Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff institutions in O.S. No. 1392/77 on the file of the Sixth Assistant City Civil Judge, Chennai, are the appellants herein. They filed the suit for a declaration that they were religious denominational institutions belonging to Beri Chetty Community within the meaning of Article 26 of the Constitution of India and consequently, the Government had no right whatsoever to interfere with the rights of Beri Chetty Community to manage their own affairs and to administer the properties belonging to the plaintiff institutions and for a permanent injunction restraining the Government and their officers from in any manner interfering with the management or administration of the properties of the plaintiff institutions and from enforcing Sections 8, 11 to 18, 21 to 26, 31 to 33, 39, 41 to 47 and 56 and Rules 5, 7 and 9 except clauses (2) and (K) of sub rules 2, 10 to 18 and 21 to 24 of the Tamil Nadu Act 29 of 1974 and Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Rules (hereinafter respectively referred to as the Act and the Rules) on the following averments: The suit institutions were founded by people belonging to Beri Chetty Community for imparting instructions in Sanskrit, Telugu and Tamil and also religion to children in Muthialpet area, particularly to children, belonging to Beri Chetty Community. Muthialpet High School For Boys, one of the suit institution, had in its management body only members of Beri Chetty Community from 1913 to 1943. The members of the said Community were the Secretaries and Chairman of the Committee with about a moiety or more of the directors being from the Community. Only after 1943 a few members of other Communities were also associated in the management committee. Muthialpet High School was founded and established by Beri Chetty Community for religious and charitable purposes. Dr. Ratnavel Subramaniam Girls High School and Dr. Ratnavel Subramaniam Aided Primary School were started as subsidiary schools for promoting similar objects which the founders had in view. After the Act and the Rules came into effect the right of the plaintiff to maintain the suit institutions and the right to administer the properties owned by the institutions had been taken away. It was sought to be entrusted to a school committee as per the provisions of the Act. After the Act and the Rules came into effect the right of the plaintiff to maintain the suit institutions and the right to administer the properties owned by the institutions had been taken away. It was sought to be entrusted to a school committee as per the provisions of the Act. Some of the provisions of Act are ultra vires and violative of Article 26 of the Constitution of India. To protect the interest of the suit institutions a writ petition was filed in this Court in W.P. No. 1361/75 and the same was dismissed along with other writ petitions with the observation that a suit would be a more satisfactory remedy. Thereafter, the present suit came to be filed for the reliefs already mentioned. 2. The defendants/respondents resisted the suit contending inter alia that the suit institutions were not religious denominational institutions, that they were not entitled to protection under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, that Beri Chetty Community was not a religious denomination, that the suit institutions were not founded and established for the benefit of Beri Chetty Community or for religious or charitable purposes. It was further contended that the attack made against the various provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act and the Rules was ill-founded and was opposed to the decision of this Court upholding the Act. 3. The trial Court framed the necessary issues and on the materials placed before it, held that Beri Chetty Community was not a religious denomination, that the suit schools were not religious denominational institutions belonging to Beri Chetty Community and that the provisions of the Act and the Rules were applicable to the suit institutions. Thus holding the trial Court by judgment and decree dated 8-9-1981 dismissed the suit. 4. The plaintiff filed appeal in A.S. No. 24/82. The learned Principle Judge by judgment and decree dated 29-9-1986 held that Beri Chetty Community was indeed a religious denomination as contemplated under Article 26 of the Constitution of India. However, the learned Appellate Judge held that the suit institutions were not religious denominational institutions within the meaning of Article 26 and therefore, the provisions of the Act and the Rules were applicable to the plaintiff/appellants. The appeal was dismissed. 5. As against this, the present Second Appeal has been filed. However, the learned Appellate Judge held that the suit institutions were not religious denominational institutions within the meaning of Article 26 and therefore, the provisions of the Act and the Rules were applicable to the plaintiff/appellants. The appeal was dismissed. 5. As against this, the present Second Appeal has been filed. At the time of admission, the following substantial questions of law were framed for decision: (1) Whether the Courts below are correct in holding that the institution is not a denominational institution in spite of the fact that there is evidence of the plaintiff clearly stating that it is a denominational institution and that evidence has not been challenged and no contra evidence has been let in? and (2) Whether the Courts below have erred in not properly applying the ratio laid down in A.I.R. 1970 SC 2079? 6. Mr. C. Hanumantha Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants, submitted that the Courts below were in error in holding that the suit institutions were not denominational institutions. According to the learned Counsel, there were abundant materials to show that the suit institutions were denominational institutions. According to the learned Counsel, in as much as the schools had been founded only by the Beri Chetty Community people for the benefit of the said Community, the Courts below ought to have held that the suit schools were denominational institutions. The learned Counsel also relied on the following judgments in support of his submissions: (1) Md. Abu Sayeed Ahmad Khan & another v. The State of Bihar & others (ILR 47 Patna 965) and (2) Judgment of S.S. Subramani, J. as the learned Judge then was in W.P. No. 5984 of 1998. (3) State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial etc. ( AIR 1970 SC 2079 ) and (4) Sri K.A.S. Committee v. Commissioner, HR & CE (AIR 1979 Andhra Pradesh 121) 7. Mr. M. Dhandapani, learned Government Advocate, submitted that it was a matter of evidence that the majority of members of the Board of Institutions consisted of outsiders and the Courts below were perfectly justified in holding that the suit institutions did not satisfy the criteria for denominational qualification. The learned Government Advocate also sought to distinguish the decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellants. 8. The learned Government Advocate also sought to distinguish the decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellants. 8. It is a matter of admission by the President of the Board that out of 12 Directors, only 5 belonged to Beri Chetty Community and the others were rank outsiders. Even the previous Correspondent cum-Secretary of the High School was one Sanjeevi Naidu, a non-Beri Chetty. Teachers and the students also belonged to various other communities. No doubt, mere admission of non-community students would not make the institutions non-denominational institutions. It has been so laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial etc. ( AIR 1970 SC 2079 ) relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellants. The case before the Supreme Court arose against the decision of the Kerala High Court declaring certain provisions of the Kerala University Act (Act 9 of 1969) to be ultra vires the Constitution of India while upholding the rest of the Act as valid. Some of the provisions of the Kerala Act affected private colleges, particularly those founded by minority Community in the State. While deciding the case, the Supreme Court held that, “Article 30(1) of the Constitution contemplated two rights which are separated in point of time, the first right being the initial right to establish institutions of the minoritys choice and it would not matter that in addition to the minority communities others from other minority communities or even from themajority community could take advantage of those institutions and that such other communities brought in income and they did not have to be turned away to enjoy the protection. The other right related to the administration of such institutions and the same must be free of control so that the founders or their nominees could mould the institutions as they thought fit and in accordance with their ideas of how the interests of the community in general and the institution in particular would be best served and that no part of this management could be taken away and vested in another body without an encroachment upon the guaranteed right.” 9. So far as the first part of the right considered by the Supreme Court is concerned, the mere fact that students from other communities studied in the present suit institutions would not deprive the institutions of the benefit of the minority status. So far as the first part of the right considered by the Supreme Court is concerned, the mere fact that students from other communities studied in the present suit institutions would not deprive the institutions of the benefit of the minority status. However, so far as the second part of the right is concerned, admittedly, the majority of the members of the Board are non-Beri Chetties. The management/administration therefore ceases to be with the particular community. The decision of the Supreme Court does not therefore help the case of the appellants. 10. The next decision is the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sri K.A.S. Committee v. Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. (AIR 1979 Andhra Pradesh 121). In that case, the General Body itself consisted of members only belonging to a particular community and no person of any other community was entitled to become a member of the institution. The institution itself was to be managed exclusively by the people of the particular community and the management of the properties and the institutions vested in the governing body consisting of only persons belonging to that community. In those circumstances, a learned single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the order impugned superseding the elected trustees of the governing body of the institution and directing a fit person to be appointed by the order to take possession of all movable and immovable properties of the institution held amounted to total extinction of the institutions right to manage its own affairs and properties. It will be pertinent to note that the learned Judge upheld another order appointing the Executive Officer for better management of the institution and carrying out all directions issued by the trustees continuing to form the governing body as it did not take away the right of administration from the governing body. This case has also no application to the facts of the present case. 11. Yet another case relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellants is that of a Bench of the Patna High Court reported in Md. Abu Sayeed Ahmad Khan & another v. The State of Bihar & others (ILR 47 Patna 965). In that case, the Secretary, Board of Secondary Education, Bihar, declared the petitioner institution as a minority school and that the minority community had a right to administer the educational institution without interference by the authorities. Abu Sayeed Ahmad Khan & another v. The State of Bihar & others (ILR 47 Patna 965). In that case, the Secretary, Board of Secondary Education, Bihar, declared the petitioner institution as a minority school and that the minority community had a right to administer the educational institution without interference by the authorities. However, the State of Bihar imposed an ad hoc committee to take over the management of the institution. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court held that such an action infringed the constitutional protection guaranteed under Articles 29 (1) and 30 of the Constitution and as such, was illegal and ultra vires. The facts of the said case are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case. 12. The last of the cases is the one decided by S.S. Subramani, J. (as the learned Judge then was in W.P. No. 5984/98 and W.M.P. Nos. 9249 to 9251 of 1998 on 29-6-1998. In that case, the question arose as to whether the petitioner in the writ petition was entitled to get a direction to have minority status accorded on the basis of the language, after quashing the order of the government rejecting its application for minority status. The Government itself had given certain norms and guidelines for considering the application and conferring minority status. However, the guidelines were ignored and the application was rejected. The Government had by its order in G.O.Ms. No. 371 directed treatment of Saurashtra community as a minority on the basis of language though they belonged to Hindu Religion and according to the learned Judge, people speaking Hindi, Telugu, Malayalam, though they belonged to Hindu Religion, on the basis of the language, were treated as minorities and a language was not confined to a particular religion or community and as long as the guidelines were fulfilled the party concerned would be entitled to be given minority status. The learned Judge also opined that merely because other members learnt and spoke Sanskrit, it could not be said that the petitioner in the writ petition was not entitled to the benefit of Article 29 (1) of the Constitution. In my view, this decision also does not help the case of the appellants. 13. It would be worthwhile to refer to what the learned Judge has stated in paragraph 26 of the Judgment. In my view, this decision also does not help the case of the appellants. 13. It would be worthwhile to refer to what the learned Judge has stated in paragraph 26 of the Judgment. “..The fact that the Board of Trustees, the persons who established a college are well-versed in Sanskrit and they all belonged to Sanskrit speaking community and the majority of the present Board of members also belonged to Sankrit speaking community, is not denied. The only contention that is raised is that knowledge of Sanskrit alone is not sufficient. But, that is not the case that is put forward by the petitioner.” Admittedly, in that case majority of the Board Members belonged to Sanskrit Speaking community. 14. In the instant case, the majority of members of the Board belonged to non-Beri Chetty Community. In these circumstances, the contention put forward by the learned Counsel for the appellants cannot at all be accepted. 15. For the reasons stated above, the substantial questions of law raised are answered against the appellants and the Second Appeal is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.