Research › Search › Judgment

Gauhati High Court · body

2001 DIGILAW 172 (GAU)

Probin Kumar Phukan v. Union of India and Ors.

2001-06-19

A.K.PATNAIK

body2001
The petitioner initially joined as Personnel Officer of the United Bank of India in 1977. He was posted as Manager (MM Scale n) in Sibsagar Branch and thereafter promoted to the post of Manager (MM Scale HI) and posted in Nagaon Branch during 3.11.1986 to 18.7.1990. While he was posted as Deputy Regional Manager, United Bank of India, Central Assam Region in Guwahati he was served with articles of charges, statement of allegations on which the articles of charges were based and a list of documents on which the Management relied on in support of the articles of charges by a notice dated 11.12.1992 of the Deputy General Manager and Zonal Manager, Disciplinary Authority. By the said notice dated 11.12.1992, the petitioner was asked to submit his statement of defence and the petitioner submitted the statement of defence in his letter dated 19.12.1992 denying the said charges. Thereafter, an enquiry was conducted by Sri DN Chakraborty, Inquiry Officer. Shri Chakraborty submitted the enquiry report dated 15.6.1996 holding the petitioner guilty of all the eight charges. In the said enquiry report, however, the Inquiry Officer stated that financial loss to the Bank has not been proved in the enquiry. The said enquiry report was forwarded to the petitioner by letter dated 13.8.1996 of the Disciplinary Authority and the petitioner submitted his written submission on the enquiry report in his letter dated 10.10.1996. The Disciplinary Authority after considering the said written submission of the petitioner passed an order dated 22.10.1998 wherein he held that the charge Nos 1,2,3,4, 5 and 6 had been proved in the enquiry, but charge Nos 7 and 8 had not been proved in the enquiry. Regarding the finding of the Inquiry Officer that financial loss to the Bank has not been proved, the Disciplinary Authority held that the said remark was beyond the scope of the enquiry in view of the fact that the quantum of Bank's loss had not been indicated in the charge sheet. In the said order dated 22.10.1998, the Disciplinary Authority further held that the major penalty of removal was warranted in consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and the charges proved and established against the petitioner and imposed the penalty of removal from service on the petitioner. In the said order dated 22.10.1998, the Disciplinary Authority further held that the major penalty of removal was warranted in consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and the charges proved and established against the petitioner and imposed the penalty of removal from service on the petitioner. Aggrieved by the said order dated 22.10.1998 of the Disciplinary Authority, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for appropriate relief. 2. Mr. N. Dutta, learned senior counsel, appearing for the petitioner, submitted that a reading of the enquiry report and the impugned order of the Disciplinary Authority would show that the petitioner had allowed some excess withdrawals and some loans to parties as Manager of the Bank in Nagaon. According to Mr. Dutta, such acts on the part of the petitioner in allowing overdrawals and loans to various parties as Manager of the Bank might be errors of judgment but did not amount to misconduct. In support of this argument, he cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. J. Ahmed, AIR 1979 SC 1022 , wherein it has inter alia been observed that a single act of omission or error of judgment would ordinarily not amount to misconduct but if such omission or error results in serious or atrocious consequences, it may amount to misconduct. Mr. Dutta submitted that the acts of the petitioner in allowing the overdrawals and loans to various parties may have amounted to misconduct if such acts of the petitioner had caused any financial loss to the Bank. But the Inquiry Officer had held in his report that financial loss to the Bank had not been established. Mr. SK Medhi, learned counsel assisting Mr. Dutta, also relied on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Dipankar Sengupta vs. United Bank of India, 1998 (2) CLJ 204 , in which the Calcutta High Court relied on the said decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. J. Ahmed (supra) and held that misconduct had not been established against the delinquent employee in that case. 3. In reply. Mr. 3. In reply. Mr. BK Das, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents, submitted that under Regulation 3 (1) of the United Bank of India Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 (for short 'the Conduct Regulations') every officer/employee is under a duty to take all possible steps to ensure and protect the interests of the Bank and discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer and under Regulation 3 (3) he has to act as per the direction of his official superior. The findings of the Inquiry Officer as well as the Disciplinary Authority would show that the petitioner has flouted the instruction of the higher officer of the Bank and has granted overdrawals and loans in excess of his power. Thus, the conduct of the petitioner was unbecoming of an officer of the Bank and he was guilty of the misconduct described in Regulations 3 (1) and 3 (3) of the Conduct Regulations. He cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager vs. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, (1996) 9 SCC 69 , in which the Supreme Court while interpreting a similar provision in the Regulations applicable to officer employees of the Central Bank of India has held that acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and a breach of such Regulation and it constitutes misconduct and no further proof of loss is really necessary. Mr. Das also relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Harinarayan Srivastav vs. United Commercial Bank, (1997) 4 SCC 384 , and Tara Chand Vyas vs. Chairman & Disciplinary Authority, (1997) 4 SCC 565 , in which orders of the Disciplinary Authority imposing punishment on Bank employees with regard to sanction and disbursement of loans have not been interfered with by the Supreme Court. He also cited the decision of the Supreme Court in United Bank of India vs. Vishwa Mohan, (1998) 4 SCC 310 , wherein the punishment of dismissal awarded to a Bank employee for his acts of bribery, embezzlement, misappropriation and other acts unbecoming of a Bank officer was not interfered with by the Supreme Court. He also cited the decision of the Supreme Court in United Bank of India vs. Vishwa Mohan, (1998) 4 SCC 310 , wherein the punishment of dismissal awarded to a Bank employee for his acts of bribery, embezzlement, misappropriation and other acts unbecoming of a Bank officer was not interfered with by the Supreme Court. He further submitted that the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution in a disciplinary proceeding against delinquent employees is very limited and the Court cannot reappreciate the evidence that have been adduced in the enquiry in the disciplinary proceedings as it is not exercising the power of appeal. He cited the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Naren Hazarika vs. State Bank of India, (1999) 2 GLR 175 (1999 (1) GLJ 232), in which the Court held that judicial review was not an appeal, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made and it was only meant to ensure that the delinquent received fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reached was necessarily correct in the view of the Court. 4. On a reading of the notice dated 11.12.1992 of the Disciplinary Authority to the petitioner which contains the articles of charge, it appears that the petitioner had been charged for failing to take all possible steps to ensure and protect the interest of the Bank and discharge his duties with utmost devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty in breach of the provisions of contained in Regulation 3(1) and 3 (3) of the Conduct Regulations. The said Regulations 3 (1) and 3 (3) are quoted herein below: "3. (1) Every officer employee shall, at all times take all possible steps to ensure and protect the interests of the Bank and discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank officer. The said Regulations 3 (1) and 3 (3) are quoted herein below: "3. (1) Every officer employee shall, at all times take all possible steps to ensure and protect the interests of the Bank and discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank officer. (3) No officer employee shall, in the performance of his official duties or in the exercise of powers conferred on him, act otherwise than in his best judgment except when he is acting under the direction of his official superior Regulation 3(1), inter alia, states that an officer employee would do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank officer, and Regulation 3 (3) quoted above further shows that in the performance of his official duties or in exercise of power conferred on him, an officer employee is required to act in his best judgment. Thus, so long as an officer employee exercises power conferred on him or within his discretion, he can act as per his best judgment but where he exercises powers which are not conferred on him and perform acts which are not within his discretion, his acts are unbecoming of a Bank officer. This is why in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager vs. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (supra), the Supreme Court has held that the very act of going beyond authority is by itself a misconduct. Further Regulation 3 (3) of the Conduct Regulations makes it clear that an officer employee is not supposed to exercise his best judgment when he is acting under the direction of his official superior. Thus, where an officer employee flouts the direction of his official superior, he commits a misconduct and his plea that he acted as per his best judgment cannot be accepted. 5. Coming now to the facts of the present case, the Disciplinary Authority has found that charge Nos 1, 2, 3,4, 5 and 6 have been established against the petitioner in the enquiry. The said charge Nos 1 to 6 are as follows : "(1) You allowed excess drawings in a number of cash credit accounts unauthorisedly beyond your discretionary power as detailed in Annexure A to the charge sheet in violation of the norms, rules and procedures laid down by the Bank in this regard. The said charge Nos 1 to 6 are as follows : "(1) You allowed excess drawings in a number of cash credit accounts unauthorisedly beyond your discretionary power as detailed in Annexure A to the charge sheet in violation of the norms, rules and procedures laid down by the Bank in this regard. (2) It has been revealed that even after temporary withdrawal of your discretionary power by the Regional Manager, Sibsagar Region vide his letter No. RO/SR/ADV/NGN/DP/89 dated 8.11.89, you unauthorisedly sanctioned a number of loan proposals and allowed disbursement of funds in respect of the said loan accounts as detailed in Annexure Bl and B2 to the charge sheet. By your aforesaid act, you violated the instruction of your superior officer. (3) It has further been revealed that as per target fixed and approved in the DCC meeting, your branch had been allowed the target of 3 (three) loan proposals each for 1989-90 and for 1990-91 under DIG (Margin Money Scheme) but you sanctioned 16 (sixteen) loan proposals received from DIG as against the target of 1989-90 and allowed disbursement of funds in respect of the same. You also sanctioned 10 loan proposals received from DIG as against the target of 1990-91 and made disbursement of funds in respect of the same in spite of the fact that Regional Manager, Sibsagar Region, in his letter dated 8.11.89 advised you to sanction and disburse the advance proposals received from DIG strictly within the target which was fixed and approved in the DCC meeting. The details of the loan proposals thus sanctioned by you are annexed in Annexure Bl and B2. (4) You allowed over-drawing. in two Current Deposit A/Cs unauthorisedly as per Annexure C to the charge sheet for which you did not obtain prior approval/concurrence of the Regional Manager, Sibsagar Region. You did not also report the same to your higher authority through the Monthly Irregularity Sheet of the Branch. (5) After the joining of Sri A. Barua, new Manager of the Branch on 1.6.90 the then Regional Manager, Sibsagar Region visited the branch on 18.6.90 and advised t you to hand over the charge of the branch to Sri Barua positively on 19.6.90 at the close of business. But you did not comply with the instructions of your Regional Manager and you delayed your release till 18.7.90. But you did not comply with the instructions of your Regional Manager and you delayed your release till 18.7.90. It has further been observed that despite the instructions of the Regional Manager, Sibsagar Region, you allowed further advances as per Annexure D during the period from 19.6.90 to 18.7.90 in clear insubordination of the instructions of the Regional Manager. (6) You had unauthorisedly allowed Term Loan to Sri Bhubaneswar Saikia to the extent of Rs. 94,199 on 17.7.90 i.e. just one day before the date of your release from the Branch knowing fully well that Sri Bhubaneswar Saikia is the proprietor of M/s Energy and Works and the outstanding balance standing in the A/c of M/s Energy and Works as on date was much beyond the sanctioned limit and the A/c had already become hard jeopardising the interest of the Bank." It will be clear from the aforesaid charges which have been established against the petitioner that he exceeded his power and discretion, and acted contrary to the direction of his official superior while granting loans, advances and overdrawing. The petitioner was, therefore, guilty of breach of the provisions in Regulations 3(1) and 3 (3)x)f the Conduct Regulations and the contention of Mr. Dutta and Mr. Medhi, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the misconduct had not been established against the petitioner in the enquiry and the disciplinary proceedings has no merit. 6. It was next submitted by Mr. Dutta that even on the charges as established against the petitioner the punishment of removal from service was disproportionate and discriminatory. He argued that no finding had been recorded by the Inquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority to show that the petitioner lacked integrity or honesty. He further argued that the Inquiry Officer had expressly held that & financial loss to the Bank by the acts of the petitioner had not been proved in the enquiry. He referred to Annexure XVII to the affidavit-in-reply of the petitioner to show that in case of another officer on charges which were more serious than those against the petitioner, a punishment of reduction of basic pay had been imposed. According to Mr. Dutta, imposition of severe punishment of removal from service against the petitioner on similar rather less serious charges was discriminatory and violative of the right of the petitioner under Article 14 of the Constitution. According to Mr. Dutta, imposition of severe punishment of removal from service against the petitioner on similar rather less serious charges was discriminatory and violative of the right of the petitioner under Article 14 of the Constitution. He cited the decision of this Court in Bidhan Chandra Dutta vs. Assam State Electricity Board, (1998) 3 GLR 49 (1998 (3) GLJ 17), in which the punishment of dismissal from service was quashed by this court and the matter was remitted to the Disciplinary Authority to pass fresh orders in accordance with law. He also relied on the decision of this Court in Nripen Chandra Sarma vs. Union of India, 1998 (2) GLT 123 (1998 (2) GLJ 278), wherein this Court discussed the law relating to discriminatory punishment imposed on the two delinquent employees by the Disciplinary Authority. In this context, Mr. Dutta submitted that this unequal treatment was shown to the petitioner because of the fact that he had been an office bearer of the Officers' Association and the President of All India Bank Officers' Confederation, Assam State Unit and the Vice President of the United Bank Officers' Association, Central Council , and in his capacity as an Office Bearer of the Association he spearheaded a number of movements with regard to upgradation of the Zonal Office, NE Region, Promotional Policy, Branch Expansion, shortage of manpower and other trade union activities. Finally, Mr. Dutta submitted that the petitioner while functioning as Manager of Nagaon Branch of the Bank had mobilised a large number of deposits for which the petitioner was highly appreciated by his higher authorities and it was during the tenure of the petitioner as Manager of Nagaon Branch that the Branch was elevated from 'large' (L) to 'very large' (VII). According to Mr. Dutta, these factors should have been taken into consideration by the Disciplinary Authority while determining the quantum of punishment. 7. Mr. According to Mr. Dutta, these factors should have been taken into consideration by the Disciplinary Authority while determining the quantum of punishment. 7. Mr. Das, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that it has been held by the Supreme Court in State of UP vs. Nand Kishore Shukla, (1996) 3 SCC 750 , that it is not for the Court to go into the question of imposition of the punishment but for the Disciplinary Authority to consider what would be the nature of the punishment to be imposed on a government servant based upon the misconduct proved against him and its proportionality also cannot be gone into by the Court. He also cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. G. Ganayatham, AIR 1997 SC 3387 , in which the law relating to judicial review with regard to proportionality of punishment has been discussed at length, and it has been held that the Court will only play a secondary role while the primary judgment as to reasonableness will remain with the executive or administrative authority, and that unless the Court finds that the punishment imposed on the delinquent employee by the executive or administrative authority as irrational according to Wednesbury or CCSU norms, the punishment cannot be quashed. Mr. Das further submitted that even in such cases where the punishment is quashed by the Court, the matter has to be remitted to the Disciplinary Authority for reconsideration and the Court will not substitute its own view as to the quantum of punishment in place of punishment awarded by the competent authority as pointed out in BC Chaturvedi's case, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1995 AIR SCW 4374. According to Mr. Das, the charges which had been established against the petitioner in this case were of serious nature and the Management of the Bank had lost confidence in him and therefore the only course that was open for the Disciplinary Authority was to remove him from service. According to Mr. J. Das, this is therefore not a fit case in which this Court should interfere with the quantum of punishment determined by the Disciplinary Authority. 8. According to Mr. J. Das, this is therefore not a fit case in which this Court should interfere with the quantum of punishment determined by the Disciplinary Authority. 8. In Union of India vs. G. Ganayutham ( AIR 1997 SC 3387 ), the Supreme Court has dealt at length the development of law both in England and in a India on the power of judicial review of administrative action on the principle of proportionality. In paragraph 28 of the judgment in the said case, the Supreme Court has summarised the, current position of proportionality in administrative law in England and in India. The Supreme Court in particular has held that the position, in our country in administrative law, where no fundamental freedom are involved, is that the Courts/Tribunals will only play a secondary role while the primary judgment as to reasonableness will remain with the executive or administrative authority. The Supreme Court has further held that the secondary judgment of the Court is to be based on Wednesbury and CCSU principles as stated by Lord Greene and Lord Diplock respectively to find if the executive or administrative authority has reasonably arrived at his decision as the primary authority (see para 16). But this is not a case where the challenge to quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is only on the ground of unreasonableness but also on the ground of violation of the fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 14 of the Constitution. In paragraph 17 of the writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the punishment of removal from service as not only grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the charges levelled but also as discriminatory, unfair, arbitrary and vitiated by bias and malafide. The petitioner has further alleged in the said para 17 of the writ petition that the said punishment has been imposed to victimise the petitioner as he was very closely associated with the Trade Union activities. In paragraph 14 of the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent Nos 2 and 5, however, it has been stated that there was no such nexus between the Trade Union activities and the enquiry proceeding, and that the punishment imposed on the petitioner was aptly commensurate with the gross misconduct for which the petitioner had been held guilty. In paragraph 14 of the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent Nos 2 and 5, however, it has been stated that there was no such nexus between the Trade Union activities and the enquiry proceeding, and that the punishment imposed on the petitioner was aptly commensurate with the gross misconduct for which the petitioner had been held guilty. In Union of India vs. G. Ganayutham (supra), the Supreme Court left open the question as to whether the Courts in our country will apply the principle of proportionality and assume a primary role in the case of administrative or executive action affecting the fundamental freedoms to be decided in an appropriate case where such action is alleged to offend fundamental freedoms. The Supreme Court has further observed in paragraph 25 of the judgment that whether the primary role will be confined to Articles 19,21 etc and not to Article 14 will also have to be decided. This question was left open by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. G. Ganayutham because in that case no contention was raised before the Supreme Court that any fundamental freedom was affected. But in the instant case as has been indicated above a contention has been raised that the fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 14 of the Constitution against discrimination has been affected. This Court therefore will have to decide this question as to whether the Court can interfere with the impugned order of removal from service imposed on the petitioner on the ground of violation of right to equality of the petitioner under Article 14 of the Constitution. 9. To demonstrate that the penalty of removal from service against the petitioner was discriminatory and violative of the right of the petitioner to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution, the petitioner has annexed to his affidavit-in-reply filed on 24.2.99, a copy of the order dated 27.4,1998 of the Disciplinary Authority imposing punishment of reduction of basic pay inclusive of stagnation of increment and FPA on an officer employee Sri Kalyan Chakraborty against whom similar and more serious charges had been established in the enquiry proceeding. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the said order dated 27.4.1998 of the Disciplinary Authority are quoted here under: "4. I concur with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the said order dated 27.4.1998 of the Disciplinary Authority are quoted here under: "4. I concur with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. It was revealed at the enquiry that you have caused financial jeopardy to the Bank in respect of all the charges except charges No.8, 13, 15, 17 and 21. Due to your allowing of irregular excess drawings in the 16 (sixteen) accounts out of 21 number of accounts, proved at the enquiry, the debit balance rose upto Rs. 48,08,389.82 against sanctioned limit of Rs.21,45 lacs only. The enquiry report revealed that such excess drawings were allowed by you beyond the sanctioned limit and beyond your financial power. The excess drawings were not reported by you to the Regional Office for confirmation, as proved at the enquiry. Further, you had not at all reported the sanction of advance allowed to the parties in respect of charge Nos 3, 9, 11, 14 and 18 to the Regional Manager. It has been proved at the enquiry that the accounts have turned to NP Anand the Bank had been exposed to financial risk of Rs. 48,08,389.82 as on 12.01.1994 in respect of 16 (sixteen) accounts. 5. The gravity of the charges proved and established against you at the enquiry were very serious in nature and it warrants imposition of a major penalty, i.e. reduction to a lower stage as contained in Regulation 4 (e) of the United Bank of India Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976. Under sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 7 of United Bank of India Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976, I hereby impose upon you the punishment of reduction of your Basic Pay inclusive of Stagnation of increment and FPA from the present level to Rs. 7130/- per month with immediate effect." The aforesaid paragraphs 4 and 5 of the order dated 27.4.1998 of the Disciplinary Authority in the case of Sri Kalyan Chakraborty would show that although Sri Chakraborty had been found to have exposed the Bank to financial risk of Rs. 7130/- per month with immediate effect." The aforesaid paragraphs 4 and 5 of the order dated 27.4.1998 of the Disciplinary Authority in the case of Sri Kalyan Chakraborty would show that although Sri Chakraborty had been found to have exposed the Bank to financial risk of Rs. 48,08,389.82 in respect of 16 accounts by allowing excess drawings beyond the sanctioned limit and beyond his financial power and also by allowing advances to parties, the Disciplinary Authority had taken a view that the gravity of charges proved against him warranted imposition of a major penalty of reduction to a lower stage as contained in Regulation 4 (e) of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations. On the other hand, in the case of the petitioner when no financial loss to Bank due to the acts of misconduct on the part of the petitioner under the six charges have been established, the penalty of removal from service has been imposed by the impugned order of the Disciplinary Authority. At the hearing of this writ petition, the Court repeatedly asked Mr. Das, learned counsel for the petitioner as to why the punishments in the two cases were different, and Mr. Das stated that a lenient punishment was given to Sri Kalyan Chakraborty because he was to retire from service. This distinguishing feature is irrelevant for the purpose of determining the quantum of punishment in the disciplinary proceedings in the two cases. In the absence of any relevant distinguishing feature in the two a cases, the Court can only come to the finding that the punishment of removal from service imposed in the case of the petitioner was arbitrary and discriminatory and violative of the fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 14 of the Constitution. In Sengara Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1983) 4 SCC 225 , the Supreme Court held: "Now if the indiscipline of a large number of personnel amongst dismissed personnel could be condoned or overlooked and after withdrawing the criminal case against them, they could be reinstated, we see no justification in treating the present appellants differently without pointing out how they were guilty of more serious misconduct or the degree of indiscipline in their case was higher than compared to those who were reinstated. Respondents failed to explain to the Court the distinguishing features and therefore, we are satisfied in putting all of them in same c bracket. Respondents failed to explain to the Court the distinguishing features and therefore, we are satisfied in putting all of them in same c bracket. On that conclusion the treatment meted to the present appellants suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and Article 14 forbids any arbitrary action which would tantamount to denial of equality as guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court must accordingly interpose and quash the discriminatory action." 10. In none of the decisions cited by Mr. Das, on the other hand, was the Court called upon to decide whether the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority in a disciplinary proceeding was discriminatory and violative of the right under Article 14 of the Constitution and the Supreme Court has held that the quantum of punishment is within the sole discretion of the Disciplinary Authority and the court cannot sit as an appellate authority over the Disciplinary Authority and substitute the quantum of punishment for that determined by the Disciplinary e Authority. In Union of India vs. G. Ganayutham ( AIR 1997 SC 3387 ), the Supreme Court has held that where no fundamental freedoms are involved and the Court quashes the order of punishment as being irrational according to Wednesbury or CCSU norms, the matter has to be remitted to the appropriate authority for reconsideration and it is only in very rare cases as pointed out in BC Chaturvedi vs. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 ), that the Court might, to shorten litigation, think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in place of the punishment awarded by the competent authority. But where the fundamental right to equality is involved, as in the present case, and the court finds that in another case on more or less similar charges the Disciplinary Authority has imposed a lesser punishment, the Court should, in my opinion, itself hold that more or less the same punishment should be imposed on the petitioner as has been imposed on another delinquent officer employee against whom more or less similar rather more serious, charges had been proved. This is because, a more severe punishment-than that imposed on the other delinquent officer employee who was found to be guilty of more or less similar charges would amount to discrimination against the petitioner. 11. This is because, a more severe punishment-than that imposed on the other delinquent officer employee who was found to be guilty of more or less similar charges would amount to discrimination against the petitioner. 11. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order dated 22.10.1998 of the Disciplinary Authority imposing the penalty of removal from service against the petitioner under Regulation 4 (9) of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations is quashed, and the petitioner be reinstated in service forthwith and a fresh order of penalty of reduction to a lower grade or post, or to a lower stage in a time scale be imposed by the Disciplinary Authority under Regulation 4 (e) of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations on the petitioner. Considering the fact that the petitioner has been found to be guilty of six charges by the Disciplinary Authority, I am not inclined to grant full pay and allowances to the petitioner for the period he had been out of service on account of the impugned order of removal, but I leave it to the competent authority to determine the proportion of pay and allowances which shall be granted to the petitioner in accordance with the Rules and Regulations of the Bank. 12. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. Considering however the entire facts and circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.