E.Padmanabhan, J.: These five habeas corpus petitions are being listed before us on a reference made by the Division Bench consisting of S.Jagadeesan and Prabha Sridevan, JJ. The said Division Bench while pointing out the contrary views taken by the earlier Division Benches passed the following orders: 1.Reference: (ORDER OF THE COURT WAS MADE BY S.Jagadeesan, J): The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner herein, challenging the impugned order of detention, is that the Tamil translated copy of the grounds of detention does not contain the correct meaning of English version of the grounds of detention. 2. In paragraph 5(1) of the grounds of detention, it is stated as follows: “I am aware that Tmt.Kuppammal is in remand and there is imminent possibility that she may come out on bail for the offences under Secs.4(1)(i) and 4(1-A) of Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937 by filing bail application in Court.” In the Tamil version, it is stated as follows: 3. The Tamil version would convey that the detaining authority is of the opinion that there is likelihood of the detenue coming out on bail by filing such bail applications. As in the English version, it is stated that there is imminent possibility that the detenue may come out on bail, no such term has been given in the Tamil version and the Tamil version on the grounds of detention simply mentions that there is some likelihood of the detenue coming out on bail. As this cannot be considered to be true and correct translation, the impugned order of detention is vitiated. 4. In fact, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the following Division Bench judgments of this Court: (i) Palaniammal v. District Magistrate and District Collector, Karur, (1999) L.W. (Crl.) 98. (ii) Kannammal v. State of Tamil Nadu, represented by Secretary to Government, Prohibition and Excise Department, Fort St.George, Chennai-9, H.C.P.No.2170 of 1999, dated 27.7.2000 and (iii) Banumathi v. District Magistrate and District Collector, Perambalur District, Perambalur, H.C.P.No.1820 of 1999, dated 19.6.2000." 5. (ii) Kannammal v. State of Tamil Nadu, represented by Secretary to Government, Prohibition and Excise Department, Fort St.George, Chennai-9, H.C.P.No.2170 of 1999, dated 27.7.2000 and (iii) Banumathi v. District Magistrate and District Collector, Perambalur District, Perambalur, H.C.P.No.1820 of 1999, dated 19.6.2000." 5. On the contrary, the learned Government Advocate on the Criminal Side contended that these judgments had been delivered by this Court without reference to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Bonid Bihari Mahato v. State of Bihar, 1974 Crl.L.J. 1457, wherein it had been held that the copy of the grounds of detention furnished to the detenue in the language known to him alone is to be taken into consideration and there should not be any comparison of the documents of English version to find out the lacuna, since the detenue is expected to know the contents of the grounds of detention only from the language known to him. If the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is mentioned therein, then, the order cannot be vitiated. 6. Learned Government advocate further referred to the judgment in the case of Rivadeneyta Ricardo Agustin v. Government of Delhi, 1994 S.C.C. (Crl.) 354 and contended that even the absence of the word "imminent" would not vitiate the order of detention, if the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority speaks about the possibility of the detenue coming out on bail. A Division Bench of this Court In H.C.P.No.566 of 1998 by order dated 3.2.1999 had also taken a similar view. 7. The learned Government Advocate also relied upon another judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ahamad Nassar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2000 Crl.L.J. 33, wherein the learned Judges of the Apex Court have held that the words "likely to be released" connote chances of being bailed out, in case there be pending bail application or in case if it is moved in future is decided. The word "likely" shows it can be either way. If these are to be taken into consideration, the Tamil version of the grounds of detention furnished to the detenue is identical and as such, the petitioner cannot be said to be prejudiced. 8. The word "likely" shows it can be either way. If these are to be taken into consideration, the Tamil version of the grounds of detention furnished to the detenue is identical and as such, the petitioner cannot be said to be prejudiced. 8. Yet another case relied upon by the learned Government Advocate is the judgment in H.C.P.No.1881 of 1998 for which one of us was a party wherein it has been held that the variation between the English version and the Tamil version would not vitiate the order of detention, unless the detenue is able to establish that the omission or the variation had prejudiced her right in any manner in making any representation to any of the authorities and thereby impaired the right of effective representation guaranteed under Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India. 9. Above all, reliance was placed on a judgment delivered by this Bench in H.C.P.No.27 of 2000, dated 1.8.2000, wherein we have held that in the English version, the words “imminent possibility” would denote the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that there is immediate possibility of the detenue moving any bail application and coming out thereon. In the Tamil version, it is stated that there is every possibility of the detenue filing the bail application and coming out on bail. Hence, the mere omission of the word “imminent” in the Tamil translated version would not vitiate the order of detention. In fact, when the matter was argued before us, none of the counsel on record referred to any of the authorities referred to above and hence, without any reference to the above judgments, we pronounced the order in the said H.C.P.No.27 of 2000. 10. From the above available materials, it is the contention of the learned Government Advocate that the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are without any reference to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Binod Behari v. State of Bihar, 1974 Crl.L.J. 1457 and virtually, the same is contrary to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court. Further, in the judgment delivered by us in H.C.P.No.27 of 2000, we had also taken a contrary view from the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Further, in the judgment delivered by us in H.C.P.No.27 of 2000, we had also taken a contrary view from the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. As, admittedly, the directly conflicting views are in the filed on this question, we are of the opinion that it will lead to other complications. Hence, we feel that it is a matter to be referred to a Full Bench in order to give a quietus to the principles to be followed. 11. “Accordingly, we direct the registry to place the papers before his Lordship Honourable The Acting Chief Justice for suitable orders for posting this matter before the Full Bench.” 2.II. Factual Matix: Before answering the points referred by the Division Bench, it would be appropriate to refer to the facts in one of the habeas corpus petitions. 3. In H.C.P.No.11 of 2000, the detenue Kuppammal had prayed for the issue of writ of habeas corpus petition to quash the order passed by the first respondent District Collector and District Magistrate, Tiruvallur District on 30th September, 1999 in his office reference No.B.D.F.G.I.S.. No.87/1999 and to set her at liberty. On 30th of September, 999, the first respondent passed orders of detention detaining the petitioner as the first respondent arrived at a subjective satisfaction that the detenue is a bootlegger and that she had to be detained in exercise of the powers conferred by Sec.3(1)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982). 4. The detaining authority, while noticing that the detenue had already been convicted in 10 earlier prohibition offences and also she had involved herself in prejudicial activities and also that on 17.9.1999 when the Inspector of Police, Prohibition Enforcement Wing, Tiruvallur along with the Police Party went for prohibition raid noticed that few persons were getting something from a person sitting on the backside of a house at the road side of the Railway Station, Sevvapet in a plastic tumbler and on seeing the police party, the unknown persons dropped the plastic tumblers and ran away. The said police apprehended the person who was sitting and on enquiry it is the detenue Kuppammal who was found selling I.D. arrack and she was found having a black coloured plastic can with a capacity of 35 liters with 32 liters of I.D. arrack which smelt bad odder. The said Kuppammal admitted that she had mixed Datura seeds with the I.D. arrack to increase its intoxication. The Inspector of Police and his party felt that if the said arrack is consumed by any one it will cause danger to the public life and health and therefore, the detenue was arrested after preparing the necessary arrest memo. The Inspector of Police seized the sale proceeds of Rs.45, 32 liters of I.D. arrack in the black can with two plastic tumblers and a funnel with smelling of arrack, under cover of mahazar in the presence of police witnesses as no independent witnesses were available. 5. The sample of about 500 ml each in two bottles were taken and sealed and labelled at the spot and the remaining I.D. arrack was destroyed and a certificate was also prepared to that effect. The said police registered a crime in P.E. W. Thiruvallur Cr.No.1749/99/u/s 4(1)(i) & 4(1-A) TNP Act, 1937. The accused was produced before the Judicial Magistrate II, Thiruvallur on the same day for remand till 1.10.1999. The samples seized were sent to the Laboratory through the Judicial Magistrate for chemical analysis. The Assistant Director, Tamil Nadu Forensic Science Lab, Prohibition Wing, Chepauk sent an analysis report to the effect that the liquor in the bottle contain Ethyl Alcohol, Acid, Esters, Higher Alcohols and Aldehydes and also Atropine and that it is arrack mixed with Atropine and that it contained 9.17 Mg% W/V of Atropine and that Atropine is a poisonous substance. The Medical Officer attached to the Government Hospital, Thiruvallur on a requisition opined that anyone consumes arrack mixed with Atropine, it would be injurious to health as Atropine is a poisonous substance and a consumer would develop dryness of mouth, tongue, skin, high fever, delirium of speech and palpitation of chest and hence if any person consumes arrack mixed with Atropine, it would endanger his life if not treated vigorously. 6. 6. On the said Inspector of Police swearing to an affidavit, and placing materials the detaining authority arrived at a subjective satisfaction that the said Kuppammal is a bootlegger as defined under Sec.2(b) of Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 and passed the order of detention with a view to prevent her from indulging in such prejudicial activities in future. The detenue was already in remand and the detaining authority was also aware that the detenue is injudicial remand, and there is imminent possibility of the detenue coming out on bail, for the offences under Sec.4(1)(i) and 4(1-A) of Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937 by filing bail application as in identical cases, the accused persons are enlarged on bail by the Court or by the superior Courts after a lapse of time and if she comes out on bail, the detenue will indulge herself in such further activities in future as well which will be prejudicial and detrimental to the maintenance of public health and public order. 7. The order of detention had been served on the detenue on 1.10.1999 along with the grounds of detention. The order of detention has been passed in English as also the grounds of detention. The Tamil version of the detention order as well as the grounds of detention also were served on the detenue at the same time and the detenue had been served with the order of detention as well as grounds of detention through the Warden, Women Special Prison, Vellore, who had translated and explained the contents of the detention order as well as the grounds of detention, besides the contents of the paper book containing material and relied upon documents were translated in Tamil and explained to the detenue. 8. One other aspect which requires to be mentioned is the material portion of the grounds of detention in English and the corresponding portion of the Tamil version of the same have to be referred. In one of the HCPs. (H.C.P.No.66 of 2000) the material portion of the grounds of detention reads thus: 5. I am aware that Thiru Selvam is in remand in Sub Jail, Pudukkottai and there is an imminent possibility that he may come out on bail for the offence under Secs.4(1)(I), 4(1-A) and (aaa) Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937 by filing bail application in the Court. (H.C.P.No.66 of 2000) the material portion of the grounds of detention reads thus: 5. I am aware that Thiru Selvam is in remand in Sub Jail, Pudukkottai and there is an imminent possibility that he may come out on bail for the offence under Secs.4(1)(I), 4(1-A) and (aaa) Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937 by filing bail application in the Court. I am also aware that in similar cases, accused are enlarged on bail by the same Court or by the superior Court after a lapse of some time. And if he comes out on bail, he will indulge in such activities in future as well which will be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and public health. Further the recourse to normal criminal law will not have the desired effect of effectively preventing him from indulging in such activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and public health. I am therefore of the opinion that curtailing his rights is essential for the maintenance of public order and public health. On the materials placed before me in ground case as well as in past cases, I am satisfied that the said Thiru Selvam is a “Boot-legger” and he will indulge in such further prejudicial activities in future as well which would disturb the public order and public health. Hence, there is a compelling necessity to detain him under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. The Tamil Version reads thus: 9. The difference with reference to other HCPs., is only the very same passage is divided into two or more paragraphs and in other respects there is no difference much less material difference in the language employed by the Detaining Authority in this respect. It is fairly stated that the translation of the grounds of detention with respect of the above extracted portion is not the exact translation but conveys the effect of the English version in Tamil. It is also admitted that the object and purpose of fair translation is to convey the same or nearest meaning of the order of detention, which has been passed in English version. At times, the verbatim translation also may not be possible and it is likely to be misread or misunderstood even. 10. It is also admitted that the object and purpose of fair translation is to convey the same or nearest meaning of the order of detention, which has been passed in English version. At times, the verbatim translation also may not be possible and it is likely to be misread or misunderstood even. 10. In the order passed by a different District Magistrate namely, District Collector, Thiruvallur, the grounds of detention read thus (H.C.P.No.103 of 2000): 5(1) I am aware that Thiru.Sampath, is in remand and there is imminent possibility that he may come out on bail for the offence under Secs.4(1)(i) and 4(1) (aaa) read with 4 (1 -A) of TNP Act 1937, by filing bail application in the Court. I am also aware that in similar cases, accused are enlarged on bail by the same Court or by the superior Court after lapse of some time. And if he comes out on bail, he will again indulge in such further activities in future as well which will be prejudicial to the maintenance of public health and public order. Further, the recourse to normal criminal law would not have the desired effect of effectively preventing him from indulging in activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public health and public order. On the materials placed before me, I am satisfied that Thiru Sampath, is a “bootlegger” and that there is a compelling necessity to detain him in order to prevent him from indulging in such acts in future which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public health and public order under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. 5(2) I am aware that Thiru.Sampth, has been remanded to judicial custody by the District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate Thiruvottiyur on 1.11.1999. He is a remand prisoner, lodged in the Central Prison, Chennai. He has not filed any bail application. There is possibility of him filing of a bail application and being enlarged on bail by the Criminal Court. I am also aware that in similar cases, bail is granted after lapse of some time and if Thiru Sampath, is then let to remain at large, he is likely to indulge in such further prejudicial activities in future as well and therefore there is compelling necessity to pass this order of detention with a view to preventing him from indulging in such prejudicial activities in future. The Tamil Version reads thus: 11.III. Discussions: The slight variance in Tamil version and the difference in translation is sought to be highlighted as a ground of challenge. In particular the aspect of imminent possibility of the detenue being enlarged on bail is sought to be raised and it continues to be a raging controversy to a certain extent. 12. Before answering the point that would arise for consideration, it is essential to refer to the law on the subject with reference to the Constitutional Provision, statutory provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 and various pronouncements on this point. 13. The writ of habeas corpus is primarily issued calling upon a person who had detained another to produce the detained individual in order to let the Court to know on what ground a detenue has been confined and set him at liberty if there is no legal justification for such detention. When once the Court comes to the conclusion that the detention is unlawful, the confinement cannot be permitted and consequently direction has to be issued to set the detenue at liberty. 14. The confinement of a person is either unlawful or considered to be unlawful in the following cases: (i) Where the detention is not authorised or under the shelter of any law or the detention law under which the detention ordered is void. (ii) Where the authority who had ordered detention is not the one specified or authorised in that behalf. (iii) Where though the specified authority ordering detention is competent and also acts under a valid law yet if such authority had failed to follow the procedure prescribed in that behalf. (iv) In some cases even when the authority had followed the procedure prescribed if action of said authority is vitiated by one or more of the defects or infirmity recognised in this respect by principles of administrative law such as (i) abuse of power; (ii) mala fides; (iii) perversity; (iv) non-application of mind; (v) arbitrariness; (vi) extraneous consideration or a fortiori reason or like. 15. It is equally well settled that strict compliance with the prescribed procedure or all legal requirements are considered as essential by various judicial pronouncements of the Apex Court and this Court. 15. It is equally well settled that strict compliance with the prescribed procedure or all legal requirements are considered as essential by various judicial pronouncements of the Apex Court and this Court. The detaining authority is required to follow strictly and scrupulously the forms and rules of law prescribed in that behalf or by the statutory provision under which the order of detention is being made after arriving at a subjective satisfaction. In the event of any deviation or violation of the statutory provisions or infraction of Constitutional guarantees, the Courts will not hesitate to quash the orders of detention, whatever be the justification to detain and the slightest infraction of the Constitutional guarantee would lead to the detenue being set at liberty. 16. At the same time, it is also settled principle that the Courts will not interfere with the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority if such subjective satisfaction is based upon some material from which a person with clear mind will arrive at the same subjective satisfaction or order detention. In other words a detention is unlawful if it is not in accordance with the law or if there is any deviation of the procedure established by law or such procedure has not been complied with. The detention, though under a valued law, if it infringes fundamental rights or if continuance of detention on the facts of the case renders the detention unconstitutional or if such detention is found to be unlawful or the detaining authority exceeds its authority or abuses it or exercises the power vested in it mala fide, then the detention order is liable to be set aside. 17. In G.Sadanandan v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1925, the Apex Court held thus: “14. Nevertheless, this Court naturally examines the detention orders carefully and allows full scope to the detenus to urge such statutory safeguards as are permissible under the Rules, and it has been repeatedly observed by this Court that in cases where this Court is satisfied that the impugned orders suffer from serious infirmities on grounds which it is permissible for the detenus to urge, the said orders would be set aside. Subject to this position, the merits of the orders of detention are not open to judicial scrutiny. Subject to this position, the merits of the orders of detention are not open to judicial scrutiny. That is why pleas made by the detenus that the impugned orders have been passed by the appropriate authorities without applying their minds properly to the allegations on which the impugned orders purport to be based, or that they have been passed mala fide, do not usually succeed, because this Court finds that the allegations made by the detenus are either not well-founded, or have been made in a casual and light-hearted manner. But cases do come before this Court, though not frequently, where this Court comes to the conclusion that the impugned order of detention is passed without the appropriate authority applying its mind to the problem, or that it can well be regarded as an order passed mala fide.” 18. It is by now well-settled that in all detention laws, the orders of detention and the continuance of detention should be in conformity with Art.22 and the Procedure laid down therein and slightest infraction of the Constitutional protection guaranteed by Art.22 and in some cases Art.21 or Art.19(1)(g) would be valid ground to make rule nisi absolute and consequently Courts do direct the detenue to be set at liberty forthwith. 19. The Division Bench reference is focused with respect to the alleged infringement of Art.22(5) of the Constitution in that the Tamil translation of the grounds of detention is not identical to the English version of the grounds of detention passed and served on the detenue or on such difference in translation being pointed. It is contended by the counsel for the petitioners that rule nisi has to be made absolute, irrespective of the fact whether any prejudice has been caused to the detenue or not and when there is a difference ipso facto, the detenue has to be set at liberty, whether any prejudice pleaded or established or not. It is contended by the counsel for the petitioners that rule nisi has to be made absolute, irrespective of the fact whether any prejudice has been caused to the detenue or not and when there is a difference ipso facto, the detenue has to be set at liberty, whether any prejudice pleaded or established or not. 20.Per contra, it is contended that it would be sufficient, if the translation of the detention order or grounds of detention served or furnished in the language known to the detenue conveys the effect or the meaning what the detaining authority intended to convey and it is not necessary to furnish a literal translation and it would be sufficient, if a fair translation or a translation which is not misleading or which may disable the detenue from making a representation is furnished. It is being pointed out that fair translation would satisfy the procedure prescribed by Art.22 as well as the Statutory Provision of Act 14 of 1992. The purpose of translation being to convey the meaning or effect of the order or grounds of detention so as to enable the detenue to make a representation, which is guaranteed by Art.22 of the Constitution. One another aspect, which requires to be considered is about the expressions, such as likelihood or imminent possibility or such other expression or basic expiration required to be conveyed or set out by the detaining authority which would satisfy the legal requirements in this behalf. 21. In A.Alangarasamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1987 S.C.C. (Crl.) 477, the Apex Court had occasion to consider the variation or difference between the English version as well as Tamil version of grounds of detention served on the detenue and while concurring with the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court held that the alleged difference between the two versions is lot so different so as to cause any prejudice to he detenue and in that view of the matter confirmed the order passed by the Division Bench. It is on the view that the two versions are not so different nor they had caused any prejudice to the detenue. It is on the view that the two versions are not so different nor they had caused any prejudice to the detenue. It has been laid down that unless the versions of grounds served on the detenue is totally different or the two versions are so different which may warrant an inference of prejudice in other respects, merely because an attempt is made to magnify such a difference would not be a ground to interfere with the order of detention. 22. In other words, the exact translation not being possible, what is expected is a fair or reasonable translation, which would convey the meaning or the effect or what was in the mind of detaining authority so that the detenue would be in a position to understand the grounds of detention and the detenue is apprised of the materials based upon which the detaining authority arrived at its subjective satisfaction. 23. While considering the scope of Art.22(5) of the Constitution and the detention provision, the Apex Court held that documents, statements and other materials incorporated in the grounds of detention, which have influenced the mind of the detaining authority in arriving at the requisite subjective satisfaction must be furnished to the detenue in a script or in the language which he understands. The emphasis being non-supply of the grounds of detention or such materials or documents along with the grounds, the failure of which would be a violation of safeguard or rights guaranteed under Art.22(5) of the Constitution. 24. It is essential to refer to the dictionary meaning of the word “translate” as set out in 1.Oxford Dictionary: express the sense of (words or text) in another language. 2.Chambers Dictionary: to render into another language; to express in another artistic medium; to interpret, put in plainer terms, explain. 3.Black’s Law Dictionary: translation means “The reproduction in one language of a book, document or speech into another language.” 25. Translation in common parlance signifies the version out of one language into another. Translation in other words as distinguished from an imitation or adaptation, would mean a full and faithful and not necessarily a literal representation of the whole sentence which is to be translated or which is to be communicated or which the detenue should be intimated in the language known to the detenue. Translation in other words as distinguished from an imitation or adaptation, would mean a full and faithful and not necessarily a literal representation of the whole sentence which is to be translated or which is to be communicated or which the detenue should be intimated in the language known to the detenue. In other words, the detenue should understand or know the grounds of detention or material documents relied upon by the detaining authority by incorporation of such terminology or expression or medium of a version of the language which is known to the detenue, which enables him to make an effective representation. 26. Etymologically, the translation would mean expressing the sense of a word or a sentence or an expression or speech in another language. Language means the method of human communication either spoken or written consisting of the use of words in an agreed way, which includes the faculty of speech, a style or the faculty of expression or the use of the words. It is nothing, but a method of expression or communication. When it comes of translation, it would mean mere expression of the sense of a word or sentence or speech or writing or book etc., in another language. 27. It is impossible to translate verbatim the same expression or words. But what is possible being conveying the meaning or expression or implication in a language known to the detenue to which the sentence or terminology or expressions or words are to be translated. By a fair translation, effective meaning could be conveyed which would serve the purpose of such translation, so that the person who is not conversant with particular language could understand the contents or the implication or the effect of expression in another language which a person may know. What is required is a fair or reasonable translation and such reasonable or fair translation could be expressed in such form or sentence or it could be coined in certain words or expression, which would convey the meaning or effect of it. Words or sentence in any language will have one or more meanings and depending upon the context in which they are used, the words would mean differently as well. 28. Words or sentence in any language will have one or more meanings and depending upon the context in which they are used, the words would mean differently as well. 28. Neither the official translator nor a person who is employed to translate is a linguist so that he could be expected to give an exact or a reasonable, fair meaning or implications of the word used in a language while translating it. Therefore, it has to be taken that a translation in a language known to the detenue would mean a. reasonable translation, which would convey what was on the mind of the detaining authority or what had prevailed in the mind of the detaining authority while arriving at the subjective satisfaction based upon the grounds of detention and the materials. Such a view alone would serve the purpose and any other hypertechnical approach would defeat the very preventive detention or render it nugatory. 29. The purpose of intimating the grounds of detention or the materials based upon which the subjective satisfaction arrived at is to convey to the detenue the grounds or reasons or documents, which had weighed with the detaining authority while arriving at the subjective satisfaction and it is a mental process by which the subjective satisfaction arrived at on the basis of materials placed. In respect of such materials there could not be an exact translation in a language which is known to the detenue, but what is being implied or what is sought to be conveyed or what is sought to be intimated to the detenue could be furnished by a translation and such translation not being a deliberate or purposeful conveyance of a wrong or misleading meaning. 30. The communication of the grounds in a language known to the detenue is for the purpose of enabling the detenue to make a representation, a right which is guaranteed by latter part of the clause contained in Art.22(5) of the Constitution. In other words, the grounds of detention should be communicated to the detenue in the language which he understands. The real effect as well as the test is whether the grounds supplied to the detenue enabled the detenue to make an effective representation. In other words, the grounds of detention should be communicated to the detenue in the language which he understands. The real effect as well as the test is whether the grounds supplied to the detenue enabled the detenue to make an effective representation. The very purpose of communication of grounds of detention to the detenue or the communication of the materials based upon which the subjective satisfaction arrived at is to enable the detenue to know the grounds of detention so that he could make a representation against such detention, which is one of the rights guaranteed under Art.22(5) of the Constitution. 31. When the grounds are communicated in a language known to the detenue the same would enable the detenue to make a representation and an effective representation too. Therefore, it would be sufficient, if the grounds of detention or the materials based upon which the subjective satisfaction arrived at is conveyed or the required implications by suitable expression of such grounds or a nearest possible meaning and not by a purposeful misleading meaning is translated and placed before the detenue. 32. In Union of India and another v. Shantaram Gajanan Kanekar and another, (1994)2 S.C.C. 571, while considering the validity of grounds of detention served in a language known to detenue (in that case Marathi language) not tallying with its counterpart in English, the Apex Court held that if the translation is a totally different version of the declaration and it does not tally with the grounds of detention made in the official language, as a result of such defective translation, it was not possible for the detenue to make an effective representation, then the order of detention is liable to be quashed. In that context, it has been held thus: “2. The respondent was served with an order of detention made under Sec.3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter”the Act“). The detenue, it is not disputed, did not know English and was conversant with Marathi language only. Marathi version of the grounds of detention was furnished to the detenue. The respondent was also served with a copy of the declaration made under Sec.9(1) of the Act together with the Marathi version of the declaration. The detenu questioned the order of detention as also the declaration issued under Sec.9(1) of the Act on various grounds. Marathi version of the grounds of detention was furnished to the detenue. The respondent was also served with a copy of the declaration made under Sec.9(1) of the Act together with the Marathi version of the declaration. The detenu questioned the order of detention as also the declaration issued under Sec.9(1) of the Act on various grounds. The principal objection raised on behalf of the detenu before the High Court was that the Marathi version of the declaration under Sec.9(1) of the Act did not tally with its counterpart in English and due to that defect, the detenu was prevented from making an effective representation under Art.22(5) of the Constitution. The High Court, on facts, found that the two versions of the declaration did not tally with each other. The High Court found that the translated version of the declaration under Sec.9(1) of the Act was defective and opined that it was not possible for the detenu to make an effective representation. The order of detention was, therefore, quashed.” 33. It has been emphasised and repeatedly held that all documents, statements and other materials incorporated in the grounds of detention and which have influenced in the mind of the detaining authority in arriving at the requisite subjective satisfaction must be conveyed or furnished in a script or language, which he understands as the detenu has got a right to make an effective representation against his detention. In other words, what was in the mind of the detaining authority while arriving at the subjective satisfaction on the materials should be conveyed by fair translation and not by a literal translation, which may at times lead to incongruity. 34. In every case, the communication of the grounds of detention in English, so long as it continues to be the official language of the State would satisfy with the Constitutional requirements, but when a detenu who is not conversant with the English language, in order to satisfy with the Constitutional requirements it would be sufficient, if translation conveys what was in the mind of the detaining authority or what was sought to be conveyed or transposed or transmitted to the mind of the detenu for all purposes, which the detenu understands it. Merely because a letter or a particular expression or a different implication by employing certain expression or word or terminology had been conveyed while translating in our considered view, is of little consequence. 35. It is also the consistent view that the grounds of detention and material documents based upon which the subjective satisfaction arrived at are being translated or furnished or being communicated in a language known to the detenu by translation of such materials and documents, besides explaining the contents of the same at the time of serving the grounds of detention. It would be sufficient, if the detenu understands the grounds and makes a representation effectively. 36. At the risk of repetition, it has to be pointed out that the detenu should be made aware of the nature of the allegations attributed to or made against him and he should be conveyed of the same in his own language either by communicating the translated copy of the same or by explaining the same to the detenu in his own language. While considering the case of an illiterate person in Jayanta Jadav v. The State of W.B., (1974)4 S.C.C. 503 , the Apex Court held thus: "4. It is also contended that the petitioner is illiterate and since the order of detention was not explained to him orally in his own language he had no opportunity to make an effective representation. The affidavit of the Deputy Secretary shows that the vernacular translation of the detention order was supplied to the petitioner on the very day of the order of detention was served on him. Besides, the petitioner had made his representation to the Government and had also appeared in person before the Advisory Board. It cannot, therefore, be said that the petitioner was not aware of the nature of allegations made against him." 37. In Devji Vallabhabai v. Administrator Goa, Daman and Diu, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1029, where the copy of detention order in English was served on the detenu not knowing English, but copy of grounds of detention was served in the language understood by the detenu, it was held that there is no violation of Art.22 merely on the ground that the order of detention was in English. In that context it has been held thus: "So far as the non-supply of the Gujarati version of the ORDER as per Annexure ‘A’ is concerned, in our opinion, there has been no violation of Art.22(5) or any other law. The ORDER as per Annexure ‘A’ was a mere formal recital of Sec.3(1) of the COFEPOSA, showing the provision of law under which the order of detention has been made. Although the Section of the COFEPOSA has not been mentioned in the last but two paragraphs of the "grounds", it has been stated that the detenu engaged himself "in smuggling goods and that there is sufficient cause to pass detention order against you with a view to preventing you from smuggling goods", which was in Gujarati. It cannot, therefore, be said that the detenu was in any way handicapped in submitting his representation, or there has been any violation of Art.22(5) of the Constitution. 9. The learned counsel, support of this third submission, cited before us the decision of this Court in the case of State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya, 1951 S.C.R. 1167: A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 157. The decision is beside the point and need not be referred to. Learned counsel for the petitioner also cited another decision of this Court reported in Nainmal Partap Mah Shah v. Union of India, (1980)4 S.C.C. 427 : A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 2129. In that case, it has been held that failure to supply the grounds of detention in the language understood by the detenu violates Art.22(5) of the Constitution. In the instant case, as we have found above, the Gujarati translation of the grounds was supplied to the detenu. The decision cited has not held that the ORDER expressed in terms; of Sec.3(1) of the COFEPOSA must also be in the language understood by the detenu. Sec.3(1) as stated above merely gives power of detention to the detaining authority. This submission also has no substance." 38. A Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court after analysing the entire case law in Shivaji Dondoji Padaki v. Government of India, I.L.R. 1989 Karn. 2361, held that failure to furnish the detention order in the language known to the detenu will not render the detention illegal when the grounds of detention are properly communicated to the detenu in the languages known to him. In that context it has been held thus: "20. 2361, held that failure to furnish the detention order in the language known to the detenu will not render the detention illegal when the grounds of detention are properly communicated to the detenu in the languages known to him. In that context it has been held thus: "20. The ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Devji Vallabhai’s case, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1029 shows that when the grounds of detention are properly communicated to the detenu, in the language known to him, failure to furnish the detention order in the language known to the detenu will not render the detention illegal. 21. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, contended that when the order of detention is communicated to the detenu in the language known to him, but the said order differs from the conclusion arrived at in the "grounds of detention" as communicated to the detenu, there will be confusion in the mind of the detenu. The "grounds of detention" here according to the learned counsel, travels beyond the order of detention and since they do not tally with each other, it was not possible for the detenu to make an effective representation. Learned counsel for the petitioner draws a distinction between a case where the order of detention is served in English with the grounds of detention only being translated in the language known to the detenu (as in Devji Vallabhai’s case, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1029,) and the case where both the ‘orders’ and the ‘grounds’ are translated and supplied to the detenu. In the former case detenu may infer the English version of the order, from what is stated in the grounds; but in the second situation, detenu will find material discrepancies between the ‘order’ and the satisfaction expressed in the grounds; hence it is contended that there is every likelihood of confusion in the mind of the detenu falling under the latter situation. 22. Facts and situations differ from cases and cases. Here is a detenu residing in Hubli, paying a monthly rent of Rs.1,500. He is a man of substantial means; he owns a car which he runs for hire engaging a driver. He has the facility of telephone in his house; he is also building a new house; he is also employed in a concern, in which his wife has invested a large capital. He is a man of substantial means; he owns a car which he runs for hire engaging a driver. He has the facility of telephone in his house; he is also building a new house; he is also employed in a concern, in which his wife has invested a large capital. He was indulging in the activities of disposing off smuggled gold even on earlier occasions, according to his statement recorded under Sec.108 of the Customs Act. He may be ignorant of the English language and understood only the Kanada version of the order served on him, which conveyed the idea that he was to be prevented from engaging in ‘transporting’, concealing and ‘transporting’ smuggled goods; word ‘transporting’ got repeated in the Kannada version of the order. However, para. 10 of the Kannada version of grounds of detention, after narrating all the facts of the case, says that it was to prevent him from engaging in ‘transporting, concealing and keeping’ the smuggled goods. The narration of the facts, the summary of the materials referred by the Detaining Authority and the satisfaction arrived at by him at para.10 of the grounds conclusively show that there cannot be any confusion in the mind of the petitioner in respect of which he has to make the representation. The grounds are clear and specific and the requirement is to supply a proper translation of the grounds." 39. The grounds of detention served on the detenu in the language known to the detenu should not be distorted or altogether different from English version of the grounds of detention. If the translation is distortive and the translation is altogether different from the English version of the grounds of detention, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that there is clear violation of fact of Art.22(5) of the Constitution. In Shekhar Shantaram Pawaskar v. V.K.Saraf, 1990 Crl.L.J. 138, it has been held thus: "According to Shri Thakare, the petitioner had not been furnished with the grounds of detention and the full and accurate material in support thereof. This had materially affected his right to make an effective representation. He pointed out that amongst the documents furnished to the detenu was a Medical Certificate dated the 26th of October, 1988 in respect of the injuries sustained by one Sidram M.Guram. The original of this certificate is in English. This had materially affected his right to make an effective representation. He pointed out that amongst the documents furnished to the detenu was a Medical Certificate dated the 26th of October, 1988 in respect of the injuries sustained by one Sidram M.Guram. The original of this certificate is in English. The petitioner was also furnished with a translation of the said certificate in Marathi. If one peruses both these documents, it is apparent that the Marathi translation is a wholly inaccurate and incomplete translation of the Medical Certificate, the original of which is in English. The injury described in the English Medical Certificate is CLW 6 cm x 1/2 cm over scalp, left side skin deep. "The same injury in the Marathi translation is described as an injury "6 x 1/2" on the left side knee." Further, the following portion which is found in the English Certificate is totally absent in the Marathi translation: "The above injuries were sustained by him/ her as per his/her statement accidentally during the performance of his/her legitimate duties and are/were not due to his/her own negligence as disobedience of orders. He is recommended leave for a period of..... His injuries were such as to prevent him from attending to his normal duties." In view of the aforesaid description it will have to be held that the detenu was confused as to which was the true Medical Certificate. Whether the English or the Marathi translation thereof. This had obviously affected adversely his right to make an effective representation, a right which is guaranteed under Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India. In view of the infringement of this fundamental right of the petitioner, it will have to be held that the continued detention of the petitioner is not legal and stand vitiated. 40. On a consideration of the entire case law on the subject, we are of the considered view that the translated or vernacular copy of the grounds of detention furnished to the detenu should not be a distorted one or it should not give a completely different meaning or version when translated copy of the grounds of detention in the language known to the detenu is furnished. The Constitutional requirements would be satisfied by translating and explaining the contents of grounds of detention and furnishing a copy of the grounds of detention in the language known to the detenu and it would be sufficient if such translation conveys or communicates what had been expressed by the detaining authority in the grounds of detention made in official language and it would be sufficient if the translation conveys the meaning or the implications or what the detaining authority meant and desired to covey and it should not be distorted or it should not give altogether a different meaning. 41. In the present case, it is sufficient to answer the larger issue referred to Full Bench and it is not necessary to go into the merits of this contention as already the detention has been quashed on other grounds. The reference is ordered in the above terms. 42. That apart recently in Amritlal and others v. Union Government through, Secretary, Ministry of Finance and others, A.I.R. 2000 S.C.W. 4203, their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down that there must be cogent materials before the detaining authority who had passed the order of detention that the detenu is likely to be released on bail and inference must be drawn from the available material on record and not be the ipso dixit of the officer passing the order of detention. In that context, the Apex Court held thus: "4. In Agustin’s decision, (1994)1 S.C.C. (Supp.) 597, this Court also placed strong reliance on an earlier but oft-cited decision of this Court in Binod Singh v. Dit Magistrate, Dhanabad, (1986)4 S.C.C. 416 : A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 2090; 1986 Crl.L.J. 1959, wherein it was held that if a person is in custody and there is no imminent possibility of his being released therefrom, the power of detention should not ordinarily be exercised. This Court held that there must be cogent materials before the officer passing the detention order that the detenu is likely to be released on bail. The inference must be drawn from the available material on record and must not be the ipso dixit of the officer passing the order of detention. This Court held that there must be cogent materials before the officer passing the detention order that the detenu is likely to be released on bail. The inference must be drawn from the available material on record and must not be the ipso dixit of the officer passing the order of detention. It is in this perspective as above, that the recording of the concerned officer in the matter under reference ought to be noticed and the same reads as below: "Even though prosecution proceedings under Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 have been initiated against Shri Amritlal I am satisfied that there is compelling necessity in view of the likelihood of his moving an application for bail and in the event of this being granted bail, the likelihood of his indulging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs as is evident from the trend of his activities, to detain him under the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988.“ 5. It is this reasoning which the learned advocate contended that the High Court should have held to be completely erroneous in the matter of being the basis of an order of detention. 6. The requirement as noticed above in Binod Singh’s case, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 2090: 1986 Crl.L.J. 1959, that there is”likelihood of the petitioners being released on bail“that however is not available in the reasonings as provided by the concerned officer. The reasoning available is the ‘likelihood of his moving an application for bail’ which is different from ‘likelihood to be released on bail.‘This reasoning, in our view, is not sufficient compliance with the requirements as laid down. 7. The emphasis, however, in Binod Singh’s case, (1986)4 S.C.C. 416 : A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 2090: 1986 Crl.L.J. 1959, that before passing the detention order of the concerned authority must satisfy himself of the likelihood of the petitioner being released on bail and that satisfaction ought to be reached on cogent material. Available cogent material is the likelihood of having a bail application moved in the matter but not obtaining a bail order.” 43. Their Lordships while reiterating the pronouncement in Binod Singh’s case, (1986)4 S.C.C. 416 : A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 2090: 1986 Crl.L.J. 1959, held as above. Available cogent material is the likelihood of having a bail application moved in the matter but not obtaining a bail order.” 43. Their Lordships while reiterating the pronouncement in Binod Singh’s case, (1986)4 S.C.C. 416 : A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 2090: 1986 Crl.L.J. 1959, held as above. In the light of the said recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court, it is unnecessary to refer to any other earlier dicta of this Court, where different views were taken. 44. Hence we hold that the detaining authority must satisfy himself of the likelihood of the petitioner being released on bail and such satisfaction to be reached on cogent materials and such material is the likelihood of having a bail application moved in the matter but not obtaining a bail order. 45. It has been emphasised that merely moving an application for bail is not a cogent material and the detention order based on such material is likely to be quashed and in that context it has been held that the reasoning “likelihood to be released on bail” is different from “likelihood of his moving an application for bail”. 46. Therefore, evidently on the cogent materials placed, the detaining authority should arrive at a satisfaction that the detenu who is likely to be enlarged on bail on the said detenu having already moved for his being enlarged on bail or his taking out such an application in this respect, which alone would satisfy the clamping of the detention in a case where the detenu is in custody. 47.III. Answer: The reference is answered as above. No consequential orders need be passed in these H.C.Ps., as already the very detenus have been ordered to be set at liberty on the ground that they were not apprised of or informed their right to make a representation to the very detaining authority till the detention was approved, following the decision of the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra and others v. Santosh Shankar Acharya, J.T. (2000)8 S.C. 374.