JUDGMENT Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. These two second appeals are at the instance of defendant No.1 and defendant No.3 respectively and are directed against judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate court below thereby affirming those passed by the learned trial Judge in favour of the respondent No.1. 2. The respondent No.1 herein filed a suit for eviction of her tenant being Title Suit No. 293 of 1973 in the 3rd Court of Munsif, Alipore on the grounds of default in payment of rent, subletting and reasonable requirement. In the said suit the alleged subtenants were made defendants No.2 to 5. 3. The ground of default was however not pressed at the time of trial. 4. As regards the ground of reasonable requirement, the case of the respondent No.1 was that she reasonably required the suit premises for her own use and occupation and for the members of her family which consisted of herself, her husband, one son and two daughters and she required total nine rooms for such purpose. 5. As regards ground of subletting, the definite case of respondent No.1 was that although the tenant was given authority in writing to create subtenancy but before the creation of the sub-tenancies in favour of defendant Nos. 2 to 5, no permission has been taken. In other words, according to the respondent No.1 only general authority given to create sub-tenancy is not sufficient but permission in writing must be taken for creation of each subtenancy. 7. The aforesaid snit was contested by the tenant as well as the subtenants by filing separate written statements thereby denying the material allegations made in the plaint. 8. Ultimately, the learned trial Judge by the judgment and decree dated December 15, 1976 decreed the suit on both the grounds viz. subletting and reasonable requirement. 9. Being dissatisfied, the tenant preferred an appeal being Title Appeal No. 229 of 1977 which was ultimately heard by the learned Additional District Judge, 11th Court, Alipore and by the judgment and decree impugned in these two appeals the said court has affirmed those passed by the learned trial Judge. 10. Being dissatisfied, the tenant and one of the sub-tenants viz. defendant No.3 have preferred these two second appeals. 11. 10. Being dissatisfied, the tenant and one of the sub-tenants viz. defendant No.3 have preferred these two second appeals. 11. These two appeals initially came up for hearing before Jyotirmoyee Nag, J and by the judgment dated May 13, 1980, Her Lordship after hearing the learned counsel for the parties held that for the purpose of creating sub-tenancy if a general authority was given by the landlord, there was no necessity of taking further permission for creating a particular sub-tenancy. Her Lordship thus held that the issue of sub-tenancy should be answered in favour of the tenant. 12. However, thereafter on consideration of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties on the question of reasonable requirement, Nag, J was of the view that the matter should be sent back to the learned Trial Court to ascertain the accommodation available at the house at Khidirpore belonging to the husband of the plaintiff who had since inherited the said house on the death of his father. The respondent No.1 was thus directed to take step for local inspection of the said house and the learned trial Judge was directed to give a finding whether the accommodations available therein are suitable to respondent No.1 and the learned trial Judge was further directed to transmit the record with the finding for final disposal of the appeal before this court. 13. Pursuant to the aforesaid direction given by Nag, J there was a commission for local inspection of the premises at Khidirpore and the learned trial Judge after recording the finding sent the record to this court. 14. The appeal then came up for hearing before Nandi, J. Before His Lordship, it was submitted by the learned advocate for the appellant that in the meantime there had been some change of constitution of the family of the respondent No. 1. The unmarried daughter of the respondent No.1 according to the appellant had been married. It was further stated that the son of the respondent No.1 was than working in Delhi and was residing with his family. It was further alleged that the accommodation in Khidirpore house belonging to the husband of the respondent No.1 and his co-sharers had been partitioned and a definite portion marked 'A' in the plan had fallen to the share of the plaintiffs husband. It was further alleged that the accommodation in Khidirpore house belonging to the husband of the respondent No.1 and his co-sharers had been partitioned and a definite portion marked 'A' in the plan had fallen to the share of the plaintiffs husband. It was further stated by a supplementary affidavit that P-353, Keyatala Road which formerly belonged to the plaintiffs father had come in possession of the plaintiff by virtue of a trust deed. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1 however contended that by virtue of such trust deed, the respondent No.1 was entitled to enjoy only a part of the said property along with her two sisters. Under such circumstances, Nandi, J appointed a special officer for the purpose of inspection of Lot A of the partition deed of the premises at Khidirpore and P-353, Keyatala Road upon notice to the parties. He was directed to enquire (i) what was the accommodation available in Lot A of the Khidirpore house and (ii) how many rooms in premises No. P-353, Keyatala Road were being used by the respondent No. 1. 15. Pursuant to such direction given by Nandi, J, the special officer has given report before this court and subsequently Nandi, J also examined witnesses in order to decide the case on merit. 16. However, subsequently, Nandi, J released these appeals. 17. Thereafter these two appeals were assigned to Mitra, J (as His Lordship then was). 18. The appellant then filed another application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure on May 17,1995 alleging that plaintiffs husband had died on January 28, 1995 and the plaintiffs son purchased two flats in Delhi and accordingly contended that there was no reasonable requirement of the suit premises by the plaintiff. The plaintiff however through her son. filed an affidavit-in-opposition admitting the death of plaintiffs husband but he denied that he had purchased two flats in Delhi as stated in application. However, His Lordship was transferred to Allahabad High Court and could not dispose of these appeals. 19. Ultimately, these appeals have come up before this court for hearing. 20. Mr. Dasgupta, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff/respondent No.1 has at the very outset taken a preliminary objection as regards maintainability of the appeal preferred by sub-tenant. According to Mr. 19. Ultimately, these appeals have come up before this court for hearing. 20. Mr. Dasgupta, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff/respondent No.1 has at the very outset taken a preliminary objection as regards maintainability of the appeal preferred by sub-tenant. According to Mr. Dasgupta the said sub-tenant not having preferred any appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge before the learned first appellate court below was not entitled to prefer a second appeal. 21. Mr. Bhattacharya, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant in the two appeals did not dispute the aforesaid contention of Mr. Dasgupta. Mr. Bhattacharya however contended that the other appeal preferred by the tenant can be heard on merit. In view of such fact I find that the Second Appeal No. 861 of 1979 preferred by the sub-tenant is not maintainable and is dismissed accordingly. 22. As regards the appeal preferred by the tenant, Mr. Bhattacharya appearing on behalf of the appellant has strenuously contended that in view of the fact that two daughters of the plaintiff have already been married and are staying in their respective family of the husband and further, the only son of the respondent No.1 being at present a resident in Delhi, this court should hold that their requirements cannot be taken into consideration while assessing that of the plaintiff. Mr. Bhattacharya further contends that it will appear from the special officer's report that there are five rooms in the house at Khidirpore which the husband of the plaintiff inherited from his father. Therefore accommodation available in the said house should be deemed to be reasonably suitable accommodation of the plaintiff. 23. Mr. Bhattacharya further contends that apart from the aforesaid house, even according to the trust deed created by the father of the plaintiff, after the death of mother of the plaintiff, she along with her two sisters are entitled to stay in the house at P-353, Keyatala Road and the plaintiff is actually staying in the said house where she has four rooms in her occupation. Mr. Bhattacharya thus contends that the suit should be dismissed in the absence of any reasonable requirement. Mr. Mr. Bhattacharya thus contends that the suit should be dismissed in the absence of any reasonable requirement. Mr. Bhattacharya further submits that Nag, J having already answered the issue of subletting in favour of the appellant while remanding the matter to the trial court, such finding cannot be reopened at this stage and as such the entire suit should be dismissed. 24. Mr. Dasgupta, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1 has on the other hand submitted that observation of Nag, J while remanding the matter back to the learned trial Judge under Order 41 Rule 25 of the Code cannot be said to be final and as such he is entitled to support the finding of the learned courts below on the question of subletting. In support of such contention Mr. Dasgupta relied upon two decisions; one of the Apex Court in the case of Gogula Gurumurthy & Ors. vs. Kurimeti Ayappa, reported in AIR 1974 SC 1702 and other of a Division Bench of this court in the case of Ganendra Nath Raychowdhury vs. Surya Kant Roy, reported in 17 CWN page 462. 25. Apart from the aforesaid question, Mr. Dasgupta contends that observation of Nag, J that a general authority by a landlord to a tenant to sublet was sufficient for creating any subsequent sub-tenancy, is against the principles laid down in the subsequent decisions of the Apex Court in the cases of M/s. Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. vs. H. C. Sharma and Shantilal Rampuria vs. M/s. Vega Trading Corporation & Ors., reported in AIR 1988 SC 145 and AIR 1989 SC page 1819 respectively. Mr. Dasgupta thus contends that the earlier decision of Nag, J cannot even be res judicata as the law on the point has altered. In support of such contention Mr. Dasgupta relies upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Agra Electric Supply Co. Ltd. vs. Alladin & Ors., reported in AIR 1970 SC page 512. At any rate, Mr. Dasgupta contends, the view of Nag, J expressed on May 13,1980 is no longer a good law in view of the aforesaid Supreme Court decisions. Thus according to him the suit should be decreed not only on the ground of reasonable requirement but also on the ground of subletting. 26. As regards the ground of reasonable requirement Mr. Dasgupta contends, the view of Nag, J expressed on May 13,1980 is no longer a good law in view of the aforesaid Supreme Court decisions. Thus according to him the suit should be decreed not only on the ground of reasonable requirement but also on the ground of subletting. 26. As regards the ground of reasonable requirement Mr. Dasgupta contends that although the husband of the plaintiff died on January 28, 1995 that fact has not affected the requirement of the plaintiff. According to him, the plaintiff still requires one room as bed room, one room for her guests and daughters who frequently visit her, one room for her son who also frequently comes to Calcutta in connection with his occupation, one room for servant and chef, one dining cum drawing room, one kitchen, one store room, one Thakur Ghar and one garage apart from toilet. According to Mr. Dasgupta, the son of the plaintiff is a well known freelance televises and often comes to Calcutta for long period in connection with the programmes that he televises, and as the' plaintiff is alone at Calcutta the son has to come very often to look after his ailing in other. 27. As regards the accommodation available in Lot A of the Khidirpore property belonging to the plaintiffs husband, Mr. Dasgupta by pointing, out the report of the special officer contends that in the said Lot A although there are four or five vacant rooms available but neither any bath nor any privy is there. Moreover, as pointed out by special officer there is no water connection in the said vacant portion. Mr. Dasgupta thus contends that the accommodation available in Khidirpore house cannot be said to be a reasonably suitable accommodation of the plaintiff. 28. As regards the property situated at P-353, Keyatala Road, according to Mr. Dasgupta, the plaintiff at present is residing in a precarious condition inas- much as the said property is a trust property which has been settled in trust by the father of the plaintiff and the trustees were the brother of the plaintiff and the present trustees include the grand children of the settlor. By the trust, plaintiff has been given only a privilege to stay in two rooms of the suit property and the similar privilege is also given to her sisters. In any event, Mr. By the trust, plaintiff has been given only a privilege to stay in two rooms of the suit property and the similar privilege is also given to her sisters. In any event, Mr. Dasgupta contends, the said accommodation cannot be said to be a reasonably suitable accommodation when plaintiff has her own house. 29. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the materials on record I formulate the following questions for determination in this appeal:- 1) Whether the finding recorded by Nag, J on the issue of subletting while remanding the case back to the trial Court under the provision of Order 41 Rule 25 of the Code is binding upon this court at the time of final hearing of the second appeal? 2) Whether a tenant given a general authority to sublet at the time of induction, is further required to take consent in writing for creation of each sub-tenancy? 3) Whether in view of changed circumstance the plaintiff still requires the entire suit premises for her own use and occupation? 30. As regards the first point formulated above, it appears that such point has been settled by this court long ago in the case of Upendra Lal vs. Gogesh Chandra, reported in AIR 1928 Cal 186, where M.N. Mukherjee, J speaking for the Division Bench made the following observation:- "An order under Order 41 Rule 25 decides nothing. The court, either the same or differently constituted, has jurisdiction, while finally hearing the appeal, to go back on the reason given or views expressed• in the order of remand and must do so when those appear erroneous." 31. The aforesaid observation was quoted with approval by the Apex Court in the case of G. Gurumurthy vs. K. Ayappa , reported in AIR 1974 BC 1702 and relied upon by Mr. Dasgupta. Therefore, the answer to the said question must be answered in negative. 32. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the view taken by Nag, J on the issue of subletting is correct. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Dasgupta. Therefore, the answer to the said question must be answered in negative. 32. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the view taken by Nag, J on the issue of subletting is correct. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Dasgupta appearing', on behalf of the respondent No.1, the said view is in direct conflict with the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Shantilal Rampuria vs. Vega Trading Corporation, reported in AIR 1989 Be 1819, wherein the Apex Court held that a general authority given to a tenant to sublet at the time of induction cannot absolve a tenant from the rigour of eviction on the ground of subletting unless it is proved that the landlord gave further consent in writing for creation of each particular sub-tenancy. In this case, undisputedly the appellant did not take any consent in writing of the respondent No.1 for creation of sub-tenancy in favour of respondent Nos. 2 to 5. Therefore, the learned courts below rightly granted decree on the ground of subletting and notwithstanding the opposite view taken by Nag, J while remanding the matter under Order 41 Rule 25 of the Code, I am constrained to take a view different from Nag, J. 33. Mr. Bhattacharya, however placing strong reliance upon subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Silverline Forum Put. Limited vs. Rajiu Trust & Anr., reported in (1998) 3 SCC page 723, strenuously contended that the decision of the two Judges Bench in the case of Shantilal Rampuria (supra) has been impliedly overruled by the said decision. After going through the said decision, I am not at all convinced by the submission of Mr. Bhattacharya. It appears that in Silverline Forum Put. Ltd. (supra), the decision of Shantilal Rampuria, has rather been approved. 34. Now the last question is whether the suit should be decreed also on the ground of reasonable requirement in the changed circumstances. 35. There is no dispute that the husband of the plaintiff was a senior Manager of a multinational Bank and her father-in-law was a former Mayor of Calcutta, a Minister of undivided Bengal a Deputy High Commissioner of India in Pakistan and a member of parliament. 35. There is no dispute that the husband of the plaintiff was a senior Manager of a multinational Bank and her father-in-law was a former Mayor of Calcutta, a Minister of undivided Bengal a Deputy High Commissioner of India in Pakistan and a member of parliament. Thus, considering her status, even in the changed circumstances, she requires one room as bed room, one room for his son and his family who often comes to Calcutta, one room for guest and married daughter, one dining cum drawing room, apart from kitchen, bath and privy. She also requires a garage and one room for servants and cook. Thus, the entire suit premises are requires to meet the aforesaid need. 36. As regards the alternative accommodation in the house at Khidirpore, it appears from the Commissioner's report that in the allotment of her husband apart from tenanted accommodation although four rooms in khas possession are available but there is no bath privy or kitchen and even there is no water connection. Thus, the said vacant accommodation in the second floor of the house at Khidirpore cannot be alternative suitable accommodation. 37. So far the plaintiffs father's house at P-353, Keyatala Road is concerned, same is a trust property created by her father and under the provision of the deed, she is entitled to stay there along with her other two sisters on payment of proportionate municipal tax and Rs. 20/- a month. According to the plaintiff, under the terms of the deed she is entitled to use two rooms with her other sisters whereas the contention of the appellant is that four rooms are allotted for the above purpose. Even if I accept the contention of the appellant that four rooms can be availed of by virtue of the provisions contained in the deed of trust, in my opinion, such accommodation in common with other sisters cannot be said to be reasonably suitable accommodation when the plaintiff is the owner of the suit house. 38. Therefore, the other vacant accommodation available in the house at Khidirpore belonging to her deceased husband or the other one in P-353, Keyatala Road cannot be said to meet her requirement. 39. 38. Therefore, the other vacant accommodation available in the house at Khidirpore belonging to her deceased husband or the other one in P-353, Keyatala Road cannot be said to meet her requirement. 39. Thus, taking into consideration the changed circumstances by virtue of the power vested in this court by section 103 of the Code, I am of the view that even in changed circumstances the respondent No.1 reasonably requires the entire suit premises for her own use and occupation and for her children. 40. Therefore, the suit should be decreed both on the grounds of subletting and reasonable requirement. 41. Thus, B.A. No. 80 of 1979 filed by the defendant No.1 is also dismissed. 42. Both the appeals are thus dismissed. 43. No costs. Appeals dismissed.