JUDGMENT S. Barman Roy, J. : By this writ petition, petitioner has, inter alia, prayed for writ of mandamous or any other appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the respondents not to curtail quota of kerosene supply to petitioner as fixed by the Sub-Divisional Controller, Food and Supply, Alipurduar and the District Controller, Food and Supply, Jalpaiguri from time to time. 2. Case of the petitioner in short is that he is the proprietor of M/s. Kiran Agency. Pursuant to an agreement dated 1.3.1984 between the petitioner and respondent No.5 being the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., petitioner was appointed as kerosene dealer for Alipurduar. After the petitioner was so appointed as dealer of kerosene for Alipurduar, he applied before appropriate authority for granting him licence under the provisions of West Bengal Kerosene Control Order, 1968 so that he may carryon his business as kerosene agent of the said oil distributing company i.e., Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. para 3(a) of the said order defines "Agent" to mean a person who is appointed as an agent of Oil Distributing Company by such Company and has been granted a licence under para 5 thereof to carryon business of kerosene agency. Soon thereafter the Director of the consumer goods, Govt. of West Bengal granted necessary licence in favour of the petitioner under para 5 of the said order to Carry on business of kerosene agent within the meaning of para 3 thereof. Said licence was renewed from time to time. Be there as it may, said licence is valid up to 31.3.2001 due to renewal granted from time to time. Various terms and conditions as stipulated in the said licence are quoted hereunder:- "1. The licensee may sell kerosene to any licenced dealer or to the holder of any permit or delivery order issued by the Director. 2. The licensee shall submit to the Director in Calcutta or to the District Magistrate elsewhere a monthly statement showing the amount of kerosene released monthly by the Oil Distributing Companies for sale in each of the areas mentioned on this license and shall be bound to report at once to the said office and changes in these quantities which he may have to make by order of the Oil Distributing Companies. 3. 3. As long as the licensee has stocks of kerosene released by the Oil Distributing Companies for a particular period left in his possession, he shall not during that period refuse to sell kerosene oil to any licensed dealer or to the holder of any permit or delivery order issued by the Director in Calcutta and the District Magistrate. 4. The licensee, whenever he makes a sale, shall enter the name and address of his firm, the date of sale and the quantity of kerosene sold on the back of the license and shall sign such entries. 5. (a) The licensee shall maintain daily accounts in registers as may be prescribed by the Director. (b) The licensee shall submit to the Director in Calcutta or to the District Magistrate elsewhere a monthly abstract of registers in such form as may be specified by the Director. 6. The licensee must grant a printed cash memo for every sale. 7. The licensee shall exhibit prominently in front of his depot a board stating- (a) the fact that he is a licensed agent, and (b) the schedule of maximum prices of kerosene fixed by the proper authority. 8. the licensee sells in tins, he shall sell in full tins equivalent to standard quantity of 18.5 Its. 9. The licensee shall comply with the provisions of the West Bengal Kerosene Control Order, 1968." 3. On perusal of the terms and conditions as stipulated in the said license and the agreement it appears to me that no one fixed quota of kerosene supply to the petitioner. In fact in paragraph 9 of the writ petition it was specifically pleaded by the petitioner that "the Indian Oil Corporation did not fix any quota and that it is regularly supplying kerosene sometimes more than 150 kls., sometimes less than 250 kls ......." Further case of the petitioner, as pleaded in paragraph 10 and elsewhere of the writ petition, is that "in view of practice and procedure" Indian Oil Corporation supplied petitioner with kerosene as per direction issued by the Director of Consumer Goods or the quota fixed by the Sub-Divisional Controller, Food and Supply. 4. According to the petitioner, after he receives kerosene supply from the Indian Oil Corporation, he is to supply kerosene to various M. R. Dealers tagged with petitioner as per the quota fixed by the Sub-Divisional Controller for each such M.R. Dealer. 4. According to the petitioner, after he receives kerosene supply from the Indian Oil Corporation, he is to supply kerosene to various M. R. Dealers tagged with petitioner as per the quota fixed by the Sub-Divisional Controller for each such M.R. Dealer. So, the Indian Oil Corporation is under obligation to supply the petitioner with such quantity of kerosene so that the petitioner may be in a position to maintain supply of kerosene to all M. R. Dealers as per the quota fixed by the Sub-Divisional Controller for each such M. R. Dealer. Therefore, it is beyond the authority/jurisdiction of the Divisional Manager, Indian Oil Corporation to .fix any quota of kerosene supply to the petitioner which may fall short of the aggregate quantity of kerosene for maintaining supply of kerosene to all M. R. Dealers attached to petitioner's agency as per the quota fixed for them by the Sub-Divisional Controller. 5. However, by letter dated 17.10.2000, the Indian Oil Corporation informed the District Controller, Jalpaiguri that despite its previous letters the District Controller had not informed the Indian Oil Corporation the names of at least three contiguous dealers of Alipurduar for diverting the quota over and above 250 kls. of M/s. Kiran Agency. By the said letter the Corporation further informed said District Controller that if it did not receive any reply from the District Controller by the end of the month of October, 2000, said Corporation would be complelled to divert the excess quantity of M/s. Kiran Agency as per his own judgment. Soon after that the Sub-Divisional Controller, Food and Supply, Alipurduar by his letter dated 2.11.2000 informed the Divisional Manager (Marketing) I.O.C., Siliguri that quantity of kerosene supplied to Kiran Agency over and above 250 kls. may be distributed to other dealers. However, soon after that the Sub-Divisional Controller by his another letter dated 3.11.2000 withdrew his earlier letter dated 2.11.2000. Despite this said Corporation is continuing to supply kerosene oil to the petitioner on the basis of the said letter dated 2.11.2000. may be distributed to other dealers. However, soon after that the Sub-Divisional Controller by his another letter dated 3.11.2000 withdrew his earlier letter dated 2.11.2000. Despite this said Corporation is continuing to supply kerosene oil to the petitioner on the basis of the said letter dated 2.11.2000. The petitioner referred to some letters issued by Sub-Divisional Controller and also the District Controller reqesting the Indian Oil Corporation to supply specific quota of kerosene to the petitioner ignoring what was written by the Sub-Divisional Controller, Food and Supply in his aforesaid letter dated 2.11.2000 so that the petitioner may be in a position to maintain supply of kerosene to various M.R. Dealers tagged with him as per the quota fixed by the Food and Supply Department. 6. Now, as the Indian Oil Corporation is not supplying the petitioner with appropriate quota of kerosene as fixed by the Food and Supply Department, he has approached this Court in this writ petition for appropriate relief, as already stated. According to the petitioner, Indian Oil Corporation is not even supplying the petitioner with minimum quota of kerosene of 250 kls. as fixed by Sub-Divisional Controller, Food and Supply. 7. It is the case of the ld. Counsel for the State respondents that minimum quota of kerosene supply to the petitioner is 215 kls. and not 250 kls. In all other respects he supported the case of the petitioner. 8. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for the Indian Oil Corporation drew my specific attention to Clause 28 of the agreement between Indian Oil Corporation and the petitioner under which petitioner was appointed as its dealer/ agent. Said Clause reads as under:- "Any dispute or difference of any nature whatsoever or regarding any right, liability act omission or account of any of the parties hereto arising out of or in relation to this agreement shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the Director Marketing of the Corporation or of some officer of the Corporation who may be nominated by the Director Marketing. The dealer will not be entitled to raise any objection to any such arbitrator on the ground that the arbitrator is an officer of the Corporation or that he has to deal with the matters to which the contract relates of that in the course of his duties as an officer of the Corporation he had expressed views on all of any other matters. In dispute or difference in the event of the arbitrator to whom the matter is originally referred being transferred or vacating his office or being unable to act for any reasons, the Director Marketing as aforesaid at the time of such transfer vacation of office or inability to act, shall designate another person to act as arbitrator in accordance with the terms of the agreement. Such persons shall be entitled to proceed with the reference from the point at which it was left by his predecessor. It is also a term of this contract that no person other than the Director Marketing or a person nominated by such Director marketing of the Corporation as aforesaid shall act or arbitrator hereunder. The award of the arbitrator so appointed shall be final conclusive and binding on all parties to the agreement, subject to the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 or any statutory modification or re-enactment thereof and the rules made thereunder for the time being in force shall apply to the arbitration proceeding under this clause. The award shall be made in writing and published by the arbitrator within six months after entering upon the reference or within such extended time not exceeding further four months as the sole arbitrator shall by a writing under his own hands appoint. The arbitrator shall have power to order and direct either of the parties to abide by observe and perform all such directions as the arbitrator may think fit having regard to the matter in difference i.e. dispute before him. The arbitrator shall have all summary powers and may take such abdence oral/or documentary as the arbitrator in his absolute discretion thinks fit and shall be entitled to exercise all powers under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 including admission of any affidavit as evidence or the matter in difference i.e. dispute before him. The arbitrator shall have all summary powers and may take such abdence oral/or documentary as the arbitrator in his absolute discretion thinks fit and shall be entitled to exercise all powers under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 including admission of any affidavit as evidence or the matter in difference i.e. dispute before him. The arbitrator shall be at liberty to appoint, if necessary any accountant or engineering or other technical person to assist him and to act by the opinion so taken. The arbitrator shall have power to make or more awards whether interim or otherwise in respect of the dispute and difference and in particular will be entitled to make separate awards in respect of claims or cross claims of the parties. The arbitrator shall be entitled to direct anyone of the parties to pay the costs of the other party in such manner and to such extent as the arbitrator may in his discretion determine and shall also be entitled to require one or both the parties to deposit funds in such proportion to meet the arbitrators expenses whenever called upon to do so. The parties hereby agree that the courts in the city of Calcutta alone shall have jurisdiction to entertain any application or other proceedings in respect of anything arising under this agreement and any award or awards made by the sole arbitrator hereunder shall entitled to the concoctment courts in the city of Calcutta only." 9. According to the learned Counsel for the Indian Oil Corporation, the relation between the petitioner and the Corporation is governed by the terms and conditions stipulated in the aforesaid agreement dated 1.3.1984. From the said agreement it would be evident that the Indian Oil Corporation has the absolute discretion to fix quantity of kerosene oil to be supplied by it to the petitioner every month. He further contended that no specific quota of supply of kerosene to the petitioner has been fixed in the agreement. It has been left open to the discretion of the Corporation to supply such quantity of kerosene as it may deem fit and proper on month to month basis. Relying upon these circumstances and Clause 18 of the agreement, in particular, it is contended by him that the present writ petition is not at all maintainable as the petitioner seeks to enforce contractual rights. Relying upon these circumstances and Clause 18 of the agreement, in particular, it is contended by him that the present writ petition is not at all maintainable as the petitioner seeks to enforce contractual rights. According to him, only remedy available to the petitioner is what is provided by or under Clause 18 of the said agreement and certainly not the instant writ petition. 10. Now, it is well settled that writ under Article 226 of the Constitution can be issued for two-fold purposes only, viz., (a) enforcement of fundamental rights as well as of (b) non-fundamental rights or in other words, ordinary legal rights. Under the first part, a writ may be issued under Article 226 only after a decision that the aggrieved party has a fundamental right and that it has been infringed. Similarly, under the second part, it may be issued only after a finding that the aggrieved party has a legal right which entitles him to any of the writs mentioned in the Article and that such right has been infirnged. Words 'any other purpose' occuring in Article 226 mean a purpose for which any of the writs could, according to well-established principles, issue. The result is that while under the first part, a writ may be issued only after a decision that the aggrieved party has fundamental right and that it has been infringed. Under the second part, it may be issued only after a finding that the aggrieved party has a legal right which entitles him to any of the writs and that such right has been infringed. Therefore, words "any other purpose" occuring in the Article means "enforcement of legal right". In this connection I am fortified by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court in Fertilizer Kamagar Union vs. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344 ; Calcutta Gas Co. vs. State of W.B., AIR 1962 SC 1044 ; Samarth Transport Co. vs. R.T.A., AIR 1961 SC 93 . 11. Further, with regard to enforcement of contractual obligation, it is well settled that in the absence of constitutional or statutory rights being involved, mandamus would not lie to enforce contractual obligation even if it is sought to be enforced against the State or other authorities within the meaning of Article 12. vs. R.T.A., AIR 1961 SC 93 . 11. Further, with regard to enforcement of contractual obligation, it is well settled that in the absence of constitutional or statutory rights being involved, mandamus would not lie to enforce contractual obligation even if it is sought to be enforced against the State or other authorities within the meaning of Article 12. Therefore, in short, in the absence of constitutional or statutory rights being involved, mandamus would not lie to enforce contractual obligation even it is sought to be enforced against the State. In this connection reference may be made to the decisions of the Apex Court in Harshankar vs. Dy-Excise Commissioner, AIR 1975 SC 1121 ; Dhanya Lakshmi Mills vs. Commissioner, AIR 1976 SC 2253; Lekhraj vs. Dy. Custodian, AIR 1966 SC 334 , Shamlal vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2045 . In fact the Supreme Court observed in a number of decisions that the State can enter into a contract with an individual just as any other private individual can; and the contract, as such, does not change its legal character mainly because the other party to the contract is a State. Similar view was expressed by the Supreme Court in a number of decisions of the Apex Court, namely, Achutan vs. State of Kerala, AIR 1957 SC 490; D.J.O. vs. Biswanath Tea Company, AIR 1981 SC 1368 , Umakant vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1973 SC 964 ; Banchhanidhi vs. State of Orissa, AIR 1972 SC 843 . Therefore, one cannot enforce a right claimed in terms of a contract unless it is shown that some statutory provision was violated. In this connection again reference may be made to the decision of the Apex Court in Prabhakar vs. Pandey, (1965) 2 SCR 713. 12. However, learned Counsel for the petitioner cited a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Marine Engineer vs. Siddeswar Halder, 1991 (I) CLJ 467 , to buttress his contention that the present petition is maintainable inasmuch as this Court in the aforesaid judgment held that in certain circumstances even contractual obligation can be enforced under Article 226. 12. However, learned Counsel for the petitioner cited a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Marine Engineer vs. Siddeswar Halder, 1991 (I) CLJ 467 , to buttress his contention that the present petition is maintainable inasmuch as this Court in the aforesaid judgment held that in certain circumstances even contractual obligation can be enforced under Article 226. On perusal of the said judgment of this Court it appears that this Court was of view that there are three types of cases in which breaches of contractual obligation of State can arise, namely, (I) where a petitioner makes a grievance of breach of promise on the part of the State in cases where on assurance or promise made by the State he was acted to his prejudice and predicament, but the agreement is short of a contract within the meaning of Article 299 of the Constitution, (II) where the contract entered into between the person aggrieved and the State is in exercise of statutory power under certain Act or rules framed thereunder and the petitioner alleges a breach on the part of the State and (III) where the contract entered into between the State and the person aggrieved is non-statutory and purely contractual and the rights and obligation of the parties are governed by the terms of the contract, and the petitioner complains about breach of such contract by a State. So far as cases coming under aforesaid categories (i) and (ii) are concerned, a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution was held to be maintainable. However, the cases falling under category (iii) i.e., where the contract entered into between the State and the person aggrieved is non-statutory and purely contractual and the petitioner complains about breach of the term of such contract by the State, it had been held that no application invoking jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable. In fact the Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid judgment further relied upon certain observations of the Apex Court in M/s. Kadkakrishna Aggarwal vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 SC 1496 , that where the contract entered into between the State and the person aggrieved, is non-statutory and purely contractual but such contract has been cancelled on a ground, de hors any of the terms of the contract and which is per se violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, remedy may be available to the aggrieved person under writ jurisdiction. From the aforesaid authorities including the decision of the Division Bench of this Court it is apparent that when the petitioner is seeking enforcement of his supposed contractual right as per terms and conditions stipulated in the contract between the parties, writ jurisdiction is not the appropriate remedy for him. The case of the petitioner clearly falls under third category as per the classification made by this Court in the aforesaid judgment of Marine Engineer (supra) and hence no remedy is available to the petitioner under writ jurisdiction of this Court. 13. Aforesaid being the legal position on this question, I have scanned the pleadings of the respective parties and also provisions of West Bengal Kerosene Contral Order, 1968 including the provisions of Essential Commodities Act to find out whether the case as stated by the petitioner involves infringement of any legal right or legal obligation created under any statute or rule or order having force of statutory law. On examining the same I find that petitioner has not been able to make out a case of infringement of any fundamental/constitutional right. Equally he has failed to make out any case of infringement of legal right. On close examination of the said West Bengal Kerosene Control Order, 1968 and also the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, I find that neither the State Government nor any of his officers at the State, District or Sub-Divisional level has been vested with any such statutory power authority to fix specific quota of kerosene to be supplied by Oil Distribution Company to an oil agent. Case of the petitioner admittedly is that the Indian Oil Corporation being the Oil Distributing Company has not fixed any specific quota of kerosene for the petitioner. Case of the petitioner admittedly is that the Indian Oil Corporation being the Oil Distributing Company has not fixed any specific quota of kerosene for the petitioner. Only Sub-Divisional Controller and the District Controller in certain correspondences requested appropriate authority of the Indian Oil Corporation to supply specific quantity of kerosene to the petitioner. By such acts of issuing request letter to the Indian Oil Corporation, the District Controller or the Sub-Divisional Controller did not exercise any statutory power or authority. So such request does not give rise to any-fundamental or legal right in favour of the petitioner. Of course other case of the petitioner in brief is that since long Indian Oil Corporation was supplying petitioner with 250 kls. or more of kerosene and at a times it also supplied him with less than 215 kls. of kerosene per month. Such supply of certain quantity of kerosene does not mean that quota of the petitioner was 250 kls. or 215 kls. Therefore, it appears that no such quota has at all been fixed for supply of kerosene to the petitioner by any statutory authority whatsoever. Enen under the contract between the parties, no such specific quota has been fixed. The request made by two officers at the. District and Sub-Divisional level of the Food and Supply Department did not give rise to any legal right inasmuch as such requests were not issued in exercise of any statutory authority/power. 14. In view of the aforesaid position of law and the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that no remedy is available to the petitioner under writ jurisdiction of this Court. It, therefore, appears that the petitioner has failed to make out any cause of action whatsoever within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 15. In the result, this petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. Writ petition dismissed.