JUDGMENT : M. Papanna, J. - Judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, Mayurbbanj-Baripada, passed in S. T. No. 134 of 1992 convicting the appellant u/s 302, I. P. C. and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life is under challenge in ing him to undergo imprisonment for life is under challenge in this appeal preferred from Jail. 2. Facts of the prosecution case leading to the present appeal may be delineated tersely as follows :-- One Deogi Majhi of Dumuria in the district of Mayur-bhanj (hereinafter referred to as ''the deceased") was known for applying sorcery to the people of her village. For some months prior to the occurrence, father of the accused persons was ill. So the accused persons suspected the deceased to have applied sorcery to their father. Working under such notion, the accused persons went to her house on 5-4-1992 at about 2 p. m. At that time the deceased was sleeping on a cot in the outer verandah of her house. Taking advantage bf this, accused Bijoy Soren gave axe blows on her head. He also stabbed her with a knife. As a result, she succumbed to the said injuries. Her daughter-in-law, Bija Majhi rushed to the spot seeing the occurrence. The accused persons fled away from the spot leaving the axe there. Thereafter neighbours reached the spot hearing her hulla. Son of the deceased. Champai Majhi who had gone for labour work at that time was sent for. After reaching the spot he learnt from his wife about the incident. Then he lodged information in Thakurmunda Police Station. Accordingly, Thakurmunda P. S. Case No. 6/92 was registered. During investigation, the I. O. having found prima facie evidence u/s 302/34, I.P.C. submitted charge sheet against the accused persons. 3. Accused persons pleaded innocence. Complete denial of the allegation of the prosecution is the defence plea. That apart, defence propounded a theory that Bija Majhi daughter-in-law of the deceased killed her and implicated the accused persons falsely in this case. 4. To prove the charge ten witnesses have been put in the witness box on behalf of the prosecution. P, w. 1 is Rama Majhi, son of the deceased. P. w. 2 is Rabindra Ho, to whom the accused made extra-judicial confession. P. w. is Banamali Patra to whom p. w. 2 told that accused Bijoy Soren gave him a knife which he threw to his back-yard. P, w. 1 is Rama Majhi, son of the deceased. P. w. 2 is Rabindra Ho, to whom the accused made extra-judicial confession. P. w. is Banamali Patra to whom p. w. 2 told that accused Bijoy Soren gave him a knife which he threw to his back-yard. P. w. 4 is Champai Majhi (informant). P. w. 5 is Bija Majhi wife of the informant. P, w. 6 is Chandini Patra, a post occurrence witness. P. w. 7 is Lalmohan Mohant who went to the Police Station along with the informant for lodging information about the incident. P. w. 8 is the Doctor who conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased. P. w. 9 is the I. O. and p. w. 10 is a co-villager of the informant. 5. The defence, on the other hand, examined one Surdan Majhi, father of the accused person, as d.w. 1 in support of its stand. 6. Relying on the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution, the learned Sessions Judge convicted Bijoy Soten, the present appellant and sentenced him as aforesaid. However, he acquitted accused Pitambar Soren of the charge. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant has raised mainly the following two-fold contentions :-- (i) The extra-judicial confession made by the accused is not acceptable in the eye of law as p. w. 2 to whom he made it, has no where said that he has close relationship with him, and (ii) The medical evidence as deposed to by p. w. 8 is contradictory to occular version of p. w. 5 so far as the number of blows corresponding to the injuries found on the deceased is concerned. Basing on these contentions he submits that the prosecution case is to be viewed with suspicion and accordingly, persuaded us to allow the appeal. 8. The learned counsel for the State, on the other hand, supported the impugned judgment. 9. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties need careful examination. Having gone through the evidence account of the witnesses on record, we found that the prosecution claims to have proved the offence with which the appellant has been charged, relying on the occular version of p. w. 5 corroborated by the medical evidence and the evidence arising out of extra-judicial confession made by the appellant to p. w. 2 and recovery of weapons of offence (M. Os. I and II) made by the I.O. (p. w, 9) on the information given by the appellant but the defence, on the other hand, propounded its defence theory that after the child of p. w. 5 died because of sorcery applied by the deceased, she was in wait for an opportune moment to finish the deceased and it is she who killed her at the material time and implicated the accused falsely in this case. 10. To start with the medical evidence as deposed to by p. w. 8, it is seen that after conducting autopsy on the dead body of the deceased he submitted P. M. report (Ext. 3) reflecting therein the following external injuries :-- (i) There was a lacerated injury 21/2 x 2' x skin deep situated on the right side of the frontal head with clotted .blood, and (ii) A stab injury l' x 1/4 x chest cavity deep situated on the left side of the chest. On dissection of the dead body, the Doctor did not find any fracture of clinial bone. Meninges and brain were found intact underneath the lacerated injury on the head. Chest wall and body cavity were also found intact. However, the Doctor found the stab injury piercing the mediastinum and the right atrium of the heart and the lung. There was extra vasation of blood in the chest cavity. As regards cause of death, the Doctor has opined that stab injury to the vital organs like heart and lungs with severe haemorrhage and shock resulted in the death of the deceased. The medical evidence further shows that with reference to the weapons of offence knife (M. O. I) and the axe (M. O. II) produced before p. w. 8 by the I, O. (p. w. 9), it has been affirmatively opined by the former that the stab injury on the chest and the lacerated injury on the head of the deceased could be possible by the weapons of offence. M. Os. I and II, respectively. The Doctor has proved the query (Ext. 4) made by the I. O. and his report Ext. 4/1 to the above effect, During cross-examination to which p. w. 8 has been subjected to, he has stated the possibility of the lacerated injury on the head of the deceased being caused by a blow with a stone. I and II, respectively. The Doctor has proved the query (Ext. 4) made by the I. O. and his report Ext. 4/1 to the above effect, During cross-examination to which p. w. 8 has been subjected to, he has stated the possibility of the lacerated injury on the head of the deceased being caused by a blow with a stone. Similarly he has opined that stab injury on the chest of the deceased could be possible with a knife having shorter length than M. O. I. The stab injury on the chest of the deceased could also be possible if an arrow pierced into the chest. 11. The first and the foremost finding of a Sessions Judge trying the accused in a charge of murder u/s 302, I.P.C. is that the deceased sustained injuries which are either ante-mortem or post-mortem in nature and the death of the deceased is either homicidal or suicidal. In the present case, the learned trial Judge has not bothered to record such a finding. It is true that Exe. 3 does not specifically mention in this regard but basing on the injuries such a finding can be arrived at by the trial Judge. Of course for not recording such a finding, prosecution case cannot be negatived. On perusal of the post-mortem report (Ext. 3) we are satisfied that the injuries found on the dead body of the deceased are ante-mortem in nature and the deceased died a homicidal death and not suicidal one. The defence has never challenged the medical evidence on this aspect either during trial before the learned Sessions Judge nor before us by the learned counsel for the appellant during heating of this appeal. The aforesaid medical evidence therefore, suggests or rather leads us to an irresistible conclusion that the injuries found on the person of the deceased were ante-mortem in nature and the deceased died a homicidal death but not otherwise. 12. Now the pertinent question is, who is the assassin of the deceased. To answer this question, prosecution has relied ion the evidence of p. w. 5 who claims herself to be an eye witness to the occurrence and the other circumstantial evidence connecting the accused Bijoy Soien with the complicity of the crime. 13. 12. Now the pertinent question is, who is the assassin of the deceased. To answer this question, prosecution has relied ion the evidence of p. w. 5 who claims herself to be an eye witness to the occurrence and the other circumstantial evidence connecting the accused Bijoy Soien with the complicity of the crime. 13. One of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the prosecution case is to be viewed with suspicion in view of the medical evidence as deposed to by p. w. 8 being contradictory to the occular version of p. w, 5 particularly when she says that she saw Bijoy giving two blows with the axe on the head of the deceased whereas p. w. 8 found only one lacerated injury on the right side of the frontal head as per Ext. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant places reliance on a decision reported in 1997 XII O. C. R. 523 (Narayan Karji v. State of Orissa) in support of his contention as aforesaid. In the reported case the evidence account of the witnesses (p. ws. 1 to 4) which is discrepant is found to be discrepant further from the evidence of the Doctor (p. w. 8) with regard to the number of blows and the corresponding injuries on the person of the deceased going a long way to create serious doubt on the prosecution version as observed by their Lordships. But here is a case where the eye witness (p. w, 5) has stated to have seen the accused giving one stab blow to the deceased which has been proved fatal as per the medical evidence as deposed to by p. w. 8. So there is absolutely no discrepancy between the evidence of the Doctor and the occular evidence with regard to number of blows and corresponding injuries on the person of the deceased causing her death. No doubt as per the medical evidence there was onty one lacerated injury on right side of the frontal head of the deceased, while p. w. 5 stated to have seen accused Bijoy smashing the head of the deceased with an axe. But in the cross-examination she said that she saw Bijoy giving two blows with the axe on the head of the deceased. The facts of the reported case quite distinguishable from the facts of the present case. But in the cross-examination she said that she saw Bijoy giving two blows with the axe on the head of the deceased. The facts of the reported case quite distinguishable from the facts of the present case. Not only that but also the death of the deceased in the present case is due to the stab injury in respect of which there is no discrepancy between the medical evidence and the occular version of p. w. 5. In view of our discussion made above, we are never in agreement with the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant and accordingly, the said contention stands rejected. 14. In fact, though the defence could not assail her version but it criticised saying that it is a tainted one which has been adopted by her to save herself killing her mother-in-law who killed her child by applying witch-craft as deposed to by d. w. 1. Her evidence admits of no doubt that at the material time she was pasting mud on the walls of her new house. Ac that time, the deceased was sleeping on a cot on the outer varendah of the house of Man Singh who is the brother of the husband of p. w, 5. Having rushed to the spot hearing a sound coming from there she found accused Bijoy smashing the head of the deceased with an axe. She also saw him stabbing her on her chest with a knife. This evidence of p. w. 5 has not been assailed nor impeached in any manner. Having rushed to the spot hearing a sound coming from there she found accused Bijoy smashing the head of the deceased with an axe. She also saw him stabbing her on her chest with a knife. This evidence of p. w. 5 has not been assailed nor impeached in any manner. In view of clear, categorical and consistent evidence of eye witness as aforesaid, the defence theory as spoken to by d. w. 1, father of the accused persons cannot be believable, The statement of d. w. 1 that after returning from the weekly market, he went to the spot and found Bija Majhj present near the dead body and on being asked as to how the deceased died, she replied that she did not know how the deceased died and that he found one blood stained stone lying in the court yard and that no axe was lying near the cot and instead there were bow and arrows stained with blood inside the room and that she had hostile terms with the deceased after the death of her child and on the very date of occurrence when he was going to the market he heard the deceased and Bija Majhi quarrelling over the issue of the death of her child and when he interfered in their quarrel he was asked to mind his own business etc., cannot be relied upon particularly when he has never stated these facts to any of his villagers nor to the I. O. soon after the occurrence. Moreover, the possibility of the lacerated injury caused to the deceased on her head by means of a stone and possibility of stab injury on her chest by means of an arrow as spoken to by the Medical Officer (p. w. 8) cannot be accepted in view of the overwhelming evidence, both direct and circumstantial, pointing to the guilt of the accused of the crime. In this regard, case of Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai Vs. State of Gujarat, can be referred to. The settled principle of law is that unless the medical evidence in its turn goes so far as to rule out completely all possibilities of injuries caused in the way alleged by the eye witnesses, testimony of the eye witnesses cannot be thrown out on the ground of any inconsistencies between the said occular version and the medical evidence. The settled principle of law is that unless the medical evidence in its turn goes so far as to rule out completely all possibilities of injuries caused in the way alleged by the eye witnesses, testimony of the eye witnesses cannot be thrown out on the ground of any inconsistencies between the said occular version and the medical evidence. The medical evidence is no doubt only a corroborative piece of evidence. It proves how the injuries could have been caused in the manner alleged and nothing more. In the instant case, the defence tried to make use of the medical evidence to prove that the injuries on the person of the deceased could not have possibly been caused in the manner alleged in order to discredit the evidence account of p. w. 5 but we have found the said eye witness account Quite credible and trust worthy for which the medical opinion pointing to the alternative possibilities cannot be accepted as conclusive. In fact, having tested her evidence with the touch stone of credibility and cogency in the light of legal principle its credibility cannot be adversely viewed depending on the evidence of d. w. 1 together with the possibility of the injuries being inflicted by the stone and arrow on the person of the deceased as opined by p. w, 8. 15. In addition to the direct evidence of p. w. 5, there is also circumstantial evidence of her villager Maina (p. w. 10) who came to the spot hearing hullah of p, w. 5 and stated in his evidence to have been the accused persons running away from the spot where the deceased was lying dead in pool of blood and on being asked he was told by p. w. 5 that Bijoy Soren killed the deceased. This is also a strong circumstance going against the accused. 16. With regard to extra-judicial confession made to p.w. 2 by accused Bijay Soren, we have gone through the evidence of p. w. 2 together with the evidence of p. w. 3. For proper and better appreciation of the said evidence, we may quote a few lines from the deposition of p. w. 2 as below :-- "At about 2 p. m. accused Bijoy woke me up. He told me that he killed a person with the knife and asked me to keep that knife. He gave the knife. For proper and better appreciation of the said evidence, we may quote a few lines from the deposition of p. w. 2 as below :-- "At about 2 p. m. accused Bijoy woke me up. He told me that he killed a person with the knife and asked me to keep that knife. He gave the knife. I kept that knife. In the evening I went to Banamali Patra and handed over the same to him. Banamali told me as to why I kept a knife with which murder was committed. He took the knife from me and threw it into his own Bari". Relevant portion of the evidence of p. w, 3 runs as follows :-- "One day p. w. 2 Rabindra came to me with a knife and told me that accused Bijay Soren gave him that knife. I asked him to throw the knife, I took the knife from him and threw it into our Bari. M. O. I is that knife." 17. Evidence of p. w. 2, as quoted above, clearly indicates that immediately after the occurrence the appellant went to him and confessed stating that he killed a person with the knife which he made over to him and went away. P.w. 2 being a young boy and a co-villager of the accused the latter reposed confidence in him while making the confession with the hope that be would not disclose the occurrence to others. 18. The only contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that in the eye of law the extra judicial confession as narrated above is not acceptable as p. w. 2 to whom he made it has nowhere said that he has close relationship with the accused. In our considered view, the accused and p, w. 2 being of the same village, which is inhabitated by a few aboriginal tribes each knowing the other, it is needless on the part of the prosecution to prove that p. w. 2 has close relationship with the accused. As we have pointed out above, believing that p. w. 2 would not disclose the incident to others, the accused made over the knife to p. w. 2, who in turn revealed this fact to p. w. 3 who asked him to throw away the knife and so saying took the same from him and threw it away in his Bari. The learned Sessions Judge has accepted the statement of p. w. 2 containing the extra-judicial confession made by the accused and placed his reliance on the same together with occular version of p. w. 8 in arriving at a conclusion that the accused is the real author of the crime. In our considered view, the extra judicial confession cannot always be regarded as a weak type of evidence. Rather it would depend upon the nature of the circumstances, the time when the confession was made, credibility of the witness who speaks to such confession. In the present case p. w. 2, a co-villager and above all a mere boy of 12 to 13 years has nothing to speak falsely against the accused and as such, we should not presume that extra-judicial confession is a weak type of evidence in the facts and circumstances as revealed from this case. Moreover, the confession has been made instantaneously and immediately after the occurrence and is not alleged to have been procured under any undue influence, coercion or pressure. The accused-appellant perhaps expected a favour from p. w. 2. But instead he revealed the truth regarding the occurrence to p. w. 3. In 2000(8) Supreme Today 402 (Gura Singh v. The State of Rajasthan), the Apex Court has ruled that extra-judicial confession, if true and voluntary, it can be relied upon by the Court to convict the accused for the commission of the crime as alleged. Despite inherent weakness of extra-judicial confession as an item of evidence, it cannot be ignored when shown that such confession was made before a person who has no reason-to state falsely and to whom,it is made in the circumstances which tend to support the statement. 19. In In Re: Man Singh Parma Teli it is held that an extra-judicial confession is undoubtedly a weak type of evidence but when it is corroborated by surrounding circumstances and other reliable evidence as in this case; it must be taken into consideration. In the instant case, we are bound to accept the extra-judicial confession made to p. w. 2 as it is corroborated by surrounding circumstances and other reliable evidence. 20. As regards weapons of offence, knife and axe (M. Os. In the instant case, we are bound to accept the extra-judicial confession made to p. w. 2 as it is corroborated by surrounding circumstances and other reliable evidence. 20. As regards weapons of offence, knife and axe (M. Os. I and II), we have found from the prosecution case itself as well as from the evidence of p. w. 5 that accused Bijoy Soren picked up the axe (M. O. II) from the spot where it was lying and assaulted the deceased by means of the same which he left on the spot while running away from there at the approach of p. w. 5. Evidence of the I. O. (p. w. 9) shows that the seized M. O. II from the spot under seizure list Ext. 10, So far as knife (M. O. I.) is concerned, we have already pointed out that accused Bijoy Soren fled away from the spot with the knife and kept it under the bed of Rabindra Ho (p. w. 2), a boy of 12 to 13 years while he was sleeping in a Government building in the village and woke him up and stated to have killed a man with the said knife. After he went away p. w. 2. an innocent boy who kept the knife with him revealed this fact to p. w. 3 who in turn rebuked him as to why he kept the knife with which murder was committed and so saying he threw it in his Bari. Evidence of p. w. 9 establishes that he arrested the accused and recorded his statement. While in custody, accused gave information that he concealed the knife under the bed of p. w. 2 immediately after the occurrence. At his instance, the I. O. went to the house of p. w. 2, who thereafter led the I. O. to the house of Banmali (p. w. 3) who in turn after supporting the statement of p. w. 2 led them to his Biri and showed the knife which was seized accordingly under seizure list Ext. 9. The I. O. proved the relevant seizure memo Ext. 9. Though two independent witnesses, namely, Udhaba Patra and Arjuna Patra, have attested Ext, 9 but the prosecution has not put them in witness box for the reason best known to it. 9. The I. O. proved the relevant seizure memo Ext. 9. Though two independent witnesses, namely, Udhaba Patra and Arjuna Patra, have attested Ext, 9 but the prosecution has not put them in witness box for the reason best known to it. But that is not the reason for discarding the evidence of p. w. 9 and the seizure memo Ext. 9. In the recent judgment of the Apex Court reported in 2000 SC 728 (State Government of NCT of Delhi v. Sunil. and another), it has been viewed by their Lordships that there is no requirement either u/s 27 of the Evidence Act or u/s 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to obtain signature of independent witnesses on the record in which statement of an accused is written. The legal obligation to call independent and respectable inhabitants of the locality to attend and witness the exercise made by the police is cast on the Police officer when searches are made under Chapter VII of the Code, Section 100(5) of the Code requires that such search shall be made in their presence and a list of all things seized in the course of such search and of the places in which they are respectively found, shall be prepared by such officer or other person "and signed by such witnesses". It must be remembered that search is made to find out a thing or document which the searching officer has no prior idea where the thing or document is kept. He prowls for it either on reasonable suspicion or on some guess work that it could possibly be ferreted out in such prowling. It is a stark reality that during searches the team which conducts search would have to meddle with lots of other articles and documents also and in such process many such articles or documents are likely to be displaced or even strewn helter-skelter. The legislative idea in insisting on such searches to be made in the presence of two independent inhabitants of the locality is to ensure the safety of all such articles meddled with and to protect the rights of the persons entitled thereto. But recovery of an object pursuant to the information supplied by an accused in custody is different from the searching endeavour envisaged in Chapter VII of the Code. 21. But recovery of an object pursuant to the information supplied by an accused in custody is different from the searching endeavour envisaged in Chapter VII of the Code. 21. It is also profitable to quote a few lines from the reported case where their Lordships have held as follows :-- "It is a fallacious impression that when recovery is effected pursuant to any statement made by the accused the document prepared by the Investigating Officer contemporaneous with such recovery must necessarily be attested by independent witnesses," 22. Their Lordships have made it clear that the Court has to believe the version of a police officer to be correct if it is not otherwise shown to be unreliable. That means the Court has to consider the evidence of the I.O. who deposed to the fact of recovery based on the statement elicited from the accused on its own worth. Their Lordships have observed that official acts of the police have bee nregularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognised even by the legislature. Hence when a police officer gives evidence in court that a certain article was recovered by him on the strength of the statement made by the accused, it is open to the court to believe the version to be correct if it is not otherwise shown to be unreliable. It is for the accused through cross-examination of witness or through any other materials, show that the evidence of the police officer is either unreliable or at least unsafe to be acted upon in a particular case. In the present case the evidence of the I. O. fp. w. 9) regarding seizure of the; weapons of offence (M. Os I and II) has not been rendered unworthy of credence by the defence. Moreover, during examination u/s 313, Cr. P. C. the accused has failed to explain all the circumstances including the seizure of M. Os. I and II made under seizure list Exts. 9 and 10, all leading to an irresistible conclusion of the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. 23. Therefore, in view of our discussion made above considering the direct evidence as well as the circumstantial evidence which has been cogently established by the prosecution. I and II made under seizure list Exts. 9 and 10, all leading to an irresistible conclusion of the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. 23. Therefore, in view of our discussion made above considering the direct evidence as well as the circumstantial evidence which has been cogently established by the prosecution. we are satisfied that the cumulative effect of the said evidence lead'us to the conclusion that within all human probabilities the accused-appellant and nonelse had committed the crime in question by doing away with the old lady to whom he suspected to have applied witchcraft to his father (d.w. 1) who was suffering from ailments for some time prior to the occurrence. 24. In the ultimate result for the reasons recorded above, we confirm the conviction and sentence of the appellant u/s 302, I. P. C. and dismissed the appeal preferred from Jail. B. P. Das, J. 25. I agree. 26. Appeal dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed