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2001 DIGILAW 180 (MAD)

Adyar Padmanabha Nagar Seva Sangham v. Corporation of Chennai, and Others

2001-02-14

V.KANAGARAJ, V.S.SIRPURKAR

body2001
Judgment :- V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. This is an appeal filed by the Adyar Padmanabha Nagar Seva Sangham, represented by its Secretary, against the order of the learned single Judge by which the learned single Judge has dismissed the writ petition. 2. The petitioner's claim is that they were in possession of the public property in R.S. Nos.57/1, 74 and 75 at Urur village. Division No.100, T.S. No.13 of Block No.21. Sri Padmanabha Nagar, Second Stage, Adyar, Chennai- 20. It was the claim in the writ petition that the appellant association members were in possession of the property for over 30 years. 3. The learned single Judge found that the association itself had been formed only in the year 1989. It was also found by the learned single Judge that the petitioner had not filed any documents to show that they were in possession and enjoyment of the property for over 30 years. The learned single Judge also took stock of the fact that the third respondent had filed a suit in O.S. No.852/78 before the City Civil Court, Madras stating that the vacant plots in the lay out plan of Second Stage Sri Padmanabha Nagar in the very same survey numbers were earmarked for public purposes, namely, for playground, park, school and for shopping centre etc., and that there were certain persons trying to trespass into the property by putting up huts and, therefore, the third respondent obtained a mandatory injunction against the Corporation directing the Corporation to protect the said property from being used otherwise than for public purposes and protect the same from being trespassed by the hut dwellers and to utilise the same for public purposes. 4. The learned single Judge also took note of the fact that in the written statement the Corporation had itself admitted that the above-mentioned survey numbers were reserved for public purposes. The Corporation had also taken the stand that on the date of filing of the suit on 20-2-1978, there were no hut dwellers in the property and that the said property was a vacant site. The learned single Judge took note of the fact that the suit was decreed by the III Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, by his judgment dated 13-4-1982 Issuing a mandatory Injunction as prayed. The learned single Judge took note of the fact that the suit was decreed by the III Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, by his judgment dated 13-4-1982 Issuing a mandatory Injunction as prayed. The stand of the Corporation before the learned single Judge was that in pursuance of this decree the Corporation was issuing notice to remove the hutments which were In the nature of encroachments. 5. The main basis of the claim of the writ petitioner was an ex parte decree in O.S. No.3924/94 against the Corporation. Admittedly, in the suit, the 3rd respondent association which had obtained a decree against the Corporation was not made a party. The plaint itself was presented on 18-5-1995 and an ex parte decree came to be passed on 23-8-1995. The learned single Judge also took stock of the fact that against this decree, the Corporation had filed an application to set aside the said decree and the same was pending. Therefore, that decree would not provide any legal basis to the petitioner appellant's stand. 6. The learned single Judge, however, took the view that basically there is total absence of rights in favour of the appellant association members as admittedly they were the encroachers. 7. Before us also the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant association could not assail this position that the members of the appellant association did not initially have any right and that they were the encroachers. The first argument before us is that since they were on the lands for about 30 years and since they were protected by a decree it cannot be said that they were not having any right. The second argument made forcefully by the learned counsel was that these lands could not be viewed as public streets. The teamed counsel wanted us to read S.222 of the Chennai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919 to mean that the lands covered thereunder would be only the public streets and not the other lands. 8. We do not think that could be the proper interpretation. The lands covered under S.220 are the lands which are reserved not only for the public streets, but for other public purposes also. Be that as it may, we also take note of the fact that the association of the appellant has come into existence only in the year 1989. We do not think that could be the proper interpretation. The lands covered under S.220 are the lands which are reserved not only for the public streets, but for other public purposes also. Be that as it may, we also take note of the fact that the association of the appellant has come into existence only in the year 1989. Therefore, their claim that they were on the lands for more than 30 years has no basis. If the learned single Judge has chosen to hold that there was no right in favour of the appellant association and, therefore, chosen to dismiss the writ petition, we see nothing wrong in it. 9. This is apart from the fact that the Corporation has promised to arrange an alternate accommodation for the members of the appellant association and identified 83 members of that association who perhaps were on the land, of course, in the capacity as the encroachers, if the Corporation has done this, there would be nothing to interfere with the judgment of the learned single Judge and the judgment is confirmed. The appeal has no merits and it is dismissed. However, in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, C.M.P. Nos. 7782 and 9220 of 2000 are closed. Appeal dismissed.