KUMAR RAJARATNAM, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal against acquittal preferred by the state. ( 2 ) THE state being aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal recorded by the i additional sessions judge, gulbarga, passed in S. C. No. 32 of 1992, dated 7-2-1995 in acquitting the accused respondents for offences under sections 498-a and 307 of the ipc, has preferred this appeal against acquittal. ( 3 ) THIS is a case of the husband pouring kerosene on his wife and setting fire to his wife, aided and abetted by the mother of the accused a-2. ( 4 ) THE prosecution case enforce in the evidence of P. W. 7-wife. She stated that a- l was her husband and a-2 was her mother-in-law. Her father was no more. Her marriage to a-l took place on 8-5-1990. P. w. 7, the wife was living with the accused after the marriage. About 5 months after the marriage, a-l demanded the P. W. 7 should bring Rs. 2,000/- from her mother for opening a pan beeda shop. The said money was given to a-l. ( 5 ) FOR two months after the money was given, the life was smooth for P. W. 7. After that a-l demanded a further sum of Rs. 2,000/ -. P. w. 7 however, stated to a-l that her parents were poor and were not able to pay any more money. She even went and told her parents. However, parents sent P. W. 7 back to her husband's house. Within four days after returning to the house of a-l, a-l again started harassing P. W. 7. On the date of occurence the sisters of P. W. 7, P. W. 8 and c. w. 3 came to see P. W. 7. But P. W. 7 was carrying three months pregnant. The sisters of P. W. 7 brought food to P. W. 7 out of affection. P. ws. 7, 8, a2-mother-in-law all ate together. After the meal the sisters, P. W. 8 and c. w. 3 left the house at about 5-30 p. m. the sisters were sent off by P. W. 7. They returned suddenly. A-l wanted to stay them for the night. They all had dinner together. After dinner P. W. 7 alone was sleeping inside the house. P. w. 7's sisters and a2-mother-in-law were sleeping in the front portion of the house. They returned suddenly. A-l wanted to stay them for the night. They all had dinner together. After dinner P. W. 7 alone was sleeping inside the house. P. w. 7's sisters and a2-mother-in-law were sleeping in the front portion of the house. ( 6 ) A-L returned to the house at about 9 p. m. P. W. 7 served food to a-l. He again demanded a sum of Rs. 2,000/ -. Without completing his meal a-l left the house. A-l returned to the house at about midnight and he came inside the room where P. W. 7 was sleeping and bolted the door from inside. A-l tied the legs of P. W. 7. When P. W. 7 was shouting for help, a-l gagged the mouth of P. W. 7 and sprinkled some kerosene on P. W. 7 and set fire to P. W. 7. ( 7 ) ONE ghouse sab, P. W. 1 who rescued P. W. 7 did not support the prosecution. After that al-husband, a2-mother-in-law and others took P. W. 7 to the hospital. ( 8 ) P. W. 3-doctor examined P. W. 7 at about 5 p. m. P. W. 7 mentioned to the doctor, P. W. 3 that she was set on fire by her husband shivaji on the previous night. P. w. 3-doctor stated that when P. W. 7 was admitted she was conscious. Ex, p. 3 is the wound certificate. P. w. 3 stated that there were burn marks on P. W. 7 in front of the abdomen, both legs and on medial aspect of both the arms. He also stated that P. W. 7 had 50% burns on her limbs. P. w. 7 sent a memo ex. P. 4 to the brahampur police station. It would not be out of place to mention even in exhibit p. 4 the doctor has stated that P. W. 7 was set on fire by a-l. ( 9 ) P. W. 10 was the woman police at brahampur police station of gulbarga town. She received ex. P. 4 from the doctor and she went to the hospital and she recorded the statement of P. W. 7. The statement of P. W. 7 which is the complaint in this case is marked as ex. P. 8. P. w. 10 returned to the police station and registered a crime under sections 498-a and 307 of the IPC. P. 4 from the doctor and she went to the hospital and she recorded the statement of P. W. 7. The statement of P. W. 7 which is the complaint in this case is marked as ex. P. 8. P. w. 10 returned to the police station and registered a crime under sections 498-a and 307 of the IPC. ( 10 ) P. W. 11 is the investigating officer. He seized the kerosene tin with some kerosene, m. o. 1. He examined the witnesses and handed over for further investigation to P. W. 9. P. w. 9 completed the investigation and placed the charge-sheet against the accused. ( 11 ) P. W. 8 is the sister of P. W. 7. She came to stay for the night in the house of the accused at the request of a-l. She corroborates P. W. 7's evidence. She states that she heard a shout. She had a quarrel with P. W. 7 and a-l. A little later P. W. 7 crying. She peeped through the window and saw P. W. 7 on fire. She cried for help and a neighbour came and the fire was put off. P. w. 8 farther states that a cart was brought and P. W. 7 was taken to shahabad railway station and by train to gulbarga and she was admitted in the gulbarga hospital. ( 12 ) IT is not necessary to deal with the evidence of other witnesses. It is sufficient for the purpose of this appeal to concentrate on the evidence of P. W. 7. P. w. 7 at the earliest opportunity has mentioned the name of a-l. Ex. P. 4 is the memo sent by the doctor to the police. Ex. P. 8 is the complaint recorded by the police from P. W. 7. Exs. P. 4 and p. 8 complement each other. Apart from this, we have the testimony of the victim herself, P. W. 7 in court. P. w. 7 in her testimony has clearly stated that the accused came at midnight and P. W. 7 served food to the accused and there was some problem between the accused and P. W. 7. Consequently, in a rage the accused poured kerosene on P. W. 7 and set fire to her. P. w. 7 in her testimony has clearly stated that the accused came at midnight and P. W. 7 served food to the accused and there was some problem between the accused and P. W. 7. Consequently, in a rage the accused poured kerosene on P. W. 7 and set fire to her. ( 13 ) WE are not able to comprehend how the trial court acquitted a-l in the light of the over whelming evidence against a-l. No doubt there were some embellishment in the evidence of P. W. 8, the sister of P. W. 7. 13-A. The Supreme Court has cautioned the lower courts from getting carried away of small embellishments of witnesses and acquitting the accused even if there is a ring of truth in their evidence. ( 14 ) WE realise that this is an appeal against acquittal and this court will not interfere with an order of acquittal unless for compelling reasons. ( 15 ) THE division bench of this court in criminal appeal No. 584 of 1994, dd: 14-11-1997 briefly culled out the ground for interference in an appeal against acquittal. This court held as follows:"64. We are deeply conscious that we are dealing with an appeal against acquittal and that if two views are possible the benefit of doubt must go to the accused. Equally, there is no immunity to an erroneous order on scrutiny. Supreme court in a number of pronouncements has used expressions, such as "substantial and compelling reasons" and "strong reasons" before an appeal against acquittal can be allowed. At this stage, we may refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in state of Uttar Pradesh v krishna gopal and another , which has dealt with the vexed questions of the power of the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. M. n. venkatachaliah, j. (as he then was), speaking for the bench, held at paragraph 13 as follows. "13. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be convicted of an offence which is not established by the evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Though this standard is a higher standard, there is, however, no absolute standard. What degree of probability amounts to proof is an exercise particular to each case. . . . . . A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be convicted of an offence which is not established by the evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Though this standard is a higher standard, there is, however, no absolute standard. What degree of probability amounts to proof is an exercise particular to each case. . . . . . . doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an over-emotional response. Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused person arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt; but a fair doubt based upon reason and commonsense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it, cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be mathematically enumerated as to how many of such units constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is an unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation of the degrees of probability and the quantum of proof. Forensic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on a robust commonsense and ultimately, on the trained intuitions of the judge". (emphasis supplied) ( 16 ) HAVING regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we have no hesitation to hold that the judgment of the trial court is palpably erroneous and contrary to law. ( 17 ) WE accordingly allow the appeal and convict a-l for offences under sections 498-a and 307 of the IPC. ( 18 ) AS fairly submitted by Mr. Mohan shanthana gouder, the learned state public prosecutor that there are no convincing reasons to set aside the acquittal of a-2. ( 19 ) WE also find that no case is made out on the materials placed before us as against a-2. The evidence of p. ws. 8 and 7 clearly make out a case only against a-l for offences under sections 498-a and 307 of the IPC. ( 20 ) SINCE it is an appeal against acquittal, we asked Mr. Ravi b. Naik, learned counsel for a-l on the question of sentence. The evidence of p. ws. 8 and 7 clearly make out a case only against a-l for offences under sections 498-a and 307 of the IPC. ( 20 ) SINCE it is an appeal against acquittal, we asked Mr. Ravi b. Naik, learned counsel for a-l on the question of sentence. ( 21 ) IT was submitted that the accused 1 has been in custody from 25-10-1991 to 7-2-1995 during trial. It is stated that the age of a-l is 32 years and an young man and the occurrence took place nearly ten years ago and a-l has been in custody for nearly 3 1/2 years. ( 22 ) WE feel that the ends of Justice will be met in the facts and circumstances of this case if a-l is sentenced to the period already undergone and also to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- in default to undergo r. i, for three months. ( 23 ) THE fine shall be paid within 3 months from the date of receipt of this order in the trial court, failing which the default sentence shall come into play. On payment of the fine, the trial court shall disburse the amount as compensation to P. W. 7, the victim. ( 24 ) WE record the assistance rendered by Mr. Basavaraj, amicus curiae for a-2. We determine his fees at Rs. 1,ooo/ -. --- *** --- .