herself liable for disciplinary action under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. ARTICLE-Il That during the aforesaid period and while functioning in the aforesaid capacity the said Ms. Kiran Aggarwal failed to send two case files out of 22 files of civil appeals in which the judgments and decrees of files in which conciliation efforts were going on as required vide confidential letter No. HHC/VIG/CM/135/87-1359 dated May 25, 1996 addressed to her by the Registrar (Vigilance) pursuant to the orders dated May 23, 1996 of Honble the Chief Justice in spite of reminders dated June 12, 1996 and July 25, 1996. THAT the said Ms. Kiran Aggarwal has thus disobeyed the order of Honble the Chief Justice and has also violated the instructions issued by the High Court vide circular letters dated June 14, 1979, March 20, 1984 and July 10, 198(1 requiring the Judicial Officers to attend to all communications from the High Court promptly and within the stipulated period and thus has failed to maintain devotion to duty and has therefore acted in a manner unbecoming of a public servant and thereby committed breach of the provisions of Rule 13(1 )(ii) and (iii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 thereby rendering herself liable for disciplinary action under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. ARTICLE-llI That during the aforesaid period and while functioning in the aforesaid capacity, the said Ms. Kiran Aggarwal was served with show cause notice dated September 10, 1996 issued by the Additional Registrar (Admn.) pursuant to the Full Court Resolution dated September 6, 1996 whereby she was specifically required to acknowledge the receipt of the show cause notice and to offer her reply to the notice. Kiran Aggarwal was served with show cause notice dated September 10, 1996 issued by the Additional Registrar (Admn.) pursuant to the Full Court Resolution dated September 6, 1996 whereby she was specifically required to acknowledge the receipt of the show cause notice and to offer her reply to the notice. However, she failed to acknowledge the receipt of the show cause notice and also failed to submit her reply to the said notice despite reminder dated September 21, 1996. That the said Ms. Kiran Aggarwal has thus disobeyed the orders of the High Court and has also violated the instructions issued by the High Court vide circular letters dated June 14,1979, March 20, 1984 and July 10, 1984 requiring the Judicial Officers to attend to all communications from the High Court promptly and within the stipulated period and thus has failed to maintain devotion to duty and has therefore acted in a manner unbecoming of a public servant and thereby committed breach of the provisions of Rule 3(1) (ii) and (iii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 thereby rendering herself liable for disciplinary action under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965." 5. By Office Order dated 27th/30th December, 1996, it was decided to hold enquiry against the delinquent officer. Honble Mr. Justice Surinder Sarup was appointed as the Inquiring Authority by Full Court vide its meeting held on 6th September, 1996. Similarly, Mr. J.L. Gupta, Additional District and Sessions Judge (Rules), High Court of Himachal Pradesh was appointed as Presenting Officer and the petitioner was informed about the said orders. 6. In pursuance of the above orders, an enquiry was fixed at Hamirpur, venue: Court of the District and Sessions Judge on March 18y 19 and 20, 1997. Intimation to that effect was also sent to the petitioner vide notice dated 10th March, 1997 issued by Mr. R.K. Sood, Secretary of the Court of Honble Mr. Justice Sarup. The dates were also intimated to the petitioner and she was directed to ensure her presence during the aforesaid period of enquiry. 7. It appears that Honble Mr. Justice Sarup reached Hamirpur ^long with the staff on the evening of 17th March, 1997. It also appears that the petitioner was informed on telephone by Mr. Ashwani Sharma, Reader of the Court of-Honble Mr. 7. It appears that Honble Mr. Justice Sarup reached Hamirpur ^long with the staff on the evening of 17th March, 1997. It also appears that the petitioner was informed on telephone by Mr. Ashwani Sharma, Reader of the Court of-Honble Mr. Justice Sarup at about 8.30 a.m. on 18th March, 1997 from the Circuit House, Hamirpur that enquiry was fixed on that date and the petitioner was requested to present herself before Honble Mr. Justice Sarup at 10.00 a.m. in the retiring room of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hamirpur where Honble Mr. Justice Sarup was present. Honble Mr. justice Sarup waited for the petitioner for half an hour from 10.00 a.m. to 10.30 a.m. Again, a direction was given to Mr. Ashwani Sharma to inform the petitioner to present herself. After some time, however, Mr. Sharma came back and reported that the petitioner had informed him that she would not appear at the enquiry and it was upto the Inquiring Authority whether to proceed ex-parte or issue warrant against her. A note was made to that effect in the record. Honble Mr. Justice Sarup thereafter proceeded to hold enquiry against the petitioner ex parte. 8. Statement of Mr. T.R. Thakur, Additional Registrar (Administration) was recorded ex-parte. The Presenting Officer also produced the relevant documents, which were taken on record. One witness remained to be examined. He was Mr. R.L. Raghu, Registrar (Vigilance), High Court of Himachal Pradesh, who was not summoned to appear before the Inquiring Authority, as he was suffering from slipped disc and was under prolonged medical treatment. Mr. Raghu had resumed duty only on 17th March, 1997 in the High Court. It was, therefore, mentioned in the report that his statement would be recorded at Shimla on the date and time to be fixed by the Inquiring Authority. On 25th March, 1997, the Inquiring Authority resumed ex-parte enquiry against the petitioner and a notice was issued to the petitioner that enquiry would be resumed at 2.00 p.m. in the Chambers of Honble Mr. Justice Sarup on 25th March, 1997. The petitioner, however, did not remain present and statement of Mr. Raghu, Registrar (Vigilance) had been recorded ex-parte. 9. On the basis of the evidence on record, oral as well as documentary, the Inquiring Authority held all the three charges levelled against the petitioner proved. The report is dated 27th March, 1997 (Annexure P/ 3 to the petition). The petitioner, however, did not remain present and statement of Mr. Raghu, Registrar (Vigilance) had been recorded ex-parte. 9. On the basis of the evidence on record, oral as well as documentary, the Inquiring Authority held all the three charges levelled against the petitioner proved. The report is dated 27th March, 1997 (Annexure P/ 3 to the petition). In the final part of the report, the Inquiring Authority observed thus : "For the aforementioned reasons, all the three charges (articles) stand conclusively proved against Ms. Kiran Aggarwal. This is as a result of ex parie departmental enquiry. There is no doubt about the fact that the delinquent officer failed to associate herself with the enquiry, rather as per the written report of the Reader of this Court, who had accompanied the undersigned on tour to Hamirpur to assist in the inquiry, whereby he intimated that not only did he inform the delinquent officer on telephone at 8.30 a.m. on 18th March, 1997 from the Circuit House where the undersigned along with the staff was staying, nor did she come for the hearing despite being personally requested by Mr. Ashwani Sharma, Reader of this Court, who went to her retiring room to request her to join the inquiry proceedings. Rather she gave a very cheeky and saucy answer that it was open to the Inquiring Authority to either proceed against her ex parte or to issue warrants against her. A written report to this effect by the said Mr. Ashwani Sharma also forms part of the enquiry proceedings. This conduct of the delinquent officer smacks of utter insubordination, indiscipline and disobedience." 10. On 4th April, 1997, an order of suspension came to be passed against the petitioner by the Court on administrative side in exercise of powers under sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 of the Central Rules with immediate effect. It was also ordered that during the period of suspension, the headquarter of the petitioner would remain at Hamirpur and the petitioner would not leave the headquarter without obtaining prior permission of the Registrar of the Court. 11. On 5th April, 1997, under the orders of the Honble Chief Justice, Additional Registrar (S) to the Honble Chief Justice reached Hamirpur at 3.20 p.m. for delivering two (confidential) letters to the petitioner. 11. On 5th April, 1997, under the orders of the Honble Chief Justice, Additional Registrar (S) to the Honble Chief Justice reached Hamirpur at 3.20 p.m. for delivering two (confidential) letters to the petitioner. Since the petitioner was busy in her Chamber, the Additional Registrar (S) waited for some time in the room of the Stenographer. When he was called inside the Chamber by the petitioner, he told the petitioner that he had come to deliver official confidential letters addressed to her by the Horible High Court. The officer requested the petitioner to accept the letters, but the petitioner refused to receive and asked the officer to send the letters by post. An order of suspension was then displayed/ affixed by the officer on the Notice Board on that day. On 6th April, 1997, when the officer again went to the Court of District and Sessions Judge, no responsible Officer was found in the Court premises. The officer talked to the Honble Chief Justice on phone in order to take further instructions. The Honble Chief Justice directed him to hand over the letters to Senior Sub Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate for handing over the same to the petitioner next day. Consequently, the second letter regarding notice had been handed over by the Additional Registrar (S) to the Honble Chief Justice to Mr. R.K. Mittal, Chief Judicial Magistrate at 1.20 p.m. on 6th April, 1997. On 6th May, 1997, the petitioner filed an application, inter alia, alleging therein that she had come to know from news item in the "Indian Express" dated 8th April, 1997 that a show cause notice was sent to her against the proposed dismissal from service, but she had not received such notice. A prayer was, therefore, made to deliver the said notice to her at the earliest. Another application was also addressed on 12th May, 1997. A prayer was also made to allow the petitioner to inspect the entire record relating to enquiry, to supply statements of witnesses, documents, order sheets and enquiry report. On 28th May, 1997 (Annexure P-23), a detailed representation was also made by the petitioner praying for dropping of departmental proceedings and to withdraw recommendation for imposition of penalty of dismissal. A prayer was also made to allow the petitioner to inspect the entire record relating to enquiry, to supply statements of witnesses, documents, order sheets and enquiry report. On 28th May, 1997 (Annexure P-23), a detailed representation was also made by the petitioner praying for dropping of departmental proceedings and to withdraw recommendation for imposition of penalty of dismissal. The petitioner was informed vide communication dated 10th June, 1997 by the Additional Registrar (S) vide Annexure P/24 that the said representation was considered by the Full Court and the same had been rejected. On 25th April, 1997, the Full Court decided to recommend the Government to impose penalty of dismissal from service on the petitioner. Accordingly, by an order dated 29th July, 1997 (Annexure P-l), the Governor of Himachal Pradesh acting on the advice of the High Court in exercise of powers vested in him under Rule 17 of the Himachal Pradesh Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as Judicial Service Rules) read with Rule 11 (ix) of the Central Rules dismissed the petitioner from the Himachal Pradesh Higher Judicial Service with immediate effect. The said order is challenged by the petitioner in this petition. 12. We have heard at length Ms. Kiran Aggarwal, party in person, Mr. M.L. Chauhan, learned Deputy Advocate General instructed by Mr. Vivek Thakur, learned Assistant Advocate General for respondents No. 1 and 2, Mr. D.D. Sood, learned Senior Advocate, instructed by Mr. Dushyant Dadhwal for respondents No. 3 and 4 and Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Counsel for respondents No. 5 and 6. 13. The petitioner, party in person, raised several contentions. She submitted that no departmental proceedings ought to have been initiated against her on the basis of an anonymous complaint, which was made to the Honble Chief Justice of this Court. She also urged that the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 1973 were applicable and the proceedings conducted in accordance with the Central Civil Services Rules, 1965 were illegal and unlawful as Central Rules would not apply to Judicial Officers of the State. It was argued that the petitioner had not committed any misconduct and no enquiry could have been ordered against her nor she could have been suspended nor any penalty ought to have been imposed on the basis of so called allegations. It was argued that the petitioner had not committed any misconduct and no enquiry could have been ordered against her nor she could have been suspended nor any penalty ought to have been imposed on the basis of so called allegations. According to the petitioner,, no reasonable opportunity of being heard was afforded by the respondents and the findings arrived at by the Inquiring Authority and conclusions reached are based on no evidence and perverse. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument without admitting it, contended the petitioner, that the so called allegations levelled against her were established, they were of a trivial nature to initiate departmental proceedings. Yet, inquiry was held by the respondents with a view to harass her. It was in mala fide exercise of power by respondents No. 5 and 6 and on that ground also, proceedings were liable to be quashed. It was also contended that a report of the Inquiring Authority was never supplied to her and an order of punishment was .passed, which was illegal, unlawful and violative of natural justice. The petitioner submitted that the£ Inquiring Authority acted against the procedure prescribed by the Rules as also in disregard of justice and fair play. He took into account extraneous and irrelevant matters and relied upon the statements recorded behind the back of the petitioner for which no opportunity was afforded to her. According to the petitioner, all the allegations By the respondents were false, frivolous and concocted. Finally, it was submitted that even if the Court comes to the conclusion that the allegations levelled against the petitioner were held duly proved, quantum of punishment inflicted upon the petitioner is grossly excessive, harsh and disproportionate to the charges established. On that count also, the order deserves to be quashed and set aside. The petitioner, therefore, prayed to allow the petition by quashing the order of dismissal and by granting conseqential benefits. 14. The respondents, on the other hand, supported the order passed against the petitioner. On behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2, it was submitted that the Government was bound to accept the recommendation made by the High Court. On the basis of the recommendation, the impugned order of dismissal (Annexure P-l) was passed by them on 29th July, 1997 and no grievance can be made by the petitioner against the said action of the Government. 15. Mr. On the basis of the recommendation, the impugned order of dismissal (Annexure P-l) was passed by them on 29th July, 1997 and no grievance can be made by the petitioner against the said action of the Government. 15. Mr. Sood, learned Senior Advocate, instructed by Mr. Dushyant Dadhwal, learned Counsel for respondents No. 3 and 4 submitted that the actions taken by respondents No. 3 and 4 were in consonance with law. In exercise of powers under the provisions of the Constitution, as also the relevant rules, departmental proceedings were initiated against the petitioner. After following proper procedure and complying with the principles of natural justice and fair play and after affording full opportunity to the petitioner, enquiry was conducted. At all stages, the petitioner was informed well in advance to attend the enquiry and to make herself available in support of her defence and to cross-examine witnesses. It was the petitioner, who did not remain present and failed to avail an opportunity afforded to her. The Inquiring Authority, in these circumstances, had no option but to proceed against her and accordingly the enquiry was conducted ex parte. If a delinquent does not remain present at the enquiry, she cannot make a complaint that no opportunity was afforded to her. It was incumbent on the petitioner to remain present when she was informed well in advance. As there was failure on her part, she cannot make any grievance against the respondents. It was also submitted by the counsel that the Inquiring Authority considered the materials placed before him and recorded findings. Those findings are findings of fact. Such findings cannot be termed perverse. This Court, submitted the counsel, is not exercising appellate jurisdiction. Judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution is limited to seeing whether the procedure adopted by the authority was contrary to law or otherwise objectionable or principles of natural justice were not observed. Since there is nothing to show that any illegality had been committed by the respondents, the impugned action does not call for interference. Regarding supply of Inquiring Authoritys report, it was submitted that the report was duly sent by the respondents to the delinquent. She, however, refused to accept the said report. It, therefore, cannot be contended that the report was not supplied to her before the impugned action was taken. Regarding supply of Inquiring Authoritys report, it was submitted that the report was duly sent by the respondents to the delinquent. She, however, refused to accept the said report. It, therefore, cannot be contended that the report was not supplied to her before the impugned action was taken. It was also urged by the learned Counsel that the allegations levelled against the petitioner were duly established and it was not a case of false or frivolous involvement of the petitioner nor there was mala fide or colourable exercise of power. , Regarding punishment of dismissal, the counsel submitted that an important fact requires to be remembered is that the petitioner was holding a responsible judicial post in Higher Judicial Service. As District and Sessions Judge, it was expected of her to act with discipline and when the allegations were duly proved on the basis of evidence and materials on record and punishment was imposed on the petitioner, this Court will not substitute punishment by interfering with the order of the respondents. 16. Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Counsel for respondents No. 5 and 6 supported Mr. D.D. Sood. He further contended that bald and vague allegations have been levelled against respondents No. 5 and 6 without placing evidence or materials on record. It was contended by Mr. Sood that respondents No. 5 and 6 had no axe to grind against the petitioner and they had acted in official capacity, and they should not have been joined as parties nor allegations should have been levelled against them. He, therefore, submitted that no case has been made out by the petitioner against those respondents. 17. On all the grounds, the counsel submitted that petitioner had not made out a case to interfere with the action taken by the respondents and the petition is liable to be dismissed. 18. Coming to the pleadings, in a lengthy petition running into more than 100 paragraphs, the petitioner has contended that though her performance as a Judicial Officer was excellent, with a view to harass her, departmental proceedings were initiated without there being any reason. It was also stated that before taking impugned action, she was not afforded reasonable opportunity of being heard and principles of natural justice were violated. The witnesses were examined by the Inquiring Authority in her absence and a copy of the report of the Inquiring Authority was also not supplied. It was also stated that before taking impugned action, she was not afforded reasonable opportunity of being heard and principles of natural justice were violated. The witnesses were examined by the Inquiring Authority in her absence and a copy of the report of the Inquiring Authority was also not supplied. Procedure followed under the Central Rules was illegal and it had caused prejudice to her. The allegations levelled were false and frivolous and no notice could have been taken on the basis of anonymous complaint filed against her. She had also denied having received various communications. According to her, statement of Mr. Raghu, the then Registrar (Vigilance), dated 25 March, 1997, could not have been considered by the Inquiring Authority as the same was recorded at Shimla after the enquiry was concluded. The petitioner had stated that instead of protecting a Judicial Officer, the respondents had initiated inquiry against her, placed her under suspension, held her guilty and dismissed from service. All those actions were illegal and unlawful. It was, therefore, prayed in the petition that the penalty imposed on her be quashed and set aside by granting all consequential benefits. 19. A detailed reply is filed by respondents No. 3 and 4 controverting averments made and allegations levelled against them. It was stated that every Judicial Officer is expected to work honestly, sincerely and diligently According to them, anonymous complaint dated 7th May, 1996 was received, but it was not the foundation of the enquiry instituted against her. Articles of charges were levelled against the petitioner and as the petitioner did not respond to them, a decision was taken to hold departmental enquiry by the Full Court. It was also stated that the petitioner had taken inconsistent pleas regarding applicability or otherwise of the Central Rules to the enquiry proceedings. At one stage, she had contended that Central Rules were*not applicable and ought not to have been invoked. On the other hand, relying on those Rules, contentions were raised that the procedure laid down therein had not been followed. In any case, contended the respondents, explanation of the petitioner was sought, opportunity to defend was afforded but it was the petitioner, who did not respond to the show cause notices, failed to put forward her defence and the Inquiring Authority was constrained to proceed with the enquiry ex parte. By doing so, the respondents had not committed any illegality. In any case, contended the respondents, explanation of the petitioner was sought, opportunity to defend was afforded but it was the petitioner, who did not respond to the show cause notices, failed to put forward her defence and the Inquiring Authority was constrained to proceed with the enquiry ex parte. By doing so, the respondents had not committed any illegality. It was also stated that the report of the Inquiring Authority was sought to be served upon the petitioner, but it was the petitioner, who had not accepted the same. Hence, it was not open to her to contend that she had not received the report. The report of the Inquiring Authority was placed before the Full Court and the Full Court, after considering the matter in its entirety, was of the opinion that the allegations levelled against the petitioner were established and it was a fit case to order punishment of dismissal of the petitioner from service and accordingly a decision had been arrived at and recommendation had been made to the Government. 20. Respondents No. 5 and 6 had filed separate affidavits refuting the allegations of mala fide and/or personal ill will against the petitioner. They have stated that all actions were taken by them as officers of the Court in accordance with law on the basis of directions issued by respondents No. 3 and 4 and the petitioner could not have made grievance against them. 21. A rejoinder is filed by the petitioner denying and controverting averments made and contentions raised by the respondents in their affidavits and reiterating what she had stated in the petition. 22. At the hearing, the petitioner contended that no enquiry could have been initiated against her on the basis of anonymous complaint made to the Honble Chief Justice. 21. A rejoinder is filed by the petitioner denying and controverting averments made and contentions raised by the respondents in their affidavits and reiterating what she had stated in the petition. 22. At the hearing, the petitioner contended that no enquiry could have been initiated against her on the basis of anonymous complaint made to the Honble Chief Justice. In this connection, our attention was invited to a Circular dated 16th January, 1984, the relevant part of the said circular reads as under : "When any complaint is received from a litigant or any citizen against any staff member or in regard to the working of court or any other complaint of such or similar nature j relating to the court is received from any person or when the High Court upon receipt of such a complaint directs an Inquiry to be made, the complainant should as far as practicable be called in person and his statement recorded in order to ascertain truth.” 23. It is not in dispute that in the instant case, an anonymous complaint, dated 7th May, 1996 was received by the office of the Honble Chief Justice. Reading the reply of respondents No. 3 and 4, however, it is clear that proceedings were initiated against the petitioner, as she failed to respond to the notices issued to her. In spite of opportunities being extended, she did not co-operate with the enquiry and hence enquiry was conducted ex parte and the action was taken. A complaint was sent to the petitioner for her comments. She could have offered her comments in respect of the allegations levelled therein. The petitioner, however, refused even to acknowledge the communications addressed to her. She, therefore, cannot contend on the basis of the Circular that the action was bad. 24. In our opinion, bald assertions made by the petitioner that no enquiry could have been initiated against her has no force. It is true as observed by the Honble Supreme Court in Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana and another, AIR 1988 SC 1395, that it is the duty of the High Court on one hand to control subordinate judiciary and on the other, it was a constitutional obligation of the Court as the Apex Court of the State to guide and protect its judicial officers. It is also true that honest and strict judicial officer is likely to have adversaries in the mofussil courts. If complaints are entertained on trifling matters, no judicial officer would feel safe and it would be difficult for him to discharge his duties in an honest and independent manner. If judicial officers are under constant threat of complaint and enquiry and if High Court encourages anonymous complaints to hold the field, the subordinate judiciary will not be able to administer justice independently. It is, therefore, imperative that the High Court should take steps to protect its honest officers by ignoring ill conceived or motivated complaints made by unscrupulous lawyers and litigants. 25. The Court in that case was satisfied having regard to the facts and circumstances that the Resolution passed by the Bar Association against the appellant was wholly unjustified and the complaint motivated. All that was said against the appellant was that he acted improperly in granting adjournments. In the light of the facts before their Lordships, the Supreme Court held that enquiry was initiated, report submitted and punishment imposed on the appellant were unwarranted and the dismissal ordered against the appellant liable to be quashed. 26. In the instant case, as submitted by the respondents, show cause notice was issued to the petitioner and the petitioner was called upon to explain what she had to say about the allegations levelled against her. She, however, failed to do so. Several reminders were sent to her, but of no avail. Departmental enquiry was, therefore, initiated against her, but she did not co-operate and remained absent at the time of enquiry. In the light of all these circumstances, it cannot be said that the actions taken against the petitioner were uncalled for. In our considered opinion, the petitioner cannot seek protection of the Circular referred to above or the "decision in Ishwar Chand Jain, The said contention, therefore, has no force and must be negatived. 27. It was then contended by her that the enquiry ought to have been conducted in accordance with the Judicial Service Rules and not in accordance with the Central Rules. It was submitted that Judicial Service Rules are meant for Judicial Officers. They are special rules and/hence, those rules are not the general rules. 27. It was then contended by her that the enquiry ought to have been conducted in accordance with the Judicial Service Rules and not in accordance with the Central Rules. It was submitted that Judicial Service Rules are meant for Judicial Officers. They are special rules and/hence, those rules are not the general rules. Moreover, nothing has been shown by the respondents as to when Central Rules were adopted and made applicable to Judicial Officers of the State and under what provisions. The enquiry conducted under the Central Rules was, hence, without power, authority or jurisdiction of the respondents and the conclusions arrived at and punishment imposed were vitiated. 28. In our opinion, even this contention has no force. As early as in November, 1996, a notice was issued to the petitioner under the Central Rules, but the petitioner did not reply. The petitioner also remained absent at the enquiry and did not participate in the proceedings. It is now not open to the petitioner to raise a contention that the enquiry had not been conducted in accordance with the Judicial Service Rules. That apart, the contention is too general and vague in nature. Ordinarily, in such matters, prejudice caused to the delinquent officer has to be kept in mind by the Court. In the case on hand, nothing has been shown how the petitioner was prejudiced. As already stated earlier, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner and allegations were levelled against her. She, however, did not respond to the charge sheet. Reminders were also sent to her, but the petitioner failed to put forward her defence. When the enquiry was to be conducted, the petitioner was informed well in advance that the Inquiring Authority will hold inquiry on 18th, 19th and 20th March, 1997 at Hamirpur, but the petitioner failed to attend the enquiry. On 17th March, 1997, the Inquiring Authority reached Hamirpur and started enquiry on 18th March, 1997. Even on 18th March, 1997, the petitioner was intimated, but she did not attend the inquiry. In these circumstances, in our opinion, it is too late to contend that enquiry could not have been held by the respondents under the Central Rules, but only under the Judicial Service Rules. Whether or not in a given set of circumstances, prejudice has been caused to the delinquent officer depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. In these circumstances, in our opinion, it is too late to contend that enquiry could not have been held by the respondents under the Central Rules, but only under the Judicial Service Rules. Whether or not in a given set of circumstances, prejudice has been caused to the delinquent officer depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. As in the instant case, nothing has been shown by the petitioner and no material has been placed on record regarding prejudice, the cotenetion cannot be upheld. 29. It was also argued that the respondents have committed an error of law and of jurisdiction in holding that there was misconduct on the part of the petitioner. Now, articles of charge framed against the petitioner have already been extracted hereinabove. It was, inter alia, alleged that while functioning as District and Sessions Judge, Hamirpur from May, 1996 onwards, the petitioner failed to offer her comments on the allegations made against her in a complaint, copy of which was sent to her; that she disobeyed the orders passed by the Honble Chief Justice and violated the instructions issued by the High Court vide its circulars referred to therein, and thereby she acted in a manner unbecoming of a public servant and that she was served with show cause notice and was specifically required to acknowledge the receipt of show cause notice and to offer her reply, but she failed to acknowledge the notice and also failed to submit the reply. 30. The argument of the petitioner is that none of the above charges can be said to be "misconduct" within the meaning of Judicial Service Rules and no enquiry could have been initiated and no punishment could have been imposed on her. The attention of the Court, for the above submission, was invited to a decision in A.L. Kalra v. The Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd., AIR 1984 SC 1361. Holding two expressions absolute integrity and, do nothing which is unbecoming of a public servant in a public sector company by its employees to be vague and of general nature, the Supreme Court held that what is unbecoming of a Government servant may vary with individuals and expose employees to vagaries of subjective evaluation. Holding two expressions absolute integrity and, do nothing which is unbecoming of a public servant in a public sector company by its employees to be vague and of general nature, the Supreme Court held that what is unbecoming of a Government servant may vary with individuals and expose employees to vagaries of subjective evaluation. What in a given context would constitute conduct unbecoming of a public servant to be treated as misconduct would expose a grey area not amenable to objective evaluation. It was also indicated by the Apex Court that failure to keep high standard of moral, ethical or decorous behaviour befitting an officer of the Company by itself cannot constitute misconduct unless the specific conduct falls in any of the misconduct, specifically enumerated in the conduct and discipline rules. 31. In A.L. Kalra, an employee of a Public Sector Corporation was charged of not refunding the advance taken for house building within the time stipulated under the Rules and for the utilisation of the said amount for other purpose. He was dismissed from service. According to the Supreme Court, there was no ground for initiating disciplinary enquiry as the breach of the Rules did not constitute misconduct. The order of punishment passed against him was, hence, set aside. The Court stated in paragraph 22 thus: "Rule 4 bears the hearing General. Rule 5 bears the heading misconduct. The draftsmen of the 1975 Rules made a clear distinction about what would constitute certain decent behaviour in respect of employees keeping in view Corporation culture may be a moral or ethical expectation. Failure to keep to such high standard of moral, ethical or decorous behaviour befitting an officer of the company by itself cannot constitute misconduct unless the specific conduct falls in any of the enumerated misconduct in Rule 5. Any attempt to telescope Rule 4 into Rule 5 must be looked upon with apprehension because Rule 4 is vague and of a general nature and what is unbecoming of a public servant may vary with individuals and expose employees to vagaries of subjective evaluation. What in a given context would constitute conduct unbecoming of a public servant to be treated as misconduct would expose a grey area not amenable to objective evaluation. What in a given context would constitute conduct unbecoming of a public servant to be treated as misconduct would expose a grey area not amenable to objective evaluation. Where misconduct when proved entails penal consequences, it is obligatory 6n the employer to specify and if necessary define it with precision and accuracy so that any ex post facto interpretation of some incident may not be camouflaged as misconduct.... In Rule 5, it is nowhere stated j/hat anything violative of Rule 4 would be per se a misconduct in any of the sub-clauses of Rule 5 which specifies misconduct. It would therefore appear that even if .the facts alleged in the two heads of charges are accepted as wholly proved, yet that would not constitute misconduct as prescribed in Rule 5 and no penalty can be imposed for such conduct. It may as well be mentioned that Rule 25 which prescribes penalties specifically provides that any of the penalties therein mentioned can be imposed on an employee for misconduct committed by him. Rule 4 does not specify a misconduct." 32. Though the Court observed that the conduct of the employee was not in consonance with corporate culture and a highly placed officer ought to have acted with the spirit of the regulations both for house building advance and conveyance advance, which were devised to help the employees, "there has been lapse in totally complying with these regulations by the appellant though it neither constitutes misconduct to attract a penalty nor substantially good enough for initiation of disciplinary inquiry." The delinquent was, therefore, ordered to be reinstated with 50% back wages. 33. The argument of the petitioner is that none of the charges levelled against her would amount to misconduct under the Rules and the ratio laid down in A.L. Kalra would apply to her case. No proceedings, hence, could have been initiated and she could not have been punished. 34. In our opinion, the contention has no force. If a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner calling upon her to explain as to what she had to say about the allegations levelled, it was incumbent on her part to submit her reply and to put forward her case in defence. It was also obligatory on her to acknowledge a receipt to the show cause notice issued to her. It was also obligatory on her to acknowledge a receipt to the show cause notice issued to her. By disobeying directions of the High Court and in not complying with the communications, she made herself liable to departmental proceedings and by holding inquiry, the respondents have not committed any illegality nor have acted contrary to law. 35. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and others, (1995) 6 SCC 749, an employee was found to be in possession of assets disproportionate to the known sources of his income. On the basis of the materials available, the charge was proved. Holding it to be misconduct, the delinquent was dismissed. When the matter reached before the Supreme Court, it was contended by the delinquent that the charge levelled against him regarding possession bi assets disproportionate to the known source of his income was not included in the definition of misconduct within the meaning of the Rules and hence, no proceedings could have been initiated. Reliance was placed on A.L. Kalra. 36. Distinguishing A.L. Kalra and holding the delinquent liable, the Court observed that A.L. Kalra had no application to the facts of the case. In that case specific misconduct was defined. General norm of behaviour and omission to return advance amount were not included in the Rules, which would constitute misconduct. But a public servant in possession of assets disproportionate to his known sources of income, which he had not satisfactorily accounted for would amount to misconduct amenable to disciplinary action under the Rules. It was, therefore, held that initiation of proceedings was within the jurisdiction and the action was well founded. 37. The respondents also sought support from a decision of the Supreme Court in Secretary to Government and others v. ACJ Britto, (1997) 3 SCC 387. In that case, an order passed by superior officers to appear before medical examination was disobeyed by a Sub Inspector of Police. The Sub Inspector proceeded on casual leave and got it extended continuously. After about five months of his over stay, when the Superintendent of Police directed him to appear before the medical authority for examination of his fitness to return duty, the Sub Inspector did not comply with. The Sub Inspector proceeded on casual leave and got it extended continuously. After about five months of his over stay, when the Superintendent of Police directed him to appear before the medical authority for examination of his fitness to return duty, the Sub Inspector did not comply with. The omission on the part of the Sub Inspector even though not specified by any rule to be an act of misconduct was held to be act of indiscipline, which was sufficient for holding departmental enquiry. The Court also observed that the decision in A.L. Kalra would not apply to the case. 38. Reference was made by the petitioner to R.C. Sood v. High Court of Rajasthan, (1994) Supp 3 SCC 711 (RC Sood I). Dealing with a case of a member of Higher Judicial Service in the State of Rajasthan, the Supreme Court observed that entrustment of the control of the subordinate judiciary to the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution is intended to ensure independence and protection of Judicial Officers from executive interference. It was also posited by the Supreme Court that fairness and non-arbitrariness are essential requirements of every administrative action. It is more so in case of administrative act of Judges. The Court uttered a word of caution: "It is necessary that members of the subordinate judiciary get no occasion to think otherwise." 39. In our opinion, the ratio laid down in RC Sood (I) has no application to the facts of the case. Similarly, R.C. Sood v. High Court of Judicature at Rajasthan and others, (1998) 5 SCC 493 (RC Sood II) is also not relevant. 40. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the contention raised by the petitioner that no proceedings could have been initiated agaisnt her is ill founded and deserves to be rejected. 41. So far as allegations of mala fide are concerned, we see no substance therein. Apart from the allegations being vague and general in nature based on misconception on the part of the petitioner, no materials, much less sufficient materials, have been placed on record. They have been specifically and emphatically controverted by respondents No. 5 and 6 by filing counter affidavits. It is settled law that burden of proving mala fide is on the person making the allegation and burden is very heavy. 42. They have been specifically and emphatically controverted by respondents No. 5 and 6 by filing counter affidavits. It is settled law that burden of proving mala fide is on the person making the allegation and burden is very heavy. 42. In E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and another, AIR 1974 SC 555, the Supreme Court observed : ".....We must not also overlook that the burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. The allegations of mala fides are often more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility." 43. It has to be kept in mind that such a charge can be made without sense of responsibility. It is, therefore, necessary for the Court to examine such charge with utmost care, attention and circumspection. The allegation of mala fide is more easily made then made out. "It is the last refuge of a losing litigant" (Vide : Gulam Mustafa and others v. The State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 1977 SC 448). 44. We are not impressed that the proceedings had been initiated against the petitioner at the instance of respondents No. 5 and 6 and the enquiry was vitiated by mala fide or colourable exercise of power. It is too much to hold that respondents No. 5 and 6 would influence the Honble Chief Justice of this Court to take departmental proceedings and to all the Judges of this Court to punish and penalise a judicial officer of the State. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the contention as without substance. 45. It was also submitted by the petitioner that a copy of the report of the Inquiring Authority was not supplied to her and on that ground also, the proceedings were vitiated and the order of punishment is liable to be set aside. Now, in the affidavit-in-reply filed by respondents No. 3 and 4, it was stated that after the enquiry was over, the Inquiring Authority submitted the report. It was considered by the Full Court. A show cause notice was sent to the petitioner along with the report of the Inquiring Authority. The petitioner, however, did not accept it. It was also stated that the inquiry report was sent to the petitioner both in person as well as by post, but she declined to receive the same. It was considered by the Full Court. A show cause notice was sent to the petitioner along with the report of the Inquiring Authority. The petitioner, however, did not accept it. It was also stated that the inquiry report was sent to the petitioner both in person as well as by post, but she declined to receive the same. It was further stated that the petitioner was aware at the time when Mr. Attri was in Hamirpur that he had been specially deputed by this Court to deliver to the petitioner the report of the Inquiring Authority but she was non-co-operative and avoided acceptance of the report. 46. In our opinion, the contention raised by the petitioner that there was failure on the part of the respondents in serving the report of the Inquiring Authority is not correct. In our judgment, the respondents were right in stating that it was the petitioner who had refused to associate with the enquiry and to accept the report. The petitioner, hence, cannot make a ^grievance of non receipt of the report of the Inquiring Authority. As we are negativing the contention of the petitioner, it is not necessary to enter into larger question about the effect of non-supply of the Inquiry Report to the delinquent. 47. The last submission relates to quantum of punishment. It was argued by the petitioner that even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that departmental enquiry instituted against her was legal and valid and principles of natural justice were also observed in the conduct of the enquiry, wherein she was found guilty, the punishment imposed on her is grossly disproportionate, excessively high and totally unwarranted. It is also arbitrary inasmuch as no reasonable man in the facts and circumstances of the case, taking into consideration the allegations levelled and proved against the petitioner, would pass an order of dismissal against her. 48. The respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the petitioner was a judicial officer working in Higher Judicial Service and was one of the senior most Judicial Officers. It was, therefore, expected of such high ranking Officer in Higher Judicial Service to act sincerely and in a disciplined manner. 48. The respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the petitioner was a judicial officer working in Higher Judicial Service and was one of the senior most Judicial Officers. It was, therefore, expected of such high ranking Officer in Higher Judicial Service to act sincerely and in a disciplined manner. If such Officers act in disregard of the directions issued by the apex Court of the State and neglect, overlook and ignore the highest Court, it would be impossible for the High Court to exercise effective control over subordinate judiciary, which would be destructive of the object underlying Article 235 of the Constitution. It was, therefore, submitted that considering the facts and attending circumstances, the action does not call for interference, 49. Having heard the rival contentions of the parties, in our considered opinion, on the last count (re-quantum of punishment), the submission of the petitioner deserves to be upheld. Let us consider articles of charge levelled against the petitioner. It was firstly alleged that the delinquent officer while functioning as the District and Sessions Judge failed to offer her comments on the allegations made against her in a complaint. The second charge related to failure on the part of the petitioner in sending two case files out of 22 files of Civil Appeals in which conciliation efforts were going on and, hence, they were required in pursuance of an order passed by the Honble Chief Justice on 23rd May, 1996 and in spite of reminders dated 12th June, 1996 and 25th July, 1996, they were not sent. By the said Act, the petitioner disobyed the order of the Honble Chief Justice. The third charge was that while functioning as District and Sessions Judge, she was served with a show cause notice dated 10th September, 1996, whereby she was specifically required to acknowledge the receipt of the notice and to offer her reply, but she failed to acknowledge the receipt of the show cause notice and also failed to submit reply. In our considered opinion, the allegations levelled against the petitioner were not so serious, which would result in imposition of extreme penalty of dismissal. 50. In this connection, both the sides referred to several decisions of the Honble Supreme Court. In our considered opinion, the allegations levelled against the petitioner were not so serious, which would result in imposition of extreme penalty of dismissal. 50. In this connection, both the sides referred to several decisions of the Honble Supreme Court. We are mindful that ordinarily, it is the disciplinary authority which would consider the question and keeping in mind the misconduct proved against the delinquent, would impose appropriate punishment proportionate to the charges levelled and held proved against the officer. It is also equally well settled that normally in exercise of power of judicial review under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, the High Court will not substitute its opinion for the opinion of the disciplinary authority and would not interfere with it. At the same time, it is well established that punishment imposed on a delinquent officer on charges levelled and established must be proper, reasonable and commensurate with the charge and should not be grossly disproportionate, excessively high or unreasonable. 51. In Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India and others, AIR 1987 SC 2386, after following the principles laid down by Lord Deplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, (1984) 3 All ER 935, the Supreme Court observed : “.....The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court Martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise/within the exclusive province of the Court-Martial, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are rec -ognised grounds of judicial review." 52. In Ex. Naik Sardar Singh v. Union of India and others, AIR 1992 SC 417, the Court reiterated that it was firmly of the view that there should not be arbitrariness in awarding punishment on a delinquent. If it is severe, the order would be vulnerable. 53. Irrationality and perversity are rec -ognised grounds of judicial review." 52. In Ex. Naik Sardar Singh v. Union of India and others, AIR 1992 SC 417, the Court reiterated that it was firmly of the view that there should not be arbitrariness in awarding punishment on a delinquent. If it is severe, the order would be vulnerable. 53. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, AIR 1983 SC 454, a forest guard was held guilty for negligence in performance of his duty, resulting into illegal cutting of seven trees. A penalty of removal was imposed on him. The Supreme Court while interfering with the order of punishment observed that the penalty imposed must be commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct and if the penalty is disproportionate, it would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 53. In our judgment, considering the allegations levelled against the petitioner and the charges proved, the punishment of dismissal imposed on her cannot be said to be commensurate with the charges. 54. The question then is as to what should be the final order. In our opinion, the law on the point is clear and it is this: Firstly, as a general rule, the High Court, while exercising extra-ordinary or supervisory powers under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, will not interfere with an order of punishment. This is, however, subject to the rider that penalty imposed on the delinquent officer is neither grossly disproportionate nor excessively high. Secondly, where the court is satisfied that the punishment imposed on the delinquent officer is excessive, unreasonable, arbitrary or disproportionate to the charges levelled and proved, normally the High Court will not substitute an order of penalty by reducing punishment imposed on the delinquent officer. In such cases, the Court may interfere with the order of penalty by allowing the disciplinary authority to reconsider the matter and to award appropriate punishment in accordance with law. Thirdly, in very exceptional and rare cases, the High Court may set aside the order of punishment and to cut short further litigation, substitute sentence impose*} on the delinquent. 55. In such cases, the Court may interfere with the order of penalty by allowing the disciplinary authority to reconsider the matter and to award appropriate punishment in accordance with law. Thirdly, in very exceptional and rare cases, the High Court may set aside the order of punishment and to cut short further litigation, substitute sentence impose*} on the delinquent. 55. In B.C. Chaturvedi, after referring several authorities on the point, the majority observed : "A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/ Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself/in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof." 56. No doubt, the petitioner pressed in service the observations of Hansaria, J. In concurring judgment, it has been indicated that even though there is no provision parallel to Article 142 enabling the High Courts to pass appropriate order, they can do so to do complete justice between the parties and relief can be moulded in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. Absence of provision similar to Article 142 of the Constitution is immaterial. In the opinion of his Lordship, Article 21 gets attracted in such cases and if the punishment or penalty awarded on a deliqunent officer is found unreasonable by the High Court, such order would be violative of Article 14 and in appropriate cases, the High Court can substitute an order of punishment. 57. In the opinion of his Lordship, Article 21 gets attracted in such cases and if the punishment or penalty awarded on a deliqunent officer is found unreasonable by the High Court, such order would be violative of Article 14 and in appropriate cases, the High Court can substitute an order of punishment. 57. In our considered opinion, when the majority has held that normally when the High Court quashes the order of punishment on the ground that it is excessive, disproportionate or unreasonable, it would stop by quashing and setting aside the order by permitting the disciplinary authority to reconsider the matter and to pass appropriate order, it would be appropriate on our part to follow the wiser path, particularly when the Disciplinary Authority is the Apex Court of the State (Administrative side). We are, therefore, of the opinion that though the order of dismissal passed against the petitioner deserves interference and is, therefore, set aside and the matter is sent back to the disciplinary authority, so as to enable it to pass an appropriate order of punishment in accordance with law in the light of observations made hereinabove. 58. For the reasons aforesaid, the petition deserves to be partly allowed. The enquiry initiated against the petitioner is held to be legal, valid and in accordance with law, so also the findings arrived at by the Inquiring Authority do not call for any interference and the charges levelled against the petitioner are held proved, but an order of penalty of dismissal passed against the petitioner is disproportionate, excessively high and unreasonable. The order of penalty is, therefore, set aside and the matter is sent back to the Disciplinary Authority for reconsideration and to take appropriate decision in accordance with law in the light of the decisions of the Honble Supreme Court, as also the observations made in the earlier part of the judgment. The petition is accordingly partly allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.-