Honble CHAUHAN, J.–Though the matter was listed today for grant of interim relief, yet with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter was heard finally. (2). The instant writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 27.01.2001 (Annx.6) by which the petitioner has been removed from the post of Sarpanch being disqualified and also against the order dated 09.04.2001 (Annx.7) by which the seat has been declared vacant. (3). The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that petitioner was elected as a Sarpanch in the election held on 04.02.2000. She was alleged to be disqualified to contest the election as she had given birth to a third child on 01.04.1996 i.e. after the cut-off date 27.11.1995 and as she made a misrepre-sentation, the proceedings were initiated against her. Smt. Sita Devi, respondent No.6 filed an application/complaint to the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Barmer on which the enquiry was conducted and the report was submitted to the Divisional Commissioner on 03.06.2000 wherein after being satisfied with the report, notice was issued to the petitioner, who submitted her reply on 03.08.2000 denying the factum that she had incurred disqualification by having the third child after the cut-off date. According to her, the last child was born to her on 20.12.1994. However, after considering the entire record and, particularly the certificate of vasectomy dated 29.03.1997 wherein petitioners husband has recorded the age of the youngest child as one year on that day, the impugned orders have been passed. Hence this petition. (4). Shri Choudhary, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has raised a large number of issues and denied the factum of having third child to the petitioner after the cut-off date. However, Miss Kusum Rao, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted that there is an Entry at Serial No.23 in Book No.2 of the Gram Panchayat, Meethadi wherein date of birth of the youngest son of the petitioner has been recorded as 01.04.1996. Nanu Ram, husband of the petitioner, has been given certificate of Vasectomy in which the age of the youngest son was shown as 29.03.1997. She has filed copies of the register of death and birth, ration card and date of birth certificate and documents showing vasectomy as Annexures R/1, R/2, R/3 and R/4 respectively. (5). Nanu Ram, husband of the petitioner, has been given certificate of Vasectomy in which the age of the youngest son was shown as 29.03.1997. She has filed copies of the register of death and birth, ration card and date of birth certificate and documents showing vasectomy as Annexures R/1, R/2, R/3 and R/4 respectively. (5). Thus, in view of the above there is no scope of interference on that count with the finding of fact recorded by the Divisional Commissioner that petitioner gave birth to the third child after the cut off date and was disqualified to contest the election. (6). The entries in the official record carried with them the presumption of correctness u/s. 35 of the Evidence Act. Undoubtedly, such presumption is rebuttable by adducing appropriate evidence. Vide Mohammed Iqram Hussain vs. State of U.P. (1); Umesh Chandra vs. State of Rajasthan (2); and Ram Harakh vs. Hamid Ahmed Khan (3). Petitioner did not lead any evidence before the Competent Authority to rebut the said presumption that the official record, copies of which have been filed as Annx.R/1 to R/4, were not correct. As the petitioner failed miserably to rebut the aforesaid presumption, no interference is required on that count. Section 114 of the Evidence Act provides for a similar presumption of regular performance while discharging official duties, There is no allegation by the petitioner that the entries made by the officers have been made incorrectly, to harm him. There is no such allegation in the petition, therefore, correctness of the aforesaid entries cannot be doubted. (7). Shri Choudhary has raised the issue regarding the jurisdiction of the Divisional Commissioner to interfere in the matter. Miss Kusum Rao, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance upon See. 98 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 which empowers the State Government to authorise any officer to perform a particular function and produced the notification dated 16.05.2000, by which the State has conferred the required competence on the Divisional Commissioner. Even if, in law, the Divisional Commissioner had no competence to entertain the matter, it does not require any interference on the technical ground for the reason that the Writ Court is not bound to interfere with an order merely on technical ground where the action had been taken in view of public policy and statutory provisions. Even if, in law, the Divisional Commissioner had no competence to entertain the matter, it does not require any interference on the technical ground for the reason that the Writ Court is not bound to interfere with an order merely on technical ground where the action had been taken in view of public policy and statutory provisions. The Writ Court may refuse to interfere even if the order is found to be illegal and without jurisdiction, but the Court is satisfied that the impugned order has met the ends of justice. (8). In Mohammed Swaleh & Ors. vs. Third Additional District Judge, Meerut & Anr. (4) the Apex Court has observed as under:- ``It was contended before the High Court that no appeal lies from the decision of the Prescribed Authority to the District Judge. The High Court accepted this contention. The High Court finally held that though the appeal laid before the District Judge, the order of the prescribed Authority was invalid and was rightly set aside by the District Judge. On that ground, the High Court declined to interfere with the order of the learned District Judge. It is true that there has been some technical breach because if there is no appeal maintain-able before the learned District Judge, in the appeal before the learned District Judge, the same should not be set-aside. But the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction u/art. 226 of the Constitu-tion. The High Court had come to the conclusion that the order of the Prescribed Authority was invalid and improper. The High Court itself could have set it aside. Therefore, in the facts and circum-stances of the case, justice has been done, though, as mentioned hereinbefore, technically the appellant had the point that the order of the District Judge was illegal and improper. If we reiterate the order of the High Court as it is setting-aside the order of the Prescribed Authority, in exercise of the jurisdiction u/art. 226 of the Constitution, then no exception can be taken. As mentioned herein-before, justice has been done and as the improper order of the Prescribed Authority has been set-aside, no objection can be taken. (Emphasis added). (9). The ratio of the aforesaid judgment squarely applies to the facts of this case. 226 of the Constitution, then no exception can be taken. As mentioned herein-before, justice has been done and as the improper order of the Prescribed Authority has been set-aside, no objection can be taken. (Emphasis added). (9). The ratio of the aforesaid judgment squarely applies to the facts of this case. Even if the Divisional Commissioner was not competent to do so, looking to the conduct of the petitioner, the order does not require any interference in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction of the Writ Court u/art. 226 of the Constitution. (10). Therefore, even if the order is without jurisdiction, that does not require to be interfered. Moreso, even before this Court, no document has been filed to prove that the documents filed by the respondents do not figure the correct date of birth of the third child. (11). The ratio of the aforesaid judgment squarely applied to the facts of this case. Even the Divisional Commissioner bad no jurisdiction or authority to pass the order, looking to the conduct of the petitioner, the order does not require any interference in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction of the Writ Court u/art. 226/227 of the Constitution. (12). Shri Choudhary has most vociferously submitted that as the disqual-ification had been incurred prior to the date of election, the petitioner could have been removed from the office only by way of filing election petition and not otherwise. In support of his submission he placed reliance upon the judgment passed by learned Single Judge of this Court (Jaipur Bench) in Jagram vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (5) wherein it has been held that if a person has incurred disqualification prior to the date of contesting the election, he can be removed only by way of election petition. (13). On the other hand, Miss Rao has placed a very heavy reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Rakesh Ghatiwal vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (6) wherein this Court has considered the issue in great detail and held that if a person has contested the election by making misrepresenta-tion, suppressing the material information regarding his disqualification, he cannot be permitted to raise the plea that he could be ousted only by adopting a particular procedure. (14). In United India Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Rajendra Singh & Ors. (14). In United India Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Rajendra Singh & Ors. (7), the Apex Court observed that ``Fraud and justice never dwell together (Fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant) and it is a pristine maxim which has never lost its temper over all these centuries. (15). The ratio laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in various cases is that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit to the persons who played fraud or made misrepresentation and in such circumstances the Court should not perpetuate the fraud by entertaining the petitions on their behalf. In Union of India & Ors. vs. M. Bhaskaran (8) the Apex Court, after placing reliance upon and approving its earlier judgment in District Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society vs. M. Tripura Sundari Devi (9) observed as under:- ``If by committing fraud any employment is obtained, the same cannot be permitted to be countenanced by a Court of Law as the employment secured by fraud renders it voidable at the option of the employer. (16). In Ratan Lal vs. Union of India & Ors. (10) this Court has considered this aspect and placed reliance upon judgments in Mangi Lal & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (11); Temple of Thakurji, Village Kansar vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (12); and came to the conclusion that an order obtained by fraud or misrepresentation, if cancelled by the authority should not be interfered by the Court while exercising its writ jurisdiction. (17). In Maharaja Chintamani Sarannath vs. State of Haryana & Ors. (13), the Honble Supreme Court has categorically held that even if the order is found to be bad/illegal/ without jurisdiction, the Court may not interfere ``if setting-aside the order amounts to reviving an invalid order. . (18). A Full Bench of this Court in Chiman Lal vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (14), vide judgment and order dated 18.02.2000, has held that the Court may not accept the argument of the party if he has obtained the order in clear violation of statutory provisions and if his action/order is against public policy or it has been obtained by misrepresentation, collusion or fraud because the action shall be void ab initio. (14), vide judgment and order dated 18.02.2000, has held that the Court may not accept the argument of the party if he has obtained the order in clear violation of statutory provisions and if his action/order is against public policy or it has been obtained by misrepresentation, collusion or fraud because the action shall be void ab initio. The Court observed as under:- ``The Common Law doctrine of public policy can be enforced wherever an action affects/offends public interest or where harmful result of permitting the injury to the public at large is evident. In such type of cases, . . . . power can be exercised by the Authority at any time either suo moto or as and when such orders are brought to their notice. (19). Moreso, if initial action is not in consonance with law, the subsequent conduct of a party cannot sanctify the same. ``Subla Fundamento cedit opus- a foundation being removed, the superstructure falls. A person having done wrong cannot take advantage of his own wrong and plead bar of any law to frustrate the lawful trial by a competent Court. Nullus Commondum Capere Potest De Injuria Sua Propria. Vide Union of India vs. Maj. Gen. Madan Lal Yadav (15). The violators of law cannot be permitted to urge that their offence cannot be subject matter of inquiry, trial or investigation. Vide Lily Thomas vs. Union of India & Ors. (16). (20). As per the findings in the inquiry against the petitioner, she was not entitled to file the nomination paper being disqualified under the provisions of See. 19(1) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, having more than two children. She filled up the nomination form suppressing this material information, therefore, she cannot claim any right arising out of her own wrong doing. (Juri Ex Injuria Non Oritur). (21). This Court has repeatedly held that filing the nomination papers by suppressing the material information amounts to moral turpitude and dis-missed petitions on the ground that a person who had the audacity to commit a fraud upon the Constitutional and other statutory provisions has no right to approach the writ Court for relief in equity. (22). The said judgment in Rakesh Ghatiwal (supra) stood affirmed by the Division Bench of this Court in between the same parties in 2001(1) RLW 546 by a detail judgment and order. (22). The said judgment in Rakesh Ghatiwal (supra) stood affirmed by the Division Bench of this Court in between the same parties in 2001(1) RLW 546 by a detail judgment and order. The Special Leave Petition filed against the said judgment has also been dismissed by the Honble Supreme Court. (23). As the matter is fully covered by the judgment of this Court in Rakesh Ghatiwal (supra), no interference is called for. The petition is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.