( 1 ) THIS Second Appeal arises against the judgment and decree dated 3-8-1982 in a. S. No,75 of 1979 on the file of the Court of ii Additional Subordinate Judge, Kakinada, dismissing the suit O. S. No. 67 of 1976 on the file of the Court of Principal District munsif, Kakinada. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case are that the appellant herein is the plaintiff who filed suit O. S. No. 67 of 1976 before the trial court. The plaintiff-appellant took on lease an extent of 1,08,462-00 square feet of site from the State Port Authorities, Kakinada for a period of 22 years with effect from 1-4-1961. As per the arrangement in between the plaintiff-appellant and the state Fort Authority, the plaintiff-appellant-lessee has to pay monthly tax due on the said site to the defendant-Municipality, being respondent herein. Subsequently, the state Port authorities asked the plaintiff-appellant to vacate the site, and the plaintiff surrendered the possession of the site to the port authorities with effect from 1-4-1968. The lease given earlier to the plaintiff-appellant was cancelled with effect from 1-4-1968 by the Government of Andhra pradesh in G. O. Ms. No. 166 dated 3-2-1970 to that effect. Thereafter, the Port authorities permitted the plaintiff-appellant to occupy an extent of 8,400 square feet of site out of the total site and ever since 1-4-1968 the plaintiff-appellant was in occupation to that extent of the site as a lessee. The State Port officer renewed the licence for every year in favour of the plaintiff till 1972-73. The appellant-plaintiff has to pay the monthly taxes on the said extent. The respondent- municipality has assessed the tax for the extent of 1,08,462 square feet at rs. 285-03 per half year i. e. , up to the first half year of 1971-72 and it was enhanced to rs. 308-29 ps. from the second half year of 1971-72. The plaintiff-appellant alleged that under mistaken impression they paid the tax to the defendant-respondent on the entire extent of site even though they were liable to pay tax only on 8,400 square feet of site. The plaintiff-appellant sought for refund of the excess amount paid namely rs. 3,536-66 ps. from the respondent-Municipality. from the second half year of 1971-72. The plaintiff-appellant alleged that under mistaken impression they paid the tax to the defendant-respondent on the entire extent of site even though they were liable to pay tax only on 8,400 square feet of site. The plaintiff-appellant sought for refund of the excess amount paid namely rs. 3,536-66 ps. from the respondent-Municipality. ( 3 ) THE defendant being respondent has resisted the suit stating that the suit is not maintainable and is hit by Section 13 of Act 45/1976 and the suit is barred by limitation. The plaintiff s right to recover the amount was also denied, as well as payment under a mistaken impression. It is further stated if at all the plaintiff has got any right to claim, the plaintiff has to claim reimbursement from the port authorities, but cannot claim refund from the defendant-respondent. ( 4 ) THE trial Court after considering the evidence on record decreed the suit holding that the suit is maintainable under Sec. 13 of act 45 of 1976. ( 5 ) AGGRIEVED by the same the defendant carried the matter in appeal in A. S. No. 75 of 1979 before the lower appellate Court. ( 6 ) THE lower appellate Court on consideration of the material on record has given a finding that the plaintiff is entitled to recovery of amount as it has been paid under a mistaken impression. However, it has observed that the suit is not maintainable by virtue of Section 93 (1) of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act, (for short "the Act"), and dismissed the suit. ( 7 ) AGGRIEVED by the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court the plaintiff-appellant preferred this Second appeal. ( 8 ) AT the time of admission of this second Appeal, the following substantial questions of law were framed for consideration in this Second Appeal. " (a) Whether the lessee of a site is bound to give notice under Section 93 of the A. P. Municipalities Act in the event of cancellation of the lease agreement? ( 8 ) AT the time of admission of this second Appeal, the following substantial questions of law were framed for consideration in this Second Appeal. " (a) Whether the lessee of a site is bound to give notice under Section 93 of the A. P. Municipalities Act in the event of cancellation of the lease agreement? (c) Whether the termination of a lease amounts to "transfer of title" within the meaning of Section 93 of the A. P. Municipalities Act?" ( 9 ) THE short point to be considered is about the maintainability of the suit without giving notice under Section 93 the Act and interpretation which has to be made to section 93 of the Act. ( 10 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant contends that the lease does not amount to transfer of title within the meaning of section 93 of the Act. Hence Section 93 of the Act has no application. Thus the suit is maintainable. ( 11 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent contends that when the transfer of title is covered by Section 93 of the Act notice is contemplated before suing and the suit itself is not maintainable. ( 12 ) ADVERTING to the said contentions, it is necessary to refer to Section 93 of the Act, which reads as follows: "obligation of transferor and transferee to give notice of transfer: (1) Whenever the title of any person, primarily liable to the payment of property tax on any premises, to or over such premises is transferred, the person whose title is transferred and the person to whom the same shall be transferred shall, within three months after the execution of the instrument of transfer or after its registration if it be registered, or after the transfer is effected, if no instrument be executed, give notice of such transfer to the Commissioner, (2 ). . . . . . . . . (3 ). . . . . . . . . (4) Every person who makes a transfer as aforesaid without giving such notice to the Commissioner shall in addition to any other liability which he incurs through such neglect, continue to be liable for the payment of property tax assessed on the premises transferred until he gives notice or unit the transfer shall have been recorded in the municipal registers. ". . . . . . ". . . . . . It is clearly mentioned in Section 93 that intimation is required whenever there is transfer of title. The words used are that "person whose title is transferred" and "the person to whom shall be transferred". They are express and explicit and indicate whenever there is transfer of title intimation has to be made and notice is required to be given regarding execution of transfer instrument to the Municipality. It also contemplates that a notice has to be given within three months of the execution. Suffice it to say that transfer that is contemplated under Section 93 of the Act is transfer of title and does not cover instrument of lease within the meaning of section 93 of the Act. It is however contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that port authorities is necessary party to the suit. No such plea was raised either before the lower Court or before the lower Appellate Court. No issue was taken. Therefore, such argument or plea cannot be allowed to be advanced before this Court in the absence of any such plea. Therefore, the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondent does not hold water. There is no transfer of title in respect of lease said to have been taken by appellant herein. The lower appellate Court has not properly interpreted Section 93 of the Act and erroneously dismissed the suit. ( 13 ) FOR the above reasons, I hold that the suit is maintainable. However, as both the courts held that the plaintiff-appellant paid the amount under mistaken impression and the amount is liable to be refunded, there is no need to disturb the concurrent finding reached by both the Courts below. ( 14 ) IN the result, the judgment of the lower Appellate Court is liable to be set aside it is accordingly set aside. The appellant is entitled to recover back the entire amount with interest and costs. The judgment and decree of the lower Appellate court is set aside and the judgment and decree of the trial Court is restored. The second Appeal is accordingly allowed. The appellant is entitled to the costs.