Judgment :- V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. Petitioner is an Association, formed for the welfare of the residents of Sengodipuram village in Dharmapuri District. The said association was formed in June, 1998. The 3rd respondent Municipal Council passed a resolution dated 25-9-1998 seeking to evict the members of the petitioner association from the premises which they were occupying on the ground that the said occupation was illegal being encroachment. 2. The claim of the petitioner association in the said writ petition was that the members of the association were residing on the said land for nearly forty years. The said land was a "natham promboke land" and though they had given several representations to the Municipal Council seeking patta, the said patta was not given to any of the members. They claimed that a resolution came before the Municipal Council on 29-5-1998 wherein, a sanction was sought for Rs. 50, 000/- as expenses for ousting the members of the petitioner association from this land, which was to the extent of 24416 sq. ft. in Survey No. 12-B and that the said resolution came to be defeated as it was opposed by majority of Councilors. It is then stated in the petition that eight residents of the said area filed suits for an injunction restraining the Dharmapuri Municiplaity from interfering with the peaceful possession of their premises. However, it is immediately stated thereafter in the petition that the subject matter of the suits was different from that of the writ petition. It was then pointed out that the suits were being stalled because of the indefinite boycott of the Court. A reference is then made to a resolution dated 25-9-1998 where the Municipality resolved to oust the encroachers from the aforementioned land occupied by the members of the petitioner association. This resolution was passed on the basis of a letter sent by the second respondent, bearing No. 21878/Nidhi-5/98-1, dated 11-8-1998 wherein, it was stated that if the Municipal Council failed to initiate eviction proceedings against the encroachers then, the second respondent, the Government, would be constrained to initiate the proceedings directly under Sec. 39(2) of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act (for short 'the Act'). It was also claimed that some other persons who had occupied the promboke lands within the municipal limits of the third respondent Municipality were benefitted by a resolution dated 24-11-1997 deciding to grant pattas to them. It was also claimed that some other persons who had occupied the promboke lands within the municipal limits of the third respondent Municipality were benefitted by a resolution dated 24-11-1997 deciding to grant pattas to them. The petitioner association also contended in the petition that the Government could not have exercised the powers under S. 39(2) of the Act and that the Municipal Council had rightly decided to recognise the rights of the members of the petitioner association on account of their occupation of the concerned land for forty years. 3. The writ petition came to be opposed by the third respondent Municipality as also the Government. In the counter, it was pointed out that the lands to the extent of 5.69 acres in Survey Nos. 12-B, C and D in Dharmapuri Town belonged to Dharmapuri Municipality and was earmarked for town extension in the revenue records. It was then stated that a portion of the land was occupied by the sweepers and sanitary workers of the Municipality but, they were ousted by the members of the petitioner association and that the members of the petitioner association were encroachers and had no right whatsoever to remain on the land. It was also stated in the counter that the Municipality had resolved by its resolution dated 29-10-1998 for utilising the abovesaid land for constructing a market. It was pointed out that such of the members of the petitioner association who had approached the civil Court had failed to get any injunction. The claim of the petitioner association that its members were living there for years together was also seriously disputed. It was also claimed that since the land was vested in the Municipality, there was no question of issuing any patta by the revenue authorities. It was stated, therefore, that the petition had no merits whatsoever. 4. Very strangely, immediately a rejoinder came to be filed claiming that the members of the fifty-two families of the petitioner association were none else but the scavengers, sweepers and sanitary workers of the Dharmapuri Panchayat and that all the fifty-two families were occupying the said land ever since this Municipality was a, "minor panchayat". It was then claimed that in the year 1980, the Government sanctioned funds for converting the hutments into tiled houses and that was done in respect of the houses of all the fifty-two families. It was then claimed that in the year 1980, the Government sanctioned funds for converting the hutments into tiled houses and that was done in respect of the houses of all the fifty-two families. Even the electricity and water supply was started from 1961 itself. One more affidavit came to be filed suggesting that the contents and subject of the suits were different from the petition. In fact, a copy of the one of the plaints was also filed. 5. The learned single Judge framed two questions on the backdrop of the conflicting claims. They were, (i) Whether the second respondent has authority to issue instructions to the third respondent in respect of the administrative matter? (ii) Whether the petitioners are entitled for alternative accommodation as of right before even the eviction proceeding is resorted to? 6. The second question seems to have been framed by the learned single Judge in view of the plea made perhaps at the time of arguments that the members of the petitioner association were entitled to the alternative accommodation even before any such steps were taken by the Municipality to oust them. The learned Judge proceeded to consider the matters on merits and came to the conclusion that firstly the petitioners had no right whatsoever of any nature. They were also not the families of the erstwhile Municipal employees as was claimed subsequently. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that the plea raised by way of additional affidavit was clearly an afterthought. The learned Judge also came to the conclusion that there was a clear cut resolution passed by the Municipality to resort to the eviction proceedings in pursuance to the letter written by the Government and that Municipality was not in favour of continuing the occupation of the encroachers as was tried to be made out. The learned Judge also clarified that the earlier resolution dated 24-11-1997 did not pertain to the municipal lands like the land in question. After considering S. 39 of the Act thoroughly the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the Municipality was rightly directed by the Government to remove all the encroachments generally in the town of Dharmapuri and that it had the power to do so. After considering S. 39 of the Act thoroughly the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the Municipality was rightly directed by the Government to remove all the encroachments generally in the town of Dharmapuri and that it had the power to do so. After perusing the copy of the plaint in O.S. No. 151 of 1998 and more particularly paragraph 7 thereof, which was filed before the learned Judge, the learned Judge also found that at least the plaintiff therein was none but a "subsequent occupier" who probably had purchased the "right to stay" by paying the money to the original encroachers. Incidentally, in this very paragraph of the plaint, the plaintiff had also claimed "adverse possession". Ultimately, relying on the celebrated judgment of the Apex Court in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan, and other judgment in Chameli Singh v. State of U. P., and Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that there was no right in the members of the petitioner association firstly to occupy and then to claim as alternate site before their eviction. In paragraph 19 of his judgment, the learned Judge took the stock of the fact that the members of the petitioner association had probably purchased the occupancy rights from the original encroachers. In that view of the matter, the learned Judge dismissed the writ petition. 7. Scathing attack was made by Mr. N.G.R. Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/appellant association on the judgment of the learned single Judge. It was first tried to be stated that there was a "broader question" involved in this appeal on account of the Municipal Council's readiness to help the members of the appellant association by granting them the patta and a contrary direction by the Government. Mr. Prasad argued that if the Municipal Council was agreeable to provide pattas then, the resolution passed by the Municipal Council could not have been negatived by the Government by issuing a contrary direction. The learned counsel, therefore, contended that we would have to weigh the inter se rights between the Municipal Council and the Government particularly because the Dharmapuri Municipal Council was a local self-Government. 8. The contention is clearly incorrect. The learned counsel, therefore, contended that we would have to weigh the inter se rights between the Municipal Council and the Government particularly because the Dharmapuri Municipal Council was a local self-Government. 8. The contention is clearly incorrect. In the first place, the first resolution passed in the year 1997 does not pertain to the "municipal lands" much less occupied by the members of the appellant association. Secondly, in this case, the Municipal Council has not passed any resolution recommending the continuance of the encroachers on the land or giving them any alternate land in case of the eviction of the members of the appellant association. Mr. Prasad tried to rely on resolution No. 52, English translation of which was provided to us. We are afraid that resolution cannot be read in the way Mr. Prasad would want us to read. That was a resolution requiring the sanction for Rs. 50, 000/- by way of expenses to oust the encroachers from the said land. The Municipal Council did not approve of it. This would not mean that the Municipal Council had in any way sided with the members of the appellant association to perpetuate their encroachment. As if this is not sufficient, after the letter came from the Government, the Municipal Council has passed ultimately a resolution, which was the impugned resolution in the writ petition. Therefore, the so-called "broader question" referred to by Mr. Prasad would not be there for us to consider. The argument is, therefore, rejected. 9. Mr. Prasad then went on the further broader questions regarding the rights of the "have note" in the society and the "destitutes" and pointed out that the fifty-two families were none but the erstwhile Municipal employees and were on the land for the last more than forty years. In our opinion, this claim is a "myth" for the simple reason that Dharmapuri Panchayat was a "minor panchayat" to begin with which could not have fifty-two employees in all. Even the total number of employees would be much less. This is apart from the fact that in the initial writ petition, this claim of appellant's members being "destitutes" was never made. We scanned the petition very carefully, Firstly, there is no claim in the writ petition that any of the families is from the class of "scavengers" or "sweepers". Even the total number of employees would be much less. This is apart from the fact that in the initial writ petition, this claim of appellant's members being "destitutes" was never made. We scanned the petition very carefully, Firstly, there is no claim in the writ petition that any of the families is from the class of "scavengers" or "sweepers". There is simply no claim that any of the member is a "destitute". On the other hand, admittedly, the houses, which are built, are tiled houses, having the facilities of electricity and water-supply. It cannot, therefore, lie in the mouth of the appellant that they are "destitutes" like the "slum dwellers", whose question was considered by the Supreme Court in the celeborated decision in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation. 10. Mr. Prasad tried to rely on three judgments of the Supreme Court in Chameli Singh v. State of U.P. Charan Singh v. State of Punjab, and Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan. Reliance was also placed on Art. 243-W of the Constitution of India. Regarding the principles stated in the above three cases, there can be no question. However, we do not find any similarity on factual aspect. On the other hand, we find that in this case the petitioners have been improving their stand by filing affidavits after affidavits. Initially they claimed to be the members of the families of the erstwhile employees of the Municipal Council. However, since a reference was made in the counter, the appellant association jumped at the opportunity and came in with the claim that its members were the municipal employees and their families. There is not even a single instance given nor a claim made by naming any erstwhile employee of the Municipal Council. 11. Lastly, when it was found by the learned single Judge that at least the members of the appellant association who went to the civil Court (for at least one of them) had purchased the occupancy rights from the original encroachers. A fresh claim came to be made that all the civil suits were to alike. The situation was tried to be improved by suggesting before us that the learned single Judge had relied upon only one of the plaints. It is pointed out by the respondents that the said plaint was filed by the petitioners alone. A fresh claim came to be made that all the civil suits were to alike. The situation was tried to be improved by suggesting before us that the learned single Judge had relied upon only one of the plaints. It is pointed out by the respondents that the said plaint was filed by the petitioners alone. Under such circumstances, it is very difficult to accept the claim of the petitioners that they are in any way "destitute" so that before they are evicted, the alternate arrangement should be made. We do not wish to dilate on the Supreme Court judgments for they are very clear. The law regarding Art. 21 of the Constitution of India also is now well-settled. Any person cannot simply run to the Court and claim any "unfair advantage" crying that he is a "destitute". There can be no difficulty in appreciating that ours being a "welfare State" must help the poor and destitute but, we are not prepared to believe that where the factual claim of poverty itself is on the brittle ground, still such help should be made available. The contention is, therefore, rejected. 12. Our attention was drawn to Arti- cle 243-W of the Constitution of India which deals with the powers, authority and resposibilities of the Municipalities. The article deals with the powers of the legislature of a State, which may, by law, clothe the Municipalities with powers necessary to enable the Municipality to function as the institution of the self-Government. The Municipalities may also be empowered by such law to prepare plans for economic development and social justice. Such law also provide the responsibility on the part of the Municipality of the performance of the functions and implementation of the schemes entrusted to the Municipalities, including those in relation to the matters listed in the Twelfth Schedule of the Constitution. We do not see as to how this Article is relevant in the present controversy. We have already seen that the Municipality itself was keen perhaps, under the direction of the State Government, to remove the encroachment, which was its duty under the Act. Under the circumstances, we do not see any merits in the appeal and would dismiss the same, confirming the judgment passed by the learned single Judge. No costs. C.M.P. Nos. 3432 and 11161 of 1999 are closed. Under the circumstances, we do not see any merits in the appeal and would dismiss the same, confirming the judgment passed by the learned single Judge. No costs. C.M.P. Nos. 3432 and 11161 of 1999 are closed. We, however, clarify that if any representation is made to the Government by the members of the appellant-Association, it may consider on its own merits. Appeal dismissed.