JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J.—Defendants-appellants have preferred this appeal against the judgment and decree dated 14.5.1991 passed by Additional District Judge, Bilaspur in Civil Suit No. 100/1 of 1984 whereby the suit of the plaintiffs has been decreed. 2. Briefly, stated, the facts leading to the presentation of this appeal are that Shri Durga the original plaintiff and since deceased and represented by the present respondents (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs) instituted a suit for possession of the land bearing khasra Nos. 468 and 473 measuring 2 bighas 17 biswas comprising khata No. 94 min, Khatauni No. 224, situate in Village Sashan, Tehsil and District Bilaspur, H.P. by way of redemption of the mortgage dated 3.9.1969 for securing a sum of Rs. 500. In the alternative it is claimed that in case the transaction of mortgage was not proved, the plaintiff is entitled for possession of the suit land on the basis of the title. 3. The suit was contested by Shri Tikhu the Original defendant now deceased and represented by the present appellants (hereinafter referred to as the defendants) and raised the preliminary objections that the suit was time barred and the plaintiff has ceased to be the owner of the suit land by virtue of adverse possession of the defendants thereon for more than 12 years, that the suit was not properly valued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction, that no cause of action accrued to the plaintiff on 30.6.1969 as claimed by him, that the mukhtiar of the plaintiff was not competent to sign the plaint and the contradictory pleas as taken by the plaintiff in the plaint are not permissible. On merits it has been averred that the suit land was sold by Durga the deceased plaintiff to Tikhu deceased defendant on 13.1.1969 for consideration in the sum of Rs. 500 and that the defendants are owners in possession of the suit land. 4. The plaintiff filed replication wherein the grounds of defence as taken in the written statement were denied and the claim as made out in the plaint was reiterated. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues: "1. Whether the plaintiff mortgaged the land in suit with the defendant on 3.9.1969 as alleged ? O.P.P. 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to redeem the suit land without payment of mortgage money? O.P.P. 3. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues: "1. Whether the plaintiff mortgaged the land in suit with the defendant on 3.9.1969 as alleged ? O.P.P. 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to redeem the suit land without payment of mortgage money? O.P.P. 3. If issue No. 1 is not proved whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the possession of the suit land on the basis of Will? O.P.P. 4. Whether the suit is barred by time? O.P.P. 5. Whether the defendant is in adverse possession of the suit land and has become its owner as alleged? O.P.D. 6. Whether the plaintiff sold the land in dispute to defendant through sale deed dated 13.1.1969 for Rs. 500 as alleged? O.P.D. 7. Whether the suit has not been properly valued for purpose of jurisdiction and court fee? O.P.D. 8. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action as alleged? O.P.D. 9. Whether the plaint has not been properly signed as alleged, if so, its effect? O.P.D. 10. Relief." 6. By its judgment dated 1.7.1985 the trial Court decided issue Nos. 1 to 3 against the plaintiffs and issue Nos. 4 to 6 and 8 in favour of the defendants whereas issue Nos. 7 and 9 were held against the defendants. As a consequence the suit was dismissed. 7. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff preferred an appeal which was heard by the learned Additional District Judge who by the impugned judgment accepted the appeal, set-aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and decreed the suit of the plaintiffs for possession on the basis of title. Being aggrieved, the defendants have preferred the present appeal. 8. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record. 9. This appeal has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law: "1. Whether the document Ext. DW 2/A could be taken into consideration for collateral purposes for seeking the nature of possession of appellant? 2. Whether the suit of the respondent in the facts and circumstances of the case could be said to be within the period of limitation?" Substantial Question No. 1 : 10. The document Ext. Whether the document Ext. DW 2/A could be taken into consideration for collateral purposes for seeking the nature of possession of appellant? 2. Whether the suit of the respondent in the facts and circumstances of the case could be said to be within the period of limitation?" Substantial Question No. 1 : 10. The document Ext. DW-2/A which purports to be a sale deed of the suit land by the deceased plaintiff in favour of the deceased defendant has been prepared on a plain paper and has not been prepared on the required stamp paper nor it is registered. Thus, this document which purports to be a sale deed was inadmissible in evidence for want of stamp and registration. However, when this document was produced in evidence by DW-2 Prem Lal it was impounded and the stamp duty and penalty thereon was realised. Evidently this could have been done in view of the provisions of Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and once the stamp duty and the penalty has been charged the bar created by said section about the admissibility of this document stood removed. Thereafter, it was tendered in evidence but still its production was objected to by the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs on the ground that the document being a sale deed was compulsorily registrable and thus having not been registered it could still not be admitted in evidence. The learned trial Judge deferred this question to be decided at the stage of final arguments when he looked into the contents of this document as a sale deed. 11. The learned Counsel for the defendants has contended that once this document was exhibited it could be read in evidence for all intents and purposes. The learned trial Judge deferred this question to be decided at the stage of final arguments when he looked into the contents of this document as a sale deed. 11. The learned Counsel for the defendants has contended that once this document was exhibited it could be read in evidence for all intents and purposes. To substantiate the submission the learned Counsel has relied on Javer Chand and others v. Pukhraj Surana, AIR 1961 SC 1655, wherein the Honble Apex Court held that once a document has been marked as an exhibit in the case and the trial has proceeded all along on the footing that the document was an exhibit in the case and has been used by the parties in examination and cross-examination of their witnesses, Section 36 of the Stamp Act comes into operation and the document admitted in evidence as aforesaid it is not open either to the trial Court or the court of appeal or revision to go behind that order as such an order is not one of those judicial orders which are liable to be reviewed or revised by the same Court or a Court of superior jurisdiction. 12. Be it stated that the provisions of Sections 34 and 36 of the Indian Stamp Act will govern the admissibility/inadmissibility of a document which is unstamped or partially stamped. Once the stamp duty and penalty is paid such a document will be admissible in evidence. However, if it requires registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 the bar created by Section 49 of that Act will not be removed. Therefore, such a document cannot be read in evidence of the transaction affecting the immovable property comprised therein. 13. No doubt, the document Ext. DW-2/A came into being when provisions of Transfer of Property Act were admittedly not applicable to the concerned area and, therefore, oral transaction of sale was permissible without a written and registered instrument but once the sale deed had been reduced into writing it was compulsorily registrable. Its production in evidence and marking it as exhibit despite payment of the stamp duty and penalty was objected to and it cannot therefore be said that the plaintiffs had not objected to the admissibility of this document. Its production in evidence and marking it as exhibit despite payment of the stamp duty and penalty was objected to and it cannot therefore be said that the plaintiffs had not objected to the admissibility of this document. Therefore, it could not have been read as a sale deed as has been done by the learned trial Judge and the Lower Appellate Court has rightly concluded so. 14. The question however still remains whether such a document cannot be read in evidence for any purpose whatsoever or can such a document be read in evidence for a limited purpose. The answer to this question is contained in Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 which provides that a compulsorily registrable document affecting the immovable property shall not be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property, further provides that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by the Registration Act or Transfer of Property Act to be registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance, or as evidence of a part performance of a contract or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effective by registered instrument. In view of these provisions the document Ext. DW-2/A could be taken into consideration for collateral purposes like determining the nature of possession of the defendants over the suit land. Substantial Question No. 2 : 15. The document Ext. DW-2/A came into being on 13th of January, 1969 and there under the deceased defendant had been put in possession of the suit land. It is undisputable that said defendant had entered upon possession of the suit land in the year 1969. Even, the deceased plaintiff had admitted possession of the defendants over the suit land since 3.9.1969 as per the contents of the plaint. However, in his statement he has not stated any specific date when he delivered the possession of the suit land to the deceased defendant but it is admitted by him that the document regarding transaction between the parties was scribed by Prem Lal. PW-2 Prem Lal has stated that he had scribed the document Ext. DW-2/A purporting to be a sale deed between the parties on 13.1.1969. Copies of Khasra Girdwari Ext. PW-2 Prem Lal has stated that he had scribed the document Ext. DW-2/A purporting to be a sale deed between the parties on 13.1.1969. Copies of Khasra Girdwari Ext. D-3, D-4 and D-5 also corroborate the statement of the defendant that he had entered upon the possession of the suit land after the execution of the deed Ext. DW-2/A. It is therefore firmly established on record that at the time of institution of the suit on 2.1.1984 the defendant had been in possession of the suit land for more than 12 years. 16. The learned trial Judge while discussing issue No. 3 has observed that even if the sale deed in question (DW-2/A) has not been duly proved on record even then the defendant being in possession of the suit land for the last more than 12 years has become owner of the same by way of adverse possession. The learned Additional District Judge while disagreeing with these findings of the trial Court observed that neither the mortgage as alleged by the plaintiff was proved nor the sale-as alleged by the defendant was proved. However, the trial court failed to differentiate between the term long possession and adverse possession because the defendants in his written statement has claimed that he was in possession of the suit land by virtue of the sale deed dated 13.1.1969, therefore, his possession continued to be permissive unless it became adverse to the true owner. He has further observed that it could be so once the defendant asserted his hostile title which he never did and continued in possession on the basis of invalid transaction. Therefore, he held that defendants had failed to prove his adverse possession over the suit land. However, the learned lower appellate Court evidently failed to appreciate the correct position in law which will govern such a situation. 17. In fact the correct position of law is that where a person takes possession of property under colour of a transfer which is inoperative being void or invalid such possession is adverse to the true owner for the simple reason that in such cases the transferee gets no title under the transfer and his possession is, therefore, without title and in contravention of the title of the true owner. Hence, adverse to the true owner. 18. Hence, adverse to the true owner. 18. In case N. Varada Pillai and another v. Jeevarathnammal, AIR 1919 Privy Council 44, it has been held as under: "On 10th October, 1895, Rajammal and Alangarammal who were then the registered owners of the two moieties of the mitta, presented a petition to the Collector, whereby, after reciting that they had, on 8th of October, 1895, given away the two villages constituting the mitta as stridhanam to Duraisani alias Alamelu, they prayed that orders might be passed for transferring the villages into her name. The petition concluded : "The said Alamelu Ammal shall hold and enjoy them with power to alienate them by way of gift, mortgage, sale, etc." Duraisani on the same date also presented a petition to the Collector reciting the gift of the villages to her on 8th October, 1895, and requesting that they should be transferred into her name. The Collector accordingly, on the 8th May, 1896, registered the mitta in the name of Duraisani. It was not contended before the Board that the above transactions effected a valid gift of the property to Duraisani; for such a gift must, under Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, be made by registered deed. Nor, having regard to Section 91 of the Evidence Act, can the recitals in the petitions be used as evidence of a gift having been made. But the defendants case is that Duraisani, although she may have acquired no legal title under the transactions referred to, in fact took possession of the property when it was transferred into her name and retained such possession until her death in December, 1911, after which date it passed to the defendant as her successor, and accordingly that the plaintiffs claim is barred by upwards of twelve years adverse possession. The High Court upheld this contention; and their Lordships, after considering the evidence, have arrived at the same conclusion." 19. The High Court upheld this contention; and their Lordships, after considering the evidence, have arrived at the same conclusion." 19. In case Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay and others, AIR (38) 1951 SC 469, where the Corporation had remained in possession of a site by virtue of an invalid grant for more than 60 years it was held that the possession of the Corporation over the site in dispute being based on invalid grant was not referable to any legal title and was, therefore, adverse to the legal title of the Government from the moment the predecessor in title of the corporation took possession of the land under the invalid grant and since such possession has continued for more than 70 years, therefore, the Corporation had acquired a title by adverse possession to the site. 20. In State of West Bengal v. The Dalhousie Institute Society, AIR 1970 SC 1778, the Honble Apex Court held as under: "16. There is no material placed before us to show that the grant has been made in the manner required by law though as a fact a grant of the site has been made in favour of the Institute. The evidence relied on by the Special Land Acquisition Judge and the High Court also clearly establishes that the respondent has been in open, continuous and uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the site for over 60 years. In this respect the material documentary evidence referred to by the High Court clearly establishes that the respondent has been treated as owner of the site not only by the Corporation, but also by the Government. The possession of the respondent must have been on the basis of the grant made by the Government, which, no doubt is invalid in law. As to what exactly is the legal effect of such possession has been considered by this Court in Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay, 1952 SCR 43 : AIR 1951 SC 469, as follows: "......The position of the respondent Corporation and its predecessor in title was that of a person having no legal title but nevertheless holding possession of the land under colour of an invalid grant of the land in perpetuity and free from rent for the purpose of a market. Such possession not being referable to any legal title it was prima facie adverse to the legal title of the Government as owner of the land from the very moment the predecessor in title of the respondent Corporation took possession of the land under the invalid grant. This possession has continued openly, as of right and uninterruptedly for over 70 years and the respondent Corporation has acquired the limited title to it and its predecessor in title had been prescribing for during all this period, that is to say, the right to hold the land in perpetuity free from rent but only for the purposes of a market in terms of the Government Resolution of 1865......." 17. The above extract establish that a person in such possession clearly acquires title by adverse possession. In the case before us there are concurrent findings recorded by the High Court and the Special Land Acquisition Judge in favour of the respondent on this point and we agree with those findings." 21. Thus, there remains no doubt that a person who enters upon possession of immovable property under an in valid/ void transfer, he does not acquire any lawful title to the property, therefore, his possession becomes adverse to the true owner the moment he enters upon such possession. 22. In this case as already stated hereinabove the defendants entered upon the suit land in the year 1969 by virtue of an unregistered sale deed, hence on the basis of an invalid transfer. Therefore, his possession right from the time of entry into the possession of the suit property was hostile to the true owner, therefore, the period of limitation to get possession of the suit land on the basis of title started running against the plaintiffs in the year 1969 and had expired in the year 1981. The suit for possession was instituted on January 2, 1984 by which time it was hopelessly time barred, therefore, the suit cannot be held to be within the period of limitation. On the contrary by virtue of lapse of time the defendants have acquired title to the suit land by virtue of adverse possession. Therefore, the findings of the lower Appellate Court that the deceased defendant continued in permissive possession of the suit land because of the transaction vide Ext. DW-2/A are contrary to the settled position in law and are therefore unsustainable. 23. Therefore, the findings of the lower Appellate Court that the deceased defendant continued in permissive possession of the suit land because of the transaction vide Ext. DW-2/A are contrary to the settled position in law and are therefore unsustainable. 23. Since the lower appellate Court has allowed the Appeal of the plaintiffs and decreed the suit for possession on the basis of title in view of the misconception about the correct legal position, therefore, the impugned judgment and decree are liable to be set-aside. 24. As a result, this appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court are set aside and the suit is dismissed. 25. In the circumstances of the case, parties are however left to bear their own costs in this appeal. Appeal allowed.